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This dissertation stages a reciprocal critique between traditional and marginal 
philosophical approaches to language on the one hand and interdisciplinary studies of 
speech-accompanying hand gestures on the other. Gesturing with the hands while 
speaking is a ubiquitous, cross-cultural human practice. Yet this practice is complex, 
varied, conventional, nonconventional, and above all under-theorized. In light of the 
theoretical and empirical treatments of language and gesture that I engage in, I argue that 
the hand gestures that spontaneously accompany speech are a part of language; more 
specifically, they are enactments of linguistic meaning. They are simultaneously (acts of) 
cognition and communication. Human communication and cognition are what they are in 
part because of this practice of gesturing. This argument has profound implications for 
philosophy, for gesture studies, and for interdisciplinary work to come.  
As further, strong proof of the pervasively embodied way that humans make 
meaning in language, reflection on gestural phenomena calls for a complete re-orientation 
in traditional analytic philosophy of language. Yet philosophical awareness of 
intersubjectivity and normativity as conditions of meaning achievement is well-deployed 
in elaborating and refining the minimal theoretical apparatus of present-day gesture 
studies. Triangulating between the most social, communicative philosophies of meaning 
 v 
 
and the most nuanced, reflective treatments of co-speech hand gesture, I articulate a new 
construal of language as embodied, world-embedded, intersubjectively normative, 
dynamic, multi-modal enacting of appropriative disclosure. Spontaneous co-speech 
gestures, while being indeed spontaneous, are nonetheless informed in various ways by 
conventions that they appropriate and deploy. Through this appropriation and deployment 
speakers enact, rather than represent, meaning, and they do so in various linguistic 
modalities. Seen thusly, gestures provide philosophers with a unique new perspective on 
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THE NEED FOR A GESTURE-INCLUSIVE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
 
0. “I Am A Climate Scientist.” 
 
Studying the hand gestures that spontaneously accompany speech is a 
philosophically necessary and worthwhile endeavor, because reflection on this ubiquitous 
practice yields a better understanding and more properly defined scope of the meaning 
that occurs in linguistic acts. Gestures made while speaking help interlocutors 
communicate intentions, make inferences, attend to each other’s being-in-the-world, 
build up a local sphere of reference, and conceptualize dynamically and metaphorically 
during discourse. 
Consider the following example of the kind of gesture I will analyze in this 
dissertation. In the course of a fifty minute interview with MSNBC journalist Rachel 
Maddow, comedian and political satirist Jon Stewart explains and defends his recent 
critique of contemporary news media, particularly twenty-four hour television news 
networks. One of Stewart’s main points is to distance his own critical work from 
Maddow’s news commentary. To do so, he employs a metaphor in which a source 
domain, meteorology, is used to describe the target domain, news media. Using this 
metaphor, he refers to himself as a ‘climate scientist,’ as opposed to Rachel Maddow who 
‘reports on the weather’ (see excerpt below). Yet, I contend, the complete entailment 
structure of this metaphor is only identifiable if we consider his speech along with his co-
speech gestures. Here is the text of this moment in the conversation (Stewart is speaking 
to Maddow): 
 
…you’re one person, with one great voice and sincere [inaudible], but I, I 
am a climate scientist. I study weather patterns and climate. You’re talking 
about the weather. And maybe these networks are not meant to be viewed 
in aggregate, but there is an aggregate. There is an effect. And when 
people say ‘well you’re influential too,’ I’m a twenty-two minute show. 
And when I say you know puppets making crank calls in front of me, I 
don’t mean that to diminish comedy. I mean that that is not then reinforced 
2 
through the next person, throu – it’s not a relay. And there is a an 
amplifying effect. To the relay.1 
   
There are many things to be noticed about this fifty-second clip of Stewart’s speech. Like 
most examples from natural language, it is not grammatical; some phrases do not even 
make much sense. Throughout, Stewart is employing metaphorical expressions to make 
his point. He says “I am a climate scientist. I study weather patterns and climate.” 
Viewers of the interview and fans of Stewart’s news satire, “The Daily Show,” know 
very well that Stewart is not a climate scientist. (If he was, he most likely would use a 
more technical term as a job description.) This self-description is contrasted, somewhat 
condescendingly, with Maddow (‘you’), when Stewart says, “You’re talking about the 
weather.” He also makes oblique references to an abstract-sounding phenomenon: “an 
aggregate,” “a relay,” “an amplifying effect.” What is he talking about? 
 Pairing Stewart’s verbal utterances with his accompanying gestures sheds a great 
deal of light on the structure as well as the content of his metaphor. The connection 
Stewart wants to make between his position as climate scientist and the object of his 
‘science’ – the “aggregate” that he observes and analyzes – is not to be found in the text 
directly. Rather, it is in the repeated handshape of the gesture that accompanies “climate 
scientist,” “weather patterns and climate” and “aggregate” (Fig 1).2  
 
Fig 1. Stewart gesturing ‘aggregate,’ ‘weather patterns and climate,’ ‘climate scientist.’ 
 
                                                          
1 http://maddowblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/11/12/5452832-the-maddowstewart-interview-uncut 
(permalink). Posted Friday December 10, 2010. Last accessed August 20, 2011. 
2 All figures drawn by G.N. Fourlas for the purposes of this analysis. 
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Also, the spatial contrast between a) his position surveying a virtual spread of weather 
phenomena and b) Maddow’s position beneath and within the field Stewart studies is 
only given in gestures. Yet understanding this connection and this contrast is necessary to 
unlock the logic of the metaphor. When Stewart holds his hands in front of him and 
slightly above his face, leaning his torso back so that he is looking up at the space 
spanned by his hands (loosely cupped, facing each other), he is taking a clear perspective 
(what David McNeill calls “observer viewpoint” or O-VPT (1992, 67, 119)): he is on the 
outside, looking at the aggregate of news networks as a climate scientist would look not 
just at a single storm, but at a temporally and geographically wide array of phenomena 
over which he must generalize. When he says to Maddow “you’re talking about the 
weather,” he drops his left hand down and to the side and turns it over so that fingers are 
loosely cupped, spread naturally, and facing down, locating her in a smaller, specific 
location, a place of particular ‘weather’, perhaps even under a storm cloud or umbrella, as 
the stance from which she reports. From under her umbrella or storm cloud, Maddow 
cannot see the wider field that Stewart sees. When Stewart says ‘aggregate’ he returns to 
the ‘climate scientist’ gesture (hands facing each other, spread apart in front of him and 
slightly above standard gesture space, spanning a certain range), thus linking the 
aggregate news networks that he analyzes as a satirist with the range of weather patterns 
and phenomena he analyzes as a climate scientist.  
 Having found the metaphorical link between a) phenomena a climate scientist 
analyzes and b) an aggregate of news networks, it is possible to analyze the verbal 
content in an informal conceptual metaphorical mapping, for instance (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Mapping for NEWS MEDIA AS METEROLOGICAL ACTIVITY 
Source Target 
Meteorological activity News media 
Weather News event 
Climate Discourse context of news event 
Climate Scientist Expert who analyzes discourses 
Weather Reporter Minor celebrity who reports received 
information about event 
 
While conceptual metaphor analysis of the verbal expressions used does help round out 
the point of Stewart’s somewhat fragmented speech, it still does not capture the structural 
relationship Stewart is after in describing the distinction between himself and Maddow, 
and it imports more negative connotations than he intends. From analysis of the verbally 
expressed metaphor, the significant contrast appears to be that as an expert and 
independent thinker, Stewart is smarter and more critical than Maddow. Yet this is not his 
intention. Throughout the interview he takes great pains to deprecate what he does as 
‘heckling’ in contrast to Maddow’s more important and legitimate journalistic activities. 
His point here is that Maddow just cannot see what he can. This is not her fault but rather 
a consequence of her position in a system, as Stewart’s gestures make clear (Fig 2).  
 
 
Fig 2. Stewart gesturing ‘talking about the weather.’ 
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Maddow is “talking about the weather,” which places her within a greater field on which 
Stewart, as an outsider, is afforded a critically distant perspective. Just as weather, 
perhaps a storm, takes place in a region that can be characterized as having a certain 
climate, Maddow’s reporting is always a single event within a much larger media 
context. Standing under her rain cloud, Maddow simply cannot see what Stewart, who 
holds the entire spread before him, can see.  
Thus, the gestures in this instance of conversation function in conjunction with 
speech to fully perform a meaning, namely, the difference between the interlocutors in 
terms of their relationship to news media. The gestures also function to link the operative 
metaphor to the literal topic at hand. Just as when he discusses ‘climate,’ ‘aggregate,’ and 
‘effect’ and uses the same gesture handshape and location, when Stewart discusses 
‘relay,’ ‘amplification,’ and ‘effect,’ the repetition of the hand gesture and the maintained 
shape of the hand gesture underscore the causal link of these processes of news networks 
assimilating to one another and disseminating the same information as a perhaps 
unconsciously emergent monolith (Fig 3).  
 
Fig 3. Stewart gesturing ‘relay,’ ‘amplification,’ and ‘effect.’ He repeats this two-handed 
gesture made up of a movement toward the left, the right hand holding an original 
position while the left hand is moved progressively further left in repeated increments, 
demonstrating a continuous pattern. 
  
These gestures continue to position Stewart as the one outside of this activity who can 
view it holistically, unlike individual participants who function within the system.  
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The words Stewart uses simply are not the sole carriers of meaning getting the 
work of communication done. Rather, as is quite clear when watching the interview, the 
meaning of this moment of conversation is enacted in a full-bodied and highly 
contextualized linguistic performance. Stewart is thinking and reasoning with his hands 
as much as with his chosen words, the pitch and prosody of his speech, his posture, his 
face, and his constant orientation to and monitoring of Maddow’s reactions. 
As I will argue in the following pages, meaning is what gets enacted and 
communicated in collaborative and cooperative, embodied and embedded, rational and 
linguistic performances. Meaning is enacted in speech, undoubtedly; but far more often 
than we realize, indeed, ubiquitously, meaning is enacted in a combination of speech and 
hand gestures. “Gesture is a universal feature of human communication,” (Gentilucci and 
Dalla Volta 2007, 159). Gestures that accompany speech do expressive and cognitive 
work; they facilitate reasoning; they coordinate the interactions and cooperative world-
building of conversation participants. If the reader of the foregoing few pages were now 
to watch any clip of Jon Stewart talking, he or she would be unable to ignore the near-
constant gesturing that accompanies his speech. As has now been well demonstrated, 
viewers and interlocutors do pick up on this activity; gestures matter to our seemingly 
effortless comprehension of others’ communicative acts (e.g. Goldin-Meadow 2003, 89). 
Moreover, speech-accompanying gestures are immediately recognized by untrained 
observers as movements distinctly relevant to concurrent speech and demonstrative of 
communicative intention, even if observers do not know the language being spoken 
(Kendon 1980, 208).3 Yet this omnipresent practice has no place in current philosophical 
treatments of language and meaning, and until quite recently, had no place in linguistic 
analysis either. In the following chapters, I hope to change that. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Kendon discusses an earlier work in which he “…showed 20 individuals a film of a New Guinea 
highlander addressing a large gathering. The observers who did not hear the sound track of the film, were 
asked to describe what movements they saw the man make. All of them recognized that he was speaking to 
a large gathering, all of them recognized the same segments of movement as being related to his speech and 
all of them distinguished these quite sharply from other movements that, they were all agreed, had nothing 
to do with his speech. Thus arm extensions, elaborate movements of the hands in the space in front of the 
body, were all recognized as belonging to his speech performance” (Kendon 1980, 208). 
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1.  Synopsis of the Argument 
 
 Communication as an activity is generally understood to be broader than 
language. Under various easily imagined circumstances, I can behave such that my 
actions are plausibly described as communicating with my cat, or with a pre-linguistic 
infant, or with a non-English-speaking Luxembourgish hotel manager. While these 
examples do not all rate the same, they suggest that meaning, as that which is enacted in 
communication, does not exhaustively overlap with what we typically consider to be 
expressed in language. Rather, meaning is accomplished and interpreted via cooperative 
symbolic interaction. Verbal linguistic acts constitute a subset of meaningful phenomena 
in this sense. The primary argument of the present work is that co-speech hand gestures 
are likewise meaningful, and, moreover, that within this broad field of cooperative 
symbolic interaction that may, for example, include art and religious ceremony as human 
meaning-making practices, gestures are properly conceived as being quite close to 
speech.  
Operating with a much narrower field of ‘meaning’, the select phenomena that 
twentieth century and contemporary philosophy of language attends to as ‘linguistic’ are 
fairly arbitrarily and ideologically cut off from a wider range of human rational 
communicative activity. In the next section of this chapter, I offer an historical narrative 
to demonstrate this abrupt yet entrenched divorce between the target phenomena in 
philosophy of language and broader communicative practices. My narrative reveals that 
even branches like ordinary language philosophy, speech act theory, and pragmatics – 
approaches that sought to move away from truth, reference, and propositions as primary 
phenomena of analysis in favor of focusing on communicative practices in context – have 
more or less been co-opted and re-absorbed into formalist and truth-conditional 
treatments of linguistic meaning. In more recent cases, when communicative practices are 
the subject of philosophical inquiry, due to a received dichotomy between verbal and 
nonverbal practices (Kendon 2004), they are bracketed off in various ways as working 
with meaningful but ‘non-linguistic’ phenomena. While sometimes cast as divided 
between semantics and pragmatics, traditional philosophy of language is more accurately 
described as consistently eschewing full treatments of linguistic performance.  
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I propose counter to the tradition that the proper target of contemporary 
philosophical investigations into language is communicative practices, specifically 
collaborative practices of linguistic enactments of meaning. As a putative hypothesis, I 
submit that linguistic activity includes nonverbal actions, or more precisely, visible 
bodily actions experienced by speaker and audience. My proposed broader scope of 
‘linguistic’ intends to include spontaneous co-speech hand gestures within its purview. I 
devote the second chapter of this dissertation, introduced briefly below, to surveying a 
remarkable outpouring of recent interdisciplinary evidence showing that the hand 
gestures that spontaneously accompany speech contribute significantly to utterance 
meaning as it is produced and understood by all involved participants. In the wake of this 
research, I find the claim that such gestures are meaningful communicative acts to be 
relatively non-controversial, and I defend this view throughout the present work. Yet 
even if one accepts that these gestures are meaningful communicative acts, what justifies 
classifying them as ‘linguistic’? I will argue for three justifications of this classification: 
(1) Hand gestures accompanying speech share with verbal linguistic performance key 
features normally taken to define speech as the paradigm of cooperative symbolic 
interaction, including intentionality, displacement, symbolism, deliberate expressiveness, 
and convention (Chapters II-IV). (2) Hand gestures that spontaneously accompany 
speech occur in tight temporal synchrony and tight lexical affiliation with the speech they 
accompany, affording many recent researchers compelling reason to turn to ‘composite 
utterances’ of speech+gesture as proper units of discourse analysis (Chapters II and III). 
(3) As suggested above, the arbitrary separation of verbal activity from other relevant and 
rational human communicative activity is neither theoretically nor empirically 
sustainable. To quote father of modern gesture studies Adam Kendon, “…this bodily 
activity [of gesticulation] is so intimately connected with the activity of speaking that we 
cannot say that one is dependent upon the other. Speech and movement appear together, 
as manifestations of the same process of utterance” (Kendon 1980, 208). In particular, 
hand gestures that accompany speech are a ubiquitous, culturally varying phenomenon, 
occurring just as ‘naturally’ or ‘non-naturally’ as speech. The question is not how to 
bring together these radically alien forms of communication; rather, the question is why 
they were ever analyzed as being worlds apart.  
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Thus, the basic and widely accepted theoretical stipulations that define the realm 
of the ‘linguistic’ as conventional, social, rational, normative, and in a Gricean sense, 
non-natural, must be considered applicable in a robust philosophical treatment of hand 
gestures. In light of much evidence in support of the meaningfulness of these gestures, it 
remains to be asked whether or not these spontaneous gestures are subject to normativity, 
that is, to success and failure, to symbolic or non-causal mechanisms of meaning, and to 
conventions that may be violated, exploited, or satisfied according to the communication 
community that shares these standards. I use these pragmatic criteria to investigate the 
plausibility of classifying co-speech hand gestures as ‘part’ of language and linguistic 
activity. Yet including gestures in this way necessarily forces a change in the received 
understanding of what is ‘linguistic’ about linguistic activity. Ultimately, philosophy of 
language has to understand and study language differently. I submit a philosophical re-
construal of language at the start of Chapter V. 
While much current work in pragmatics, cognitive pragmatics, and contextually-
sensitive semantics rightly sees linguistic behavior as rational, intentional, and 
cooperative communicative activity, it wrongly persists in cutting spontaneous hand 
gestures out of its emerging picture. For an adequate philosophical treatment of hand 
gestures, we should certainly be asking questions about communicative activity, effort, 
and interpretation – in other words, questions of pragmatics. But there is no need to 
follow the tradition in severing criteria for successful communicative activity from the 
concept of linguistic meaning. As stated, my philosophical treatment of hand gestures 
aims to utterly dissolve this distinction.  
In place of a strong semantic-pragmatic divide, I advocate conducting inquiry into 
linguistic communication with tools from phenomenology and embodiment studies, 
which show that meaning and communication are enacted, that cognition is embodied, 
that we think and mean together in dynamic moment-by-moment constructions that are 
lived and knowledgably conducted and navigated without need for translation, decoding, 
or propositionally-structured processing of each others’ beliefs. Thus, my aim in this 
work is to build a synthetic account of linguistic communicative activity that is mutually 
informed and constrained by phenomenology and pragmatist theory and converges with 
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findings and methodologies in embodiment studies, namely an enactive approach to 
cognition. My argument unfolds along the following lines. 
 
Chapter II 
 The second chapter specifies what I mean by ‘spontaneous cospeech hand 
gestures’ by sifting through the wealth of recent interdisciplinary empirical and 
theoretical research on gestures. I circumscribe the phenomena at issue in my argument: I 
am not investigating emblematic gestures or deictic gestures, but the dynamic non-
consciously-planned hand movements that accompany speech. Different paradigms 
within gesture studies have demonstrated these types of gestures (alternatively called 
‘iconic,’ ‘metaphoric,’ ‘ceiving,’ ‘pragmatic,’ ‘interactive’, and ‘illustrator’ gestures) to 
be involved in cognition and to be salient in expression comprehension. I present and 
evaluate these different views, and I gather the empirical material necessary to ask 
questions about the conventionality of gestures. This requires reviewing what is known to 
date about the intentionality of gestures, the reception or interpretation of gestures, the 
difference gestures make to the unfolding of a conversation, and the cultural variance of 
gestures, among other topics.  
The debate between what I call ‘leakers’ and ‘builders’ is relevant here: many 
gesture researchers, even in their attempts to include gesture in definitions of language, 
present gesture as utterly natural bodily upsurge that unintentionally gives away or 
‘leaks’ information about a speaker’s mental states (McNeill 1992, 2005; Goldin-
Meadow 2003; etc). Other researchers focus on how gestures are elements of dynamic 
embodied meaning construction that, as haptic and visual activities, are open to conscious 
monitoring and deployment and susceptible to failure and modification (Streeck 1993, 
1994, 2008a, 2009, 2010). I will also compare different methodologies of gesture study, 
and I will clarify my own methodology of mutually constraining inter- and intra-
disciplinary pluralism. My philosophical engagement with this research intends to show 
that gestures do display linguistic properties, and that verbal expression and 
comprehension depends upon aspects of communicative acts traditionally thought to be 
non-linguistic, non-conventional, or ‘gestural’. These reflections on empirical gesture 
studies support a rejection of any sharp semantic-pragmatic divide in philosophy of 
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language. Furthermore, I raise a critical awareness regarding the philosophical 
implications of different paradigms of gesture study and deploy this awareness 
throughout the following chapters. 
 
Chapter III 
 This chapter surveys the philosophical resources for a pragmatic theory of 
communication that could include spontaneous hand gestures. Given that hand gestures 
are meaningful communicative acts, it stands to reason that speech act theory and other 
philosophies focused on communicative action, usage, and linguistic performance could 
be a philosophical home for co-speech gestures. To investigate this possibility, I review 
the post-Gricean literature on speech acts, implicature, relevance – in short, the emerging 
field of ‘cognitive pragmatics.’ Figures as diverse as Robert Brandom (philosophy), 
Bruno Bara (psychology), Michael Tomasello (evolutionary psychology), and N.J. 
Enfield (psycholinguistics) base their new theories of conversational activity on Grice. I 
use their central set of concerns – intention, inference, cooperation, and context – to 
articulate the questions set out in Chapter I as to the conventionality or ‘non-naturalness’ 
of gestures, and the questions set out in Chapter II regarding how best to approach 
gestural meaning-achievement (leaking vs. building).  
I argue that while contemporary pragmatic inquiry may be changing the 
conversation of philosophy of language for the better, some of these approaches are yet 
still better than others in pointing the way forward. In particular, the evidence on the 
cognitive, conceptual, and expressive aspects of hand gestures has not yet been integrated 
into philosophical pragmatics. The pragmatism of W.V.O. Quine and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein predates this research. Neo-Gricean, ‘cognitive’ pragmatist theories struggle 
with gesture findings, because the dominant, operative view of meaning in philosophy is 
mentalistic, individual, disembodied, and psychologistic, and thus over-determines the 
outcome of inquiry into normativity and convention in gesture. For example, Tim 
Wharton’s post-Gricean continuum of showing and non-natural meaning places 
emblematic gestures in the middle, as a perfect example of the mixed (natural and non-
natural) signs he attempts to analyze, whereas he insists that spontaneous gestures are 
categorically instances of natural meaning , as clouds ‘mean’ that it will rain (2009, 149). 
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This approach fails to appreciate the fully integrated roles spontaneous gestures play in 
cognition and expression, which are normative and social activities. Wharton's analysis 
represents how current philosophical work on these matters is caught in an overly 
mentalistic and internal conception of meaning. This flavor of ‘cognitive’ philosophy is 
still too disembodied and hence is unable to let go of the vocabulary of mental states, 
mind-reading, and modular brain architecture. Chapter III argues that the linguistic 
pragmatist tradition betrays its own best insights when it fails to appreciate the dynamic, 
social, interactive aspects of embodied communication. Insights from phenomenological, 
intersubjective, and enactive approaches to cognition and meaning-making (Chapters IV 
and V) must be incorporated in order to sustain the desired pragmatist approach. 
 
Chapter IV 
Providing an alternative to the conception of meaning that constrains dominant 
understandings of what counts as ‘linguistic,’ this chapter presents an existential-
phenomenological understanding of language, drawing primarily on the work of Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The goal here is to show that disclosure and 
appropriation are indispensible features of linguistic communication, and that the 
irreducible situatedness and sociality of human existence dispel the need for a narrow 
mental-states and mind-reading picture of communicative success. Leading gesture 
researchers David McNeill and Jürgen Streeck draw on this tradition explicitly; this 
chapter elaborates on the inspiration they found in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty by 
engaging select aspects of the phenomenological view in a critical exchange with new 
findings in gesture studies. The upshot of the reciprocal critique is that an empirically 
informed phenomenology of language indicates an array of disclosive, world-relating 
possibilities in language use, rather than a binary opposition between authentic and 
inauthentic speech. This array of disclosive practices must also be taken seriously by 
gesture studies. This chapter articulates a new sense of communicative intentionality as a 
showing that emerges out of worldly comportment and shared know-how. By introducing 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty into this discussion, this chapter makes way for an entirely 




 The fifth chapter joins the foregoing concerns and answers these questions by 
integrating arguments for an embodied understanding of cognition. While my 
commitment to this paradigm will have already been apparent in my evaluations of 
cognitive pragmatics, discussions of gesture research, and in my dialogue with recent 
empirical uptakes of phenomenology, this chapter clarifies the evidence and 
argumentation for a positive account of gestures as embodied enactments of meaning 
(Johnson 1987, Thompson 2007, De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, e.g.). Recent work on 
metaphor and gesture exemplifies the deep connection between gesture research and 
embodiment studies (Müller 2007, 2008a,b; Cienki 2008, Cienki and Müller 2008a,b; 
Streeck 2008b, e.g.). A new view of intersubjective embodied meaning-making is offered 
in Hanne De Jaegher’s notion of participatory sense-making. I join these contemporary 
conversations by bringing my critical apparatus of meaning-leaking versus meaning-
building to bear on metaphor-gesture research. Drawing on the work of previous 
chapters, I claim that gestures are normatively constrained yet potentially transformative 
linguistic behaviors. This approach can clarify some difficulties in framing the 
relationship between convention and cognition in metaphoric gesture research. 
Additionally, I offer preparatory analyses demonstrating how co-speech gestures may be 
properly seen as emergent elements of organism coordination and participatory sense-
making as described in the enactive paradigm. Finally, Chapter V contains concluding 
statements regarding the implications that a gesture-inclusive understanding of language 
has for philosophy. 
 
2. History of Gesture Study (and Non-study) in the West 
 
 As mentioned at the outset, at the time of this writing, there is no treatment of co-
speech hand gestures in the field known today as philosophy of language. Yet philosophy 
has not always been neglectful or disinterested when it comes to movements of the hands 
in coordination with acts of speaking. The dismissal of gesture as an object of theoretical 
interest came along with the rise of philosophy of language in Anglo-American 
philosophy at the start of the twentieth century. A concurrent dismissal took place as the 
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science of linguistics came into its own, as I will trace below. Indeed, the two arguably 
most significant developments in linguistics in the twentieth century – structuralism and 
Chomskyan generative grammar – both laid highly influential groundwork for how mid-
century philosophers of language came to respond to the challenges laid out by Gottleb 
Frege, Bertrand Russell, and other early thinkers of this field. The Cartesian tradition of 
rationalism, mind-body duality, and true knowledge gained through inner monologue has 
held sway in much linguistic theorizing as well, particularly in Chomsky’s enthusiastic 
following of Descartes.4 Yet before this preference for disembodied propositions and 
systematic relations between arbitrarily fixed symbols took firm hold in the twentieth 
century, many thinkers struggled to understand gesture and its relationship (whether 
chronological, causal, structural, or functional) to spoken language and to thought. 
   
Gesture study in the west: antiquity – 19th century 
Discussions of gesture in antiquity focus on its role in learned rhetoric. What we 
can glean from the writings of Quintilian and Cicero is a partially thematized 
understanding of gesture as a universal language that occurs naturally to all humans, but 
which more importantly lends itself to refinement through teaching and artifice (Kendon 
2004, 35). Early modern Europe suppressed or sought to ‘reform’ gesture for just this 
reason; the art of controlling one’s gestures was advocated as moral discipline towards 
more ‘civilized’ conduct of a piece with Counter-Reformation aims (Burke 1991, 76-79). 
The widely accepted unreflective premise that gesture is a natural and universal 
supplement to the act of speaking carried over into the 18th and 19th centuries.  
                                                          
4 See Cartesian Linguistics 1966. As Neil Smith enthusiastically pens in his introduction to Noam 
Chomsky’s 2000 New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, expressing Chomsky’s pessimism 
regarding cognitive science, “…we are still as far away as Rene Descartes was from knowing why someone 
chooses to react to a picture with how beautiful, or it reminds me of Bosch, rather than by silence” (ix). 
Smith praises Chomksy for cutting “the Gordian knot” of the mind-body problem by arguing that since 
Descartes, “we don’t have criteria for what constitutes a body” (viii). Eager to return to these humble days 
of responsible science, Chomsky writes in his introduction to this book, “The precedents of the early 
modern period, and the thinking that lay behind them, merit closer attention than they have generally, in my 
opinion, received” (2000, 1). Chomsky’s theory of linguistics is more clearly outlined in subsequent section 
of this chapter. 
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 The eighteenth century saw a high point of interest in answering questions of 
glottogenesis, i.e., language origin.5 Giambattista Vico’s New Science (1999 [1744]) 
offers a vivid picture of glottogenesis as a process of metaphorical extension from non-
linguistic representation to linguistic signs. Vico’s account has been used in the recent 
resurgence of interest in language origin research to develop glottogenetic sketches that 
highlight iconicity, mimesis, and metaphor (Danesi 1993). Vico held that pagan peoples 
“…in their mute condition… expressed themselves by using gestures and objects 
naturally related to their ideas” (1999 [1744] 172, 174). Early peoples were not yet 
capable of articulate speech, on this view, and so communicated via the first language, 
the language of the gods, which was expressed in “wordless religious acts or divine 
ceremonies” (Vico 1999, 402). Spoken language followed gesture.  
French philosopher Denis Diderot also saw gesture language as metaphorical 
(1973 [1751], 169). Diderot studied deaf communication as an avenue to better 
understanding the essential nature of language. This hunch about a gesturalist 
glottogenetic account was shared by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac, with whom Diderot conversed over dinner in preparation for his “Letter on the 
Deaf and Dumb,” according to Jules Paul Seigel’s introduction to the text (Seigel 1973). 
In his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, Condillac tells of an early “language of 
action” that served communicative purposes as conventional sign systems were being 
developed: “They [the early people, Adam and Eve] usually accompanied the cries [of 
each passion] with some movement, gesture, or action that made the expression more 
striking” (2001 [1756], 114). According to Condillac, “…the cries of passion contributed 
to the development of operations of the mind by naturally originating the language of 
action, a language which in its early stages, conforming to the level of this couple’s 
limited intelligence, consisted of mere contortions and agitated bodily movements” (2001 
[1756], 115). Rousseau’s glottogenesis story is perhaps better known, and it captures 
some myths about communication and gesture that still lurk in the literature today. 
                                                          
5 According to Kendon, “the idea that gesture is somehow more closely connected to ‘nature’ than spoken 
language and that it is a form of communication common to all mankind… recommended gesture to those 
philosophers of the 18th century who opened up the discussion on the question as to whether language could 
have a natural, rather than a divine origin” (2004, 35). 
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 By Rousseau’s account, the human language ability comes from bodily needs, 
communal living, and weather. In his Essay on the Origin of Languages, Rousseau 
explains that languages are conventions related to peoples and practices, and these 
conventions arise out of spontaneous vocalizations that themselves emerge from the 
passions of love and community (1997 [1781]). Communication precedes conventional 
languages, however, and communication is need-based and gestural. Rousseau thought 
that the visual modality was easier and more accurate, though less expressive, than the 
vocal-aural modality: 
 
The two general means we have of acting on someone else’s sense are 
restricted to two, namely movement and the voice. Movement acts 
immediately through touch or mediately through gesture… Although the 
language of gesture and that of the voice are equally natural, the first is 
easier and less dependent on conventions: for more objects strike our eyes 
than our ears, and shapes exhibit greater variety than do sounds; they are 
also more expressive and say more in less time. (1997 [1781], 248)  
 
While gestures are easy, “pleasurable”, full of content, and get the job of communication 
done (Rousseau 1997 [1781], 249), and while they without question preceded human 
speech (267), Rousseau did not see them as adequate to the task of full human emotional 
expression (277). He concludes, “If we never had any but physical needs, we might very 
well never have spoken… It would seem then that the needs dictated the first gestures 
and the passions wrung the first voices” (252-253). Humans in the south lived in warmer 
climates and out of their agreeable conditions spoke “the first languages, daughters of 
pleasure and not of need” (278). Practical and rougher-sounding languages sprung up in 
the bitterer northern regions (279). Note, then, that Rousseau thought of all forms of 
human communication as ‘natural’ insofar as they arise from bodies living in physical 
and social environments. The process of conventionalization itself is presented as a 
causal and organic, need-based evolution. 
Eighteenth century European thinkers clearly understood gesture as expressive 
and communicative (of need, of intention to act, of information about objects and 
environment), but also as natural, not yet caught up in the differences and distinctions of 
syntactic conventions and regional tongues. So conceived, gesture is a colorful vestige of 
a more primitive time, a now-superfluous cross-cultural proto-language, and so its study 
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is likely to reveal insight into language origin, the nature of symbolization, and the 
connection between language and thought. 
 The nineteenth century saw continued advancement of the scholarly pursuits of 
the previous century in regards to gesture’s evolutionary and expressive roles, 
particularly in the work of anthropologists and ethnologists that in turn informed 
experimental psychologist Willhelm Wundt at the turn of the twentieth century. Wundt’s 
The Language of Gestures (1973) contains reflections on Deaf sign languages and 
gesturing, particularly of Neapolitans and Indians that still inform the literature today, as 
will be discussed at greater length in Chapter II. Wundt presents gestures as sometimes 
being part of language and sometimes fully constituting a language, and his taxonomy of 
types of gestures includes symbolic gestures that are clearly communicative (1973, 88-
90). He generally defines gestures as “nothing more than movements of expression which 
have been given special qualities by the urge to communicate” (73) and spends much of 
his work systematically and qualitatively describing these ‘special qualities’. Reminiscent 
of his 18th century predecessors, but demonstrating a shift away from serious 
glottogenesis study, Wundt writes, “One might go so far as to say that the concept of 
original language, which is only a hypothetical peripheral question in speech 
investigations, becomes an observable reality in gestures” (1973, 73). Indeed, the 
decision of the Linguistic Society of Paris to ban all inquiry into the origin of language in 
1866 significantly cooled general scholarly interest in gestures (Danesi 1993, vii). Only 
in the 1970s, and primarily in the United States, did respectable scholarly work return to 
this question (Danesi 1993).  
Furthermore, the nineteenth century saw the development of the printing press: at 
this time “the culture of the printed word finally came to prevail” and Europe becomes 
“primarily a text-based society” (Kendon 2004, 357). Thus the main reason that gesture 
theorist and historian Adam Kendon gives for the decline in interest in gesture after the 
nineteenth century is the institutional dismissal of the theoretical issues with which 
gesture is related, combined with the absence of a theoretical apparatus or paradigm into 
which gesture could be fit (2004, 63). For Kendon, the success of behaviorist and 
psychoanalyst theories of human meaning from the nineteenth century onwards renders 
gesture “…too much a part of deliberate expression and too much governed by social 
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convention to be of interest to psychologists” in the first half of the twentieth century 
(2004, 65). Ironically, natural scientists (psychologists) turned away from gesture study 
because they saw gesturing as a sociological phenomenon, yet social scientists (linguists) 
would reject it as too natural. The causes for its neglect in linguistics and philosophy in 
the twentieth century and today warrant a fuller discussion.   
 
Twentieth-century linguistics and gesture 
 The dominance of structural linguistics and descriptive generative linguistics that 
came to hold sway in the twentieth century in the United States excluded gesture as an 
object of study. Though important exceptions exist,6 and though the cultural 
anthropologists who laid important methodological groundwork for modern scientific 
language study had ‘room’ for gesture as “…part of a broad patterning of communicative 
behavior of which spoken language is another part” (Kendon 2004, 65-66), gesture did 
not come into focus. Linguistics, in an effort to develop as an autonomous discipline with 
its own techniques and technologies, strove to distance itself from psychology. Citing 
Dwight Bolinger, Kendon notes that since gesture seems to be “only partly governed by 
convention,” it did not garner any attention from this developing science (Kendon 2004, 
67). Note that gesture was too conventional and expressive for psychology, but not 
conventional enough for linguistics. (In philosophy, social convention is not a thematized 
feature of language until ordinary language philosophy, discussed below.) This is an 
important observation, for as we will see when we turn to contemporary treatments, in 
order for gesture to ‘fit’ into linguistic study, it is necessary either to see language as 
something broader than a system of arbitrary conventions, or to specify differently what 
counts as ‘convention’. As Kendon argues, in spite of a traceable lineage of interest in 
“kinesics” and “non-verbal behavior”, the proper domain of ‘the linguistic’ became 
increasingly specialized under Ferdinand de Saussure and then Noam Chomsky.  
The realm of the linguistic, on these views, is comprised of contrasting linear 
segments (Saussure) and features that correlate to mental representations (in a 
Chomskyan paradigm in particular). Communication is theoretically modeled – not 
                                                          
6 These exceptions include the work in cultural anthropology of Boas, Sapir, Efron, Ekman & Friesan, 
Trager, and Birdwhistell. 
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empirically described – as “a sequential, alternating exchange of well-formed spoken 
sentences, much as we are led to believe it to be by those two gentlemen, A and B, who 
have so long been found on page 27 of [Saussure’s] Cours de linguistique general” 
(Harris 1987, 163ff). Structural analysis took as its object langue, or speech as the 
socially instituted system of signs (Saussure 1983), thus viewing meaning as emerging 
not out of individual acts of speaking (parole), but out of paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
contrasts between signifiers (fixed elements within the system). In a parallel fashion, 
Chomskyan analysis primarily concerns itself not with “observable…acts of speaking,” 
but rather “linguistic competence” (Kendon 2004, 68), and Chomskyan analysis came to 
almost exclusively characterize the science of language study in the last century. 
Jerome Feldman, Professor Emeritus of Berkeley’s cognitive science department, 
writes the following in the introduction to his 2006 work in embodied cognition and 
language entitled From Molecule to Metaphor: A Neural Theory of Language: “By now, 
virtually everyone agrees that the scientific explanation for human language and 
cognition will be based on our bodies, brains, and experiences. The major exception is 
Noam Chomsky, whose dominance of twentieth-century linguistics is unparalleled in any 
other academic field” (Feldman 2006, xi). As recently as 2003, Chomsky holds that “We 
don’t know nearly enough about the brain for cognitive science to take it seriously” 
(Feldman 2006, xi, quoting Chomksy’s 2003 Berkeley lectures. See Feldman 2006, 280). 
Though he has revised and refined his position over the decades, Chomsky has held this 
firm stance since his earliest writings in syntactic theory that came to be so influential on 
current linguistic science. Chomsky’s insistence that the only possible scientific study of 
language is the study of competence, rather than performance, resulted in closely guarded 
borders over what communicative phenomena do and do not earn the title of ‘linguistic’. 
Chomsky outlines these boundaries in clear terms:  
 
We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the 
speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual 
use of language in concrete situations). Only under the idealization set 
forth in the preceding paragraph [“an ideal speaker-listener, in a 
completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its language 
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and 
errors… in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance” 
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(3)] is performance a direct reflection of competence. …The problem for 
the linguist… is to determine from the data of performance the underlying 
system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he 
puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic 
theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental 
reality underlying actual behavior. (Chomsky 1965, 4) 
 
As this passage plainly states, Chomsky is fully aware of the nuances and complexities of 
actual language use. These features of ‘actual behavior’ do not interest him, because he 
sees them as impossible to study systematically. While Chomsky would not have even 
included co-speech gesture as an aspect of language use, his rejection of performance as 
an object of study informs twentieth-century and contemporary treatments of gesture. 
Even at this early stage, Chomsky is also quite cognizant of the criticisms of such 
a radical demarcation. “There has been a fair amount of criticism of work in generative 
grammar on the grounds that it slights study of performance in favor of study of 
underlying competence,” he writes (Chomsky 1965, 15). Chomsky does allow for some 
interaction between performance and competence via study of the relationship between 
surface structure and deep structure in generative grammar, though he points out that “it 
is difficult to imagine any other basis on which a theory of performance might develop,” 
particularly since “it is the descriptivist limitation-in-principle to classification and 
organization of data, to ‘extracting patterns’ from a corpus of observed speech, to 
describing ‘speech habits’ or ‘habit structures’, insofar as these may exist, etc, that 
precludes the development of a theory of actual performance” (Chomsky 1965, 15).  
There is no ambiguity here: Chomsky takes the goal of the study of linguistics to be 
universal claims about competence made by generalizing over performance data. His 
project is motivated by the observed phenomena of grammatical knowledge, the human 
capacity to produce a limitless number of grammatical sentences in a language, which 
Chomsky sees as being radically underdetermined by experience (Chomsky 1972, 103, 
e.g.). Chomsky takes this observation as indicative of universal innate brain architecture 
that affords this infinite yet systematic linguistic capacity.  
On its own, Chomsky’s project of transformational-generative grammar and his 
stance on linguistic science is justifiable; it is one scholar’s stated method and hypothesis, 
and it no doubt produced ample results in accordance with its own restrictions. Yet 
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Chomskyan linguistics became the default linguistic paradigm in American universities 
and remains so today. Chomsky not only stated his method for his own work, but 
strongly advised all linguistic scholars to be painstakingly aware of the restricted scope of 
their efforts. For example, in “Form and Meaning in Natural Languages,” he writes, “It is 
particularly important that the limitations of understanding be clear to those involved in 
teaching, in the universities, and even more important, in the schools. …It is important… 
to remain alert to a very real danger: that new knowledge and technique will define the 
nature of what is taught and how it is taught” (Chomsky 1972, 101). To avoid mistakenly 
following garden paths of new technological developments, particularly those in 
cognitive science, Chomksy advocates strict adherence to his determination of 
appropriate target ‘linguistic’ phenomena:  
 
We do not interpret what is said in our presence simply by the application 
of the linguistic principles that determine the phonetic and semantic 
properties of an utterance. Extralinguistic beliefs concerning the speaker 
and the situation play a fundamental role in determining how speech is 
produced, identified, and understood. Linguistic performance is, 
furthermore, governed by principles of cognitive structure… that are not, 
properly speaking, aspects of language. …The general theory of linguistic 
structure is concerned with discovering the conditions that any such 
grammar may meet. (Chomsky 1972, 15-16) 
 
Again, Chomsky makes the decision to leave the vagaries of language usage and 
performance aside in order to clear space for a workable science. The present work does 
not have the space or scope to fully detail and respond to the unfortunate consequences 
Chomsky’s influence has had on academic pursuits to make sense of actual linguistic 
behavior. The significant point is that Chomsky’s decisions to carve up language study 
are just that – decisions. If we look closely, we can see that these decisions are the 
inheritance of a modern philosophical tradition (e.g. Chomsky 2000, 1) that philosophy 
itself has since grown away from. And yet, the innate and mentalist focus on linguistic 
competence undeniably sets the stage for twentieth-century and most current linguistic 
projects. 
According to Kendon, Chomsky “directed attention to the inner mental apparatus 
that was proposed as responsible for the existence of any language whatsoever and 
gesture… was consigned, along with much else, to the waste-basket of ‘performance’” 
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(Kendon 2004, 68). This carving out of certain phenomena as objects of linguistic 
analysis set up a hard and fast line between verbal, aural, and orthographic phenomena on 
the one hand, and nonverbal, visual and kinesic phenomena on another. The first group 
was deemed ‘linguistic’, the second not. One consequence of this far-reaching split is 
seen in the study of nonverbal behavior such as facial expression and bodily movement, 
which following academic trends of cybernetics and information theory, came to be 
analyzed as ‘analogically’ rather than ‘digitally’ encoded.7 Gesture was naturally 
relegated to this camp, “insofar as it was thought to be ‘pictorial’” or its indexical 
deployments (pointing) were seen to function analogically (Kendon 2004, 70). As a result 
of this hard split between analogical and digital coding, nonverbal “communication was 
seen as employing devices quite different from those of spoken language and it was 
regarded as having sharply different functions” (Kendon 2004, 71). As I will show in 
later chapters, even the prolific new field of empirical gesture studies today struggles 
under the massive inertia of this paradigmatic understanding of gestures as radically other 
to speech and conventional language, with the consequence that theorizing about gestures 
remains quite constrained to an outdated model.  
Adam Kendon, whose interest in gesture can be traced to his early rigorous 
analysis of nonverbal behavior in the 1970s (e.g. his 1977 book Studies in the Behavior of 
Face-to-face Interaction), notes that this late-mid-century fascination with nonverbal 
communication “could only have arisen in the context of an ideology that had insisted 
that words as they could be written… constituted the basis of communication” (2004, 
357). Though this paradigm allowed nonverbal behavior to be seen as a sometimes 
important complement to verbal behavior, it was attached to “matters of relationship”, 
unconscious and involuntary displays, and incidentally informative rather than 
communicative functions (Kendon 2004, 357). On this view, gesture did not make the cut 
as an object of linguistic study. As Kendon sums up the development up through the final 
decades of the twentieth century:  
                                                          
7 As linguistics became increasingly viable as a science, following the development of structural analysis, 
“the idea of ‘language’ as a self-operating machine had firmly taken hold” (Kendon 356). Armstrong, 
Stokoe and Wilcox (1995) cite Lieberman as arguing that the mind is thematized in terms of the best 
technology at the time – in this case, a computer.  This point is also argued in the May 2008 issue of 
Scientific American. 
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…despite the growth of linguistics, on the one hand, and a greatly 
increased concern with communication, especially nonverbal 
communication, on the other, gesture remained largely unstudied because 
it was left without a theoretical framework into which it could readily be 
fitted. So long as the focus of linguistics was purely on spoken utterance, 
and especially as this focus was upon idealized utterances abstracted from 
the vagaries of actual usage, the relationship between gesture and speech 
would remain obscure. So long as nonverbal communication was 
considered sharply separate from verbal communication, attention in this 
field would be directed mainly to those aspects of behavior that 
contributed to the maintenance or change of interactions or relationships… 
[Gesture] thus fell between stools. (Kendon 2004, 72) 
  
Twentieth-century philosophy of language   
Overview  
Alongside the changes in linguistic research foci at this time, philosophy turns its 
back on the natural and holistic approaches to linguistic meaning found in the 
romanticism and anti-Enlightenment tendencies of the 18th and 19th centuries. The brief 
history I will give here shows, however, that it has long been the case that philosophers 
writing on language, thought, mind, communication, and rationality have had at their 
disposal resources that could account for the linguistic meaningfulness of hand gestures. 
These resources include notions of intention, use, custom, convention, context, 
affordance, experience, act, disclosure, and interpretation. Yet due to the prevailing 
interests and ideologies of the time, these resources were assimilated to dominant logical 
and formal models of propositional references to reality, rather than innovatively 
deployed to address the rich complexities of the way people live and make meaning in 
language. 
A sketch of philosophy of language in the twentieth century Anglo-American 
tradition can be drawn roughly as an on-going contrast between logically reconstructed 
language and ordinary language (Baldwin 2006, 62), with focus on truth and reference or 
usage and communication, respectively, though neither approach ventures too far from a 
general preoccupation with abstract propositional content and form. In this sense, few if 
any philosophers of language in the twentieth century can be said to be concerned with 
‘performance’ of the sort that Chomsky demarcates in the middle of the century. Turn of 
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the century investigations into mathematics and logic (Frege 1879, Husserl 2001) 
dominate the first half of the century, initiating a linguistic turn when it comes to the kind 
of claims that philosophy can make about reality and knowledge.8 Analysis of language 
according to its structure, compositionality, and referential operations therefore focus this 
philosophical strain on questions of epistemology and metaphysics. The fundamental 
problem to be solved is how words can relate to the world; driving questions are about 
reference, not communication. 
Both Wittgenstein’s watershed rejection of his Tractatus-era philosophy and work 
done in ordinary language philosophy and speech act theory (by Austin, Strawson, Grice, 
and others) marked the mid-century with a turn to psychology, pragmatics, and inference. 
For the first time in this century, communication as such comes to the fore in 
philosophical analysis of language. Yet the distinction that much ordinary language 
philosophy draws between literal meaning and conversational implicature, now more 
commonly and broadly cast as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, allows 
for continued work in truth-conditional paradigms in order to handle the literal or 
semantic realm. In other words, all the phenomena discovered here as ‘pragmatic’ were 
then neatly shuffled out of the way of proper linguistic content, which could then be 
analyzed in regards to its truth and reference. Philosophy again did not take up thorough 
treatment of actual communicative acts. We thus find in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, highly influenced by Chomsky’s work, a gap yawning between linguistic 
competence and idealized successful speech acts, on one side, and the possibility of a 
plausible theory of the conditions for such demonstrated practice on the other.  
As will be discussed in more detail below, these late-century insights (into 
interpretation, cooperation, and convention as necessary conditions for communication) 
are important developments that have the potential to move philosophy of language 
beyond a logical-formal paradigm. These features are exactly what would be needed for a 
theory of linguistic communicative activity that could accommodate co-speech hand 
gestures. Yet as the contemporary debate between contextualist and insensitive semantics 
                                                          
8 Under this view, “…language is not just the contingent expression of some wholly independent reality; 
instead there is an internal relation between the two. What remains controversial is the nature of this 
internal relation and thus the role of language in our conception of reality” (Baldwin 2006, 60). 
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indicates, for example, the field has not yet allowed itself to fully embrace these insights, 
and has turned instead to speculative faculty psychology to bulwark the burden of its 
legacy.  
Philosophy’s ignorance of gesture as a phenomenon of meaning is harder to 
explain today, not only because gestural practices are now widely and publicly 
researched in many fields (gesture studies boasts its own journal, conferences, classes on 
college campuses, and the like), but also because innovation and development in 
philosophical semantic and pragmatic theorizing offers so many features of linguistic 
meaning and linguistic activity that co-speech gestures demonstrate and upon which the 
study of these gestures could shed more light. One reason that I find it worthwhile to 
review approaches to linguistic meaning that this project ultimately rejects, therefore, is 
that many problems, concepts, and phenomena that are necessary to reckon with in order 
to grasp the full significance of gestures come up along the way. For example, as seen 
above, since the late twentieth century communication has become a guiding motivation 
for linguistic analysis. The same can be said of anti-foundationalist or socially-contingent 
accounts of reference, underdetermination of literal or verbal forms for generating 
utterance meaning, the indispensible contributions of context, and necessary operations 
(and normative expectations) of interpretation and inference. These criteria for an 
adequate explanation of the meaning of a linguistic act can be applied to co-speech hand 
gestures; indeed, as I discuss in subsequent chapters, gestures go quite a long way in 
demonstrating how interlocutors handle these cognitive and expressive burdens. In this 
way they make for a fuller account of relevant phenomena on philosophy of language’s 
own terms. Moreover, study of gesture offers an obvious corrective to an obvious short-
coming of philosophy of language, namely its radical ignorance of the presence and 
activity of the bodies of dialogic beings. Before we can move to a proper consideration of 
this point, however, I want to spell out in greater detail how the Anglo-American 
tradition at once provides crucial resources and takes crucial missteps when it comes to 
offering an adequate analysis of utterance meaning accomplished in linguistic acts. 
 Frege’s legacy: truth value and truth conditions 
Gottlob Frege’s investigations into logical structures and his development of a 
predicate calculus permanently focused philosophical linguistic analysis on propositions 
26 
and their truth-values. According to Thomas Baldwin, his two basic requirements that 
would provide the platform for much subsequent formal semantic theory were firstly “the 
fundamental status of sentence-meaning vis-à-vis word meaning” and secondly “the 
central role of the concept of truth in the elucidation of sentence-meaning” (Baldwin 
2006, 63-64). To understand both these requirements and their deep interrelation, recall 
his famous distinction between sense and reference. A sign has a sense and a reference. 
“The reference and the sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated 
conception,” which is “subjective,” while sense is public, common, shared, and objective 
(Frege 1948, 212). A sign expresses a sense – “the mode of presentation” of the object, 
its stable face or label – which may or may not have referents, which the sign designates 
(Frege 1948, 211, 214). Take for example the sign ‘café’. The referent “is the object itself 
which we have designated by its means” (Frege 1948, 213), in this case the café in which 
I sit. The associated idea or image of ‘café’ that any of us may experience upon hearing, 
reading, or speaking the sign is, for Frege, “wholly subjective,” and he leaves analysis of 
this realm aside (1948, 213). In between the real-world referent and the subjective, 
internal idea “lies the sense,” the public, shared representation of what I want and expect 
you to understand when I deploy the sign ‘café’ (Frege 148, 213). Frege says that 
intention in thinking and speaking justifies our expectations that signs designate referents 
(1948, 214). Yet he is most interested not in the referents of individual words or names 
but sentences. “A sentence contains a thought,” (Frege 1948, 214), and by ‘thought’ 
Frege means, essentially, a proposition (1948, 214fn5). That thought-proposition is the 
sense of the sentence. The truth-value of the sentence is secured by its referent, that is, 
the sense of the thought the sentence puts forward directs us to states of affairs in the 
world. Says Frege, “Every declarative sentence concerned with the referents of its words 
is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its referent, if it exists, is either the true 
or the false” (1948, 216). That is, “all true sentences have the same referent,” namely, the 
True (Frege 1948, 217). ‘The author of this dissertation is sitting in Marché’ has a 
different sense from ‘The author of this dissertation is sitting in a café’; both have the 
same referent (the True); and both also share the referent of the sentence ‘The morning 
star is the evening star’, although that too has a distinct sense. The thought together with 
the truth-value – the sense together with the referent – yields knowledge (Frege 1948, 
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230). “It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the 
referent,” Frege explains (1948, 216). Analysis of language is a process of moving from 
individual specific words to sentence-level senses, so that we can get beyond particular 
expressions to interchangeable true facts of the world. “…[I]n the referent of the sentence 
all that is specific is obliterated” (Frege 1948, 217). Communication in context is not 
Frege’s concern. Rather, he focuses philosophical inquiry on determining meaning as 
truth via the mapping from senses to referents, and this focus dominates the field for the 
next century, leaving communicative activities such as gestures quite out of the picture. 
  In the Tractatus-Logico Philisophicus (1961 [1921]), Ludwig Wittgenstein 
radicalizes Frege’s view, importantly contributing to Bertrand Russell’s founding of 
analytic philosophy and paving the way for the logical empiricist movement that 
followed. I will only briefly rehearse the intricacies of this work here, particularly as my 
project traces its lineage in part from Wittgenstein’s ultimate rejection of the logical-
atomist paradigm in Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein’s early uptake of 
Frege understood language as representing reality in a systematic, isomorphic fashion. 
According to the Tractatus, the world is the totality of facts – the positive facts of true 
propositions, or the negative reality of false propositions. A proposition is a meaningful 
combination of ‘simples,’ basic terms which name the simple, indestructible objects in 
the world. Well-formed sentences of a language reflect how things are in the world, as 
their logical structure (words or names properly combined to make meaningful 
propositions) represents the structure of reality (simple objects that combine to make up a 
possible state of affairs). A ‘state of affairs’ is a possible, sensible combination of objects 
or things in the world. Wittgenstein defines ‘objects’ relationally, as potential 
constituents of states of affairs. Their nature (their internal properties or their form) is 
given just as how they are allowed to combine with other objects in a possible state of 
affairs. These simple names are the endpoints of analysis because they link directly to the 
world; they have an atomized and arbitrary meaning which must be explained and 
learned. Wittgenstein thus posits the existence of metaphysically guaranteed simple 
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objects; their being is prior to experience.9 The meaning of sentences is still derived from 
their logical structure; the truth of a sentence is determined empirically.  
The way is thus laid for logical empiricism and the positivist claim that knowing 
the meaning of a sentence is tantamount to knowing how to prove that it is true, or in the 
extreme stance of verificationism: “the meaning of a statement is its empirical methods of 
verification that ultimately yield sensory information” (Zack 2010, 340). Rudolf Carnap’s 
perhaps more candid attempt to stake out methods of probable verification for scientific 
terms wedged open a space for empirical observation and investigation to begin to 
replace logic as a ground for sentence-meaning, as it replaces logic as a way to render 
truth claims (Baldwin 2006, 76). Note, then, that from Frege through Carnap, philosophy 
of language is a debate about the relationship between logic and the world, an attempt to 
sort out the internal and external sources of sentence- and word-meaning, a metaphysical 
and epistemological question as to how to get the clearest picture of reality to shine 
through linguistic forms.  
W.V.O. Quine radically challenged the ‘dogmas of empiricism’ that by this point 
had come to roost in early-to-mid twentieth-century philosophy of language (1951). 
According to Quine, the dogmas of analyticity and reductionism utterly side-step the 
question of linguistic meaning. Pursuits of synonymy and analyticity chase each other’s 
tails; definition “hinges on prior relations of synonymy,” (Quine 1951, 27), and 
synonymy defined as the interchangeability of terms preserving truth-value presupposes 
knowledge of those terms’ senses such that truth-value can be ascertained. Regarding 
word-meaning, Quine embraces a lack of foundation and describes the best process as a 
necessarily holistic analysis: “Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as 
wholes, are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of explication is to 
preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening the usage of other 
contexts” (1951, 25). Empiricists get no further with the move from word-meaning to 
sentence-meaning so long as they maintain what Quine identifies as a reductive stance: 
                                                          
9 According to Kenny, this puts him at odds with the prevailing view of his day: “Whether a sentence has 
meaning or not is a matter of logic. Whether particular things exist or not is a matter of experience. But 
logic is prior to all experience. Therefore whether a sentence has meaning or not can never depend on 
whether particular things exist” (Kenny 1973, 78). 
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“The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in 
isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. My 
countersuggestion… is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of 
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (1951, 38). In other 
words, empirical verification has as its proper target not a single sentence or proposition 
but “the whole of science” (1951, 39). He rejects completely the possibility of defining 
words or interpreting expressions in the abstract. Quine’s insistence on holism and his 
pragmatic faith in our disinclination to disrupt entire systems at a time highlights the 
indispensible roles played by context, cooperation (with the world and with each other), 
and interpretation in determining the meaning of linguistic expressions and knowledge 
claims. Though Quine’s Word and Object (1960) may be most accurately read as a 
behaviorist-epistemological study of the operations of reference, his general proto-
pragmatism – i.e., his concern with the contextual, process, and contingent nature of truth 
– initiates the turn to ordinary language philosophy.  
  
Ordinary language philosophy: meaning as use, language as doing 
As we have seen, the tradition stemming from Frege rested on the premise that 
“an account of meaning should take a concern with the conditions under which what is 
said is true as fundamental” (Baldwin 2006, 94). Ordinary language philosophy, the 
practice importantly advanced by J.L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, Gilbert Ryle, and others of 
the Oxford school and associated with their contemporary Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later 
works, challenged this view, arguing against the narrow emphasis that Austin neatly 
describes when he says, “We have not got to go back very far in the history of philosophy 
to find philosophers assuming more or less as a matter of course that the sole business, 
the sole interesting business, of any utterance – that is, of anything that we say – is to be 
true or at least false” (Austin 1961, 220). While these philosophers wrote at different 
points in the third quarter of the century and wrote on different aspects of language use – 
presupposition, performance, intentionality, etc. – they are joined in their emphasis on 
speech and communication. Here, then, one might hope to find some breathing room, 
some broader perspective in which to study face-to-face dialogue in all of its actual 
complexity, including gesticulation. Not so. Even with the development of speech act 
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theory, which aims to illuminate speakers, contexts, and complex conditions of meaning-
making practices, ordinary language philosophy neither introduces the role of the body 
(which, rather than hang around as an awkward relic of Cartesian duality, is now just 
swept along in the tide of the ‘mental’10) nor overturns the reign of the truth-conditional 
paradigm. However, these thinkers still offer promising resources for doing just this. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings such as Philosophical Investigations (1958) 
and On Certainty (1991 [1969]) famously leave off of discussing truth-conditions and 
atomistic compositionality in favor of meditations on belief, intention, context, 
interpretation, prototypical utterances, language games, and forms of life. In an effort to 
replace theories of meaning with therapeutic practices of problem-solving and 
clarification, in his later writing Wittgenstein holds a word’s meaning to be a contingent 
function of its use. “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ 
the word ‘meaning’, it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language” (Wittgenstein 1958, 20; §43). He makes no systematic distinction between 
word meaning and sentence meaning: “To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language. To understand a language means to be a master of a technique” (Wittgenstein 
1958, 45; §99). All language use gets its meaning from its setting and moment of 
deployment, from the intentions and transitory psychological state of the speaker, from 
the language game in which the particular utterance is to count as a move. These insights 
and this paradigm-shift in method presented ordinary language philosophy as the practice 
of focusing on what is already apparent in our linguistic practices and in our social and 
rational practices more broadly, rather an obscured logical deep structure, in order to 
explain the workings of language. Working independently of Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin 
offers kindred reflections on the use of language.  
Though John Searle bemoaned the messiness of his conclusions (1973), ordinary 
language philosopher J.L. Austin came to see all utterances as speech acts (1961, 237); 
that is, both special ‘performatives’ (“I pronounce you husband and wife”) and everyday 
statements (“It isn’t snowing as much as we had expected”) are acts. As acts, their 
                                                          
10 “The problem of finding a place for the mental in the physical world, of accommodating the causal 
power of the mental, and of accounting for the phenomenal aspects of consciousness are all live problems 
in the philosophy of mind today because they share some of the [Cartesian] doctrine's ontological, 
epistemological, and semantic assumptions” (Tanney 2009). 
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meaning is not divorceable from their context or from their manner of enactment. “There 
are a great many devices that can be used for making clear, even at the primitive level, 
what act it is we are performing when we say something – the tone of voice, cadence, 
gesture – and above all we can rely upon the nature of the circumstances, the context in 
which the utterance is issued” (Austin 1961, 231). Performative utterances are not 
properly evaluated for their truth or falsity, but rather for their felicity or infelicity. “An 
infelicity arises – that is to say, the utterance is unhappy – if certain rules, transparently 
simple rules, are broken” (Austin 1961, 224). Standing in the living room and loudly 
announcing “I divorce you” does not, in contemporary American society, mean that one 
has actually divorced their spouse (Austin 1961, 225). If I insincerely congratulate you 
with the words “nice job” on an achievement for which I actually do not think you 
deserve credit, my speech act is infelicitous. Precluding a very special set of 
circumstances, saying “The cat is on the mat, but I don’t believe it is,” isn’t making a 
false statement as much as an “outrageous” one (Austin 1961, 235).  
These conventions, which guide how we perform utterances or ‘do things with 
words’, are importantly relative to a society of language users. Austin explains, 
 
The social habits of the society may considerably affect the question of 
which performative verbs are evolved and which, sometimes for rather 
irrelevant reasons, are not. …Now since apparently [our] society approves 
of censuring or reprimanding, we have here evolved a formula ‘I 
reprimand you’, or ‘I censure you’ … But on the other hand, since 
apparently we don’t approve of insulting, we have not evolved a simple 
formula ‘I insult you’. (1961, 232)  
 
Since Austin ultimately holds that not just utterances containing performative verbs, but 
all statements, are performatives, local conventions are just as needed in making sense of 
everyday speech acts:  
 
…stating something is performing an act just as much as is giving an order 
or giving a warning; …on the other hand… when we give an order or a 
warning or a piece of advice, there is a question about how this is related 
to fact which is not perhaps so very different from the kind of question 
that arises when we discuss how a statement is related to fact. [in order to 
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handle both these cases]… We need to go very much farther back, to 
consider all the ways and sense in which saying anything at all is doing 
this or that – because of course it is always doing a good many different 
things. (Austin 1961, 238, emphasis added) 
 
Austin proposes adding an account of force along with an account of meaning in order to 
capture some of this constant doing that we are doing when we act in language. Searle 
later critiques this distinction, pointing out that ‘force’ is often inseparable from what is 
meant by the speech act (1971). What is relevant for my purposes is how Austin 
importantly held an idea of a “total speech act” (Searle 1971, 143) and saw all speech 
acts as simultaneously conventional and context-dependent (contra Searle 1971, 149). For 
Austin, in any and every new speech-act context, there are conventions always already 
waiting for us. Austin’s sense of ‘convention’ is never simply or solely located in 
grammar or literal sentence meaning; like Quine and Wittgenstein, Austin seeks to 
explain linguistic meaning by preserving the connection of any particular use to the life 
and purpose in and for which it is used.  
 
3. Grice and the Role of Nonconvention in Meaning 
 
Paul Grice later developed an account of meaning based on the interaction 
between speaker intention and the way utterances exploit context, convention, and 
expectation to implicate more than what is actually said. The overarching contention of 
his language philosophy is that to make sense of each other’s rational-communicative 
behavior, participants necessarily interpret over and between standard forms, rules, and 
particular uses. Linguistic activity is a rational behavior in which more is communicated 
and understood than what is literally said. Grice can thus plausibly be read to pave a way 
for rational, inferential, non-verbal linguistic communication; that is, his work 
importantly opens up the possibility of identifying key features of communication as 
linguistic performance that speech-accompanying gestures also demonstrate. 
As the heart of his theory demonstrates, it is our exploitation of standards that 
make our meaningful exchanges both interesting and ultimately indicative of 
intersubjective rationality. In his Logic and Conversation lectures at Harvard in 1967, 
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Grice aims to analyze “conditions governing conversation” (1989, 24). In any utterance, 
the conventional meaning of the words used determines what is said (in a strict, or what 
Grice calls a ‘preferred, sense). In some cases the conventional meanings of the words 
spoken also determine what is implicated; a speaker can use words to literally say, or to 
indicate or implicate (Grice 1989, 25). Implicatures that follow logically (demonstrating 
formal presuppositions or entailments) from words used are conventional implicatures. In 
Grice’s example, if a speaker says, ‘Henry is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave,’ the 
speaker has conventionally committed herself to indicating that Henry’s being brave is a 
consequence of his being an Englishman, although she has not said this outright or in the 
preferred sense (Grice 1989, 25). The primary target of Grice’s work at this time is not 
these sorts of implicatures, but rather the kind he calls nonconventional, and in particular, 
a subset of these that he calls conversational implicatures.  
Conversational implicatures presume the existence of (and participants’ tacit 
adherence to) a principle that governs conversations as intentional communicative 
activities. Grice offers the Cooperative Principle, which states: “Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (1989, 26). 
Grice then analyzes the Cooperative Principle into four more specific categories, each 
with attendant maxims (1989, 26-27): 
 
1. Quantity 
a. Make your contribution as informative as required. 
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required. 
2. Quality. Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true: 
a. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
3. Relation: Be revelant. 
4. Manner: Be perspicuous: 
a. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
b. Avoid ambiguity. 
c. Be brief. 
d. Be orderly. 
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The purpose of talk presupposed by these conversational maxims is “a maximally 
effective exchange of information,” and talking is on Grice’s view “a special case or 
variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior,” (1989, 28). These maxims are thus 
normatively enforced by a community of speakers; a speaker who utterly failed to meet 
these rational expectations would most likely be “subject to rebuke” of varying degrees 
(Grice 1989, 27).  
The precise connection between the Cooperative Principle and its related maxims 
and the nonconventional phenomenon of conversational implicature is failure to fulfill 
the maxims (Grice 1989, 30). The maxims can be understood as descriptions of 
conventions that guide conversational behavior. Failure to adhere to them by 
conversational participants who are still presumably rational and still presumably 
adhering to the overarching Cooperative Principle triggers a need for nonconventional 
interpretation, that is, interpretation that is not fully determined or specified in advance, 
but which relies on context and inference in various ways. Out of various kinds of failure 
possible, the type that Grice calls “flouting” most generally leads to conversational 
implicature via exploitation of the maxims. Grice explains: 
 
On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do 
so without violating another maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, 
and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead, 
the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How can his saying what he did 
say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall 
Cooperative Principle? (1989, 30) 
 
A classic example to demonstrate both this sort of implicature and the reasoning process 
Grice attributes to the hearer is the case in which a philosophy professor writes a 
pointedly brief letter of recommendation praising a student’s grammar (Grice 1989, 33). 
This would appear to flout maxims of relevance and quantity, at least. This professor isn’t 
opting out, since he is writing the letter. He knows more about the student than his 
command of grammar, and he knows that more information is requested, since it is a 
recommendation letter. He must then be reluctant to say anything else, and this is 
understandable if what he would say would be negative. Thus, the professor thinks his 
student is no good at philosophy: he has demonstrated this by saying all the good things 
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he can say about the student, and these don’t include philosophy. In the end, then, 
although at the level of what is said there is maxim violation, at the level of what is 
implicated, the maxims or minimally the Cooperative Principle is satisfied (Grice 1989, 
33). In his later “Retrospective Epilogue,” Grice notes, “What I have been calling 
conversational implicature is just those assumptions which have to be attributed to a 
speaker to justify him in regarding a given sequence of lower-order speech-acts as being 
rationalized by their relation to a conventionally indexed higher-order speech act” (1989, 
370). In other words, when a person communicates, they perform speech acts at multiple 
levels, not all of them verbal or vocal; their interlocutors are expected to track the 
emerging meaning across all of them (Grice 1989, 35). This is quite successful most of 
the time; and when it is not, metalinguistic clarification is always an option (“Why didn’t 
you write more?” “I got my point across just fine, actually.”). 
 The kind of reasoning process that Grice’s hearers go through to make sense of 
conversational implicatures is entirely, thoroughly, almost egregiously propositional. 
Grice gives many examples of this and also offers a generic formula for the interpretation 
or “working out” of such an implicature: 
 
‘He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing 
the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing 
this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he 
knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; 
he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or 
is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that 
q.’ (Grice 1989, 31) 
 
While he does not expect in the least that the average hearer will deploy such technical 
vocabulary, Grice insists that “the presence of a conversational implicature must be 
capable of being worked out; for even if it can in face be intuitively grasped, unless the 
intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature… will be a conventional 
implicature” (1989, 31). Why does failure to be worked out in rational, propositional 
form make an implicature conventional instead of nonconventional? Precisely because it 
is the additional effort required to make sense of an odd, unexpected, not conventionally 
predetermined utterance that characterizes it as nonconventional. In these cases, what is 
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literally said or directly conventionally implicated is not enough to render the speech act 
rational and cooperative. In conventional implicatures, the rationality or saliency of the 
utterance is automatically apparent, no extra thinking or attributing of various intentions 
and shared background knowledge required. With cases of nonconventional implicatures 
such as conversational implicatures, the hearer must reason across standard forms and 
conventions as well as concrete, particular situations and knowledge, and presumed 
rational communicative intentions. Yet as Grice’s pattern clearly demonstrates, all of this 
effort takes place (or at the very least, when made conscious, it takes place) via forms that 
are ‘linguistic’ in the traditional sense. These nonconventional implicatures that are 
expressed silently in what is not said, or in the excess of what is said, contribute 
significantly to the meaning-making processes of conversations. The conversational 
implicatures are not spoken, but they are linguistic. However, it appears from the 
foregoing that they are linguistic in virtue of being able to be put into propositional from 
in a hearer’s inner dialogue with himself, in his reasoning processes. 
 I appreciate Grice’s careful highlighting of the interpretive effort that goes into 
“working out” the full meaning of an utterance, an effort that in the majority of cases 
goes beyond what is literally said. Yet in subsequent chapters I will be arguing that this 
effort to understand nonconventional moves and usages in our everyday language 
practices is not necessarily unique to certain sarcastic or clever remarks, and it is not 
necessary that this reasoning process be translated into propositional forms. An embodied 
and enactive view of cognition offers other routes of explanation for such inferential 
processes. I return to this issue in Chapters III-V. 
 Grice ultimately advocates that we see language as just another form of rational 
activity.11 To this end, he demonstrates that it is possible to find non-verbal analogues for 
his conversational maxims. In each case, one has rational expectations for one’s partner’s 
contributions to a physical task.12 Although he doesn’t spell it out explicitly, it seems that 
the same interpretive processes must hold in cases where these maxims are flouted: if I 
                                                          
11 Grice holds that “the use of language is one among a range of forms of rational activity and that those 
rational activities which do not involve the use of language are in various ways importantly parallel to those 
which do” (1989, 341). 
 
12 Grice (1989, 28) gives the examples of fixing a car or baking as activities in which expectations for 
others’ rational and helpful contributions holds. 
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am cooking dinner and my boyfriend hands me a flower instead of a spatula, I can either 
interpret this as an accidental maxim-flouting (‘He really is an absent-minded idiot and 
clearly doesn’t pay attention to what I need!’), or I can interpret it as an intentional 
violation (‘How sweet! I should relax a bit about this water boiling over and enjoy our 
time together’). It is also interesting to note that in his “Further Notes on Logic and 
Conversation,” Grice considers verbal stress as a possible linguistic convention and 
ultimately prefers to classify it as having the same potential for meaning contribution as 
do conversational (nonconventional) implicatures (1989, 50-53). I pursue his line of 
reasoning on this more carefully in Chapter III, when I inquire as to how co-speech hand 
gestures may be understood to contribute to meaning both conventionally and non-
conventionally. 
Grice’s legacy: semantics vs. pragmatics in contemporary philosophy of language 
While contemporary researchers in cognitive linguistics, psychology, and 
pragmatics take up the holistic nature of Grice’s theory in order to include nonverbal 
communicative behavior in accounts of language, the traditional received interpretation 
of Grice’s work in philosophy has led to sharp divides between what is conversationally 
implicated but not said (pragmatic phenomena), and literal meaning, which is then kept 
as semantic or linguistic meaning, i.e. the proper domain of philosophical and linguistic 
research. Contemporary pragmatic theory tends to be neo-Gricean in some way, adopting 
to varying degrees his primary tenets: that there is a gap between speaker meaning and 
literal sentence meaning; that speaker meaning is fundamentally intentional; and that 
human linguistic communication is guided by some rules or principles, whether these are 
thought to be social-cooperative, rational, cognitive or some combination (Korta and 
Perry 2011). Alternatively, recent semantic theories attempt to make as few ‘concessions 
to context’ as possible by continually limiting the scope of what counts as a proper object 
for a scientific language study. Representing this approach, formal semanticist Emma 
Borg argues strongly against counting linguistic meaning as ‘a species of general 
ostensive behavior,” instead insisting that we preserve “some fundamental differences 
between communicative acts in general and linguistic acts in particular” (2006, 261). In 
their review of Herman Cappelen and Ernst Lepore’s (2005) Insensitive Semantics: a 
defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism, Robert J. Stainton and 
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Catherine Wearing write that the debate between minimalism and contextualism is 
“currently at the center of research in philosophy of language” (Stainton and Wearing 
2006, 187). In this section I roughly sketch the terrain of this debate between context-
based semantics and insensitive semantics, which rests on what I take to be a false 
dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics generally.  
As I discussed above, on Grice’s view, meaning construction is fundamentally an 
intentional, social, cooperative act; it is not fundamentally a ‘linguistic’ act as narrowly 
understood. Conversational (nonconventional) implicatures, while not spoken, are 
linguistic phenomena, and they bear complex relationships to what is said, such as 
relations of nondetachability and cancelability (Grice 1989, 41-46). Without getting into 
these intricate analyses, it seems fair to say that rationality, cooperation, context, and 
much interpretive effort (and expectations of such effort) form the broader backdrop of 
communicative performance that Grice theorizes. Furthermore, as discussed, Grice 
considers nonverbal behaviors to be richly inferential and meaningful by the same 
criteria. Often, he thinks, it takes “a suitable gesture or tone of voice” to figure out what 
sort of maxim exploitation is intended (Grice 1989, 34). On my reading, Grice’s aim to 
set human linguistic intentional behavior within a spectrum of broader rational intentional 
behavior can be interpreted as a move to broaden our understanding of linguistic activity.  
The leading neo-Gricean pragmatic theory today is Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) 
Relevance Theory. Relevance Theory has been well-developed over the past several 
decades and has far-reaching potential for analyzing verbal communication, including 
rhetorical devices such as irony and metaphor, with an alternative paradigm to truth-
conditional semantics. As Sperber and Wilson note, “Verbal communication is governed 
not by expectations of truthfulness but by expectations of relevance, raised by literal, 
loose and figurative uses alike”; “the nature of explicit communication will have to be 
rethought” (2002). This attempt to study the cognitive underpinnings of communication 
is commendable in its intent, though overly mentalistic in its realization.  
Sperber and Wilson’s principle of relevance codifies what they observe as the key 
explanatory mechanism of utterance meaning and comprehension: “an act of ostension 
carries a guarantee of relevance, and… this fact… makes manifest the intention behind 
the ostension” (1986, 50). According to their reading of Grice, “the very act of 
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communicating creates expectations which it then exploits” (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 
37). All of the expectations and obligations that Grice discusses as maxims, Sperber and 
Wilson posit to be exhaustively handled by the idea of relevance. On their view, when a 
speaker communicates to a listener, she gets his attention and gives information. This 
signals to the listener that the speaker thinks her message is relevant to him. Having 
access (only) to his own conscious and unconscious mental states and general situation, 
the listener selects out of a wide range of possible meanings (given that literal sentence 
meaning always underdetermines speaker meaning) the one that is most easily processed 
and most salient to him. “Our claim is that all human beings automatically aim at the 
most efficient information processing possible,” whether consciously done or not 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 49). In a more recent paper, Sperber and Wilson (2002) 
defend “the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise 
in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions,” and they explain that 
this mind-reading is accomplished by a “dedicated” “comprehension module.”  
At the same time that it makes an important contribution to the philosophical 
understanding of linguistic meaning by systematically locating pragmatics at all levels of 
utterance production and processing, Relevance Theory’s faculty-psychological model 
and the potential reductivism of its sweeping analytic tool rightly garners much criticism. 
Aside from a lack of consensus on a standard of measurement for ‘processing costs’, the 
set of potentially competing factors or ‘contextual effects’ in this cost-benefit efficiency 
analysis are in some cases immeasurable (generally in cases where utterances implicate 
something other than or in addition to logical truths). Modularity is popular in certain 
philosophical camps, but is widely criticized from a neurobiological perspective (e.g. 
Edelman (1990); Edelman & Tononi (2000); Armstrong, Stokoe & Wilcox (1995); Tallis 
(2004)) and is seriously undermined by cognitive linguistics’ rejection of autonomous 
linguistics (Taylor 2007). Perhaps most problematically, Sperber and Wilson explicitly 
endorse a ‘coding-decoding’ model of utterance construction and comprehension, while 
Grice can be interpreted to have been intending an alternative to just such a theory of 
meaning (as can be taken from his Modified Occam’s Razor in “Further Notes on Logic 
and Conversation” (Grice 1989, 47)).  
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As a pragmatic account, Relevance Theory fits under a broader category of 
contextualist semantics, which includes intention-based semantics, and which is currently 
in a war with some branches of formal semantics, including minimalism and ‘insensitive’ 
semantics. Emma Borg confirms the growing trend of attempts to combine Gricean tools 
of implicature, intention, inference, and context with a resolute commitment to truth-
conditional semantics when she condemns these attempts, asking “whether a formal 
semantic theory could, or should, take the intentional states of a speaker to be relevant in 
determining the literal meaning of an uttered sentence” (Borg 2004, 215) and answering 
in the negative. Borg aims to keep around “syntactically-individuated sentence-types” 
which have a mostly fixed meaning by virtue of their analyticity. To get their meaning, 
these sentence-types are in each utterance case partially “relativized to a context” (2004, 
216), though this context cannot include intentional states. For Borg, being a formal 
semanticist or taking even a moderate formal semantics approach requires a commitment 
to the claim that “everything that can be found at the semantic level can be traced to the 
syntactic level” (Borg 2004, 217), à la Montague (see Bach 1989) or early Davidson. 
‘Unarticulated constituents’ that point to context-dependency can either be dismissed 
entirely (Borg’s preference) or still be understood as syntactically triggered on this 
view.13 Speaker intentions cannot be appealed to in a formal account that thereby also by 
definition seeks to deductively derive truth-conditions, since intentions are inferred 
abductively; they are rich, unrepeatable (tied to context) and hence “formally intractable” 
(Borg 2004, 219). As such, comprehension of speaker intentions falls outside the formal 
semantic scope designated by Jerry Fodor’s modularity of mind theory, which Borg 
follows. Modularity of mind theory separates computational processing of syntactic 
composition from non-modular reasoning processes that handle the content of 
representations. As Borg explains:  
…any theory which admits appeal to speaker intentions as relevant in 
determining literal meaning involves the kind of abductive, non-
                                                          
13 Note that when philosophers talk about the need for context in understanding even the truth-conditional 
meaning of some sentences, the prototypical cases are indexicals, demonstratives, and ‘hidden indexicals’ 
or ‘unarticulated constituents’ like comparative adjectives and location-based predicates (such as those 
having to do with weather). These are seen as special or marked cases. There is denial or ignorance of the 
general underdetermination of meaning. 
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demonstrative reasoning process which Fodor places beyond the reach of 
genuine modules. Thus any theory of semantic content which appeals to 
speaker intentions cannot form part of a modular language faculty. (2004, 
219) 
 
Robert Stainton shares Borg’s commitment to meanings as mental representations 
such that “meaning looks a lot like syntax” (2006, 934). In other words, one can analyze 
linguistic meaning (semantics) by tracking word meaning and combinatorial rules that are 
fixed in a context-free way. Following Fodor and Chomsky and thus at pains to specify a 
properly scientific account of language, Stainton holds that “…semantics… can be 
nothing more than rules for mapping one mental representation to another, by well-
defined tractable procedures. The science of language is thus restricted to describing the 
sub-personal, unconscious, automatic, cognitively impenetrable rules of the language 
faculty” (2006, 935). Here again intentionality must be bracketed off to some other, less 
philosophical realm of communication theory, since “meanings just are in the head,” 
though as just noted, we can’t get in the head (Stainton 2006, 935). Relevance theory and 
other neo-Gricean attempts, on Stainton’s view, are out of bounds, despite their 
popularity. As he and Wearing write in their positive review of Insensitive Semantics 
(2006), semantic minimalism or insensitivity is rare (unfortunately, they suggest), as “it is 
now widely agreed that the range of expressions which, as a matter of their linguistic 
contribution, anticipate input from context to truth-conditions is simply vast” (Stainton 
and Wearing 2006, 187).  
A debate thus continues over the proper scope of formal semantic analysis in 
philosophy of language. Some insist that utterance-meaning depends upon contextual 
factors not directly cued in what is literally spoken; this position makes appeal to speaker 
intentions and modularity (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 2002; see Carston and Powell 
2006). On the other side of the debate are Borg and other minimalists, who appeal to 
modularity yet reject speaker intentions (at least when it comes to literal meaning, which, 
on this Chomskyan-legacy view, is the proper target of semantic theory). Most theorists 
continue to maintain a sharp divide between semantics and pragmatics, whether they 
advocate a ‘semantics-only’ approach insensitive to context, or whether they struggle to 
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cross this apparently intractable divide by incorporating context and psychological 
processes.  
On my view, the very existence of the debate itself proves the divide to be 
ultimately untenable. Intention, context, and inference do importantly contribute to 
utterance meaning; successful and complete interpretations of the verbal elements of an 
utterance would not be possible without these features. Such nonconventional elements 
may not, however, make their contribution in a cleanly compositional, truth-conditional 
fashion. The Stainton and Borg camp maintains the divide between literal meaning and 
implied meaning in order to have a formal theory that addresses what is said in Grice’s 
preferred sense. As far as I can see, this is scarcely different than adopting a Chomskyan 
principled stance and restricting philosophical analysis to the level of competence. Of 
course, Grice showed us that our communicative competence goes far beyond the putting 
together of correct sentences, hence the war between the insensitivists and the neo-
Griceans. Yet most current accounts, including those that seek to further Grice’s insights, 
rely on a modularity of mind paradigm to do a lot of the necessary behind-the-scenes 
work. This fact on its own weakens the force of these theories so long as sound empirical 
evidence from neuroscience continues to question the feasibility of this kind of 
modularity.14 So long as philosophy of language remains committed to this fight set on 
these terms, the full potential of Grice’s investigations into communicative practices 
cannot be reckoned. Recognizing co-speech hand gestures as relevant phenomena will 
not be possible. We need a philosophy of language that follows what we know of 
communication and cognition, a philosophy of language that unites semantics and 
pragmatics by understanding that ‘competence’ is nothing without performance, in 
actuality, is nothing other than performance. The gesture-inclusive re-construal of 
language that I construct in the following chapters transcends the divide between 
                                                          
14 As Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist Gerald Edelman writes, “The notion of modularity is based on an 
overly simple interpretation of the effects of ablation of parts of the brain… although modern imaging 
techniques reveal certain areas of the brain that are active in certain tasks, it does not follow that the 
activity of such areas is the sole cause of particular behaviors” (2004, 30-31).  As Jerome Feldman argues, 
following Edelman’s balanced approach between modularity and holism, “The brain clearly does rely on 
specialized neural circuits, but these interact massively with one another and almost always have 
overlapping functions” (2006, 282). 
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competence and performance by turning instead to the embodied, embedded, and 




INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON CO-SPEECH HAND GESTURES: 
CIRCUMSCRIBING GESTURAL PHENOMENA 
 
0. Method of Mutually Constraining Pluralism 
 
The historical narrative that constitutes the bulk of Chapter I presents a tradition 
in philosophy of language and meaning that systemically ignores embodiment, 
environment, and audience. The positive task of the present undertaking is to reorient 
philosophy of language around the notion of linguistic communication, such that the 
complexities and realities of embodiment and environment in communication and 
cognition can be rightfully considered, indeed, so that they can become primary guiding 
lights in any utterance analysis. A philosophy of linguistic communicative action is one 
that unites semantic and pragmatic analyses of utterance meaning. In the narrative I gave 
in the last chapter, however, I did not discuss the fact that throughout the twentieth 
century, many philosophers called for an end to the pursuit of theories of language and 
meaning as such. Yet in subsequent chapters, I will be calling on just such figures, for 
example Martin Heidegger, to inform the approach I am recommending. As this chapter 
is largely focused on method, I introduce it by first making the aim of my method 
explicit. 
 There is still need for the criticisms raised by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin 
Heidegger, Richard Rorty, John Dewey, and other philosophers who called for 
philosophers to cease attempting to exhaustively thematize language. In the wake of the 
twentieth century’s prolific preoccupation with language, meaning, and thought, the 
received interpretations and renowned debates that constitute Anglo-American 
philosophy of language today have not taken heed of these calls for attention to 
complexity, context, and ordinary language practices. Resolute commitments to 
formalism, mentalism, representationalism, and truth values abound in the halls and 
journals of United States Ivy League universities. In other words, philosophy of language 
of the very kind that Wittgenstein bemoaned is alive and well. And this breed of thinking, 
which tends still to disdain pragmatic phenomena en masse, is not attending to either the 
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embodiment of meaning in general or the phenomena of co-speech gesturing in 
particular. 
 Yet this present work is advocating a discernible way of thinking about language 
and meaning. My goal is not to do away with the philosophical work of understanding 
our own understanding and living in language but rather to redirect this work. I think that 
rather than a search for an ever neater theory of formal semantics, the academic and 
scientific efforts that will yield a better understanding of linguistic meaning from an 
interdisciplinary investigation into embodied and contextualized, actual practices of 
communication.  
Such an investigation into specific practices of meaning-making necessarily 
involves going outside the traditional bounds of philosophy and entering into the realms 
experimental science and empirical description.15 Yet the bounty of recent empirical 
observations and experiments of hand gestures that I am about to discuss do not 
constitute a self-interpreting body of knowledge. As I will argue in Chapters III and IV, 
philosophical concepts of interpretation, disclosure, normativity, sociality, and 
intentionality (among others) are indispensible to making sense of new research findings 
on how people make sense together in linguistic communicative acts. The question for 
philosophy is not how to invent, all by itself, better theories about language, thought, and 
meaning. The question for philosophy is how to reciprocally interact and evolve with new 
empirical investigations into embodied cognition and expression. 
My method, then, is a mutually constraining pluralism. This will be enacted in 
this chapter in the ways that I place myself in gesture studies, the questions I take up, and 
the discipline-crossing dialogues I facilitate. The method will be apparent in future 
chapters in the way philosophical treatments of language and meaning are evaluated and 
recast in light of new empirical findings, while new empirical findings are steered clear 
of philosophically problematic turns. In some cases these dialogues are easier and more 
immediately justified than others, as when gesture theorist David McNeill finds 
inspiration in existential phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, 
or in the new cognitive linguistics work that is of direct lineage from George Lakoff and 
                                                          
15 As Jürgen Habermas has said, “We have to bear in mind that philosophical thought, which has 
surrendered the relation to totality, also loses its self-sufficiency” (1981, 2). 
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Mark Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory. I discuss new work in cognitive 
pragmatics and psychology that aims to follow the ordinary language philosophy of Paul 
Grice; yet I will use insights from new paradigms in cognitive science, such as 
enactivism, to critique these new pragmatic accounts. Therefore, I put all philosophical 
theories and claims that I discuss into reciprocal dialogue with the most current research 
in cognitive linguistics and cognitive science.  
At the time of this writing, gesture studies is an explosively growing field. The 
review offered below only treats the most well-known and representative camps of 
research, while mentioning other seminal or provocative studies where relevant. My 
intent in this chapter is to familiarize the reader with key terms, themes, and questions in 
the research, so that in later chapters I may analyze more particular issues, 
methodologies, or findings as they are salient for certain philosophical questions of 
linguistic activity.  
I begin with an historical overview of the various ways that scholars have defined 
gesture (II.1).16 As described in the previous chapter, one finds scholarly interest in 
gesture only at the beginning and the end of the past century. The overlaps and disunities 
in these few influential scientists’ classifications assist me in demarcating my target 
phenomena. Furthermore, reflecting on how gestures have been defined helps make 
manifest the implicit ontologies and philosophical underpinnings operative in gesture 
scholarship today. In II.2 and II.3, I contrast what I take to be the two dominant 
paradigms in contemporary gesture theory, that of David McNeill and Jürgen Streeck, 
respectively. Unpacking the philosophical significance of these theories is part of the 
work of all subsequent chapters; here my goal is to demonstrate how certain decisions 
about what function(s) gestures serve highlight certain aspects of the phenomena while 
playing down others. These differences lead to a philosophical and methodological 
preference for more interactive and pragmatist approaches to gesture study (II.4), which I 




                                                          
16 For a far more complete historical overview, see Kendon’s 2004 tome.  
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1. Taxonomies, Typologies, and Continua: Defining Co-Speech Gesture 
 
Gesture as gesture 
‘Gesture’ in its broadest usage is body motion that is temporally and structurally 
related to language production. It is not incidental motion. According to Adam Kendon, 
widely known as the father of contemporary gesture research, gestures can be 
differentiated from other visible bodily movement in a communication setting insofar as 
they are seen as deliberate, conscious, and governed by communicative intention 
(Kendon 2004, 11; see also Kendon 1977; 1980). ‘Gesture’ is understood as “a label for 
actions that have the features of manifest deliberate expressiveness” (Kendon 2004, 15). 
Criteria of manifest deliberate expressiveness include formal parameters such as clear 
onset and offset of movement. Both pragmatic and semantic conditions hold: 
“movements that have these characteristics [of manifest deliberate expressiveness] are 
treated as if they are performed by the actor under the guidance of an openly 
acknowledged communicative intent and the actor will be regarded as being fully 
responsible for them” (Kendon 2004, 14). Generally, we have no trouble parsing out 
gestures from non-gestures in this sense, as demonstrated by Kendon’s 1977 findings 
(Kendon 2004, 5). Researchers identify gesture “by carefully analyzing the way in which 
participants in interaction differentially attend to each other’s behavior and by delineating 
that aspect of it which they treat as being a relevant part of the utterance of their 
coparticipant. Action so treated can be referred to as ‘gesture’” (Kendon 2004, 6).  Even 
in discussing gesture as ‘gesture’, then, lay observers and scientists alike both make 
reliable pre-reflective identifications and classifications of certain communicative, 
linguistically-oriented behaviors. In this way, gestures demonstrate the sort of 
communicative intentionality essential to language use (see Frege 1948, 214).   
As will be presented in some detail below, the term ‘gesture’ is used to cover a 
broad range of communicative bodily movement. Each researcher or theorist delineates 
these phenomena in a unique way. As my focus is on speech-accompanying gesture, the 
following attends closely to typologies and continuua that feature this particular gestural 
activity. In distinguishing amongst types of gesture, Kendon’s early work refers to “all 
gesturing that occurs in association with speech as gesticulation” (Kendon 1986, 7), in 
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distinction from autonomous gestures, quotable gestures, emblems, gesture systems and 
sign languages (1986, 8), all of which are more fixed and conventionalized gesture 
typologies than gesticulation. More recently, Kendon uses the term ‘gesture’ when 
discussing coverbal gestures, as do most contemporary researchers.17 It is interesting to 
note that Kendon prefers his own multi-dimensional approach to other scholars’ 
increasingly categorical typologies, since on his view, “Humans have at their disposal the 
gestural medium which can be used in many different ways and from which many 
different forms of expression can be fashioned… [thus] we cannot establish permanent 
categories that represent essentially different forms of expressive behaviour” (Kendon 
2004, 107). Nonetheless, ‘Kendon’s continuum’ of gesture typologies (formalized not by 
Adam Kendon but by David McNeill in 1992) remains influential in the field. In his 1988 
descriptions, Kendon intended to demonstrate that gesture may take on more or less 
verbal-language-like properties, ranging from the compositionality or lexical form found 
in words to “pantomimic representations,” depending on the “communicative demands 
laid on it” (Kendon 2004, 104). McNeill’s use of the continuum is discussed below. 
Surveying various attempts to systematize gesture that were made both before and after 
his 1988 writing, Kendon reveals important commonalities amongst the twentieth-century 
scholars, namely that 
 
Everyone seems to recognize that gestures may be used in pointing, for 
representing through some form of depiction or enactment something that 
is relevant to the referential content of what is being said, and many have 
recognized that there are also important functions for gesture in respect to 
marking up or displaying aspects of the logical structure of the speaker’s 
discourse. All… have looked upon gesture as an activity that is significant 
for the understanding of a speaker’s expression, they regard it as having an 
important role to play in this and all agree that it is not without significant 
social meaning. (Kendon 2004, 107)  
 
Despite these overarching similarities, diversity remains, since researchers’ interests, 
disciplinary backgrounds, and reasons for inquiry into gesture vary. To appreciate the 
achievements of Kendon’s and McNeill’s continuua, as well as the differences between 
                                                          
17 I follow this convention. 
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them, it is necessary to lay out the influential paradigms on which they draw and which 
they refine. My brief review of representative twentieth-century approaches is given 
below. I use this review of influential schemata to triangulate my own target phenomena 
and differentiate the guiding questions I bring to gesture study. 
 
Wilhelm Wundt 
 Offering a thoughtful, dedicated treatment of hand gestures, particularly 
referential hand gestures, at the beginning of the twentieth century, founder of 
experimental psychology Wilhelm Wundt’s The Language of Gestures (1973) would 
seem to be an ideal touchstone for present-day gesture scholars and theorists. Notably, 
however, Wundt only discusses gesture phenomena in itself and never in relation to 
speech, focusing on “gesture languages” such as those used by the Plains Indians or the 
Deaf (Kendon 2004, 92). This restricts the direct applicability of his writing to the present 
task, particularly since, as Wundt observes and as has now been well-documented 
(Kendon 1988; McNeill and Goldin-Meadow 1999), gestures in the absence of speech 
predictably take on highly conventional form and usages. Nonetheless, I find insightful 
and inspiring Wundt’s focus on the semiotic relationship between form and meaning in 
gestures, as well as the conviction with which he takes up their meaningful and 
communicative nature, revealing nuanced layers of symbolism and cultural variability.18 
As mentioned in Chapter I, Wundt’s work denotes an important shift from the 
Romantic treatments of gesture in eighteenth century to a more scientific, anthropological 
and psychological approach to studying gesture as a natural, ubiquitously occurring 
behavior that is then vastly differentiated and specified according to the needs of social 
and communicative practices. His identification and analysis of symbolic gesture 
(discussed below) anticipates far more recent arguments for the embodiment of 
metaphorical thinking, and Wundt’s understanding of expressive interactive movement as 
                                                          
18 Wundt’s semiotic approach is interestingly embodied: “the ‘etymology’ of a gesture… is indicated when 
its psychological meaning and its connection with the general principles of expressive movement is 
recognized” (1973, 72). Whether or not this can be taken as evidence of gesture as the origin of language, it 
does usefully demonstrate “the necessity for a time in the development of every natural form of 




a dialectic that gives rise to shared concepts predates today’s continuity-based enactive 
approaches to cognition and meaning (Wundt 1973, 94, 146-149). 
The first distinction Wundt makes is between demonstrative and descriptive 
gestures (1973, 73-74). Demonstrative (pointing) gestures are used most basically to 
draw attention to present objects, but can refer to spatial relationships or parties in the 
communication. Demonstrative gestures can supplement imitative ones by pointing to 
like objects to clarify that an imitative gesture is imitating something akin to this present 
object being pointed to (Wundt 1973, 75). They function robustly like indexicals; 
Wundt’s discussions of how pointing can work with other gestures and can take on more 
complex functions in temporarily established reference situations find recent empirical 
elaboration in work on ASL’s referential use of space (see e.g. Liddell 2003). 
Wundt divides the much larger class of descriptive gestures into mimed and 
connotative gestures (1973, 74). Mimed gestures are either indicative – transitory 
sketches of an object made with the finger, or plastic – recurring three-dimensional hand 
forms that mimic the intended object (Wundt 1973, 76). They depict their intended object 
closely and unambiguously. Connotative gestures are distinct from mimed gestures in 
that they require imaginative supplementation (though this can vary in degree, making 
connotative gestures sometimes very much like mimed gestures). These tend to operate 
via metonymy, for example, outlining the shape of a beard to indicate a goat (Wundt 
1973, 77).  
The third class of gestures Wundt offers is symbolic; this class is composed of the 
same forms as descriptive gestures but has to do with the particular extensions of mimed 
or connotative gestures to new or more metaphorical uses (Wundt 1973, 74). “The overall 
character of the symbolic gesture… consists of transmitting the concept to be 
communicated from one field of perception to another, e.g. implying a temporal 
connection with spatial means or depicting an abstract idea physically” (Wundt 1973, 
74).  A symbol functions via indirect reference to some concept linked by association 
(1973, 88), as Wundt’s example shows:  
 
…a hand cupped like a ladle is directly associated with its meaning, 
‘drinking gourd’. The Indians use the same gesture to indicate ‘water’. 
This is where an indirect association arises between the object and the 
51 
means used to indicate it. The gesture suggests the ladle or gourd, which 
in turn implies that which it holds. This new application makes the gesture 
a symbolic one in the most general sense: the concept expresses an idea 
not for its own sake, but for one that is different from it. (Wundt 1973, 89) 
  
Symbolic extensions can become quite complex over time: where a plastic gesture 
of a donkey’s ear begins by signifying a donkey, it may become more commonly used to 
indicate stupidity (Wundt 1973, 89). Wundt explains, “If we subordinate gestural 
communication to the general category or language, we may speak of its symbols in the 
same general context we do when we talk of the WORD as a symbol of the CONCEPT” 
(Wundt 1973, 87). Yet gesture symbolism is unique here due to its ever-lingering 
semiotic connection: “The gesture appears to us not as a haphazard, external symbol, but 
as the ADEQUATE symbol of an idea” (Wundt 1973, 88). Thus even after years or 
generations of both conventionalization and meaning change, gesture forms preserve 
something that is the core or ground of what they signify. For readers today, Wundt’s 
treatment suggests that gestures are highly relevant for understanding metaphor, as when 
he claims that  
 
…symbolic gestures are extremely instructive as concerns the 
psychological development of symbolism, since they offer every possible 
level of transformation from the most primitive to the most highly 
developed, where a concrete image becomes the expression of a concept 
which cannot actually be represented by concrete means. (Wundt 1973, 
89) 
 
From Wundt’s classifications, as well as his descriptions of gesture syntax not reviewed 
here, it is clear that expressive hand movements are capable of fully carrying the 
communicative, representational, and referential burdens of linguistic communities. The 
foregoing examples hopefully serve as intuitive illustrations of how hand gestures can 
function as richly symbolic communicative tools, layered with meaning yet flexibly 
selective in specific situations. While Wundt observed gestures in the absence of speech, 




Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen 
Many interdisciplinary scholars today refer to Kendon’s continuum as a 
touchstone when devising their own criteria for categorizing, coding, and determining 
usage conditions as necessary for their projects, but perhaps the most influential schema 
in twentieth-century gesture scholarship is found in Paul Ekman and W.V. Friesen’s 
seminal 1969 article, “The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, 
Usage, and Coding.”19 It is worthwhile to review the intuitive and telling distinctions 
made in this early anthropological work and interesting to note which questions have 
persisted and which have fallen out of fashion. For example, there is less investigation 
today of what Ekman and Friesen call ‘origin,’ or what we might call ontogenetic origin: 
how certain nonverbal behaviors come to be part of an individual’s repertoire. The most 
popular research programs focus on ‘coding,’ or explanations of how the nonverbal 
behavior conveys information. Questions of ‘usage,’ which concern “regular and 
consistent circumstances surrounding the occurrence of a nonverbal act” (Ekman and 
Friesen 1969, 53), investigate issues of how non-verbal behaviors interact with and mean 
with verbal behaviors. Similar pragmatic considerations are at the core of my 
philosophical inquiry into spontaneous cospeech gestures.  
Ekman and Friesen list six parameters of usage, or “regular and consistent 
circumstances surrounding the occurrence of a nonverbal act”:  
 
(1) External conditions, (2) relationship of the act to associated 
verbal behavior, (3) awareness, (4) intention to communicate, (5) 
feedback from observer, and (6) type of information conveyed. 
(Ekman and Friesen 1969, 53) 
 
Regarding the type of information conveyed (6), the authors distinguish between 
informative, communicative, and interactive nonverbal actions. An act is informative if 
others could share an interpretation of its meaning, regardless of the actor’s intent to 
express anything in that act. For example, anyone in a crowded restaurant might notice a 
customer’s voice rising steadily above the din and take this as an informative indication 
of the customer’s anger, which he may not have had any intention to publicize. 
                                                          
19 This itself was strongly influenced by David Efron’s (1941) taxonomies, not reviewed here. 
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Communicative acts, on the other hand, are “clearly and consciously intended by the 
sender to transmit a specifiable message” (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 55-56). An 
interactive act in some way affects or influences the interactive behavior of other actors 
involved.  
The nonverbal behaviors that are used in such circumstances Ekman and Friesen 
analyze or code into the following five categories, based on the correspondence between 
the act and its meaning. These distinctions are the most cited parts of the article today: 
 
• Emblems. This “most easily understood” type of nonverbal behavior has a 
“quite specific, agreed-upon meaning” (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 66). 
Classic American emblems are a thumbs-up sign or the OK handshape (as 
well as more profane emblematic gestures). By Ekman and Friesen’s 
typology, these gestures are more widely shared than those with 
idiosyncratic meaning, and they are clearly communicative.  
• Illustrators. These are “movements which are directly tied to speech, 
serving to illustrate what is being said verbally” (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 
68). “[A]ll… share the attribute of being intimately interrelated with the 
concomitant verbal behavior on a moment-to-moment basis…” (69). 
Illustrators are broken down into further types:  
o batons, which can be thought of as accents more than 
representations; 
o ideographs, which “sketch a path or direction of thought” (1969, 
69); 
o  deictic movements, which draw attention to a present object;  
o spatial movements, which represent a spatial relationship; 
o kinetographs, depicting actions of the body; and 
o pictographs, which draw their referent. 
Classifications very much like these show up in all gesture typologies or 
paradigms that come after Ekman and Friesen, as can be gathered from 
discussions below. The category of illustrators, then, is one of the first 
descriptions of co-speech gesturing. Any gesture that shows up in direct 
compliment to speech Ekman and Friesen deem an ‘illustrator,’ whether it 
be a point to specify the referent of a verbal item (a deictic movement) or a 
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two-handed palm-up gesture of weighing to indicate uncertainty or 
decision as in the phrase “on the one hand…” etc. (an ideograph). The 
researchers typify illustrators as always either “iconic” or “intrinsic” in 
their meaning relation, but never “arbitrary” (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 
69). For Ekman and Friesen, iconic gestures are ‘extrinsic’ types, though 
different in degree of motivated connection between the nonverbal 
behavior and the information they convey than arbitrary gestures, which 
are also extrinsic. They are not completely satisfied with their decision to 
classify iconic signs as distinct from intrinsically motivated signs, 
however (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 61), and the reason for this difficulty 
may best show up in illustrators, since these gestures made with speech 
cannot be properly called unmotivated, thus seemingly showing iconic 
signs to also have an intrinsic or direct connection between act and 
significance.20 
• Affect displays. Most of Ekman and Friesen’s research into this 
phenomenon focuses on facial expressions such as smiles or grimaces; 
Paul Ekman’s studies of facial expressions is now quite well known (most 
recently, see Ekman 2003). Nonverbal displays of emotion such as crying, 
laughing, frowning, etc. may take place with or without deliberate 
intention to communicate, and as such can be related to verbal behavior in 
a number of ways. Ekman and Friesen say they are probably either iconic 
or intrinsic (1969, 78). They claim, “We have obtained reasonable 
evidence for a pan-cultural element in affect displays – the association of 
particular facial muscles with particular emotions” (Ekman and Friesen 
1969, 80).  
• Regulators. Possibly the most pragmatic of the nonverbal behaviors 
discussed, these are “acts which maintain and regulate the back-and-forth 
nature of speaking and listening between two or more interactants… 
related to conversation flow, the pacing of the exchange” (Ekman and 
Friesen 1969, 82). One can imagine a friend putting a hand on her 
interlocutor’s elbow to initiate a turn-taking or something of this sort. 
                                                          
20 Iconicity is typically difficult to deal with, as has been thoroughly addressed by Phyllis Wilcox (2000) 
and Sarah Taub (2001) working on ASL, and by Sherman Wilcox (2004) writing on ASL and gesture. 
Knowing what makes something iconic of something else is a metonymical and sometimes metaphorical 
relation, and thus involves ‘intrinsic’ elements. For Ekman and Friesen, the difference between iconic and 
intrinsic should be like the difference between calling one’s friend on the phone and holding up a phone-
receiver handshape next to one’s ear to indicate one’s intention to call. Note that generally Kendon finds 
this paper to induce “mental fog,” writing that “It would have been better if the attempt to set up a typology 
had been abandoned and instead it had been recognized that behavior in interaction is best analysed in 
terms of a multiple set of scales or dimensions of comparison” (2004, 98). 
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These are classified as “interactive-informative” but probably not 
communicative (Ekman and Friesen 1969, 83).   
• Adaptors. These phenomena are very interesting for Ekman and Friesen’s 
investigations into ontogenetic development of nonverbal behavior, and 
their remarks here raise questions of nonverbal behavior as habit (1969, 
86). Yet as idiosyncratic and largely unconscious movements of 
adjustment or self-comfort, such as head-scratching or other personal 
ticks, these acts are not seen as communicative or as semantically 
informative. Like affect displays but less directly, adaptors may point to a 
speaker’s level of comfort or discomfort, or they may be habitual. 
In the terms of this taxonomy, the present work is primarily concerned with what 
Ekman and Friesen call “illustrators.” I am not focusing on facial affect displays or 
adaptors, and this is for various reasons, but mostly because they are not clearly 
communicative, either for Ekman or Friesen or by Kendon’s critiera of manifest 
deliberate expressiveness. Emblems, which are clearly communicative, are systematized 
and fully conventional in their meanings. They can occur without speech, because they 
are fixed signs and operate as words do. While particular usages in particular contexts 
will of course result in various inflections and micro-enactments, an emblem has a 
standard meaning or set of meanings. My research focus is on speech-accompanying 
hand gestures, and this includes illustrators and regulators.  
The above paragraphs summarize one of the most influential nonverbal behavior 
classification paradigms to date and locate the present work’s focus within this context. 
One can also gather from the above review a sense of the wide variety of factors that 
come into play when researchers take on the task of systematizing behaviors that seem to 
take place outside the bounds of conventions or easily articulated rules. As Kendon notes, 
Ekman and Friesen’s attempted groupings of nonverbal behaviors “have not been 
established according to a common set of criteria” (Kendon 2004, 97). As Kendon 
analyzes their analysis, 
 
…while emblems are distinguished in virtue of their socially 
acknowledged communicative status, illustrators are recognized because 
of the contribution they are said to make to something that is spoken; 
affect displays are distinguished because of the type of information they 
convey; adaptors are distinguished on the basis of the presumed 
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motivation that lies behind them; regulators are distinguished in terms of 
function. What makes it difficult to apply this typology, however, is the 
fact that acts that are members of one category are also members of 
another category, depending upon the point of view of the analyst. 
(Kendon 2004, 97) 
 
While I would add that Ekman and Friesen seek to maintain some continuity by judging 
each of these types according to other axes, such as communicative-informative or 
extrinsic-intrinsic, Kendon is right to see subjectivity prevail in the face of such 
complexity. The more recent paradigms that I discuss below work with a more restricted 
target phenomenon, that of co-speech gesture, yet this narrowed scope does not 




 While Kendon’s presence in this overview is near-ubiquitous (and proportional to 
his significance in the field), an introduction to his work on the relationship between 
speech and gesture illuminates the discussions that follow. I discuss here just one moment 
in the great body of Kendon’s work: his 1980 article “Gesticulation and Speech: Two 
Aspects of the Process of Utterance.” 
 Kendon’s 1980 piece develops for the first time in modern gesture scholarship a 
structural hierarchy within co-speech gestural movement, as he introduces the concept of 
the Gesticular Phrase (G-phrase), which is “distinguished for every phase in the 
excursionary movement in which the limb, or part of it, shows a distinct peaking of 
effort” (1980, 212). The G-phrase is made up of component actions: for example an effort 
peak is the stroke of the G-phrase, which is typically set up by a preparation phase and 
followed by a recovery or return phase (Kendon 1980, 212). One or more G-phrases 
(each typically composed of preparation, stroke, recovery) may occur within a Gesticular 
Unit, a range that begins when a speaker starts to extend her limb until the moment that 
the limb is at rest again (Kendon 1980, 212).  
 Crucially, these phrases and units correspond to structural demarcations in the 
speech stream. Following criteria from Kingdon (1958) and Crystal and Davy (1969), 
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Kendon first analyzes phonological Tone Units in the speech stream into various levels of 
organization, including Locutions, Locution Groups, Locution Clusters, and Discourse 
(listed in progressively higher levels of organization, with Discourse equaling one 
speaker’s complete turn in a conversation) (Kendon 1980, 210). Kendon finds that “each 
level of organization distinguished in the speech stream was matched by a distinctive 
pattern of bodily movement” (1980, 210). Each Locution analyzed turned out to have its 
own G-unit (Kendon 1980, 216). For every Tone Unit, a corresponding G-phrase could 
be identified (Kendon 1980, 216). These structural correspondences are taken to be 
telling of a connection between gesture and speech at the level of content, which this 
seminal piece also discusses. 
 Kendon observes that in some cases, the relationship between Tone Units and G-
phrases (each being temporally and structurally equivalent to an utterance) is more 
complex than in other cases. He explains, 
 
An examination of just which Tone Units are grouped by a single G-
phrase and which co-occur with one or more than one G-phrase suggests 
that the G-phrases are manifestations of the ‘idea units’ the utterance is 
giving expression to and are linked to the output of Tone Units only as 
closely as this itself is linked to the expression of ‘idea units.’ (Kendon 
1980, 216) 
 
The suggestion is that both modalities each express or articulate conceptual content (‘idea 
unit’). For example, a single G-phrase in which the speaker moves her forearm in a 
certain way with her hand oriented in a certain direction may correlate to a sequence of 
several Tone Units. Alternatively, a speaker may say a single Tone Unit – Kendon’s 
experiments yield the example “and supposedly rebuffs her” – while performing two G-
phrases, one that expresses the idea of ‘rebuff’ and another that initially indicates the 
supposed character of this act (1980, 217). Kendon offers the upshot of this study, a 
conclusion that pervasively colors subsequent gesture scholarship, when he says 
 
…whereas the structure of the movement pattern in gesticulation is closely 
integrated into the rhythmical structure of the co-occurring speech 
stream… in terms of the phrasal organization of the gesticulation a distinct 
phrase of gesticulation is produced for each unit of meaning or ‘idea unit’ 
58 
the utterer deals with. This means that the phrases of gesticulation that co-
occur with speech are not to be thought of as mere embellishments of 
expression or as by-products of the speech process. They are, rather, an 
alternate manifestation of the process by which ‘ideas’ are encoded into 
patterns of behavior which can be apprehended by others as reportive of 
those ideas. (Kendon 1980, 218) 
 
This passage is an early statement of the systematic connection between gesture and 
speech as two equally operative modes of communicative expression, a connection that 
remains at the center of scholarly inquiry into gesture practices. 
 In this same writing Kendon details some further evidence for the autonomy of 
the gestural aspects of an utterance. For example, observable semantic content in the 
gesture often precedes its expression in the verbal channel, demonstrating that gestures 
are organized prior to and not as a result of the speech production process (Kendon 1980, 
218-220). Kendon’s explanation at this stage is that encoding may be faster in the case of 
gesture than it is in speech. Noting the differences between the modalities, Kendon 
observes that “…in gesticulation encoding is presentational. Though conventional forms 
may be used, the utterer has considerable freedom to create new enactments which do not 
then pass into any established vocabulary” (1980, 223). The freedom of gestural 
enactments paired with their observed meaningfulness presents scholars with a paradox 
that drives the research today, as will become clear in the remainder of this chapter. 
  
David McNeill 
 David McNeill is a psychologist and leading contemporary researcher of co-
speech gestures. In 1992, McNeill schematized Kendon’s descriptions of gestures into a 
continuum, discussed briefly above. In his more recent Gesture and Thought (2005), 
McNeill continues to develop his own distinct theory of the speech-gesture relationship 
by elaborating this spectrum into a multi-dimensional set of continuua (2005, 7-12). 
These begin with a continuum comparing the relationship of the type of gesture to 
speech, running as follows:  
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• Continuum 1: gesticulations (obligatory presence of speech)  emblems (optional 
presence of speech)    pantomime (obligatory absence of speech)  sign 
language (obligatory absence of speech) 
 
Then McNeill offers a continuum detailing the relationship of gesture types to linguistic 
properties: 
 
• Continuum 2: gesticulations (linguistic properties absent)  pantomime 
(linguistic properties absent)  emblems (some linguistic properties present)  
sign language (linguistic properties present)  
 
While it would be correct to say that McNeill’s gesture work focuses on gesticulations, 
the combination of these two continua allow him to situate his theoretical approach vis-a-
vis the relationship of gesture and speech more broadly:  
 
The comparison of the first and second continua… shows that when the 
vocal modality has linguistic system properties, gesture, the manual 
modality, does not take on these properties. And when it does not, speech 
tends to be obligatory with gesture. This… implies that speech and gesture 
combine into a system of their own in which each modality performs its 
own functions, the two modalities supporting one another. (McNeill 2005, 
9) 
 
As McNeill goes on to say, his work “operates upon this premise” of two modalities 
acting in mutual and reciprocal support (2005, 9). McNeill details two further continuua, 
one comparing the relationship of types of gesture to conventions, and one comparing 
different semiotic characteristics. From these four sets of comparative criteria, McNeill 
precisely locates his target for analysis in the following summary of gesticulation: 
 
Gesticulation accompanies speech, is nonconventionalized, is global and 
synthetic in mode of expression, and lacks languagelike properties of its 
own. The speech with which gesture occurs, in contrast, is 
conventionalized, segmented, and analytic, and is fully possessed of 
linguistic properties. (McNeill 2005, 12) 
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As the present project is a philosophical treatment of co-speech gestures as enactments of 
linguistic performance, I should note that while my work is significantly indebted to 
McNeill’s, I will in this and later chapters take a critical stance on this demarcation of 
gesticulation. In particular, I do not share McNeill’s theoretical motivation for positing 
gesticulation as a radically different, seemingly ontologically distinct kind than speech, 
nor a different ‘species’ than sign language. In the next chapter, I will be questioning 
whether or not it is correct to deny conventionality to spontaneous co-speech gestures 
(and responding in the negative). In that and later chapters, I will also point out important 
ways in which speech can take on ‘gestural’ properties. McNeill finds it comfortable to 
claim at once that gesture is “part of language” and that gesture and language form a 
dialectical psycholinguistic production model (see 2005, 21). On the contrary, I find that 
including co-speech gestures as ingredients to enactments of linguistic performance 
becomes a much more daunting theoretical task when one is committed to the alterity of 
gestures at a basic level of definition.   
 
In addition to elaborating these classificatory continua, McNeill offers a highly 
refined gesture coding schema. With his imagery-language dialectic and growth point 
theory, McNeill argues for a dialectical production model that puts gesture at the core of 
both thinking-for-speaking and expressive action (McNeill 2005). Details and 
implications of his theoretical apparatus are discussed in II.2, below. McNeill’s coding is 
designed to work with the experimental conditions and goals of his lab, which for over 
twenty years has investigated various psycholinguistic aspects of co-speech gestures 
elicited in a videotaped monological narrative setting. Participants watch a Sylvester and 
Tweety cartoon, “Canary Row,” and retell the story to a listener who is out of range of 
the video camera. These videos are then coded and analyzed, using the method outlined 
below. While specific conditions are manipulated to facilitate various particular 
investigations into the relationship of gesture to thought and to speech, the basic coding 
criteria offer a precise demarcation and description of co-speech gesture phenomena.   
 These gestures accompanying narrative speech can be categorized according to 
the following criteria (McNeill 1992, 78-81):  
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• Imagistic. Does the gesture depict imagery? These gestures would contain some 
representational content, as opposed to ‘beats’ or gestures that seemingly only 
emphasize or “punctuate” speech in some way.21  
 
• Iconic. “A gesture is iconic if it bears a close formal relationship to the semantic 
content of the speech” (McNeill 1992, 78). This classification can be seen as a 
further specification of imagistic gestures; these imagistic gestures iconically 
depict some aspect of the accompanying speech. Sarah Taub’s example of the 
sign for tree in ASL is a classic example of iconicity in the manual modality 
(Taub 2001, 29). In spontaneous co-speech gesturing, any hand gesture that 
resembles some aspect of what is being said would count as iconic. McNeill 
observes that classification of gesture requires knowledge of the scene being 
described as much as the specific words that occur in speech. Iconic gestures can 
be classified semiotically or structurally.  
 
• Metaphoric. Such a gesture presents an image of an abstract concept. Metaphoric 
gestures must thus depict two things: Base and Referent. McNeill’s classification 
is closer to traditional treatments of verbal metaphor than are Wundt’s discussions 
of symbolic gesture. Cornelia Müller (2007, 2008a) and Alan Cienki (2008) offer 
detailed examples and discussions of metaphoric gesture that fit with McNeill’s 
overall paradigm. Müller presents an instance in which a young woman charts the 
course of a relationship gone wrong by riding the ‘ups and downs’ with the palm 
of her right hand (Müller 2007, 114). Here the Base would be the iconic depiction 
of a journey over a mountainous terrain; since the Referent is a romantic 
relationship, the gesture is metaphoric.   
 
• Deictic. Pointing movements. Spatial reference, rather than pointing to present 
objects, is a more common use of deictic gestures in a narrative setting. Imagine a 
                                                          
21 See Kendon 2004, p. 103 for a discussion of the difficulties of these demarcations. 
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speaker recounting a baseball game for a listener, and frequently pointing with his 
outstretched right hand at ‘first base’ in the scene his speech and gesture set up. 
 
• Beats. These hand movements are not defined by meaning since they lack 
discernible meaning. Instead, they are classified by noticeable movement 
characteristics.22 Beats tend to be biphasic (having only a stroke and retraction 
phase) and of relatively low energy. A woman lightly taps her leg as the topic of 
conversation changes.  McNeill offers a “beat filter” for ruling out meaning and 
classifying hand movements as beats (1992, 81). 
 
In addition to this typology, McNeill has a detailed program for coding, in which coders 





o Palm and finger orientation 
o Gesture space 
• Motion 
o Trajectory shape 
o Space where motion takes place 
o Direction 
• Meaning 
o Hands : “What does it represent and what viewpoint does it entail?” 
o Motion: “Are there any marked features, such as manner, direction, kind 
of path, or locus?” 
o Body: “Is it representing a different entity from the hand or motion?” 
 
                                                          
22 Similar to David Efron’s batons. Efron (1941) offered a schema that was very influential for Ekman and 
Friesen. 
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Since McNeill is working with video, there are specific procedures for coding timing of 
gesture occurrence in relation to speech.  Temporal synchrony and speech-gesture 
coexpressiveness are of central importance to McNeill’s research project (1992, 23), 
which posits a dialectical relationship between speech and gesture as two unlike modes of 
thinking that come together to produce and manifest a single idea. Therefore, McNeill 
analyzes kinesic aspects of gestures into ‘G-units’ and within these, ‘G-phases’ made up 
of discrete movement phases: preparation, pre-stroke hold, hold, stroke, post-stroke hold, 
and retraction (see Kendon 1980 for original development of speech-accompanying 
gesture structure into units and phrases of bodily movement placed in a phrase-hierarchy; 
Kendon shows these phrases to be fully coordinated with speech structures such as tone 
units (see especially Kendon1980, 210-212)). Of these, only the stroke is obligatory. It is 
“the peak of effort in the gesture. It is in this phase that the meaning of the gesture is 
expressed. The stroke is synchronized with the linguistic segments that are coexpressive 
with it” (McNeill 1992, 83).   
 McNeill’s many schemata facilitate a very detailed coding of recorded gesture 
events. This system allows him to discuss kinesic hierarchy in tandem with phonological 
hierarchy (which involves syllable prominence and meaningful groups of sounds within 
an utterance), to discuss variations of handshape and uses of gesture space, and to 
contrast character viewpoint (C-VPT) gestures with object viewpoint (O-VPT) gestures 
(McNeill 1992, 84-95). These are significant analytic tools, but each is specified for his 
experimental purposes. For my purpose, the development of these schemata demonstrate 
the potential systematicity of gestural phenomena and their contribution to utterance 
meaning. 
 
Why do we gesture? 
The question of why we gesture, or what function gestures serve, already arrives 
alongside questions of classification and type. This question is present in evaluating how 
communicative a gesture may be, rather than say informative or interactive, or whether a 
gesture is best understood as encoding meaning (‘packaged’ by the gesturer for the 
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listener) or as a site for listener-decoding (as with unconscious facial displays, perhaps).23 
Historically, this question has been taken up in the quest for language origins, though I 
will not be following this route.24 A contemporary debate focuses on interpretations of 
the presence and absence of gesture in speech situations.  
For some theorists, the observation that people may speak without gesturing, that 
is, the observation of a putative lack of necessity when it comes to gesture, seriously 
undermines any strong claim to the importance of gesture for linguistic communication 
(e.g. Krauss 1991). As recent experimental research has shown (Alibali, Heath, et al. 
2001; Bavelas, Gerwing, et al. 2008), however, the type of speech task (monologic or 
dialogic) and conditions of visibility (for example, speaking on the telephone as a no-
visibility condition) affect the frequency and manner of co-speech gesture, thus 
complicating the question of simple presence or absence. Janet Bavelas argues that her 
findings support the primacy of dialogic speech and the likelihood that gestures are 
basically communicative; she explains the persistence of gestures in no-visibility 
situations on the grounds that these, as well as monological speech situations, are 
derivative from the face-to-face communicative interactions through which habits of 
gesturing while speaking develop (2008, 516). Furthermore, fluency is affected in 
situations where gestures are constrained (Alibali 2001), and listener comprehension is 
affected (in negative and positive ways) by both the presence and absence of gesture 
                                                          
23 See Ekman and Friesen on encoding and decoding (1969, 55). 
 
24 As seen in Chapter I, thinkers from antiquity through the nineteenth century saw in gesture a possible 
answer to the question of glottogenesis. As noted in Danesi (1993) and Kendon (2004), recent decades have 
seen something of a revival of this interest, which the Linguistic Society of Paris had put to rest in the 
1860s. Gestural theories of glottogenesis argue that human language emerged not from animal cries but 
gesturally. On some such arguments, there is far less of gap between animal cries and speech than between 
sign language and speech (Wundt 1973). The vocalist position requires more of an evolutionary break and 
cannot provide much answer to the question of why we gesture. Evolutionary and anatomical arguments 
also support the gesturist position (e.g. Call and Tomasello 2007). For mirror neuronal support of this 
thesis, see Gentilucci, M. and R. Dalla Volta (2007). David Armstrong, William Stokoe and Sherman 
Wilcox argue in Gesture and the Nature of Language (1995) that all language has its origin in gesture. See 
Wilcox’s 2004 article “Cognitive iconicity: Conceptual Spaces, meaning and gesture in signed languages” 
for two routes of development from gesture to language. Hewes’s overview (1976) remains the received 
authority on the gesturist perspective on glottogenesis. Hewes reviews a vast history of literature, mainly 
philosophical, tracing ancient rhetorical practices through the 18th century origin of language debate 
between Condillac and Herder and arguments from evolution. His own proposition involves a theory of the 
“depigmentation” of the palms (Hewes 1976, 498). 
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(Goldin-Meadow 2003; see also Driskell and Radtke, 2003). An existential interpretation 
of the presence and absence of co-speech gesture is found below, in more detailed 
discussions of McNeill (2005). Overall, while the questions of why we gesture when we 
do and why we do not when we do not have not been conclusively answered, these 
experiments have demonstrated context, communicative pressures, sociality and the 
cognitive and expressive labor called for by a given communicative situation to be highly 
relevant factors and explanatory variables. 
In the following sections I discuss two broad theoretical responses to the question 
of why we gesture. My point in doing so is not only to familiarize the reader with 
prevalent themes in the gesture literature, but also to demonstrate that a philosophy of 
gesture (and mind, and language), whether explicit or implicit, is operative in the way 
this question gets answered.  According to the view put forward by David McNeill (1992, 
2000, 2005) and colleagues, we gesture because gesturing is an integral component of our 
dynamic thinking and speaking processes. I detail this psychological approach, as well as 
select empirical evidence for this treatment of gesture, in II.2. According to an emerging 
alternative paradigm of which I take Jürgen Streeck (1993, 1994, 2009, 2010) to be a 
representative theorist, we gesture because gestures accomplish our communicative 
interactions and cooperative enactments of meaning (see also Kendon 2004).25 This 
interactive, ecological approach is reviewed in II.3. All of the treatments of gesture 
discussed in the remainder of the chapter share common ground and can be allied against 
more mainstream linguistic and psychological approaches that see gesture as superfluous 
to linguistic analysis, and as distinct from a moderate view that sees gesture as primarily 
serving non-communicative purposes of emphasis or lexical retrieval (Krauss, Morrel-
Samuels, et al. 1991) or that seeks to assimilate gesture to pre-existing psycholinguistic 
production models (De Ruiter 2000). While McNeill’s project specifies an utterance 
production function for co-speech gestures, this is not incompatible with assigning 
                                                          
25 Kendon offers a richly nuanced and non-committal survey of gesture functions, particularly noting with 
great clarity how gestures can contribute to an utterance’s referential content as well as serving pragmatic 
and interaction functions (2004, 158-159). While in my mind Kendon belongs in the meaning-building 
approach detailed below in this chapter, as a great observer of gesture he is more reticent in making the 
strong theoretical claims characteristic of McNeill and Streeck’s accounts. I return briefly to Kendon’s 
treatments of gestures’ semantic and pragmatic contributions to utterance meaning in Chapter III. 
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gestures a communicative role, which McNeill also does, albeit more as a presupposition 
than a justified posit.26 Thus I offer the reviews below in one sense as a joint presentation 
of some of the most compelling evidence to date for the indispensible role co-speech 
gestures play in communicative linguistic performances. Yet the approaches differ 
significantly, and it is worthwhile for my project of creating a philosophy of linguistic 
performance to consider seriously the philosophical underpinnings and implications of 
each (II.4). 
 
2.  Co-Speech Gesture in Thought and Speech: The Growth Point and Friends  
 
David McNeill’s primary theoretical contribution to gesture studies is his theory 
of the growth point, a hypothesized unit of thinking-for-speaking meant to account for 
and predict utterance formation and meaning construction in specific contexts.27 
“Thinking-for- speaking” describes cognition that is constrained by the requirements of a 
specific linguistic code (Slobin 1996). The term posits certain cognitive processes that 
select and shape and prepare ideas for expression in speech. McNeill’s Growth Point 
hypothesis “refers to how speakers organize their thinking to meet the demands of 
linguistic packaging on-line, during acts of speaking” (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 141). 
McNeill’s posited growth point is a moment in time that marks the lifespan of a thought, 
                                                          
26 In more recent writings (e.g. McNeill 2000), McNeill rejects modular information-processing models of 
speech (or, equally, speech and gesture) production on the grounds that these models leave out both context 
and the complex interweaving of idiosyncratic “individual cognition and the language system” (McNeill 
and Duncan 2000). This is not to rule out all possible processing models on McNeill’s view. Kita and 
Özyürek’s Interface Hypothesis provides a model wherein linguistic choices constrain iconic gesture 
formation, and this has been stated as in support of McNeill’s dynamic or dialectical understanding of 
speech and gesture production in Kita, S. and A. Ozyurek (2007).  Furthermore, Furuyama and Sekine 
(2007) have shown that the pressures of catchments, gestures that recur to create coherency in discourse, 
constrain the selection of what is presented as salient information (in general content and in speech). As 
Eric Pederson has suggested, GP Theory most specifically discusses the origins and outputs of thinking-for-
speaking; it cannot presume to be more than agnostic on what takes place in between (personal 
communication). The existential, ecological, and meaning-saturated nature of the theory does seem to rule 
out ballistic modular models, however.  
 
27 The growth point is a theoretical concept “referring to the primitive form, psychologically, from which 
the utterance is claimed to emerge. This growth point is a theoretical entity with defined properties that 
predict empirical data” (McNeill 1997, 190). 
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from its earliest stages in a speaker’s “cognitive being” through its external 
manifestation, when the thought is “brought onto a concrete plane of existence” in the 
composite act of speech and co-speech gesture (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 156; see 
McNeill 2005). The growth point has an internal dialectical structure in which imagistic 
and linguistic thinking mutually inform and constrain each other as a thought unfolds into 
an utterance. The growth point functions externally as the point of differentiation and 
most salience from a background context. 
The growth point delimits the rise and fall of thought via the interplay of an 
internal imagery-language dialectic. According to McNeill, this kind of thinking 
(thinking-for-speaking) is composed of two opposing semiotic modes. Language, meant 
narrowly here to refer to linguistic structure and verbal expression, is categorical, social, 
constrained by convention, analytic, linear and segmented. Imagistic thinking on the 
other hand is idiosyncratic, holistic or global, and synthetic. Speech embodies the former, 
gesture the latter (McNeill 1992, 2005). One way that the growth point is dynamic, then, 
is in this instability between the kinds of thinking that go into utterance formation and 
production. Importantly, the dialectical “unpacking” of the growth point is the 
microgenesis not only of the verbal and gestural output, but of the thought itself. On this 
view, gesture is both a) part of language, since it contributes essentially to the 
construction of expressive utterances, and b) part of thinking (or thinking itself), since it 
shapes and accomplishes thought. Furuyama and Sekine’s definition shows how the 
growth point (GP) is posited to be both externally and internally dynamic:  
 
The GP is a minimal unit of thinking-for-speaking that contains elements 
opposing one another, while the GP itself is also in opposition with its 
contextual background. The oppositions at different levels of analysis 
fuels a dialectic between opposing elements, until a full-fledged idea is 
developed and expressed in words and gesture. (Furuyama and Sekine 
2007, 79)  
 
In a famous example of a growth point, a participant in McNeill’s lab re-tells the 
narrative of a Sylvester and Tweety cartoon wherein Tweety drops a bowling ball into the 
drainpipe of which Sylvester is concurrently climbing up the interior. The speaker’s 
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sentence expresses that Tweety takes the bowling “ball and drops it down the drainpipe.” 
She makes a symmetrical two-handed gesture with palms loosely curved and facing 
down. The downward stroke of the gesture is synchronous with ‘down’. Importantly, the 
gesture stroke does not coincide with the verb ‘drops’, but is withheld to co-occur with 
‘down’. McNeill identifies the growth point of this utterance as ‘it down’, the image of 
the downward movement plus the linguistic content of the ‘it’ (the bowling ball) and the 
path particle ‘down’. The gesture is momentarily withheld because the core concept to be 
accomplished in this instance, according to McNeill, is what the bowling ball was doing 
and how it pushed Sylvester down a drainpipe. This action marks the external contrast 
with the general flow of the story – this is the salient point the speaker is making via 
interplay of the two distinct modes of speech and gesture. Though Tweety is still the 
agent in the utterance linguistically speaking, the gesture aided in transitioning to an 
understanding of the bowling ball as the real agentive force and ‘it down’ as the true 
“anchor” of the sentence. The growth point is ‘unpacked’ in this “process of articulating 
the implications of a core idea and using these implications as a guide to a well-formed 
surface structure. The ultimate sentence can be considered an action with which to 
present the GP” (McNeill 2005, 122).  
 The growth point is a holistic minimal unit in just this way: speech and gesture 
jointly embody thinking-for-speaking, and this thinking-for-speaking must be understood 
as always in context and as driven by imagistic content and linguistic constraint working 
in tandem. Significantly, the unpacking of the GP takes place not only before but while 
speaking and gesturing, such that the utterance (co-occurring speech and gesture) is  
 
an act of communication, but also an act of thought. Not only the listener 
but the speaker is affected. That is, the speaker realizes his or her meaning 
only at the final moment of synthesis… The synthesis – its analytic and 
holistic qualities – is a single mental representation for the speaker which 
did not exist until the instant of fusion at the rhythmical pulse. (McNeill 
1992, 246) 
 
The growth point is thus a ‘point’ posited both temporally and conceptually; it is 
the moment of emergence of an idea unit. Why this particular moment? What is this 
upsurge that marks a unitary thought to be unfolded? A psychological predicate, as the 
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semantic and pragmatic function that gives rise to a growth point, is a break from a 
background and definitive of this background as a figure implies its ground.28 In other 
words, the psychological predicate is the point to be made or the thought to be 
highlighted – what the sentence or even conversation is building up to, what the speaker 
is working to get across. The connection between gestures and psychological predicates 
is dual, since (1) gesture and speech synchronize here (in gesture stroke and peak 
prosody) and (2) “the form of the gesture embodies … the elements of meaning that are 
being differentiated at this moment” (McNeill 2005, 108). At any point in discourse, a 
speaker has contextual knowledge, awareness, and focus, all of which are enabled by and 
contribute to rich and responsive background conditions of the meaning emerging in the 
conversation. According to McNeill’s notion of communicative dynamism, in both 
internal and external form, “gestures add contrasts” and so move this emerging meaning 
along (McNeill 1992, 251). 
For McNeill, communicative dynamism is the beginning of the answer to the 
question “why do we perform gestures at all?” (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 155) and 
explains why sometimes we may speak without gesturing.29 In later work, McNeill 
describes communicative dynamism in terms of “the H-model”, a Heidegerrean take on 
psychological predicates. McNeill writes: 
 
By performing the gesture, the core idea is brought into concrete existence 
and becomes part of the speaker’s own existence at that moment. The 
Heideggerean echo in this statement is intended. Gestures … are 
themselves thinking in one of its many forms – not only expressions but 
thought, i.e., cognitive being, itself. (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 155-156. 
Original emphasis.)  
 
                                                          
28 Salient information, that is, “significant (newsworthy) contrast” to a more general “field of oppositions” 
is manifested in the synchronous surface form of the two modalities of speech and gesture, the co-timing of 
gesture stroke and the “acoustic aspect” in their resolution in a well-formed utterance plus gesture at the 
most informative, which is to say, most contrastive, point in a narrative or discourse (McNeill 2005). 
 
29 “This concept [cognitive being] explains the occurrence of gestures, and explains why they are more 
frequent and more elaborate where the departure of the meaning from the context is felt to be greater” 
(McNeill and Duncan 2000, 157). 
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McNeill glosses the idea of a thought as a shift in ‘cognitive being’, at once instigated 
and accomplished by linguistic practices:  
  
. . . to have your thoughts come to exist in the form of signs is to cause 
them to exist in a context of shared practical activities. A sign signifies 
only for those who ‘dwell’ in that context. This we can recognize is a 
recipe for the GP: sign and context are inseparable, and this context must 
be dwelled in. (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 156)  
 
To gloss this somewhat obscure passage, one can say that McNeill sees gestures as a 
mechanism for dwelling, that is, as a tool for conducting one’s self with others in such a 
way that the shared world is responded to meaningfully. On this view, the growth point 
dialectic is a process of mapping “‘external’ interactive contexts into internal units of 
functioning”, because it simultaneously brings linguistic categories and constraints to 
bear on idiosyncratic, personal reactions to a given situation and ‘grounds’ semantic 
frames and abstract grammatical constructions in context-specific experiences of 
significance and salience that take shape imagistically (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 
157).30 The point at which new meaning takes shape in the hands “is a mechanism for 
this ‘existential content’ of speech, this ‘taking up of a position in the world’” (McNeill 
and Duncan 2000, 193). When a speaker gestures, on this view, she reveals not simply 
her thoughts (as inner mental contents), but rather “part of her current cognitive being, 
her very mental existence, at the moment it occurs” (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 193). I 
take ‘cognitive being’ to be McNeill’s way of dressing-up the dynamism of thinking that 
takes place in the context of a conversation or communicative action. On McNeill’s view, 
a speaker’s gestures highlight the richest moments of her event of meaning-making, 
indicating for her interlocutors that her “mental existence” is doing something new and 
interesting relative to the immediate context. I address the success of this term as an 
interpretation of Heidegger and as a thematization of gesture function in Chapter IV. 
The definitive claims I identify in Growth Point Theory are that (1) thinking-for-
speaking begins schematically, as an idiosyncratic image contrasting against the current 
context, and (2) meaningful speech requires gesture (or, in a weaker claim, imagistic 
                                                          
30 Note that thinking-for-speaking starts imagistically for McNeill. 
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thinking). On my reading, McNeill aims to posit an existential, ecological account of 
meaning construction as the holistic response of an embodied and socially embedded 
semiotic being, and this aim brings the work into the vicinity of existential 
phenomenological views of language.  For McNeill, gesture is an organismic response to 
situations of significance. His ultimately speculative collapse of ‘gesture’ into both the 
initiating element of a dialectic of cognitive production and the outward manifestation of 
this process moves McNeill’s account beyond the realm of empirical falsifiability and 
into the terrain of existential phenomenology. I return to and elaborate this dialogue 
between McNeill’s theoretical work and existential phenomenology in Chapter IV.  
Elaborating and critiquing Growth Point Theory 
McNeill offers an intricate theoretical apparatus for thinking about spontaneous 
co-speech hand gestures. This should be of interest to philosophers not only because 
McNeill draws directly from philosophers, as I will discuss later, but also because he is 
making claims about the nature of cognition, language, and meaning. For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is important to note various claims about gesture that are presupposed by 
McNeill’s Growth Point Theory. Critics point out that McNeill’s operating framework is 
psychological, rather than interactive or enactive in nature. For example, Adam Kendon 
writes, 
It appears that gestures produced in relation to speech are an integral 
component of the communicative act of the speaker. Regardless of 
whether and how they contribute to the interpretation of the 
communicative act by others, they must be seen as part of the speaker’s 
final product, and not as symptoms of some struggle to attain verbal 
expression. If gestures help to make clear our own thoughts, they do so in 
much the same way as words do. (Kendon 2004, 358-359) 
This comment directly challenges the core tenets of Growth Point theory, namely that 
speech and gesture are radically distinct modes, and that gestures are a window 
(“symptom”) into a speaker’s cognitive processes. While both McNeill and Kendon see 
gestures as broadly ‘communicative,’ as we have seen, McNeill understands spontaneous 
speech-accompanying gestures as by definition non-linguistic. Rather, they are 
manifestations of a related, accompanying cognitive process that is not the same as 
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process as preparing to speak; thus gesturing is not the same act as using words.31 
McNeill wants to enrich our understanding of speech production by pointing out that 
gestures (in both production and expression) often are co-present in thinking-for-speaking 
and co-expressive with speech. Yet dialectic requires that the involved poles be in 
essence distinct from each other. While gestures take on language-like properties in the 
absence of speech (McNeill and Goldin-Meadow 1999), in the specific phenomenon of 
conversational, daily, spontaneous speech-accompanying gesture, gestures will never be 
there in the way that words are, according to McNeill. Gesture interpretation requires 
complex posits of psychological background conditions, processes, and motivations that 
McNeill does not attribute to ‘linguistic’ elements like words. Thus, as I discuss in more 
detail in the following chapter, co-speech gestures on McNeill’s view cannot be subject 
to the external, social norms and conventions that guide (properly so-called) linguistic 
behavior. McNeill and his colleagues frequently slip into what I describe below as a 
‘meaning-leaking’ paradigm of gesture thematization, wherein gestures are understood as 
unintentionally, non-consciously, and uncontrollably revealing aspects of a speaker’s 
current mental state (or “cognitive being”).  
 
While McNeill’s most recent treatments of gesture move in the direction of an 
embodied existential-phenomenological approach (about which I say more in Chapter 
IV), in the past decade ample empirical research has been carried out under the auspices 
of Growth Point Theory.32 For example, Sotaro Kita and Ash Ozyürek (2007) offer a 
hypothesis for a production model that expands on empirical evidence for the imagery-
language dialectic posited by Growth Point Theory. Their Interface Hypothesis holds that 
“gestures originate from an interface representation, which is spatio-motoric, and 
organized for the purpose of speaking” (Kita and Ozyürek 2007, 68).33 Kita and Ozyürek 
                                                          
31 It should be noted that in his treatment of gesture as an element of cognition he calls ‘imagistic thinking,’ 
McNeill offers an embodied account of cognition. 
 
32 See for example the 2007 volume edited by Susan Duncan and Justine Cassell, Gesture and the Dynamic 
Dimension of Language: Essays in Honor of David McNeill (John Benjamins Press).  
 
33 According to this hypothesis, “…gestures are generated during the conceptual process that organizes 
spatio-motoric imagery into a suitable form for speaking. Thus, it predicts that the spatio-motoric imagery 
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extend McNeill’s dialectical picture of two modalities affecting each other, rather than an 
apparatus outputting a pre-existing idea. On their view, the meaning of what is produced 
in thinking-for-speaking is shaped through the dialectic. Yet their work focuses 
specifically on crosslinguistic investigations which “show convincingly that the linguistic 
packaging of information shapes iconic gestures online” (Kita and Ozyürek 2007, 72); in 
other words, this is evidence for only one direction of the dialectic, the way that syntactic 
structures constrain the shape of accompanying hand gestures. 
 Susan Goldin-Meadow has written extensively on how gestures take on more or 
less language-like properties in various contexts of communicative burden and in various 
populations (hearing versus deaf, for example). In a recent paper, Goldin-Meadow writes,  
 
But when gesture shares the burden of communication with speech, it 
loses its language-like structure, assuming instead a global and synthetic 
form. Although not language-like in structure when it accompanies 
speech, gesture still constitutes an important part of language. It conveys 
information imagistically and as such, gives speakers a means to convey 
thoughts that they cannot express in words, and a mechanism for changing 
those thoughts. Gesture can be part of language or can itself be 
language… (2007, 31) 
 
Despite this lingering commitment to a narrow definition of ‘linguistic’ and what counts 
as ‘language,’ Goldin-Meadow’s research offers significant insights into how co-speech 
gestures can function as meaningful products for speakers and learners in real situations 
of communication and problem-solving. Though she may not present it as such, I find 
that this approach indicates an avenue for understanding gesture that is distinct from 
McNeill’s, since the route she takes is not in terms of a relationship between imagery and 
linguistic form but between what is expressed and what is thought. In other words, we 
can from this research begin to think of moments of enactment of meaning and how, 
through collective cooperative processes of interaction and interpretation, these lead to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
underlying gestures is shaped simultaneously by 1) how information is organized in a readily accessible 
linguistic expression that is concise enough to fit within a processing unit for speech production, and 2) the 
spatio-motoric properties of the referent (which may or may not be verbally expressed)” (Kita and Ozyürek  
2007, 69).  
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further enactments of meaning. Understanding co-speech gestures as part of shared 
enactive processes of meaning-building requires backing away from the vocabulary of 
‘conveying’ or ‘revealing’ thoughts. 
 
3. Linking Cognition and Communication: Gesture in Interaction 
Gesture theorist and communication studies scholar Jürgen Streeck (1993, 1994, 
2009) approaches gesture in a manner that highlights its communicative as well as social 
and practical nature; on this view, the significance of a gesturing act is interactively 
produced and located between interlocutors, thus side-stepping the communicative-
informative debate sketched above. In contrast to McNeill, Streeck’s paradigm and 
methodology is ecological, behavioral, and microethnographic, rather than psychological. 
Says Streeck: “I regard gestures as conceptual acts, not as expressions of conceptual acts 
that take place elsewhere, ‘in the mind’” (2009, 160). While this statement may seem to 
echo McNeill’s picture of gestures accomplishing thought, Streeck’s focus on interactive 
activity between participants and environment, rather than on individual cognitive 
processes, results in a different emphasis that may deliver better on this claim of 
accomplishment. Streeck conceives of gesture “as a family of human practices: not as a 
code or symbolic system or (part of) language, but as a constantly evolving set of largely 
improvised, heterogeneous, partly conventional, partly idiosyncratic, and partly culture-
specific, partly universal practices of using the hands to produce situated understandings” 
(Streeck 2009, 5). To facilitate study of gestures as practices of producing human 
understanding, Streeck focuses on “human action and interaction in non-experimental, 
every-day life settings” (2009, 5).  While grounded in various methods of context and 
conversation analysis, in more recent work Streeck has come to focus on gesture “in its 
close connection with practical, bodily acts” (2009, 7). 
In his 2009 work Gesturecraft, Streeck presents “the skilled, mindful bodily 
practice of gesture” as “a universally available resource from which people can 
manufacture understanding – of each other and of the world they share” (2009, 2). He 
argues that gestures gather meaning from environments, structure environments, 
articulate experience, share experience with others, and organize our interactions (Streeck 
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2009, 3). Streeck attends to the bi-directional nature of human understanding and sense-
making, highlighting the activity and passivity, production and reception, and collective 
interpretation in every speech-gesture act. He employs Martin Heidegger’s notion of care 
to make this point (Streeck 2009, 6). Streeck also draws on phenomenology (Merleau-
Ponty and Polanyi), embodied cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, Johnson, et al.) and 
conversational analysis to get this method of micro-ethnography off the ground.  
Drawing on anthropological and phenomenological observations that he details 
throughout Gesturecraft, Streeck offers six gesture ecologies, “that is, six different ways 
in which gestural activity can be aligned with the world, with concurrent speech, and with 
the interactants” (2009, 8):  
 
• Making sense of the world at hand. Rather than seeing gestures as “movement 
in the air by empty hands,” this ecology attends to how gestures couple with 
objects and actions in the world. Streeck finds that “…wherever cooperation 
involves the handling or making of things… one finds manifold indexical, 
iconic, and symbolic actions of the fingers and hands, and often these are 
entirely indispensible, given the type of activity underway and that 
communication tasks that it raises for the practitioners.”  These sorts of 
gestures “structure the participants’ perception of objects,” “disclose… 
features and affordances of things,” “analyze, abstract, and exhibit action,” 
and “‘mark up’ the setting” (Streeck 2009, 8). He offers the example of car 
mechanics exploring together with hands a dent and from this exploration 
gesturing possibilities about how the surface may be repaired. 
 
• Disclosing the world within sight. “This is the prototypical realm of pointing,” 
which “enables the participants to coordinate their orientation so that they 
jointly focus gaze on a distant object, feature or location.” In this mode, 
gestures “serve spatial orientation as well as the sharing of sights.” Yet once 
joint attention is established, Streeck notes how points and other gestures 
establish vectors, directionality, lines of force, and overall elaborate how the 
particular scene is to be viewed (Streeck 2009, 8-9) 
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• Depiction. Taking place on the ‘stage’ set up by interactants focusing 
primarily on their unfolding dialogue, these gestures (which are looked at) are 
employed as “a representation device, to depict aspects of the talked-about 
world.”34 Depictive gestures “represent worlds in collaboration with speech,” 
and refer to shared knowledge rather than what is immediately visible 
(Streeck 2009, 9). Streeck offers the example of an architect telling a student 
about a building site he visited recently. As detailed a picture as the words 
might give, the accompanying hand movements structure the scene for the 
student who has not visited the site. Here the gestures “depict what the spoken 
utterance describes” (Streeck 2010, 230).   
 
• Thinking by hand: gesture as conceptual action. “Thinking by hand involves 
the speaker’s hands producing schemata in terms of which utterance content 
or narrated experience is construed.” Streeck refuses to “lump together” this 
mode of gesture with what others have called ‘iconic’ or ‘imagistic’ or 
‘illustrator’ gestures, so that he can denote this special mode of “ceiving or 
caption,” “a bodily form of conceiving, i.e. of conceptually structuring content 
to be articulated in speech.” When speakers ‘ceive’ via gesture, they “without 
attending to the process and without wishing to depict anything, use their 
hands to give form to – i.e. construe – content.” (Streeck 2009, 9-10) A cept is 
thus a “manual concept” (2010, 233) in the sense of spontaneous acting out of 
an idea, such as ‘cranking’. Frequently this kind of gesturing enacts 
metaphorical or metonymical reasoning by demonstrating motorically the 
vehicle of a metaphor or some select aspect of a more abstract concept (for 
example, a mechanic rotating his index finger in a circle by his ear while 
making a ‘listening face’ to demonstrate hearing something crank (2010, 
                                                          
34 In earlier work, Streeck demonstrates that speakers modify gesture depending on how much attention 
listeners are paying to their hands and their discourse (Streeck 1993 & 1994; see also McNeill 1994, 
Kendon 1994). Streeck’s work from this time investigates gaze, offering empirical tracking of what 
happens for the participants in a discourse situation with gesture.   
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233)). Streeck explains, “the speaker’s body supplies a sensorimotor schema 
that structures some phenomenon or abstract domain and thereby renders it 
intelligible” (2010, 234).   
 
• Displaying communicative action. This mode is a functionalist classification 
of when hands embody communicative action. These are a variety of cepts, as 
they show how speakers understand their speech actions (as questioning, as 
imploring, etc.) and how their actions relate to actions that have gone before. 
This “pragmatic mode of gesture” includes pronominal references (such as 
pointing to a speaker or represented speaker position), the stance the speaker 
takes towards the unfolding discourse, and any actions of the hands “by which 
aspects of the interaction are displayed.” (Streeck 2009, 10) 
 
• Ordering and mediating transactions. What marks out this pragmatic mode 
from #5 is its orientation to other participants in the interaction and its 
attempts to regulate their communicative processes. “This mode of gesturing 
can involve touching or gesturing toward the other to elicit attention or to 
allocate a turn, to solicit response or attempt to silence it, or to manage the 
attention of others to one another.” In most instances, Streeck notes, these 
gestures can only be analytically separated from gestures that display 
communicative action. (Streeck 2009, 10) 
 
Since all of these ecologies are alignments of hand gestures with concurrent 
speech and the actions of involved participants, it is difficult for me to name which of 
these typologies I am investigating and which I may ignore, as I had so responded to 
previous taxonomies reviewed in this chapter. Rather, Streeck’s proliferation of the 
possibilities of meaning creation and enactment found in co-speech gestures both 
cautions against seeing co-speech gestures as a monolithic phenomenon and points us to 
a holistic and yet localized approach to communicative performances of meaning as such. 
For Streeck, the response to the question ‘why do we gesture?’ requires us to see gesture 
as a fluid and flexible tool that we put to use differently depending on different contexts 
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and communicative demands (see also Bavelas 2008). The question then becomes ‘why 
do we do the various particular things we do – verbally, kinesically, visually, etc. – to 
communicate in situations x, y, and z?,’ which is to say that if we follow Streeck’s 
example, our inquiry must examine the broader phenomena of human embodied 
communicative activity. Only then will we have the proper framework in which to do 
justice to hand gestures’ specific contributions to unique enactments of linguistic 
meaning. 
As a way of fleshing out the distinction I find between McNeill and Streeck, I 
close this chapter by introducing a brief taxonomy of my own. Note that within the 
assortment of researchers and theorists convinced that gestures are semantically rich 
behaviors co-operating with speech to form utterances, there are conflicting claims. On 
the one hand, gestures are held to be uncontrollable, unconscious ‘windows’ to speakers’ 
thought patterns and intentions. On the other hand, some researchers claim that gestures 
are external objects accessible for both speakers and listeners to monitor and interact 
with. I call the first view ‘meaning-leaking’ and the second the ‘meaning-building’.  
The ‘leaking’ account, in which gestures reveal cognitive activity, tends to link 
gesture with the ‘truer’ aspects of our thinking and speaking (McNeill 1992), pointing out 
that gestures correct verbal mistakes and give away our lies (Franklin 2007, e.g.). The 
‘leakers’ also emphasize the spontaneous, rather than sedimented, nature of the gestural 
modality.35  Regarding the impact that gestures have on thought, McNeill writes that 
“gesture supplies the idiosyncratic, the personal, and the context-specific aspects of 
thought, to be combined with the socially regulated aspects that come from the 
conventions of language” (1992, 2). While the paradigm of spontaneity and non-
convention is frequently a useful and powerful heuristic for thematizing the contribution 
of gesture to meaning, as we will see in the next chapter’s speech-act analysis as well as a 
discussion in Chapter IV of Merleau-Ponty’s spontaneous-sedimented dialectic (2002), 
there isn’t good reason to see gestures as only and ever ‘spontaneous’ and speech as only 
                                                          
35 This contrast anticipates a discussion in Chapter IV of Merleau-Ponty’s spontaneity-sedimentation 
dialectic, which is quite influential for McNeill. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, McNeill may under-
appreciate the intelligence of spontaneity in Merleau-Ponty’s conception. 
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and ever ‘sedimented’. Note also that the ‘leaky’ view tends to focus on individual 
cognitive processes, rather than on the irreducible sociality of linguistic activity.36  
On the other hand, the ‘meaning-building’ approach focuses on how meaning is 
jointly, locally, and dynamically constructed through external exploitation of gestures as 
communicative tools. This approach offers suggestions for how gestures, as 
communicative tools, may fail. Failure at least becomes an option under this paradigm, 
and as philosopher Jürgen Habermas tells us, failure “shows the rationality of the 
expressions – failures can be explained” (1981, 11). The ‘building’ position also helps to 
differentiate amongst gestures. Gestures may vary in the degree and quality of their 
expressivity and content; it is not only their presence or absence to which we need to 
attend. For example, Janet Bavelas, in a study on gesturing while on the telephone, 
concludes that it is the absence rather than the presence of gesture that is marked, and 
offers empirical evidence that gestures may change in frequency and force under different 
communicative pressures (2008). The social as well as the cognitive nature of gestures is 
highlighted in the ‘building’ paradigm.37 I discuss more detailed examples of both 
paradigms in subsequent chapters. This ‘leaking’ vs. ‘building’ divide proves to be a 
useful beginning heuristic for specifying key features of an enactive, rather than 
representationalist, account of linguistic practices of meaning-making. 
 
4. Gesture’s Pragmatic Turn 
In this chapter, I have attempted to introduce foundational terminology and 
research methods and questions in the emerging field of gesture studies. As this 
interdisciplinary research initiative grows rapidly with each passing day, I have only tried 
here to give accounts of some of the most representative and influential taxonomies, 
theories, and lines of inquiry. In particular, I have here gathered together field-defining 
research that turns around the question of the relationship of spontaneous hand gesturing 
                                                          
36 “… an individualized and internalized environment (if such thing could even exist) is not a genuine 
social environment; one cannot see how it could constitute and structure individual cognitive abilities”  
(Steiner & Stewart 2009, 534). 
 
37 “Our alternative is to propose that face-to-face dialogue with all of its natural features is the basic form of 
language use” (Bavelas 2008, 516). 
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to the act of speaking. While all of the research reviewed above shares a commitment to 
investigating hand gestures as meaningful human practices that in some way aid in 
communication and cognition, and while the two broad responses to the question ‘why do 
we gesture?’ that I outlined – offered by David McNeill (and colleagues) and Jürgen 
Streeck – both dialogue with existential phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Martin Heidegger, there are significant differences between them. In later chapters I will 
continue to discuss research results from these camps; both McNeill and Streeck, along 
with Kendon, are close watchers of gestures and offer insights into the phenomena too 
important to ignore.  
Taking these qualifications into account, nevertheless I find that there are 
significant philosophical motivations for favoring the interactive approach offered by 
Streeck, or what I have termed the ‘meaning-building’ approach to gesture. On the other 
hand, there are significant philosophical motivations for critically evaluating the current 
cognitive-psychological approach put forward by McNeill and his associates. While it is 
not my aim to reject all instances of ‘meaning-leaking’-type analysis or to insist that 
gestural phenomena never ‘leaks’ meaning, I think researchers need to understand the 
philosophical implications of this view and proceed with great care. Since this is not an 
election, however and since there are aspects of Streeck’s treatment that require 
philosophical clarification and intervention, the point is, more importantly, that a 
pragmatic turn is taking place in gesture scholarship.  
By ‘pragmatic turn’ I mean that the empirically-based field of gesture studies is 
expanding beyond (still-unresolved) intracranial inquiries into individual cognitive 
processes to include questions of interaction, multimodal participation and meaning 
construction, discourse regulation, and embodied social cooperation (for example, 
Tomasello 2008; Sweetser and Sizemore 2008; Enfield 2009; Streeck 2009; Wharton 
2009; Bara 2010). It is appropriate that gesture studies would initiate such a turn, since 
gestures as non-verbal utterance elements might be analyzed with pragmatic tools 
designed to go beyond what is said. Furthermore, a philosophically pragmatic view of 
meaning as consequence is better equipped to deal with the complexities of multimodal 
embodied communication. I take up and elaborate this dually pragmatic nature of co-
81 
speech gestures in Chapter III, demonstrating that these new inquiries are helpful for my 
project of seeing gesture as an enactment of linguistic meaning.  
I suggest that gesture research can serve as a new lens through which 
philosophers might gain perspective on the on-going struggle to properly relate semantic 
and pragmatic inquiries into linguistic meaning. Yet just as in the explosion of empirical 
research and theoretical apparatus that followed McNeill’s Growth Point theory, recent 
work in ‘cognitive pragmatics’ (Bara 2010; Wharton 2009), recent reinterpretations of 
Grice from evolutionary and gesturalist perspectives (Tomasello 2008; Enfield 2009), 
and recent experiments on the interaction-regulating role gestures may play in discourse 
(Sweetser and Sizemore 2008; Gerwing and Allison 2009) are going unnoticed by 
mainstream philosophers of language. In the following three chapters, then, I tease out 
and work through the philosophical motivations already afoot in these interdisciplinary 
inquiries in order to offer philosophical justification for my own preferences and 
evaluations of gesture research. 
The remaining chapters of the dissertation will offer philosophical motivation for 
an approach to gestures that sees them as social and normative phenomena that are 
dynamically co-constructed, embodied enactments of linguistic meaning, rather than 
mere manifestations of an isolated consciousness in conversation with itself. Following 
the leads I find in my reflections on gesture studies, I consider theories of communicative 
action and speech acts (Chapter III), existential phenomenological treatments of 
interpretation and disclosure (Chapter IV), and embodied cognitive science explorations 
of gesture as schematic and cooperatively enactive (Chapter V). My aim is to offer a 
reciprocally informed and informing reading of philosophy and gesture such that a 






PRAGMATIC AND PRAGMATIST APPROACHES TO GESTURE STUDY: 
GETTING NORMATIVITY IN CO-SPEECH GESTURES 
 
0. Pragmatics and Pragmatism 
  
In the previous two chapters, I advocated thinking of language and meaning in 
terms of performative, communicative acts that make use of context, knowledge, 
intention, interpretation, and multiple modalities (speech, gesture, gaze, e.g.). In this 
chapter I give further philosophical support for this preference, and I accentuate and 
develop a crucial component of communicative linguistic activity: these acts that use 
language to communicate do so for an audience, and the context, background knowledge, 
and purpose are importantly shared. In other words, the emerging account of how 
spontaneous co-speech gestures are a first-class element of linguistic action must 
establish linguistic activity (and co-speech gestures along with this) as an irreducibly 
social phenomenon. As presented in Chapters I and II, I take certain evidence and 
arguments (see particularly I.1) to indicate that, contra the philosophical and linguistic 
traditions since the twentieth century, hand gesturing while speaking is a linguistic 
activity, in large part in virtue of its “belonging to [sic] speech performance” (Kendon 
1980, 208). In highlighting the social nature of this activity, I am following the 
intersubjective or pragmatic turn that is succeeding a linguistic turn in various theoretical 
treatments of language, meaning, and mind.38 Setting my account apart from these, of 
course, is the inclusion of co-speech hand gestures. Introducing this complex and 
previously unaccounted-for element into pragmatic and pragmatist discussions of 
sociality specially highlights shared effort, cooperation, and embodied knowledge and 
action as indispensible factors in communication, thus paving a way past the 
                                                          
38 I explain this usage at the close of Chapter II. In philosophy, the term ‘pragmatic turn’ is associated with 
emphasis on experience, appreciation for pragmatist philosophy such as that of Peirce, Dewey, or James, 
and with the more recent work in “experimental” post-linguistic turn thinking (see Koopman 2011). In 
linguistics and gesture studies, a new wave of work in ‘cognitive pragmatics’ is constituted by a range or 
actually quite different approaches and claims (see Wharton 2009; Bara 2010; compare with Tomasello 
2008). 
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propositional bias that has plagued accounts, including most pragmatic accounts, of 
rationality and linguistic normativity up to now. 
This chapter offers two directions of approach to the goal of clarifying the 
linguistic status of spontaneous co-speech hand gestures. The first direction is elevation 
via assimilation: showing that hand gestures can be analyzed by the models and formal 
pragmatic tools that analyze verbal utterances, thus elevating the status of gestures to an 
already identifiable linguistic realm. The second direction is elevation via 
reprioritization: showing that verbal utterances or propositions (conventionally 
configured strings of verbal symbols, spoken or thought) are not the only tool of meaning 
achievement; furthermore, they are dependent upon other modalities and elements of 
meaning. By revising the received notion of the linguistic such that it includes visible and 
haptic bodily communicative performances, the way is laid to also revise the received 
notion of rationality, so that it is not strictly propositional or necessarily dependent upon 
formulation in propositions. The two directions of approach have one end: bringing 
nonverbal and verbal phenomena into the same plane of analysis, thereby undoing a 
persistent dichotomy that has excluded gestural phenomena from philosophical-linguistic 
analysis. The broader philosophical point is that language is properly recognized as a 
sphere of normatively-guided human practices of meaning-achievement (which includes 
broadly meaningful symbolic practices such as visual art, dance, and religious ceremony), 
and that gesture is properly recognized as an activity of meaning-achievement that takes 
place within the sphere of linguistic activity. Both pragmatics and pragmatism facilitate 
both directions of approach – elevating gestures and re-prioritizing propositions – that 
help me make this point. 
 
Pragmatics 
The domain of pragmatics, when considered philosophically, is a challenging one 
to pin down. For my purposes, pragmatics studies the meaning of communicative acts as 
acts. This is fairly close to some influential definitions, for example Robert Stalnaker’s 
“Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed” 
(1970, 275) or “pragmatics studies the use of language in context” (Lycan 1995, 588) or 
Kent Bach’s claim that “pragmatic information is generated by, or at least made relevant 
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by, the act of uttering it” (2001, 22). Of the two branches that often divide this discipline, 
I am generally more concerned with what has been termed far-side pragmatics – the 
study of meaning that “goes beyond” what is said. This branch stands in contrast to 
pragmatic analyses of “the near-side of what is said” – analyses that seek to supply the 
facts necessary for securing interpretation of indexicals, deictics, and whatever other 
pieces of immediate context contribute to or disambiguate what is said (Korta and Perry 
2011).   
Gricean far-side pragmatics outlines a process of interpreting or reconstructing a 
speaker’s communicative intentions as a requirement for establishing the full meaning of 
an utterance.39 In debates surrounding Grice’s formulations and in subsequent 
neoGricean pragmatic theory, there is some tension regarding the underlying model of 
communication. On Grice’s view, we recognize others’ intentions through ampliative 
reasoning (Korta and Perry 2011), not strict rule-following – hence the possibility of 
nonconventional communication such as conversational implicatures (as discussed in 
Chapter I).40 Communication then is not just achieved by decoding interlocutors’ 
messages; at the very least it also requires figuring out what is going on in their minds 
more broadly (and some theorists, such as Sperber and Wilson (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter I) think that this ampliative reasoning or mind-reading should replace the 
decoding model, by and large). Paralleling the debate as to how many ‘concessions’ a 
formal semantic theorist must make to context (near-side pragmatics), there is no 
consensus regarding how much of a ‘coding-decoding’ model should implicitly or 
explicitly be involved as a starting place for figuring out ‘what is said’ in order to then 
reckon the meaning beyond what is said (far-side pragmatics). The limitations of a 
decoding model will become clear in subsequent discussions in this chapter.  
 Why should the status of pragmatics matter to scholars of spontaneous co-speech 
hand gestures? The present work argues for recognition of the linguistic nature of these 
gestures. So long as semantics cannot be cleanly separated from pragmatics, then the 
                                                          
39 As he gives the formula in the 1957 lecture “Meaning”: “‘[S] meant something by x’ is roughly 
equivalent to ‘[S] intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the 
recognition of this intention’” (Grice 1989 [1957], 219). 
40 ‘Ampliative’ reasoning is non-deductive reasoning that draws inferences based on given premises. 
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phenomena with which linguistics and philosophy of language concerns itself when it 
studies language are linguistic, or become so when needed for analysis of communicative 
performances that humans enact at high-order levels of intentionality and rationality. 
Thus, attending to pragmatic phenomena present in co-speech gestures elevates them to a 
linguistic status. This new construal of language is achieved in part by demonstrating that 
verbal utterances are themselves better understood when gestures are included in 
clarifying both near- and far-side pragmatic aspects (thus elevating/assimilating gestures), 
and in part by showing that the kinds of criteria we use to determine success in linguistic 
activity are actually broad enough to easily include nonverbal communicative behaviors 
(re-prioritizing the proposition).  
The not-inconsiderable traditional resistance to this expansion of the realm of the 
linguistic is premised upon a biased notion of linguistic phenomena/communicative acts 
as propositional. For example, Austin and Grice include non-conventional elements as 
part of communicative (normatively regulated) acts; yet these elements demonstrate 
rationality in so far as they can be stated propositionally. While early versions of speech 
act theory demonstrate that nonconventional and, technically speaking, nonverbal 
(unspoken) elements are parts of communicative acts, they stay well within a 
propositional bias. It is necessary to deploy pragmatist criteria of communicative action 
and interaction against these empirical pragmatic theories to re-prioritize the status of the 
proposition in ordinary language philosophy.  
 
Linguistic pragmatism   
My use of the term ‘pragmatism’ may not sit well with all scholars of American 
philosophy, so allow me to clarify my restricted scope at the outset. For the most part, I 
draw from ‘neopragmatists,’ namely Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom, to discuss 
recent philosophical theories of communicative action, which both dovetail with and 
deviate from neoGricean pragmatic accounts. Habermas’s and Brandom’s accounts focus 
on the rationality of communicative action and can be described as offering a linguistic 
pragmatism. In their focus on normativity (with its core ingredients of sociality, 
convention, success, and failure) these neopragmatists have discernible if complex roots 
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in classical pragmatists such as Charles Peirce, William James, Herbert Mead, and John 
Dewey, and in ordinary language philosopher (and pragmatist) Ludwig Wittgenstein.  
There are certain broad tendencies that thread through the pragmatist tradition 
when it comes to language and meaning. For this philosophical family, language is a 
doing, an active and dynamic process, a working that takes on some task, a purposive 
functioning for some project for some persons so engaged. Communication, sense-
making and –taking, and contextualized interpretation are the activities for which 
linguistic phenomena (words, sentences, (gestures)) are tools. The meaning that emerges 
(as use) in these practices is always shared: meaning cannot exist privately but only 
publicly. Pragmatism understands meaning and truth as tied to situations of use, and 
therefore as defeasible, requiring reconstruction, and relative to unfolding and future 
‘cashings out’. 
In recent years, philosophers have greatly contributed to the coherent statement of 
a classically pragmatist theory of language and meaning. For example, in his recent book 
Pragmatism and Reference, David Boersema lists Dewey’s four features of language as: 
(1) human creations and artifacts (of which language is one) are processes, not ‘things’; 
(2) these processes are living behaviors and so part of our engagements with the world; 
(3) language (as a behavior) has ‘work to do’ in the context of inquiry; and (4) language 
is a tool (2009, 79-80). This outline is helpful, since Dewey himself does not offer a 
systematic theory of language and meaning. Nonetheless, Dewey’s comments in 
Experience and Nature (2008 [1925]) express his functionalist conception of language as 
communication and discourse, an activity of the body-mind in interaction (with its 
environment, with others, and with itself) (Dewey 1925, 223; LW.1.196-223). In this 
work, Dewey locates normativity in the body-mind that arises in interaction (1925, 211; 
LW.1.211) and explains meanings in terms of purposes for which they can be “taken” or 
“mis-taken” (1925, 219; LW.1.219). In the functionalist, emergent dialectic Dewey 
offers, “meanings, ideas… occur” as “characters” or “qualities” of “a new interaction of 
events” and they furnish a situation “with new properties” (1925, 221; LW.1.221). In 
other words, meaning is the difference ideas make to felt experiences. Words are tools for 
difference-making, but everything depends on use in interaction. In some cases, language 
as we tend to think of it is most successful when it “disappears” (Dewey 1925, 223; 
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LW.1.223). Dewey offers further provocative suggestions: for example in Human Nature 
and Conduct, he tells a partially gesturalist tale of language’s origin and evolution 
(Dewey 1922, 56; MW.14.56). In this earlier work, Dewey sees language as evolving in 
the context of human social environment and need, and thus emphasizes language’s 
communicative function and publicity. As Boersema glosses Dewey, “what counts as 
being a linguistic term and what is its meaning or reference is a matter of future 
determination, that is, by its public, social functioning in the interactive discourse of 
language users” (Boersema 2009, 81). The pragmatic criteria of interaction and 
consequence that I deploy in this chapter stem in part from Dewey’s work.41 
Offering a robust and holistic account, Mark Johnson puts forth a pragmatism of 
meaning based on his own work in embodied philosophy of language and meaning and 
the work of James, Dewey, and Eugene Gendlin. Johnson understands human meaning in 
a self-consciously broad sense, as that which “concerns the character or significance of a 
person’s interactions with their environments” (2007, 10).  
This pragmatist view of meaning says that the meaning of a thing is its 
consequences for experience – how it ‘cashes out’ by way of experience, 
either actual or possible experience. Sometimes our meanings are 
conceptually and propositionally coded, but that is merely the more 
conscious, selective dimension of a vast, continuous process of immanent 
meanings that involve structures, patterns, qualities, feelings, and 
emotions. (Johnson 2007, 10) 
The pragmatist account of co-speech gesture that I develop in subsequent sections of this 
chapter follows from Johnson’s insight that propositionality is an optional practice of 
meaning-making. Nonetheless, I push to expand the notion of the linguistic such that 
normatively-guided practices that contribute to meaning achievement in language are 
counted, even if these practices are not propositional. In other words, ‘coding’ is not a 
necessary requirement or exhaustively defining feature of linguistic practices, on my 
view. As will be discussed in more detail below, Robert Brandom agrees that linguistic 
meaning is determined by use, more particularly, by consequences that cash out in 
                                                          
41 For full treatment of how Dewey gives an embodied account of meaning, see Johnson 2007, especially 
Chapter 4. 
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practice. Brandom offers a rational inferentialist strand of linguistic pragmatism, and 
insofar as his account is radically disembodied, in many ways he and Johnson are not a 
felicitous pairing. The present point is that pragmatists of all stripes can agree on certain 
core features, namely intersubjectively regulated doings that are defeasible and 
meaningful in terms of consequence, when it comes to language and meaning.42  
Particularly, the pragmatist view of meaning as consequence and effect, as 
something that gets determined in interaction with environments and real-world 
happenings and so can only be determined locally and intersubjectively, insists that 
meaning is not the sole property of the speaking subject. As I show below, this insight 
has the power to overcome a coding-decoding model of communication and a 
problematic picture of mind-reading as processing others’ inner propositions. This 
pragmatic insight works by shifting the event of meaning to the space between 
interlocutors or to their shared (cooperative) activities. While certain pragmatist accounts, 
like many theories of pragmatics, must be critiqued on the basis of a lingering 
propositional bias, they can nonetheless contribute to a set of criteria that is useful for 
understanding co-speech gesture as linguistic performance. Notably, I see pragmatism 
and pragmatics as aligned in a shared program of going beyond the formalist semantics-
syntax complex in order to grasp non-propositional practices of meaning making as 
communicative action, while still recognizing these practices as subject to normative 
constraints and demonstrative of rationality.  
 
1. Why Talk about Normativity?  
 
My primary goal in putting questions of normativity to the phenomena of 
spontaneous hand gestures is to demonstrate conventionality, sociality, and rationality in 
the gestures, which in turn assists in arguing for gestures as linguistic elements of 
embodied and enactive meaning construction. This argument reverses the received order 
                                                          
42 I am consciously spanning, rather than worrying about, the gulf between classical and neo-pragmatic 
accounts of language and meaning. Koopman (2009) helpfully thematizes what is frequently seen as a 
divide between these two as a historical difference in emphasis: experience (classical) versus normativity 
(neo), and argues for a third way or wave: transitionalism.  
89 
that often insists on propositionality (the prized product of linguistic activity) as a 
requirement for high-order rationality. A more nuanced and empirically responsible 
understanding of the ‘glue’ that bonds communication participants together, across 
modalities, rules, exploitations, and all the ingredients of performance, makes room for 
gestures and holds them up as integral ingredients of communicative acts. In so making 
room, we re-prioritize verbal speech acts to a more appropriate place or perspective 
within the totality of communicative action.  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in cognitive linguistics and psychology 
the broad meaningfulness of co-speech hand gestures has been and continues to be well-
documented; at the same time, many are in the process of staking out various positions 
regarding the nature of this meaningfulness. In this chapter, I argue that gestures are 
meaningful in virtue of being subject to the conventions and conditions that make 
communication possible; they share these conventions and conditions of normativity with 
other linguistic communicative acts. I take this approach because since the linguistic turn, 
philosophy has not only been primarily concerned with language (Hacking 1975), but has 
increasingly located this concern around various attempts at anti-foundationalist, non-
causal normativity. Thus the most likely avenue to convince philosophers of the linguistic 
status of co-speech gesture is to show that communicative criteria of success and failure 
are aptly applied to it.  
The goal of the following discussion is two-fold: on the one hand, reflecting on 
the legacy of developments in twentieth-century philosophy helps me to arrange 
philosophical priorities. The consequence of the linguistic turn is best understood as the 
decision of various traditions to self-consciously avoid foundationalist narratives. The 
neo-pragmatist tradition makes advances here when it comes to linguistic meaning, 
introducing what I take to be a now-indispensible ingredient of an intersubjective 
normative authority. I think human practices of co-speech gesturing are particularly 
evocative enactments of meaning-making under such authority, as I will argue in 
subsequent sections. Yet it is precisely here that a second point emerges, in the form of a 
failing. This tradition has yet to produce an account of real communicative phenomena 
such as co-speech gesturing, and it is unlikely to do so, for principled reasons. While 
Rorty, Habermas, and Brandom rightly highlight language as a doing, an activity that 
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takes place in particular settings for purposes relative to local communities, they each 
emaciate that language use by restricting those purposes to reason-giving, justification, 
and problem-solving, and by restricting linguistic practice to proposition-mongering. 
Interestingly, then, linguistic pragmatism offers criteria that articulates the value of 
gestural practice even as it fails to acknowledge its existence. 
As outlined in Chapter I, twentieth century philosophy took as its primary target 
phenomena the meaning of words, the formal and representational aspects of 
propositions, and a variety of questions of linguistic usage. This marked a turn from 
previous centuries’ preoccupations with concepts and sense data analyzed in isolation 
from linguistic mediation. Richard Rorty’s major contribution to twentieth-century 
Western philosophy following the initial linguistic turn came in blending the insights of 
Sellars and Quine in such a way that foundationalism was overcome and relativism 
avoided. Surpassing the first wave of linguistic turn thinking that merely sought to 
replace empirical foundations of traditional epistemology with linguistic analysis, this 
newer linguistic turn recognized the difference between causation and justification and 
declared contingent linguistic practices as the final arbiter. That is, on a neo-pragmatist 
interpretation of the linguistic turn, what is normatively at stake in our communicative 
practices is neither a) a modern-epistemological worry about direct perception of reality, 
nor b) grammaticality or strict formal correctness. We are not right or wrong about 
sensory perception; we are more or less successful putting forward certain takings of the 
world for our interlocutors to consider. Knowledge claims are local and defeasible, and 
not properly measured in reference to ‘the way the world is.’  
Rorty thematized the metaphilosophical upshot of the linguistic turn to be the 
possibility of “a methodological shift in philosophical orientation away from the 
metaphor of our minds as machines for representing the world through our ideas [a casual 
approach to grounding normativity] and toward the metaphor of our beliefs as aspects of 
the vocabularies in which we justify ourselves to one another [a justificatory approach to 
grounding normativity]” (Koopman 2011, 64). Such a shift is possible because, following 
Sellars, Rorty argues that “there is no such thing as a justified belief which is 
nonpropositional, no such thing as justification which is not a relation between 
propositions” (Rorty 1979, 183). Our knowledge and beliefs, always fallible, can be 
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rationally accepted on the basis of other (fallible) knowledge and beliefs, not ‘true’ 
empirical reality represented in our minds.43  Following this shift, the supreme human 
activity is not making sense of the world that presses upon us via sensation, but trading 
reasons with one another in defense of knowledge claims and beliefs. Rationality merges 
with proposition-mongering. 
 Leaving behind modern epistemology as no more than a bad metaphor of mirrors 
and machinery, Rorty advocates a holism that is at once anti-foundationalist and anti-
relativist. As Colin Koopman glosses Rorty’s view: “Instead of appealing to foundations, 
we ought to explicate our correct use of language in terms of contextual features 
involving the historical, temporal, cultural, and practical situatedness of such language 
use” (Koopman 2011, 68).Without foundations, philosophers can nonetheless avoid an 
anything-goes free-fall into relativism by stalwartly holding normative correctness in 
view. Rather than measuring the success and failure of human practices against an 
epistemologically problematic unmoving reality outside of us (rather than aiming at 
objective truth or what Rorty calls ‘capital-T truth’), we now appeal to the contingently 
and collectively-agreed upon rules of various local language games. Language does not 
represent the world, on Rorty’s view; it is our world, since we have no intersubjectively-
vetted knowledge and no justified beliefs without it. We live in and through our 
vocabularies. Thus the linguistic turn turns us to, as Koopman puts it, requirements for 
pro-contextualist and pro-normative philosophical accounts of practices (Koopman 2011, 
71). And for Rorty, the interesting practices in question are various uses of propositions, 
which always take place under authority.  
 Linguistic practices so conceived thus regulate all rational activity and are 
themselves subject to normative constraint. “Linguistic analysis enables us to discern that 
there are correct and incorrect usages of our words and other bits of language” (Koopman 
2011, 72). Yet proper language use is not the whole point; precisely because it is 
‘propositions all the way down’ for Rorty, paradigm shifts in what and how language gets 
used yields paradigm shifts in our political and social reality (see for example Rorty 
                                                          
43 For the full story see Koopman 2011, pp. 63-68. 
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1989, 16-17). The correctness at issue is not syntax, but how one takes the world and how 
this taking is or is not shared by one’s conversation community.  
According to Rorty, all levels of human meaning are achieved in language, 
including meta-level changes to our normative vocabularies. Rational activity is linguistic 
activity that takes place under the auspices of authority; that authority to which we are 
responsible is our community of language users. This order of explanation, much like a 
pragmatics-oriented analysis discussed above, in theory would be useful in re-prioritizing 
propositionality and thus clearing a way for recognizing the contributions of non-
propositional visible bodily communication. However, Rorty’s focus is on vocabularies, 
and he utterly overlooks nonverbal signs in this notion. The community of language users 
to which we are responsible is thus an ideal, imagined group of people who communicate 
only in verbal “marks and noises” that make meaning by making propositionally explicit 
whatever serves local purposes of justification (Rorty 1989). This problematic view is 
taken up with accompanying tunnel vision by both Brandom and Habermas, as I discuss 
below.      
 As will be unpacked and defended in the rest of the chapter, my view of 
normativity at once follows and deviates from the neo-pragmatist linguistic turn view, 
which holds that meaning is achieved via successful accordance with community-set and 
community-held standards and expectations. Note that I do not share the quite deflated 
behaviorist account of language that Rorty comes to offer, as when he writes in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,  
 
To say that [a given organism] is a language user is just to say that pairing 
off the marks and noises it makes with those we make will prove a useful 
tactic in predicting and controlling its future behavior. (Rorty 1989, 15) 
 
Like Habermas and Brandom, I see value in articulating a theory of language and 
meaning. However, I contend that such a project must be oriented around communication 
and embodied performances of meaning-achievement. The substantial difference between 
my view and that of Habermas or Brandom, whose robust accounts of pragmatist 
pragmatics are outlined below, is that I want to acknowledge that there are undergirding 
conventions for nonverbal communicative activities, which can succeed or fail in regards 
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to those standards.44 In other words, bodily communicative practices such as co-speech 
hand gestures are normatively-structured practices of meaning-achievement.45 As such, 
they are subject to criteria of rationality, and they are functionally equivalent to verbal 
utterances (at least at this philosophical level of explanation).  
Moreover, I argue in this and subsequent chapters that gestures are directly 
meaningful without taking propositional form. This means that the normative authority 
governing language use is not solely concerned with the correct composition and 
deployment of propositions (and this makes sense, if we take the insights of pragmatics 
seriously). As Koopman argues in critique of Rorty, “focusing solely or purely on 
linguisticality facilitates incomplete accounts of normativity” (Koopman 2011, 62-63). 
My view can be further located, then, in relation to contemporary pragmatists such as 
Johnson and Koopman, who point out that there are meaningful human practices that are 
normatively structured – subject to criticism and defense, success and failure – which are 
non-linguistic. Johnson posits that we expand our notion of meaning beyond the typical 
Anglo-American scope, claiming that “immanent, preconceptual, and nonpropositional 
meaning is the basis for all forms of meaning,” (Johnson 2007, 34). In seeking to 
overcome a “language-centered prejudice” in philosophies of meaning (Johnson 2007, 
209), Johnson points out that there are many types of meaningful symbolic activity that 
are not properly deemed linguistic, including music, painting, sculpture, and architecture 
(2007, 208). Koopman offers the example of dance: “Consider the practical achievement 
                                                          
44 While my way of doing so in this chapter involves focusing on communicative action, it should be noted 
that analyzing the semantics of gesture (and speech) also point to normative conventions. As Streeck writes 
in describing what are typically seen as ‘iconic’ gestural representations, “Depiction is always a matter of 
convention, and this is as true for gestures as it is for paintings and drawings. Whether I recognize a cluster 
of paint particles or a sequence of motions in the limbs as a likeness of an object or not is a matter of the 
methods by which these images have been made, and whether these methods are part of my cultural 
repertoire” (2009, 120). In typical, everyday, successful cases, we simply do not notice the constraining 
conventions that shape our (immediately recognized and understood) linguistic representations. 
45 Kendon describes “the semantically coherent gesture-speech ensemble” as “a speaker achievement,” 
adding “The relationship between the gestural component and the speech component in the utterances does 
not seem well understood as a simple causal relationship, where the one is dependent upon the other in 
some kind of unchanging way. Speakers, rather, can control these two components and can orchestrate 
them differently, according to the occasion. …Speech and gesture are partnered in the common enterprise 
of discourse construction. Neither is the cause nor the auxiliary of the other, nor is there any obligatory link 
between them” (2004, 127-128). 
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present in a successful dance performance in which the normativity is better construed as 
an embodied skill than anything that could be analyzed as propositional, sentential, or 
linguistic on even the broadest construal” (Koopman 2011, 75). Agreeing with Johnson 
and Koopman, my goal is to reserve a place for language use as a sub-region of human 
practices of meaning-achievement and locate co-speech gesture as belonging to this 
linguistic place. In other words, only some linguistic processes of communication yield 
propositional products. Thus the neo-pragmatist view cannot be, and is not, the end of the 
story when it comes to non-foundational, normatively constrained linguistic meaning-
making. 
Taking this position is a somewhat controversial move vis-à-vis the role of 
normativity in linguistic theory. The use of conventions to distinguish between linguistic 
(or rational, or human) meaning on the one hand and natural signs on the other dates 
back at least to Aristotle (Glüer and Wikforss 2010). Tim Wharton’s 2009 Pragmatics 
and Nonverbal Communication offers a contemporary treatment of the issue. Wharton 
recalls the Gricean distinction between natural and non-natural meaning: natural signs 
‘mean’ in the way that ‘spots mean measles’ or ‘clouds mean rain,’ whereas non-natural 
signs ‘mean’ by virtue of conventionalized associations and rules.  
Wharton attempts to problematize this sharp distinction by introducing a 
continuum between showing and meaningNN (Gricean non-natural meaning). Nonverbal 
behaviors may be involuntary, Wharton argues, but may be shown voluntarily, i.e. with 
intention to communicate. Wharton’s example of this is the act of crying openly. 
Describing the case when a person we are talking to is upset and makes no effort to hold 
back his tears, Wharton states, “Someone behaving in this way might intend to inform us 
of their distress, and by openly displaying their natural behavior, they might make it 
easier for us to recognize their informative intention” (2009, 31). Later on in this work, 
Wharton recommends that the kind of ‘mostly non-conscious’ (2009, 152) gesticulation 
that McNeill studies ought to be treated similarly as the case of openly crying. Wharton 
suggests “that gesticulations are better treated as natural signs of the speaker’s desire to 
help the speaker understand, and are interpreted via inference rather than decoding” 
(2009, 153). In the course of setting out this showing-meaningNN continuum, he classifies 
co-speech gestures as entirely natural and non-linguistic, though he classifies emblematic 
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gestures as “non-linguistic” yet “non-natural in the Gricean sense” (Wharton 2009, 149). 
Emblematic gestures, such as the thumbs-up, are conventional signs. Yet Wharton 
follows the received verbal/nonverbal split and calls them non-linguistic. While this 
effort to embrace nonverbal data within the realm of conventionalized meaning is a very 
useful step in the direction I want to go, I object to this classification of all gestures as 
non-linguistic and, importantly, to the classification of co-speech gestures as natural signs 
that ‘mean’ the way that clouds ‘mean’ rain, or that signal intention to promote 
understanding in the way that crying openly signals intention to demonstrate feeling. 
(Furthermore, Wharton is misguided in presenting his readers with a dichotomous choice 
between inferring and decoding as the only cognitive processes involved in 
communicative exchange; this overlooks entirely the possibility that gestures point us 
toward a more enactive model of communicative cognition.) As data from the last chapter 
and subsequent treatments in this chapter show, gestures are more like words than they 
are like clouds. This correct construal of gesture becomes possible once we conceptualize 
both words and gestures as tools under the auspices of a study of rational communicative 
action which puts such tools to use.46  
 
2. Neopragmatists: Rationality as Potential Propositionality 
 
Rorty’s linguistic turn, briefly glossed above, has it that normativity enables 
rational attempts – attempts that may succeed or fail, according to community standards – 
and that the only attempts that admit of justification are uses of concepts in 
propositionally-structured linguistic activities. This section explores some of the more 
systematic philosophical accounts of communicative action as a normatively-structured, 
rational practice of language use. The programs of Habermas and Brandom can be seen 
as the best offerings in linguistic turn philosophy for my purposes. They offer my project 
a focus on interaction and intersubjectivity, which are indispensible ingredients in an 
                                                          
46 In a recent review of Wharton’s book, Kensy Cooperrider notes in criticism, “It seems that gesture – 
perhaps preeminently among the non-verbal behaviors Wharton discusses – challenges the ease of 
disentangling nature and convention, biology and culture. Indeed, this is part of what make gesture a 
compelling area of study” (Cooperrider 2011, 81-82). He adds, “After all, gesture in the real world, in all its 
many diverse incarnations, complicates – if not altogether confounds – attempts to specify exactly what is 
natural and what is conventional, what is intended and what is not, what is shown and what is meant” 
(Cooperrider 2011, 87). 
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account of embodied linguistic performance. Furthermore, in this neopragmatist picture, 
the normativity that governs proper use of linguistic elements (such as words and 
sentences) is parasitic upon a prior normativity that governs discourse. This potentially 
posits the activity of discourse, not the proposition (as verbal truth-bearing or world-
representing unit), as the philosophically significant phenomenon (see for example 
Brandom 1994, 496). Despite these valuable possibilities for philosophical reorientation, 
the defect that these accounts share is a persistent propositional bias that utterly overlooks 
the role of the body in meaning-making as well as the rich myriad ways that we achieve 
meaning together without propositional mediation. 
 
Habermas 
Jürgen Habermas’s work is especially fitting for the conversation I am trying to 
conduct regarding the linguistic and rational status of co-speech gestures, because 
Habermas can be understood as doing both pragmatics and pragmatism.47 In his Theory 
of Communicative Action (1981) and related works collected in On The Pragmatics of 
Communication (1998), he puts forward a theory of formal pragmatics. This formal 
theory proposes “that we do not set illocutionary role over against the propositional 
content as an irrational force, but conceive of it as the component that specifies which 
validity claim a speaker is raising with his utterance, how he is raising it, and for what” 
(1981, 278). In other words, Habermas’s aim is to devise a method of formal (that is, 
transcendent of specific content) analysis for the communicative action people perform 
with each other. The usefulness and limitations of this theory are discussed briefly below.  
                                                          
47 While his membership in the tradition is sometimes contested, Habermas is considered by many to be a 
pragmatist, and he draws certain alliances with pragmatism for himself (as found in the essays in Truth and 
Justification, 2003).  Habermas and Pragmatism collects works from various philosophers who dialogue 
around the possibility of Habermas as a pragmatist, and Habermas offers a response to close the work 
(Aboulafia, Bookman, and Kemp, 2002). In her article in the volume, Myra Bookman highlights what I 
take as the defining pragmatist theme in Habermas’ work, writing, “From Peirce, Mead, and other 
pragmatists, Habermas draws out the significance of intersubjectivity in the communicative process” (2002, 
75). In “Habermas’s Kantian Pragmatism,” Richard J. Bernstein argues that Habermas wrestles together a 




By offering a theory of rationality as action, or as a practice, that uses and prefers 
a linguistic medium, Habermas helps achieve a philosophy of linguistic performance in 
the dually ‘pragmatic’ sense I am after. His model of communicative action may be 
expanded to accommodate gestures as parts of utterances, thereby elevating gestures and 
reprioritizing verbal utterances to make room for other media of rationality. In this way I 
would deploy Habermas in a similar manner as I do Grice: both show us that meaning-in-
or-with-language is an action or achievement (a pragmatist tenet) and that meaning-in-or-
with-language requires more than the mere words vocalized to be achieved (a pragmatic 
claim). Thus both pragmatist-pragmatic accounts contextualize (reprioritize) verbal 
utterances and make room for other modalities such as hand gestures as tools of meaning 
achievement, (thus elevating them).  
Yet there is good evidence that for Habermas, rationality depends on 
propositionality, and so only if we get gestures to work propositionally can they fit in this 
model of communicative action. I use ‘propositionality’ in this sense to indicate the 
requirement of codifying meaning in a conventional string of verbal symbols. If this 
reading is fair, then Habermas offers more motivation for assimilating gesture analysis to 
the analysis of verbal utterances than he gives motivation for demoting verbal utterances. 
Habermas’s motivation for assimilation is worth considering; he offers good reasons why 
propositions are significant human tools. Nonetheless, this is just the sort of well-worked 
out philosophy of language, communication, and rationality that has been drawn up and 
operates in complete ignorance of bodily contributions to meaning and to utterances and 
hence will have to be rethought. In what follows, therefore, I find both resources and 
shortcomings in Habermas’s account.  
 
Rationality 
For Habermas, rationality is the practice of embodying knowledge for others, in a 
self-consciously defeasible way. Persons as well as “symbolic expressions – linguistic 
and non-linguistic, communicative or non-communicative actions – that embody 
knowledge” can be rational (Habermas 1981, 8). Symbolic expressions and actions are 
rational when they are “susceptible of criticism and grounding,” that is, of being 
questioned and being further explained, usually by making reference to shared forms of 
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life (9). When one puts forth a symbolic expression of knowledge (typically though not 
necessarily via a speech act, as will be explained below), one relates to a world that one 
shares with interlocutors. World-relation is the necessary condition for rationality on 
Habermas’s view. Yet he offers a broad, “phenomenological” model, which includes a 
representationalist, truth-conditional idea of reference, but only as one of three ways (the 
objective relation in the trio objective, social, and subjective, outlined below) in which 
we thematize an always already given, pre-thematic, shared lifeworld (Habermas 1981, 
83). On this phenomenological model,  
 
…rational expressions have the character of meaningful actions, 
intelligible in their context, through which the actor relates to 
something in the objective world. The conditions of validity of 
symbolic expressions refer to a background knowledge 
intersubjectively shared by the communication community. 
(Habermas 1981, 13)  
 
These world-relations are rational in that they a) can fail, b) need intersubjective 
recognition, and c) can be defended against criticism. These criteria are important to keep 
in mind, as I will apply them to work in gesture studies later in the chapter. Note that, as 
stated, these criteria of rationality do not require the world-relations to take a particular 
form. 
 Communicative action, a particular, privileged kind of rational action that is the 
target of much of Habermas’s writing, presupposes “a reference system” constituted by 
the three worlds that interlocutors thematize from their given lifeworld. By articulating 
these worlds and the ways in which conversation participants can relate to them, 
Habermas develops a formal pragmatics that he sees as improving upon both analytic 
philosophy of language and ordinary language philosophy’s ‘empirical pragmatics’.  He 
defines communicative action as “the interaction of at least two participants capable of 
speech and action [to] establish interpersonal relations, seek to reach understanding about 
an actual situation, and coordinate plans of action” (Habermas 1981, 86). Later in Theory 
of Communicative Action, he writes, “I have called the type of interaction in which all 
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue 
their illocutionary aims without reservation ‘communication action’” (294, italics in 
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original). For Habermas, the immanent purpose or “original mode” of language use is 
reaching understanding (1981, 288); language is made to be used rationally. 
 
Formal Pragmatics 
Reaching understanding is the rational action par excellence for Habermas, and 
we can analyze participants’ attempts to do so by attending to the illocutionary aspects of 
their communicative performances. The formal aspects of this are unpacked in the 
following paragraphs. It is crucial to note that participants (not just theorists) keep track 
of each others’ illocutionary actions; this is precisely what makes rationality possible – 
what Brandom calls ‘score-keeping’ (discussed below). Formal pragmatics is a theory of 
action oriented toward reaching understanding that, while empty of content, reveals the 
procedure by which participants achieve (or fail to achieve) understanding about world-
relative content.48  
A formal pragmatics is needed because whether or not participants are engaged in 
communicative action is determined not only by the semantic content of what they say, 
but rather by whether or not they use language to take up a reflective relation to the 
world. Note an important upshot of this claim: communicative action is coordinated 
through, not coincidental with, symbolic expressions, the paradigm case of which is 
speech acts. Language is the preferred medium for communicative action; language must 
be used in a certain way for communicative action to be taking place. Recall that 
communicative action is the rational attempt to reach understanding and coordinate 
action non-coercively, and rational attempts are those that can fail, that require 
intersubjective recognition, and that allow of defense against criticism. Thus, in 
                                                          
48 A formal pragmatic theory also allows Habermas (and participants) to evaluate whether someone is 
engaged in communicative action or other types of rational (world-relating) action, such as teleological 
action or strategic action. It is of great importance to Habermas’ social-political and critical theory, which 
he codifies in a discourse ethics (1988), that communicative action is of a different kind than strategic, 
which is parasitic on the presuppositions of communicative action (such as trust, transparency, and 
genuineness). Language is misconceived as a one-sided medium in all types of action (each of which has a 
corresponding rationality or world-relation) except communicative action, which rightly uses language as a 
reciprocal and reflexive medium of self- and world-building via the genuine staking and perpetual 
collective revision of validity claims (see for example Habermas 1981, 94-95). This careful distinction is 
not relevant here, however, and I cannot afford the digression required to treat of it adequately. 
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communicative action, a participant takes on a world-relation via a validity claim, the 
status of which is contingent upon the critical reception of her fellow participants. 
Considering each of the three worlds in turn contrasts the speech acts through 
which participants can relate to (stake a validity claim about) the world in question. For 
each world, we can compare the modality of regulation, the communicative action 
maxims, the criteria of failure, the purpose of speech acts, the pure case of speech act, 
and the form the speech act takes.  
 
Objective world 
 The objective world is ‘the’ world about which we make truth claims. While these 
truths are always defeasible, when we make them we take them with a certain confidence, 
and we don’t question the reality about that which we speak (see Bernstein 2010). 
Making validity claims in relation to the objective world is a normatively-regulated 
action. These speech acts can be rejected according to the truth of the statement, on the 
basis of shared propositional knowledge. The purpose of speech acts is to 
represent/presuppose states and events. Through this sort of speech act a speaker takes a 
relation to something in the objective world. The pure case of this speech act is 
constative; the act is objectivating. The standard form is an elementary propositional 
sentence. An example is “It rained on twenty-three of the thirty-one days of May this 
year.” (Note that Habermas’s use of “propositional” only in this case of speech acts is 
technical and narrower than my sense of ‘propositionality’ as a conventional string of 
verbal symbols.)  
 
Social world 
 The social world is ‘ours,’ the world in which we conduct interpersonal 
relationships. Making validity claims in relation to the social world is a normatively-
regulated action. These speech acts may be rejected under the aspect of rightness in 
relation to normative context, or on the basis of normative accord. The purpose of speech 
acts made in relation to this world is to establish and renew interpersonal relationships. 
Through such an act, a speaker takes a relation to the social world. The pure case of this 
speech act is regulative; the act is norm-conforming. The standard forms are imperatives 
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 The subjective world is ‘mine;’ by taking relations to it via symbolic expressions I 
present myself to others.  Making validity claims in relation to the subjective world is an 
expressive self-presentation. These speech acts may be rejected under the aspect of 
truthfulness in relation to subjective experience, or on the basis of mutual trust in 
subjective sincerity. The purpose of speech acts made in relation to this world is to 
manifest experiences or represent oneself. Through such an act, a speaker takes a relation 
to the subjective world. The pure case of this speech act is expressive; the act is 
expressing. The standard forms are elementary experiential sentences. An example is “I 
am so pleased that we adopted that starving cat.” 
  
According to Habermas, a rational speaker maintains this three-fold relation to the 
lifeworld via propositional content, interpersonal relationships, and speaker intentions 
(1981, 96). In communicative action, relations to the world are not straightforward but 
reflexive – all utterances are relativized “against the possibility that their validity will be 
contested by other actors” (Habermas 1981, 98). When I say that I am pleased that we 
adopted the starving cat, if I am using this expression to act communicatively, then I am 
uttering the statement with awareness that I may be called on to give further evidence of 
my sincerity. Particularly if my interlocutors know that I tend toward hyperbole, I may 
reasonably add, “Really, I am more excited about this cat than about the burrito we had 
for lunch that I also said pleased me.” When I say that it rained for twenty-three of the 
thirty-one days in May, I am prepared to explain that I saw this statistic on the local news 
channel’s weather report. If my interlocutor has a competing statistic, I am open to 
hearing it; this is part of what is involved in my action of staking a validity claim in 
relation to the objective world of meteorological data that we share. The three-world 
relations thus make possible various kinds of validity claims via rational (fallible, 
intersubjectively regulated, defensible) expressions. All illocutionary acts have a “built-in 
orientation toward intersubjective regulation” (Habermas 1996, 318). 
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Propositionality and the question of medium 
One way to understand what Habermas is doing in offering a formal pragmatics is 
as a demonstration that “the illocutionary force of an utterance – the communicative 
aspect that seeks understanding using social knowledge… can be subjected to rational 
formalization” (Bookman 2002, 74). As Myra Bookman argues, this is a significant 
strategic move that is “…contrary to many of the philosophies of language that Habermas 
draws upon… traditions that separate language and speech, pit locutions against 
illocutions, distinguish competence from performance, and reduce language to localized 
games of convention” (2002, 68). Glossing this, we can say that Habermas goes beyond 
Chomsky, Austin, and Wittgenstein in his attempt to formally treat what people do with 
symbolic expressions as rational, rather than only seeing the propositional content of the 
expressions themselves as being subject to constraints and norms (or rather than giving 
an informal description of language use for the sake of describing language use (see 
Habermas 1981, 96-97; 278)).  
 In addition to furthering the field of pragmatics, there is a decidedly pragmatist 
flavor to the goal of attending to communicative action as a rational intersubjective 
practice (though perhaps a less pragmatist flavor in the attempt to formalize the practice). 
In “Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality,” (1996), 
Habermas writes, “Since the linguistic turn… we have good reasons for following a 
suggestion of G.H. Mead and explaining the self-relation of the knowing, acting, and 
speaking subject – that is, the relation of the first person ‘to herself’ – on the basis of the 
adoption of the perspective of the second person ‘on me’” (1998, 308). Taking a reflexive 
attitude on one’s being-in-the-world facilitates critique, learning, transformation, and 
problem-solving. Yet a reflexive attitude only becomes possible through the expectations 
of how others will receive one’s expressions. As has perhaps already become quite clear, 
Habermas merges existential phenomenological premises with pragmatist principles, as 
when he writes that his and Carl Otto Apel’s “early familiarity with, and leaning towards, 
philosophical anthropology and the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time (Heidegger’s 
analysis of ‘being in the world’ in particular) had prepared us for a pragmatist 
epistemology” (2002, 227).  Habermas ought to be careful to not leave phenomenology 
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behind too quickly, however; the turn toward the social for him (as for so many others) is 
synonymous with pure lingualism.  
 For example, Habermas writes, “… we can deal with our knowledge operatively – 
that is, render it more precise, elaborate it, reconstruct it, systematize it, test it for 
consistency and coherence – only if it takes on a shape that can be grasped symbolically” 
(1998, 313). In this claim, there is no reason to say that the symbolic shape must be a 
verbal utterance or take a propositional form. Ultimately, however, this preference is too 
strong a thread running through all of Habermas’ writing on language and communicative 
action.  While he points out that “the linguistic medium extends further than 
communicative rationality,” it remains the case that for him 
 
expressions are embedded in the context of a lifeworld that is in turn 
linguistically constituted… to this extent, although forms of life qualify as 
candidates for the term ‘rational,’ they do so only in the indirect sense that 
they constitute the more or less ‘congenial’ background for establishing 
discursive procedures and for developing reflexive capacities. (1998, 334-
335) 
 
Thus it is the potential to be thematized in discourse that makes a form, activity, or 
practice rational. Rational activity embodies knowledge, but it embodies it in ‘discursive’ 
forms: “one knows the conditions for the illocutionary or perlocutionary success of a 
speech act when one knows the kinds of actor-independent or actor-relative reasons with 
which the speaker could vindicate her validity claim discursively” (Habermas 1998, 340). 
The knowledge we share of our objective or social world – that common ground in 
respect of which all our expressions (including, as he says above, non-linguistic and non-
communicative expressions) may be explicitly grounded if called for – exceeds 
propositionality in Habermas’ technical sense (and in my more general sense of a 
conventional string of verbal symbols) and may operate like ‘know-how’ knowledge. Yet 
we can only engage in practices of critique and collaboration and can only offer up 
validity claims with their illocutionary force if we thematize that knowledge via 





Robert Brandom (1994, 2000, 2009) offers a strain of linguistic pragmatism 
known as inferentialism. On this view, human linguistic ability is ‘at its core’ rational and 
justificatory, thus inherently social. Yet Brandom’s way of highlighting sociality is by 
taking the act of giving reasons as fundamental and primary among all other human 
linguistic activity. Taking Brandom as the logical culmination of the sort of linguistic 
theory that becomes possible after Rorty’s linguistic turn, it is evident that somewhere 
along the way we have gotten quite off track from actual communicative practice. 
Following Wittgenstein, Brandom provides a positive pragmatic order of explanation that 
prioritizes doings with language as analytically prior to and responsible for emergent 
semantic meanings in language. While this piece of his picture is useful for understanding 
communication, his restricted scope of what it is that we do with language (give and ask 
for reasons) and how we do it (in verbal propositions that make our inner inferential 
reasoning processes ever more explicit) remains a determinate and instructive 
shortcoming. 
On Brandom’s account, sapience (human rational activity) is essentially 
conceptual, because concepts are that which we can use rightly or wrongly. Conceptual 
activity amounts to rule-following. Since appropriate use of concepts takes place in the 
space of reasons, the practice is linguistic in the sense of being propositionally 
articulated.49 Hence, human rationality is discursive.  Language use is concept use, and 
the normative authority guiding concept use is grounded “in discursivity and sociality” 
for Brandom (Koopman 2011, 76). Meaning is an achievement of inferential reasoning; 
conceptual contents are specified by how concepts function in given instances of 
inference. When I say “It is such a nice day,” the meaning of ‘nice day’ cannot be 
understood apart from what I am doing in making the assertion – for example, responding 
to the question “Why should we end this reading group meeting early?” or defending a 
suggestion, “We ought to end this reading group meeting early.” The action of my using 
language at that moment indicates the purpose of my so using language and thus gives 
the meaning of the language used. Note, then, that social conventions at the level of 
                                                          
49 “Concept use …is an essentially linguistic affair,” according to Brandom (2000, 6). 
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cooperative purpose are normatively prior to the meaning of the constituent terms used. 
Brandom offers not a circular as much as a dialectical approach to normative meaning-
achievement: “The pragmatist direction of explanation…seeks to explain how the use of 
linguistic expressions, or the functional role of intentional states, confers conceptual 
content on them” (2000, 4). 
Brandom’s approach to linguistic pragmatism “…might take as its slogan 
Sellars’s principle that grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word” (2000, 6). In 
this, Brandom puts himself in the company of the later Wittgenstein, as well as Rorty and 
Sellars.50 In his recent Reason in Philosophy, Brandom also locates this pragmatism in 
the lineage of Kant and Hegel: a concept is a rule, a norm, and the contents are specified 
in the course of the application of this rule or in the conforming to a norm. Put in 
Wittgenstein’s idiom, one can only make an intelligible statement within the confines of a 
particular language game that operates on the basis of shared and always revisable rules. 
This commitment accounts for the primacy of the propositional in Brandom’s semantic 
system (see e.g. 2000, 12-13). The primary language game humans play is that of giving 
and asking for reasons; even if I merely say ‘I am going to the store now,’ the 
significance of this statement is grounded in implicit, contextual reasons I have for 
making it, reasons which I am prepared to make explicit if the statement is called into 
question. My words have meaning just because I use them to make collective rational 
sense of the world I co-inhabit with my interlocutors. This sense-making is always 
already constrained by the practical world that we share: I cannot reasonably claim that 
I’ll see you outside of the bar at 8 pm tonight and also that I’ll be in class from 7 to 9 pm 
this evening; this conflict renders at least one of my assertions untrue or meaningless in 
the sense that the implicit supporting reasons of each statement will directly contradict 
each other. Attempting to make this conflicting claim would indicate a poor grasp of 
various constituent concepts (for example, what it is to ‘be’ somewhere or what is 
required in ‘seeing someone somewhere’).51 Even though the representational logic of 
                                                          
50 In his anti-representationalist and anti-foundationalist starting points, Brandom also keeps company with 
James and Dewey. 
51 For Brandom, “conceptual normativity gets constructed by making explicit in rational language that 
which is already implicitly binding in social practice” (Koopman 2011, 76). 
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propositions is, on Brandom’s pragmatist order of explanation, second to what 
interlocutors are trying to do with their propositions, concepts – and thus semantic 
content – get specified in propositionally coded inferences (Brandom 1994, 496). There is 
“no conceptual [sic] content without this representational dimension,” which is “the 
expression of the social articulation of inferential practice” (Brandom 1994, 497).  
 This is a functionalist and normative account of meaning that emerges as 
inferential use; Brandom employs the deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement to 
track what we do as language (concept) users. In making an assertion, I undertake a 
commitment to, if necessary, say more in order to verify the ‘warranted assertability’ of 
my statement. To the extent that I am committed to my assertion, I take responsibility for 
its being true. My endorsement of it has the effect of granting my interlocutors the ability 
to hold me as committed to the assertion (presuming that they agree I am entitled to it) 
and to repeat the assertion themselves on my authority.52 As linguistic activity for 
Brandom is inherently social, to engage in discourse is to engage in linguistic 
scorekeeping, in which an interlocutor continuously measures a speaker’s statements 
against her previous (known) commitments, checks for material incompatibilities, and 
updates the ‘scorecard’ to maintain as much consistency, completeness and 
warrantedness as is possible (Brandom 2009, 36).53 Yet despite the heavy-handed 
language of ‘score-keeping,’ Brandom is not interested in evaluating human 
communication, or even explaining it as such; unlike Habermas, this is a descriptive 
account of normativity, not a normative one. The metaphilosophical motive of 
Brandom’s analysis is to follow in Rorty’s foundationalism-shirking footsteps without 
losing the normative rigor of binding concepts. All of these doings – taking 
responsibility, endorsing, etc. – are what it takes to have rational knowledge in the 
absence of a naively foundationalist epistemology/modern worldview. (Note that, 
problematically, rational knowledge does not include kinesic or embodied doings, for 
                                                          
52 Here Brandom follows Frege, whose “fundamental pragmatic principle” he takes to be “that in asserting  
a claim, one is committing oneself to its truth” (2000, 11). 
53 Koopman calls Brandom’s 1994 tome Making it Explicit “non-foundational normative philosophy of 
language at the very pinnacle of systematicity” (Koopman 2011, 76). Yet it could be pointed out that 
Brandom’s model of linguistic activity is an empirical hypothesis more than a justified claim. 
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Brandom.) An important distinction between Brandom and Habermas, then, is that 
Brandom’s goal in formalizing communicative action as a normative, rational practice is 
“to explain the representational dimension of thought and talk” (Brandom 1994, 495), 
albeit in a thoroughly non-foundational, post-linguistic-turn manner. 
 
Potential propositionality as a requirement for rationality 
The foregoing accounts are each plagued with a propositional bias that results 
from an overly narrow construal of the communicative process as primarily concerned 
with problem-solving and reason-giving. The above statement of Brandom’s linguistic 
pragmatism may read like a yet more technical recasting of Habermas’s formal 
pragmatics. Without covering over important differences, which include and surpass 
those just noted, what one sees in both Habermas and Brandom is strong philosophical 
justification for the role of propositionality in far-side pragmatics. Much as in Grice’s 
work (though the differences here are yet greater), communication is achieved via speech 
acts that take place on various levels, but which must always be able to be ‘worked out’, 
that is, put into explicit verbal forms. For Grice, our ability to reconstruct our 
interlocutors’ rational processes via ampliative reasoning renders their nonconventional 
performances meaningful. The communicative actions of speakers who violate 
conversational maxims are no less normatively regulated than those who follow the 
maxims.  
On Habermas’s account, a moral element comes into play: reflexive language use 
is the triumph of an allegedly pure reason over empirical force. Only when interlocutors 
rely on the illocutionary force of their speech acts to negotiate a problem or conflict in 
question do they engage in communicative action. In other words, only when the 
normative authority of collectively established and re-established world order sets the 
standard of conversation, rather than coercive threats of physical sanctions or promises of 
reward, can the communication be seen as rational. This normative authority is both 
established and deployed in discursive practices. Habermas focuses too exclusively and 
narrowly on communicative action that is about discursively negotiating problems and 
conflicts. This priority makes sense if one’s prevailing concern is giving reasons and 
justifying beliefs. Yet just as Austin stressed, there are a very large number of other 
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speech acts with communicative models other than justification, for example the act of 
praising, or naming. 
Brandom is a rational, rather than Romantic, expressivist, who like Habermas 
wants to get away from speaker intention or interiority in favor of seeing meaning as 
dynamic external consequences and concepts as tools of purposive action. On Brandom’s 
view, I cannot answer the question “What is democracy?” by making reference to a stable 
extra-linguistic entity in the world, nor by referencing a privately imagined entity. I can 
only answer the question “What is democracy?” by situating my response in a context of 
possible definitions and then arguing why my response is the most compatible with the 
commitments of my interlocutors. I could respond with an action, say waving a flag, or 
perhaps burning one, and this too may be a meaningful response, but only if my 
interlocutors can make explicit the reasoning process by which that act says something, 
only if a story about the implicit symbolism and implicit context can be told. For these 
pragmatists, the achievement of meaning involves language – what is said, what is not 
said, what can be said about what is and is not said, and what can be said to one’s self 
about what another has said or has not said.  
The fascinating, if unintended, upshot of the above theories of speech acts or 
communicative action is that the essential features of language are not the linguistic 
elements per se. Language gets its meaning from the way it is used, which is to say, from 
the communicative action of which it is part. It is the act of using language together to 
relate to, better understand, and even change a shared world or worlds that makes 
language rational, the defining feature of humanity. And the act of using language only 
makes sense when done with and for others, and only when done in certain ways at 
certain times and in certain contexts. Communication only succeeds because we are 
responsible to those norms, which makes us able to respond to each other.  
Taken on its own terms, this claim – that communally-derived normative 
constraints enable communicative success – can be provocatively and productively 
applied to other modalities of communication, such as gesturing. This is the pathway that 
I am attempting to clear in the present chapter: elevating gestural activity to the same 
status as verbal activity by demonstrating that it too is constitutively dependent upon 
communicative norms. Thus it would seem that to the extent that the spontaneous hand 
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gestures that accompany speech inform and contribute to our responses to each other, 
they are elements of communicative action. Technically, so long as their contributions 
can be made explicit via translation into conventional locutions, they are no less linguistic 
than the unspoken words that infuse my exploitation of a Gricean maxim or the built-up 
knowledge a friend has of my character that informs his evaluation of the validity of my 
self-expression in Habermas’s sense. Undoubtedly a facilitated dialogue between Israeli-
Arab and Israeli-Jewish participants will include meaningful hand gestures that can 
change the course of a conflict resolution situation (for this particular example, since 
Waisman 2010). If one can convince Brandom that hand gestures enact dynamic 
functional conceptualizations in context (and some gesture theorists would argue that 
very point (Streeck 2009, discussed below)), they can count as tools that make explicit 
what a speaker is doing when she offers a composite speech+gesture utterance. In other 
words, were these theorists of communicative action to become aware of the regular, 
ubiquitous way that hand gestures communicate and enact communicative purposes, 
there would seem to be no reason not to include gestures in their projects. 
As a gesture scholar, I read Habermas or Brandom and at once seem to find places 
to fit gesture in. Frustration arises when their accounts ultimately close off the possibility 
of including kinesic, visual bodily behavior in the analysis. Even while the heart of what 
is at stake in a neo-pragmatist account of language is normativity and the bounds of 
communicative action, the linked commitment to propositions and disembodied 
inferential reasoning acts as a barrier to that core sentiment. Gestures must either be 
translated exhaustively into verbal expressions or wait at the door. Hence, hand gestures 
have not been included. Since there are principled reasons that neo-pragmatists fail to 
extend this offer to non-propositional, bodily communicative behavior, it remains 
unlikely that such behavior will be included. The only chance of admission to the neo-
pragmatist party requires the meaning of gestures to be parasitic upon the possibility of 
being rephrased in verbal propositions. There is another way to understand 
communicative action as a normatively constrained, cooperative, social practice of 
meaning achievement in language. This way requires an understanding and true 
appreciation of the embodiment and social embedded-ness of language and cognition. 
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3. Gesture Pragmatics: Normativity Without Propositions 
  
This section gathers from cross-disciplinary scholarship recent data that cannot be 
adequately treated or made sense of by traditional, proposition-based or semantically-
oriented accounts of language. According to pragmatic arguments made in the previous 
sections, if gestures cannot fail, then they also cannot succeed in activities of meaning-
achievement. The data below shows that co-speech gestures admit of success and failure, 
of revision and critique.54 Consider this passage from linguist Charles Goodwin: 
 
Our default practices of representing such [language] events, especially 
writing (but also parties’ later reports what happened in an encounter, i.e. 
they talk about what others ‘said’), typically privilege one component of 
this process, language, that is what was said, while rendering other 
embodied displays, and just about everything the hearer did, invisible. 
This leads quite easily to an ideology in which language is conceptualized 
as an isolated self-contained system, the outcome of private psychological 
processes situated within a single individual, the speaker, rather than as a 
form of public practice lodged within the organization of action within 
human interaction. (Goodwin 2006, 98) 
 
The following discussions offer empirical and theoretical support for my two-fold 
goal of a) reconstruing language by reprioritizing the status of the proposition in favor of 
pragmatic criteria of intersubjective meaning-achievement and b) elevating co-speech 
gestures (as prime nonverbal communicative behavior) to the status of linguistic 
                                                          
54 Note also that recent work in gesture scholarship by Sotaro Kita (2009) and Adam Kendon (2004) point 
to systematic cultural differences within the cross-cultural practice of gesturing while speaking. Kita 
reviews four factors governing cross-cultural variation of co-speech gestures, finding culture-specific 
conventions for (1) form-meaning associations, (2) spatial cognition, (3) verbal means of expressing spatial 
information, and (4) pragmatics, or “the principles under which gesture is used in communication” (2009). 
Meanwhile, Kendon has identified four culturally specific gestural forms (of which the grappolo – purse 
hand gesture - is one), which are identifiable functions of particular gestures that are widely used in a 
particular communication community (2004, 226ff). Kendon’s method is to generalize over a range of 
related pragmatic usages to get at a more general meaning that can then be associated with the gestural 
form and movement pattern (a semantic theme). He writes that “this theme, being introduced as it is in 
different ways in different contexts, through the way it interacts with the (usually verbal) meaning of the 
spoken component of the utterance, contributes to the creation of a highly specific local meaning” (Kendon 
2004, 226). 
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phenomena by showing them to be conditioned and constrained in a way similar to verbal 
linguistic practices. My overarching aim is to bring verbal and nonverbal communicative 
performances into the same plane of analysis. 
Moreoever, taken collectively, the recent work emerging from several disciplines 
indicates a broad trend in scholarship to which philosophy ought attend. In a mix of 
disciplines outside of philosophy, particularly in embodiment-oriented lines of cognitive 
science, cognitive linguistics, evolutionary psychology and anthropology, there is a 
recent and on-going effort to thematize cognition as a social, interactive, and 
intersubjective phenomenon. Hence we can speak of a ‘pragmatic turn’ in these fields, as 
these accounts of cognition and meaning-making increasingly refuse to abstract away 
from others who form audiences and co-create meaning, from environments and objects 
that co-constitute situational significance, or from face-to-face interactions that distribute 
meaning-construction across various modalities and micro-actions.55 Such cross-
disciplinary work converges to support a pragmatist reconstrual of language as embodied 
communicative action.  
Recall that in most of the pragmatic theories that come after Grice, as well as in 
neopragmatist theories of inferential rationality, agents communicate meaningfully by 
keeping track of each other’s statements and, crucially, unstated-yet-presumed intentions. 
Agents do this via careful reconstructive reasoning, which takes place in a verbal 
modality. Some of the more robust neo-Gricean theories, such as Sperber and Wilson’s, 
attribute special modules in the brain for this sort of mind-reading or processing of 
others’ propositional reasoning (Sperber and Wilson 1986).  As it turns out, a variety of 
possibilities exist for understanding how humans coordinate actions and intricately 
communicate with one another without rationally reconstructing the inner monologues of 
our interlocutors or fellow participants in propositionally-structured monologues of our 
own. In the following subsections, I offer an overview of alternative accounts of 
rationality and normatively-guided linguistic activity that do not necessitate propositional 
utterances or propositionally-structured thinking. First, I use Michael Tomasello (2008), 
                                                          
55 For particularly good collections, see The Roots of Human Sociality, edited by N.J. Enfield and Stephen 
C. Levinson (2006), and Enaction: Toward a new paradigm for cognitive science, edited by John Stewart, 
John Robert, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2010). 
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N.J. Enfield (2009), and Eugene Gendlin (1962, 1991) to make the argument that 
language use is not just proposition-mongering, but is better thought of as a normatively 
constrained practice of meaning-achievement in a dialogic, cooperative context. This 
achieves aspect a) of the goal stated above – reprioritizing propositions and reconstruing 
language. Subsequently, I draw from recent work in linguistics (Charles Goodwin) and 
communication studies and anthropology (Jürgen Streeck) to offer evidence that co-
speech gestures are instances of language use on the grounds just established (aspect b – 
bringing gestures onto the plane of linguistic analysis).  
 
Language beyond propositions 
  
Tomasello & Enfield: A non-propositional neo-Gricean picture  
 In The Origin of Human Communication, Tomasello demonstrates that 
‘communicative context’ is not enough to explain the behavior that humans engage in 
when they use language to communicate with each other. A wealth of background 
knowledge and presumed intentionality and a ‘conceptual common ground’ are all in play 
when both spoken utterances and gestures have the meanings they do in their precise and 
particular instances of deployment.56 In order to explain communicative achievement, we 
need to note the requirements of joint attention, shared experience, and forms of life. 
These conditioning phenomena undergird the meaningfulness of gesture just as they 
undergird the meaningfulness of spoken utterances. There are then two primary 
conditions for human communication: (1) mutually assumed common conceptual ground 
and (2) mutually assumed cooperative motives (Tomasello 2008, 6). As Tomasello 
explains,  
For humans the communicative context is not simply everything in the 
immediate environment, from the temperature of the room to the sounds of 
birds in the background, but rather the communicative context is what is 
                                                          
56 To demonstrate this, Tomasello employs a great example of two women out for a walk. Along the way, 
one simply points to a bicycle. This gesture can have any number of complex meanings for the other 
woman depending on common conceptual ground, presumed intentionality, etc. Tomasello discusses a few 
possibilities: it is the bike of her ex-boyfriend, and her friend is warning her that he may be nearby; or it is 
the bike of her ex-boyfriend, but the friend doesn’t know the couple has broken up, and is informing her 
that he is nearby with the expectation that she will want to stop and say hello. 
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‘relevant’ to the social interaction, that is, what each participant sees as 
relevant and knows that the other sees as relevant as well – and knows that 
the other knows this as well, and so on… (2008, 74) 
 
Such “recursive mindreading” is central to the story Tomasello tells, though he shows us 
another path from Grice to accounting for the real workings of human conversations 
(Tomasello 2008, 335).57  
For Tomasello, human communication is marked as such by virtue of its added 
layer of intentionality that he calls “Gricean communicative intention”, which captures 
my intention when ‘I want you to know that I want something from you’ (2008, 88-89). 
On this view, in order for person B to understand person A’s communicative act, person 
B must be motivated to make “relevance inferences”, i.e., assume that A finds A’s 
message relevant to B and then reason from that assumption. “Overt expression of the 
Gricean communicative intention places the communicative act itself – the gesture or the 
utterance – into the participants’ common ground, specifically, into the ongoing joint 
attentional frame within which they are communicating…  I want us to know this 
together” (Tomasello 2008, 91). Much of Tomasello’s research over the past fifteen years 
indicates that while ape vocalizations are genetically fixed stimulus-response patterns 
deployed involuntarily to “benefit the vocalizer in some more or less direct way” (2008, 
54), thus revealing little if any sociality or intentionality, ape gestures are flexible and 
sensitive to others (2008, 55). Their attention-getting gestures “express the two-tiered 
intention that I want you to see something so that you will do something” (Tomasello 
2008, 54). Such gesturing is evolutionarily rare, as they “split…the referential intention 
that the recipient look at something and the social intention that she do something as a 
result” (Tomasello 2008, 54-55).    
 We can immediately note important similarities between what Sperber and 
Wilson take from Grice and what Tomasello identifies as crucial to human 
communication. Both accounts seize upon intention and inference, supported by an idea 
of relevance, to explain not just some speech acts but all utterances. These theories 
crucially diverge, however, in their respective explanations of how Gricean pro-social 
                                                          
57 In contrast from the path Sperber and Wilson (1986) offer, as discussed in Chapter I. 
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premises such as cooperation give rise to a full-fledged language, with lexical and 
syntactic conventions and an account of acquisition and comprehension. As discussed in 
Chapter I, Sperber and Wilson appeal to a dedicated ‘comprehension module.’ In their 
1986 statement of Relevance Theory, the explanation of how interlocutors make 
spontaneous relevance inferences is quite complex, involving memory stores of 
representations, assumptions (which are “structured sets of concepts”), conceptual 
addresses (which are “point[s] of access to the logical, encyclopaedic and linguistic 
information which may be needed in the processing of logical forms containing that 
address”), and a deduction device to operate over the logical core of assumptions 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 71, 85-86). In short, an entire brain architecture and 
computational model of cognition is required to explain the efficient processing of 
relevant information, that is, “information that modifies and improves an overall 
representation of the world” (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 71).58 Tomasello, however, sees 
‘relevance’ as an inherently social and project-oriented category, and places these 
inferential cognitive and expressive burdens on gestures. Unlike Sperber and Wilson and 
other neo-Griceans, Tomasello’s approach is enactive and embodied, rather than internal, 
mentalist, or a priori.59  
 According to Tomasello’s narrative, full-blown conventional language use is 
directly traceable, both phylogenetically and ontogentically, to nonverbal and ‘natural’ 
communicative practices involving gesture. Gestures such as pointing and iconic 
(‘pantomiming’-type) gestures demonstrate attention-direction and imagination-direction, 
respectively, and “communicate in complex ways because they are used in interpersonal 
situations in which the participants share conceptual common ground as interpretive 
nexus, as well as mutual assumptions of cooperation” (Tomasello 2008, 322). More 
formal or arbitrary linguistic conventions for communication share this “cooperative 
infrastructure” and “piggy-back” on the skills used in natural-gestural communication via 
a “drift to the arbitrary” (Tomasello 2008, 322). The order and rapid sequence of infant 
                                                          
58 They also offer different definitions of ‘relevance’, with Sperber &Wilson’s being far more technical and 
presupposing the existence of mental representations. 
59 For a gloss on ‘enactivism’ as used here, see Hutto 2005, Thompson 2005. This is discussed in Chapter 
V. 
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communication development, as well as the complex and productive structures of 
primary sign languages, evidence the same ability to symbolically indicate references in 
both gestural and verbal communication (Tomasello 2008, 323).  
On the ‘arbitrary drift’ model, conventionalization is a result of the covering-over 
of iconic motivation in gestures as they are witnessed by younger generations: “as the 
iconicity becomes opaque for new learners the possibility arises for a stylized depiction 
of opening [for example] that is highly abstract and resembles no particular kind of 
opening with particular objects” (Tomasello 2008, 224). Moving from this schematicity, 
Tomasello posits “holophrases,” or “one-unit communicative acts”, as the first instances 
of communicating via convention (2008, 224). From this notion of holophrases acting as 
dynamically and complexly as needed, given varying joint attentional contexts, 
Tomasello proposes the emergence of three functional grammars, in correspondence with 
communicational motives and degrees of syntactical complexity: a grammar of 
requesting, a grammar of informing, and a grammar of sharing (2008, see Chapter 6).60  
Tomasello claims then that what we know as ‘language’ is “a complex mix of 
‘natural’ principles of communication and grammar – processes that derive directly from 
the way humans are built to cognize the world and interact socially – and 
conventionalized communicative devices created and passed along with specific cultural 
groups” (2008, 295). As he explains it, “The eventual switch to totally arbitrary vocal 
conventions was only possible because these conventions were first used in conjunction 
with – actually piggy-backed on- more naturally meaningful action-based gestures” 
(Tomasello 2008, 325). This ‘piggy-backing’ model does not require positing the brain as 
a modular computational system; the recursive mind-reading and mutual awareness 
necessary for complex communication is there with simple communication, before any 
sentences are uttered. The immanent pressures and constraints of social life paired with 
the adaptability of the human body-mind provide the necessary ground for the historically 
                                                          
60 A grammar of requesting requires only a simple syntax, can be accomplished using combinations of 
pointing and intention-movements, and thus is found at the chronological species-level of homo (Tomasello 
2008, 294). At the other end of the continuum, a grammar of sharing requires a ‘fancy’ syntax to, for 
example, track participants across a narrative, is accomplished mostly in vocal language, meets standards of 
grammatical normativity, and is particular to later sapiens (Tomasello 2008, 294). The middle grammar of 
informing uses a mix of signed and vocal language. 
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cumulative cultural growth of communities working through collaborative effort toward 
shared goals and according to shared normative constraints.      
 
Psycholinguistic gesture researcher N.J. Enfield (2009) offers another example 
that builds on Grice’s framework to account for the meaningfulness and communicative 
nature of co-speech hand gestures. Enfield argues that the proper object of study when it 
comes to the operation of utterances is a composite phenomenon of speech-with-gesture. 
Speech-with-gesture is by no means the only example of a composite utterance on this 
view, but is a prototypical instance of the observable fact that linguistic meaning exceeds 
the bounds of conventional types and constructions and draws from interpretive patterns 
and principles that are ‘non-linguistic’. Building on extensive empirical research with the 
composite speech-with-gesture utterances of a Lao village and an interesting theoretical 
synthesis of Peirce and Grice, Enfield maintains that “Language is just a subset of the full 
resources necessary for recognizing others’ communicative and informative intentions,” 
since “There is meaning in language for the same reason that there is meaning elsewhere 
in our social lives: because we take signs to be the public elements of cognitive processes 
(Peirce 1955), evidence of others’ communicative intentions (Grice 1957, 1975)” 
(Enfield 2009, 2).  
Enfield follows Grice in claiming that language users interpret across both 
conventional and nonconventional signs and usages (2009, 12). Guided by his detailed 
investigations into the composite speech-and-gesture utterances of Lao speakers, Enfield 
draws out far more fully Grice’s implicit insight that all contributing communicative 
behavior is subject to both conventional and non-conventional usages and interpretations.   
 
[Nonconventional signs] become signs only when taken as signs in 
context. This is the key to understanding the asymmetries we observe in 
composite utterances like speech-and-gesture ensembles. A hand gesture 
may be a convention sign (e.g. as ‘emblem’). Or it may be non-
conventional, only becoming a sign because of how it is used in that 
context (e.g. as ‘iconic’ or ‘metaphoric’). …Hand gestures are not at all 
unique in this regard: the linguistic component of an utterance may, 
similarly, be conventional (e.g. words, grammar) or non-conventional (e.g. 
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voice quality, sound stretches), or symbolic indexical (e.g. demonstratives 
like yay or this). (Enfield 2009, 13)  
 
For Enfield, both verbal and gestural elements in a composite utterance put burdens of 
both recognition and interpretation on the conversation participant (2009, 14). 
“Composite utterances are interpreted through the recognition and bringing together of 
these multiple signs under a pragmatic unity heuristic or co-relevance principle, i.e. an 
interpreter’s steadfast presumption of pragmatic unity despite semantic complexity” 
(Enfield 2009, 15, emphasis added). In other words, attention to intention and the effort 
to charitably and reasonably interpret another’s communicative acts in context are 
necessary no matter what modality the communicative signs are in. The multiple signs 
are easily taken together and understood at once when this sort of interpretive effort is in 
play. Says Enfield, “…the mere fact of language being used triggers a process of 
interpretation, and the gestures which accompany speech are straightforwardly taken to 
be associated with what a speaker is saying” (2009, 16). Highlighting “the collaborative, 
public, socially strategic nature of the process of constructing composite utterances,” 
Enfield insists that these communicative moves “are not merely indices of cognitive 
processes, they constitute cognitive processes” (2009, 20-21). This focus on enactive 
processes is a possible way out from the propositionality requirement, one to which I 
return in Chapter V.  
 
Gendlin: meaning as interaction of felt sense and symbol 
Of course, the idea that language involves more than words, sentences, and 
representationalist function is not new; thinkers have argued to broaden our notion of 
language and these arguments have become more pressing in the wake of the strong 
lingualism engendered by the linguistic turn. Eugene Gendlin, an American philosopher 
and psychologist and a scholar of pragmatism as well as phenomenology, describes the 
emergence of meaning in a way that dodges the restrictions of lingualism and 
propositional bias without insisting upon foundations in meaning-construction. To 
capture the felt sense of what Gendlin sometimes called a “preconceptual” knowledge, or 
an implicit experience that is on its way to becoming explicit, Gendlin gives the example 
of a poet “stuck in the midst of writing a poem” (1991, 17). He offers this story: 
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The poem is unfinished. How to go on? The already written lines want 
something more, but what? The poet rereads the written lines. The poem 
goes on there, where the lines end. The poet sense what that edge there 
needs (wants, demands, projects, entwirft, implies…..). But there are no 
words for that. It is ah, uh, . . . . . The poet’s hand rotates in the air. The 
gesture says that.  
 Many good lines offer themselves; they try to say, but do not say – 
that. The blank still hangs there, still implying something more precise. 
Or worse, the proposed line makes the . . . . . shrivel and nearly disappear. 
Quick, get that line out of the way. The poet rereads the written lines and 
ah . . . . ., there it is again. Rather than that line, the poet prefers to stay 
stuck. 
 The . . . . . seems to lack words, but no. It knows the language, 
since it understands and rejects – the lines that came. So it is not 
preverbal; Rather, it knows what must be said, and knows that these lines 
don’t say that.  
 …The . . . . . knows what we want to say. It knows with a bodily 
gnawing, very much like something forgotten, but now we can add 
something quite striking: what it knows may be new in the history of the 
world! (Gendlin 1997, 17) 
 
The point here is that the creation of meaning, no matter how spontaneous, is not a free-
for-all. Neither is it a disembodied or solitary activity. Relevant here is his notion of how 
the process of making meaning in language is guided – by relevance and felt meaning. In 
a conversation, for example,  
 
The felt meaning (relevance) of what has gone before enables one to 
understand what comes next. Often one has a fairly specific sense of what 
will be said next, but often one is wrong. Something quite different is said 
next; something quite different was being led up to. Yet, when the listener 
hears this rather surprising thing, he can still understand it from out of the 
same felt meaning that – he guessed – would lead to something else. 
…Both what the listener expected, and what was actually said next, were 
understandable from out of the relevant felt meaning. (Gendlin 1962, 129) 
 
The meaning of the conversation unfolds, and both participants are at work in that 
unfolding. For Gendlin, meaning is a functional relationship between symbols and 
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experiencing (1962). Gendlin, who often writes of bodily contributions to meaning, uses 
the term “moreness” (or “. . . . .”) to capture the felt sense or feeling or experiencing 
beyond verbal symbols that interacts with verbal symbols in the achievement of meaning. 
As he says in the story about the poet, the moreness is not preverbal – it is part of 
language in the sense of intention to communicate and the informing material of 
communication. Gendlin explains,  
 
The felt meanings that function in experienced creation of meanings are 
always just these (directly referred-to) felt meanings, having whatever  
meaning they have. They are not indeterminate, they are merely capable of 
further symbolization. …If this felt meaning functions, the results will be 
different than if some other felt meaning functioned instead. (1962, 148)    
 
I take this idea of the possibility of further symbolization as an important clue to the 
puzzle of rationality, propositionality, and the realm of the linguistic. Whatever the 
modality or modalities one is communicating in to others, further elaboration is always 
possible and is frequently required. Communication is cooperation and coordination via 
meanings built up for that process, in that process – it is not an exhaustive activity, or 
perhaps it is more accurate to say, it is not an activity that is ever finished.  
Communication is, however, an achievement activity, something that can be done 
better or worse, something that is done for a reason, something that knows of success or 
failure. Much of the time, high-order human communication is done using language. It is 
important to keep separate the conventions that guide language use and the conventions 
that guide communication. Nonetheless, I contend that if we sustain an effort to see 
language use as a communicative practice, and meaning as an enactment or achievement 
of communication that tends to use language as a preferred medium, then we will lose the 
imperative to maintain a privileged place for verbal symbols and verbal utterances. 
Rather, it begins to make more sense to see ‘language’ as including all those symbolic 
modalities that humans deploy together to achieve meaning in communicative action.  
  Following Enfield and Tomasello, I suggest we recast the ideas of intentionality 
and mind-reading by finding them in embodied enactments. Via Enfield’s notion of 
pragmatic unity, it becomes clear that conversation participants treat each other’s gestures 
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just as in Austin’s and Grice’s speech act paradigms, where interlocutors have 
expectations about, make assumptions regarding, and generally navigate the intentions 
and implications of their interlocutors’ verbal performances in both their conventional 
and non-conventional aspects. Speech act theory can be improved by including nonverbal 
performances in its pragmatic analyses, as the focus turns to joint attention, shared 
experience, mutually intelligible forms of life, and cooperative symbolic practices. 
Following Gendlin, we can maintain the significance of symbol use for the collaborative 
event of meaning-making without insisting that the materials used are the whole story. In 
other words, we can maintain Brandom’s pragmatic order of explanation, yet pick up 
Gendlin’s offer of an implicit guiding felt meaning that is linguistic not because it is pre-
propositional but because it interacts codependently with linguistic forms. 
 
Gestures as linguistic phenomena 
 Having established the criteria for language use in communicative action as being 
thoroughly pragmatic – contextual, dynamic, intersubjective, drawing on joint attention, 
shared purpose, and cooperative yet critique-bearing motivations – I now offer evidence 
that speech-accompanying gesturing is an activity of language use. 
 
Goodwin: relegating communicative effort and repairs  
A longtime gesture researcher, linguist Charles Goodwin studies how language 
operates in interaction environments. Goodwin’s observations and writings on his father, 
Chil, a severe aphasic who literally communicates with others, helps get at the enactive, 
normative, and social event of making-meaning without propositions. Following a stroke, 
Chil can only say ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ and ‘and’. He can make tonal noises, and he can point. 
Goodwin observes 
 
Despite his almost complete lack of productive language, [Chil] 
nonetheless acts as a powerful speaker in conversation. He accomplishes 
this by using a range of meaning-making practices beyond language itself 
to bring phenomena to the attention of his interlocutors who attribute 
relevant communicative intentions to his actions and who work hard to 
figure out what he wants to tell them. …The way in which Chil uses 
systematic practices to get others to produce the language he needs again 
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demonstrates the relevance of focusing on the public organization of 
collaborative action within interaction. (Goodwin 2006, 98) 
 
Goodwin thus details a fully collaborative way in which meaning is made, in language, 
yet across modalities and individual bodies and consciousnesses. Chil’s acts of meaning 
construction are co-productions of several participants who immediately recognize his 
communicative intent and begin working to give back to him the sense that he wants to 
make. Goodwin offers a thorough analysis of an episode in which Chil, via prosody, 
‘nonsense’ syllables, and pointing, told his son that he liked the bagel he was eating and 
that he noticed his son’s new haircut – in other words, Chil and Chuck enjoy a regular 
meal, parent-child interaction, and bonding small talk.  
Goodwin notes that “Chuck,” Chil’s addressee, must first recognize “that Chil’s 
pointing finger embodies the intention to indicate something to Chuck” (2006, 106). This 
is not enough; Chuck must also “construe [the gesture] in a way that is relevant to the 
activities in progress at the moment, and to use the pointing gesture as the point of 
departure for a relevant next move” (Goodwin 2006, 106). Chuck rightly takes the point 
as Chil’s indication of his enjoyment of the bagel. Goodwin explains this process by 
arguing that “Chil’s gesture does not stand alone as an isolated pointing hand, but is 
instead elaborated by a number of other co-occuring signs, including a range of quite 
different kinds of embodied displays” (2006, 106). While this multimodality is “quite 
general in the organization of human gesture and action,” the careful sequence through 
which participants offer up potential interpretations of the gesture for Chil to accept or 
reject is an extraordinary making-explicit or drawing out the full logical conclusion of the 
activities that typical conversation participants engage in automatically and 
unconsciously.  
The salient difference that sets Chil’s communicative action apart from standard 
cases is that others offer the explicatory or elaborating speech that completes the meaning 
of the gesture (Goodwin 2006, 106-108). (As will be discussed below, this is not that rare 
of a phenomenon (compare with ‘word searches’).) Fascinatingly, even as participation 
from interlocutors becomes putatively more active in Chil’s case, highlighting the 
multimodal and participatory nature of all human communication, there is no doubt that 
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Chil is the speaker when he is the speaker. His agency and authorship are not lost; he 
remains the arbiter of the meaning being achieved. As Goodwin analyzes the event: 
 
…Chil and his interlocutor animate different elements of the complex 
carrier (gesture + talk) used to construct Chil’s action, although Chil alone 
is the principal who commits himself to what is being asserted. His 
genuine agency arises from the way in which he is implicated in different 
stages of this process and visibly responsible for the proposition voiced by 
his interlocutor. (Goodwin 2006, 109) 
   
With little remaining command of the conventional verbal forms that most take to be the 
exhaustive constituents of language, Chil is able to communicate quite effectively, and to 
take on the appropriate role and commitments of a language user. This example ought to 
trouble the frequent conflation of communicative action with verbal symbol 
manipulation, driving a conceptual wedge between the two and opening up some space 
for broader possibilities, as the above sections argue for. It may be the case that what 
makes human communication rational has very little to do with the modality in which it 
occurs; at the very least, it is clear that more than the verbal modality are crucially in play 
when meaning is achieved in language. As Goodwin summarizes his study of Chil: 
 
Description of the forms of sociality through which his actions and 
meaning are constituted requires an analytic framework that takes into 
account not only the mental, cognitive, and psychological lives of 
individual actors but also the public organization of the sign systems, 
including language, [that] are being used to build action together, and how 
these systems are calibrated, linked to each other, and articulated in real 
time through sequential organization. (Goodwin 2006, 109)  
 
 Goodwin gives further evidence of the cooperation and coordination of 
participatory multimodal communicative action sequences in non-impaired speakers’ 
activities in his discussion of repairs, which will anticipate the next section’s review of 
Streeck’s work on gesture and gaze. Repairs are self-corrections while speaking: how 
speakers handle errors of performance such as stuttering, mispronunciation, or incorrect 
word choice. Goodwin classifies repairs as “public practices for negotiating a state of 
123 
mutual attentiveness” (2006, 100). Interlocutors tend to give more attention to a speaker 
after a performance error in their speech, shifting their gaze to the speaker. This 
demonstrates that they heard the error and that they found it relevant for subsequent 
action (Goodwin 2006, 100). To notice the full effects of repairs, one must be attuned 
beyond speech, to gestures, gaze, and facial expressions, and to hearer reactions and 
responses.  
Repairs directly manifest what is and is not acceptable in a language (since a 
speaker who stops speaking to modify what she just said, often repeating chunks of what 
she just said, enacts rule-following for her listeners) (2006, 102). Goodwin writes of how 
repairs also “contain, as part of their organization, a public structure of intentionality, a 
displayed reason for why the speaker is repairing the talk in progress” (2006, 102). 
Getting right whatever was said wrong (in Goodwin’s example, a misidentified referent) 
matters to the purposes of the talk, and the speaker’s repair highlights this for the hearer, 
who now attends more carefully to this aspect of what is being communicated. The hearer 
does not need to rationally reconstruct what and why the speaker intends to 
communicate; the speaker flags this in the performance itself. The repair secures joint 
attention, and both parties coordinate the communication by attending to the salient point 
as it emerges.  
To make a similar point, Goodwin recalls an earlier study of his in which  
 
…. a speaker who addresses three separate hearers during a single 
sentence by moving his or her gaze from one to the other, changes the 
emerging content and structure of the sentence in progress at each gaze 
shift so as to maintain the appropriateness of the talk of the moment for its 
current addressee. The sentence that finally gets spoken is not the one that 
the speaker began with. What seems crucial in such a process is not the 
syntactic organization of the final sentence, a single complex tree structure 
for example, but, rather, the way in which each emerging unit of talk 
projects a constrained but nonetheless variable range of possible next units 
that might follow it. (Goodwin 2006, 103)  
 
As Gendlin describes, one sees here a flexible yet constrained way that the emerging 
meaning may be achieved. This achievement is negotiated between conversation 
participants. Goodwin focuses on organization of action within interaction, rather than 
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(only) on the linguistic units themselves. By doing so, he can observe where and how the 
(always social) work of communication takes place: in multiple modalities, involving 
multiple participants. 
  
Streeck: success, failure, and rationality in co-speech gesture 
Jürgen Streeck’s microethnographic studies of hand gestures that accompany 
speech in contexts of everyday conversation and everyday activities offer further ways of 
understanding co-speech gestures as normatively constrained and rational yet non-
propositionally structured practices. Streeck argues that gestures play a vital role in 
organizing how a conversation and the attendant conceptualizations in that conversation 
unfold. Crucially, both speaker and listener “co-author” the emerging dialogue and the 
gestures that constitute it (Streeck 1994, 248). Since both participants are so actively 
involved in the process of meaning construction, any given gesture may fail to ‘do it for’ 
the listener and so be subject to revision. 
 Streeck’s research on the interaction of gaze and co-speech gestures identifies a 
broad cross-cultural tendency:  
 
… as speakers begin to produce what Ekman and Friesen (1969) called 
‘illustrators,’ that is, as they initiate gestural events that are integral parts 
of the message, they shift their gaze to the gesture, and then, as they 
produce the word that is most intimately tied to it, they look back at the 
recipient. (1993, 288) 
 
In this activity, “the gesture is thus made part of what is reasonably ‘visible’ in the 
interaction (I know that you know that I know that you have seen it)” (Streeck 1993, 
289). This is a directly embodied performance of the kind of mutual interpretation of 
intentions that Grice highlights as integral to communication and rationality. Most 
interesting about Streeck’s analysis is his observation that both the speaker and the 
listener varyingly and jointly attend to – look at – a gesture, allowing both of them to 
relate it to the meaning that is unfolding, which in turn allows them to collaboratively 
direct this emerging meaning. “Since the speaker can see and does see what she is doing, 
she could suppress her manual behavior any time if it appeared to her as symbolically or 
otherwise undesirable” (Streeck 1993, 289). Rather than seeing gestures as uncontrollable 
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leakages of one’s thought processes, by attending to their visibility and tool-like object-
ness, theorists may follow participants in reasonably assuming that if their conversation 
partner is gesturing while speaking, he intends that act as part of the enactment of his 
meaning. Moreover, the fact that speakers sometimes make their gestures “overtly 
relevant” via their gaze ‘ranks’ the gestures: “differential gaze-direction thus serves the 
participants in practically distinguishing between functionally different uses of gesture: 
not all gestures warrant the same amount and kind of attention” (Streeck 1993, 295). 
Streeck’s analysis provides starting criteria for the success or failure of different co-
speech gestures. 
 Streeck describes instances of ‘word searches’ (Goodwin & Goodwin 1986) in 
which a speaker may gesture while struggling to find the right word to continue the 
utterance. Much like a failed turn at Pictionary, the speaker’s recipient may offer 
incorrect interpretations of the gesture that attempts to make up for the missing word 
(Streeck 1994, 250). These and other descriptive gestures may need to be redesigned if 
they fail to secure the appropriate recipient response (Streeck 1994, 252). Similarly, if the 
recipient fails to attend to the gesture at all, the gesture may be rejected or redesigned. As 
Streeck puts it, “the audience’s orientation to or away from the speaker determines the 
fate of the gestures that the speaker makes” (1994, 257).  
As an example of recipient-designed or audience-responsive gesturing, he 
documents a case in which a German artist attempts to explain her exhibit to a small 
group of politicians visiting her art opening. At first, the politicians stare fixedly at the 
exhibit and miss her gestures, which grow increasingly small and half-hearted. When she 
notices the gaze of a member of the audience is directed at her, the artist begins gesturing 
again, this time much more boldly and symbolically (Streeck 1994, 259-265). Streeck’s 
description of this event gives us some fledgling criteria for gesture failure (“…they 
neither merge into one another nor combine into complex constructions. They remain 
isolated, bounded simple events” (1994, 259)) and success (the gestures “becoming 
structures in space that are set up in a sequence of preparation and stroke…” (1994, 
262)).  
In a successful gesture situation, the gestures and speech operate in dynamic and 
smooth temporal and emphatic coordination, making it difficult to parse out where the 
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responsibility for the emerging meaning exactly lies – it happens through the hands, 
through the voice, through the words, through the speaker, and through the listener. In a 
good statement of the embodied social enactment of meaning that two people might 
coordinate, Streeck summarizes, “The shape, complexity, and communicative role of the 
gestures in this segment vary depending upon whether they are being attended to …how 
an event will eventually be conceptualized and represented in a moment of face-to-face 
interaction can depend upon the ways in which the recipient deals with the speaker’s 
attempts to gesture” (1994, 265).  The artist’s co-speech gestures are dynamic and 
responsive tools that, along with her words and along with the nonverbal response 
indicators (i.e., gaze) of her listeners, unfold a particular, local understanding of her 
artwork.  
This example reveals the creation, use, and correction of gestures to be an 
intersubjective activity, just as we saw verbal repairs to be an intersubjective project of 
meaning-building and communication coordination in the discussion of Gendlin as well 
as Goodwin’s work above. Speech and gesture not only regulate interactions (see 
Sweetser and Sizemore 2008); they are guided and shaped by interactive pressures and 
purposes. Sociality, particularly the requirement of joint attention, requires multi-modal 
and multi-party activity to be sustained. 
 
While grounded in various methods of context and conversation analysis, in more 
recent work Streeck has come to focus on gesture “in its close connection with practical, 
bodily acts” (2009, 7). This focus on action and the part gestures play in action sequences 
returns us to Habermas’s rich notion of communicative action as world-relation. More 
generally, Streeck’s gesture typology demonstrates that co-speech gestures by definition 
are linguistic according to the criteria I set out in the foregoing section. Recall from 
Chapter II that Streeck classifies co-speech gestures by the function they play or the 
action they perform. These actions can be understood as taking on different world-
relations. His gesture ecologies include making sense of the world at hand, in which 
gestures couple with objects and actions in an immediate environment such as a work 
environment; and disclosing the world within sight, in which aspects of a visual scene 
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that participants share are selected and made relevant or salient by a speaker (2009, 8-9). 
Of the first ecology, Streeck writes 
 
One can think of two mechanics exploring with their fingers a dent in a 
fender to determine how to remove it: exploratory motions become 
gestures, which can display information, such as the texture of the surface. 
People can virtually share tactile experience by gesturalizing the motions 
through which this experience is gathered. (2010, 227) 
 
Note that words may not capture or communicate the texture of the surface the way that  
a hand motion – or a hand in action, actually touching the surface – can. The world-
knowledge is there first in the direct interaction with the object and may be effectively 
shared through mimicking that experience in gesture. 
Depictive gestures, which are meant to be and are typically looked at, are 
employed as “a representation device, to depict aspects of the talked-about world” 
(Streeck 2009, 9). These gestures “represent worlds in collaboration with speech,” and 
refer to shared knowledge rather than to what is immediately visible (Streeck 2009, 9). 
According to Streeck, “Depiction is a distinct gestural practice, tightly organized and 
firmly supported by linguistic units, for example demonstratives and deictic adverbs such 
as like this (Streeck 2002), and visually attended by both speaker and recipient (Streeck 
1993; Gullberg & Kita 2009)” (2010, 230). In these cases, “gestures of the hand enable 
the recipient to imagine an absent world” (Streeck 2010, 230). For example, an 
architect’s gestures about a building site he has visited elaborate, specify, and extend the 
verbal description he gives, helping the student researcher to construct a useful image of 
the scene. The architect uses his hands to show different terrace levels in their 
relationship to each other, and by looking at his own gestures he indicates for the 
researcher that relevant information is being enacted there. Streeck summarizes, “While 
his talk gives a vivid description of the scene, it is the gestural structuring of the space in 
front of him that ultimately enables the interlocutor to build an adequate representation of 
the site that he describes” (2010, 230).  
It is only the fourth ecology, ceiving or conceptualizing by hand, that analyzes 
certain gestures as manifesting a speaker’s internal processes. It would be more accurate, 
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however, to say that these gestures actualize “ideational content,” or concepts (Streeck 
2010, 226). Streeck does not commit to their being internal processes; concepts are public 
and shared, since these are still “performances of embodied schemata that structure 
content” (Streeck 2010, 232). The last two ecologies, displaying communicative action 
and ordering and mediating transactions, are pragmatic modes of gesture that as such are 
very much ‘for’ interlocutors, as they highlight and comment on what is (or has recently 
been) happening here and now between participants (e.g. pronominal reference or meta-
level gestures that capture the feel of the conversation), or attempt to explicitly redirect 
attention or role or in some way alter the way that the conversation is proceeding.  
By Streeck’s account, these different gesture actions demonstrate different world 
relations. Of the six ecologies, he writes,  
 
Other gesture ecologies could presumably be identified, but in the 
meantime this heuristic enables us to take note of the fact that hand 
gestures not only embody meaning and mediate communication in 
heterogeneous ways, but also bring the communicating body in contact 
with the world in a variety of distinct modes. (2010, 226) 
 
If we follow Habermas’s lead here, we can say that these various ways of relating to the 
world in communicative action are enactments of rationality. Streeck’s work is 
particularly attuned to the recipient-designed nature of gestures, demonstrating that 
gestures require intersubjective recognition – one of Habermas’s criteria for rational 
attempts. The above description of the artist ceasing and then redesigning her gestures for 
her audience show that gesture attempts can fail (another Habermasian criterion). ‘Word 
searches’ may indicate that gestures can be criticized and rejected (the last criterion). 
Pairing Gendlin’s lesson of further symbolization with Streeck’s microethnographic 
studies of gestures in the workplace, it is reasonable to understand gestures as doing 
certain work or performing certain communicative labors, and hence as subject to 
critique, further (different) symbolization, or improvement if they do not achieve their 
various tasks of meaning construction.61 This elaboration may take the form of verbal 
                                                          
61 In recent writing, Kendon frequently makes use of the notions of production and fabrication in 
explaining how gestures make meaning. For example, he notes that “this extreme fluidity of use and the 
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clarification, or a modification to the gesture handshape, movement, location, or manner, 
or a shift in strategy of getting the listener to attend to the gesture. What must be noted is 
that unlike Habermas, in Streeck’s paradigm, these rational communicative actions are 
embodied, and while they may admit of propositional phrasing, there is strong indication 
that they do certain communicative tasks better and differently than do verbal utterances. 
 
4. Co-Speech Gestures as Normatively-Guided Speech Acts  
 
Why normativity matters to gesture study 
The above discussions indicate that in a wide range of approaches, disciplines, 
and methods, normativity plays an indispensible role in meaning construction. As argued 
at the outset of the chapter, and in light of the above treatments (from pragmatics, 
pragmatism, linguistic theory, embodied cognitive sciences, and philosophy of language), 
I take ‘normativity’ to indicate that which conditions meaning-achievement: correctness 
and the possibility of correctness according to dynamic, contingent, community based 
standards. These standards (conventions or norms) are more concerned with pragmatic 
criteria of success than with formal constraints or propositional language use. The 
presence and operation of pragmatic norms both reflect past social practices and inform 
possibilities for current social practices, rendering these practices rational, that is, 
intelligible, justifiable, and fallible. Norms may take the form of strict conventions but 
are also operative in nonconventional, on-the-fly behaviors that nonetheless demonstrate 
rationality.  
Communicative action, as a rational social practice, is normatively regulated. We 
would struggle to have meaningful communicative acts without conversation-guiding 
maxims, speech act forces, or shared systems of symbolization. These are implicitly 
operative, communally and historically built-up tools that we deploy in expert and largely 
unconscious navigation of social interactions. This is not to say that we would not have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
detailed way in which the hands can change their symbolic role from one part of the discourse to another 
shows how the gestures produced by this speaker are shaped by his semantic aims. It shows how his 
gesturing, like the words with which they are associated, are fashioned under the guidance of meaning 
production. It also suggests that they are …created as parts of an object that is being created for public 
presentation” (Kendon 2004, 174). 
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communicative action without these incredibly facilitating tools, however. If we take 
communicative action as the paradigm case of rational action – action for others – then 
there is no closed set of what counts, and we cannot exhaustively predetermine what 
inventions of communication humans may act out. (Note, though, that social technology 
does not displace pragmatic maxims and forces; it seems to rely on them more heavily.) 
Yet communicative action is for others with whom we share a world or worlds; these 
worlds allow our actions to be for others in the sense of giving us an about-which to 
communicate and a common ground for adjudication. The norms and the content come 
from the worlds and our shared experiences in them. (By ‘worlds’ I mean everyday 
shared horizons or contexts of history and material and social life.) Worldhood allows 
communicative action to be a coherent practice, rather than a constant reinventing of the 
wheel.  
The foregoing accounts have further narrowed this subset of rational action that is 
communication action. For Habermas, communicative action is that which reaches 
honestly and openly, without manipulation or threat, toward understanding about a shared 
world. For Brandom, it is concept-mongering via propositional exchanges of reasons. For 
Tomasello, it is embodied displays of second-order intentionality that facilitate 
cooperation. For Streeck, it is making sense of, disclosing, elaborating, or imagining a 
particular environment with another, and it is thinking and reflection that emerges in 
face-to-face interaction.   
Indeed, these accounts do rely, to varying degree, on shared systems of symbol 
manipulation which allow for reference (indirect and direct), representation, and rules for 
composition. Indelibly intertwined with traditional linguistic elements in all theories of 
communicative action, however, we find protocol for performance. While a computer can 
manipulate symbols and construct complex symbolic chains according to algorithms, 
only a rational creature can make mistakes or can fail to adhere to norms. Failure 
presumes intentions and an audience. Failure happens in performance. Failure is the 
necessary flipside to rationality and to communicative action as successful performance. 
 
On the basis of the above criteria, I argue that spontaneous co-speech gestures are 
products or enactments of a normatively structured practice. They are frequent elements 
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of communicative action. They co-constitute speech acts, and they enact rationality on 
their own terms.  
This argument goes against the grain of historical and contemporary treatments of 
gesture. Just as long as verbal data has been the paradigm for linguistic signs, a lingering 
Romantic tradition has seen bodily expression as wholly natural (see Chapter I). This 
trope persists in contemporary gesture theory, particularly in the claim that gestures can 
never go wrong. As I described at the end of Chapter II, a prevalent way of 
conceptualizing gesture in current literature is as ‘meaning-leaking’. A ‘leaking’ account, 
in which gestures reveal cognitive activity, tends to link gesture with the ‘truer’ aspects 
of our thinking and speaking (McNeill 1992), pointing out that gestures correct verbal 
mistakes and give away our lies (Franklin 2007, e.g.).62 The meaning-leaking paradigm 
holds gestures to be uncontrollable, unconscious windows to speakers’ thought patterns 
and intentions. I contrast this with a meaning-building paradigm that portrays gestures as 
external objects accessible for both speakers and listeners to monitor and interact with. 
The point is not that there is no meaning-leaking, but rather to note differences in 
emphasis, philosophical implications, what questions we get to ask. This chapter has 
gathered empirical and theoretical support from a meaning-building perspective. 
As this chapter has shown, positing complete naturalness and lack of failure as a 
possibility for gesture has deeply problematic philosophical implications. This move 
places gestures firmly outside of the realm of the linguistic (which necessarily feels 
counter-intuitive to anyone who attends to communicative performances in real 
conversations (see e.g. Bavelas 2008 or Kendon1980)). At the same time, this designation 
of ‘natural sign’ locates gestures on the other side of rationality. Classifying co-speech 
gestures as non-rational or irrational has further undesirable implications, such as 
stereotypes of excessively gesturing bodies, or a general modern Western tendency to 
                                                          
62 Kendon appears to identify the trend that I call ‘meaning-leaking’ when he notes “…even with the recent 
revival of interest in gesture it often has not been studied for its own sake. It has been seen as a new 
‘window’ on the mind or it has been seen as somehow a ‘help’ to speaking or thinking. Thus it is studied 
for what it might reveal about inner processes, and rather less often as an integral part of a human’s 
expression” (2004, 358). 
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downplay (if not entirely ignore) the constitutive role of bodily experience and activity in 
human reasoning and meaning-making.63 
 
World-relation as rational reflection: a mismatch interlude 
Despite the tendency of gesture studies to see gestures as leaking and revealing 
meaning, as natural and never wrong, after the present discussion it should be clear that it 
is possible to find and produce gestures that are infelicitous, that violate or exploit 
conversational maxims, that fail to achieve the meaning they intend, or that require 
further symbolization or design. Without following up on this insight, Grice claimed that 
the possibility of extending the criteria of relevance to vocal stress “will perhaps entitle 
us to expect that an aspect of an utterance which it is within the power of a speaker to 
eliminate or vary, even if it is introduced unreflectively, will have a purpose connected 
with what is currently being communicated” (1989, 51). Streeck and Goodwin, for 
example, offer rich observations of co-speech gestures as aspects of an utterance that the 
speaker can indeed eliminate or vary, especially under pressures and in response to the 
reception of the utterance. Grice’s comment here also anticipates Enfield’s idea of a 
pragmatic unity heuristic: conversation participants take the actions of interlocutors as 
constituting intentional meaning-making activity and reason across and between 
modalities and conventions to co-construct that meaning. As we have seen in Goodwin 
and Streeck, the meaning built in this way is the responsibility of the speaker but the 
result of speaker-hearer collaboration.64 That vocal stress or spontaneous hand gestures 
are “introduced unreflectively” does not diminish their contribution to the emerging 
                                                          
63 In the 1930s anthropologist Franz Boas and psychologist David Efron conducted their famous study of 
the gestures of Italian and Jewish immigrants to Manhattan, finding that gestures systematically vary with 
cultural background and also with assimilation to a new environment, and perhaps launching long-held 
American stereotypes - as seen, for example, in a review of the study that appeared in Science News Letter 
under the title “Do You Talk With Your Hands? You Probably Do - More Than You Realize - Though the 
Average American’s Gestures Lack European Freedom” (September 5, 1936). The connotation of Italians 
and gesture remains widespread today; Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s hand movements are fair 
game for media analysis (“The Nino Scalia Guide to Sicilian Hand Gestures” by Garrett Epps appeared in 
The Nation April 24, 2006). 




meaning. In fact, unreflective introduction ought to elevate these ‘paralinguistic’ items to 
the same status as verbal-symbolic contributions, since these too tend to be introduced 
unreflectively, and also admit of error and correction at the level of performance and at 
the level of the world-relation they seek to stake out. 
 Moreover, the gestural modality is particularly powerful in that it enables, perhaps 
more easily than spoken language does, a reflective relation to the world that is the aim of 
the highest orders of human rational activity. As discussed above, Streeck points out that 
the visibility of gesture puts it squarely within the shared “meaningfully interpreted 
space” (Hutchins 2006, 388) in which the speaker and the hearer are at work. The gesture 
is there for the speaker to react to as much at is there for her interlocutor. Susan Goldin-
Meadow’s work on speech-gesture mismatch in children’s learning situations is another 
example of how participants react in complex ways to each other’s communicative 
actions.  Mismatches between gesture and cogesture speech are to date little-studied, and 
every researcher who takes them up understands them differently. Note, however, that the 
classification of a certain speech-gesture pairing as a mismatch presumes a certain norm 
of matching. Mismatches may then give participants reason to more carefully attend to 
what is happening in a communicative interaction in which they occur, while researchers 
and theorists can use mismatch studies as tools of self-reflection that reveal the implicit 
norms of that relationship that have been built thus far.65   
  In Goldin-Meadow’s paradigm, a mismatch occurs when the information 
conveyed in the speech channel compliments but does not at all overlap with the 
information conveyed in the gestural channel. Goldin-Meadow’s hypothesis regarding 
these events is that they indicate a stage in cognitive development: “A speaker who has 
produced a gesture mis-match knows (at some level) the information conveyed in both 
modalities. However, the speaker has not yet developed a framework… within which 
those pieces can be fitted together” (2003, 29). Goldin-Meadow’s work highlights two 
crucial features of co-speech gestures: they are meaningful to their audience in a 
contentful way that at least parallels speech, and they are further indicative of what is 
going on with the gesturer in relation to the task being talked about. Gestures in this case 
                                                          
65 As I argue in “Mining the Mismatch: An Essay Review” (Cuffari 2011). 
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have the potential to be used by educators and parents as a tool that measures a child’s 
cognitive development relative to a particular task. Her work also indicates how teachers 
can monitor and modify their own speech-gesture mismatches to better respond to certain 
students.  
Orit Sônia Waisman has written on a different kind of speech-gesture mismatch 
observable in conflict dialogue between Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Jewish interlocutors 
(2010). Mismatches on her view look like reference errors, as when a speaker says ‘there’ 
while pointing at her own stomach. Waisman takes these odd composite utterances to 
indicate “… a state of overload, in which the speaker’s emotional content exceeds the 
means of expression, and marks the search of this means of expression by the speaker” 
(Waisman 2010, 173). Yet mismatches, as under-theorized and problematic phenomena, 
admit of alternate analysis when the researcher takes the perspective of social interaction 
rather than individual psychology as primary. Approaching them first as intersubjectively 
built, communicative resources, rather than wayward missives from a speaker’s 
subconscious, might allow us to see mismatches as the fledgling missteps of language 
users faced with a new tool, or as the effort of agents in the midst of working towards 
something new yet mutually intelligible. We might understand that the mismatches are 
the interlocutors’ efforts to negotiate the conflict they found themselves in, rather than 
representations or symptoms of those efforts. We might trace the consequences of a 
mismatch in other participants’ uptake or correction or re-deployment of it – in other 
words, in the shared understanding that the participants gradually build together out of 
misunderstandings that motivate further communicative and interpretive effort. 
 
Criteria for meaning-achievement and the need for non-propositional normativity 
The competition between a meaning-leaking approach, with its logic of interiority 
and revelation, versus a meaning-building approach, with its logic of intersubjective 
construction, demonstrates just how challenging it is to determine criteria for meaning 
achievement. Scholars who have devoted decades of work to gesture observation 
consistently describe gestures as especially revelatory of what’s going on with speaker 
cognition. They attend closely to the event of expression that gestures seem to bring 
forth. I turn in the next chapter to better understand the philosophical significance of 
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meaning construction as an event of cognition and expression. The present chapter laid 
the groundwork for such consideration, however, by inquiring into the rational 
motivations and mechanisms that condition the possibility of communication as such. 
Sociality and interaction must be kept at the forefront of any analysis of communicative 
practice. These pragmatic criteria define rational action as for others and world-oriented; 
individual cognition is possible only in light of and perhaps after the fact of cooperative 
projects of sense-making. Furthermore, the pragmatic criteria of this chapter have 
broadened the horizon of meaning-making to include multi-modality as a regular feature 
of communicative action. 
This chapter sought to ‘get’ gestures as rational and linguistic activities via two 
directions of approach. I attempted to broaden the standard notion of rationality as 
propositional and the notion of linguistic as verbal. Using recent work in embodied 
cognitive science, I argued that intersubjective inferential reasoning does not require 
propositional processing. Recall Goodwin’s discussion of Chil. Via a critical reading of 
speech act theory and the notion of communicative action, I continually problematized 
the idea that linguistic activity is only or even primarily verbal. Formal and empirical 
pragmatics both indicate that the meaning that is achieved in language is accomplished 
through action that depends upon elements traditionally regarded as nonlinguistic, 
namely, elements of nonverbal, kinesic, visual, and haptic performance. While the 
tradition has analyzed nonverbal performance by rationally reconstructing these 
behaviors into propositional form, I have tried to show that this is not a necessary step for 
communicative success.66 Broadening the received notions of what is ‘rational’ and what 
is ‘linguistic’ such that embodied performances or communicative enactments, such as 
hand gestures, may be included, involves a demoting or reprioritizing of propositions 
                                                          
66 As evolutionary psychologist Richard W. Byrne challenges, “the fact that so much can be achieved 
without involving that level of mental representation – parsing of behavioral structure, social learning of 
complex skills by program-level imitation, and so on – opens the door to a heretical thought. Could it be 
that the prevalence of causal-intentional understanding of our social world is illusory, a consequence of 
retrospective contemplation?” (2006, 480) 
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(conventionally configured strings of conventional verbal symbols) such that they are no 
longer sufficient, nor necessary, for rational interaction.67 
I have also tried to demonstrate how co-speech gestures can admit of further 
symbolization and of critique and correction.  To round up the criteria for ‘gesture 
success’ that can be gleaned from the empirical work discussed above, we might say that 
gestures fail when they are not attended to; do not bring the hearer to an appropriate 
conception; or do not solve lexical retrieval problems for the speaker or do not help 
meaning enactment (think of Gendlin’s poetry writing example, before the right word 
comes). In terms of form, some signs of less successful gestures could include simple 
constructions; a lack of ‘building up’ of a space or scene; no holding or very brief 
holding. Gestures that can be described in any of these ways will likely require revision 
to better achieve communicative goals. On the other hand, successful gestures are 
watched; they may be repeated by the recipient; or they indicate an appropriate referent, 
resolve an ambiguity or solve a momentary conversational confusion. Successful gestures 
are likely to demonstrate complex, continuous constructions and may be held for a long 
time. While there is less in the literature to defend this, I hypothesize that successful 
gestures may also result in mood elevation and the felt sense of resolution as dialogue 
moves forward and comprehension is advanced (think of teaching). 
Note that my strenuous arguing for the non-naturalness or normative nature of 
gesture meaning is motivated largely by a forced need to get gestures on the right side of 
an inherited dichotomy between convention and nonconvention. Yet as much of the 
foregoing has demonstrated, nonconventional communicative practices can be seen as 
rational and normatively constrained, so long as they are done for an audience and admit 
                                                          
67 As a further note on the issue of propositionality and gestural conventions akin to syntax and grammar: 
indeed, gestures may sometimes be translated into propositional form. It would be ludicrous to argue (in 
propositional form, no less) that humans don’t communicate using propositions. Consider a project like 
Habermas’s, for example. Clearly there is value in understanding and articulating the various ways humans 
can use verbal language to affect each other and to effect social change. Surely it would be beneficial to 
systematically include co-speech gestures as part of that picture of language use. In some cases, this may 
mean assimilating gestural phenomena to pre-existing tools of verbal linguistic analysis. It should also 
reflexively critique and refine those analyses. In other words, there is no reason to reject or argue against 
propositionality as a tool that humans have that enables communicative action and rational reflection. Yet it 
is not the only tool. 
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of success and failure, critique and revision. Philosophical reflection on gestural 
phenomena thus reflexively critiques the very philosophical standards that prompted the 
analysis or reflection. A communicative act, whether made according to convention or 
not, consists in an interpretive taking-as on both the part of the speaker and the hearer. 
More needs to be said about this taking-as. It cannot be the case, as Brandom suggests, 
that our primary linguistic activity is giving or asking for reasons. While maintaining the 
requirement of intersubjective normativity, in the next chapter I bring other regular 
practices of (nonverbal and verbal) language use onto the stage I am setting.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND CO-SPEECH GESTURAL PRACTICE 
  
0. Introduction: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Intersubjectivity 
 
The previous chapter insisted that, like spoken linguistic activity, hand gestures 
that accompany speech are intersubjectively structured, normatively constrained, social 
practices of meaning-making. While I drew on empirical sources to demonstrate that 
these practices are embodied, the pragmatist philosophy that assisted in articulating the 
priority of normativity and convention for communicative success did not address this 
crucial dimension of embodiment. The aim of the present chapter is to establish that the 
normatively constraining and enabling, intersubjectively shared background conditions of 
linguistic meaning are embodied, and to specify in what ways this is the case. The lens by 
which I get the embodied nature of these constraining communicative conditions into 
view is the phenomena of gestural practices. (I am leaving largely unaddressed the much 
broader literature on embodied theories of language, though I will have occasion to return 
to this in Chapter V). Some theorists of gesture practices (such as David McNeill and 
Jürgen Streeck) draw on certain twentieth-century existential phenomenologists (Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty). By elaborating these encounters, I argue for an 
embodied, intentional world-relation as the condition for intersubjectively meaningful 
linguistic enactments.  
The pragmatic lesson of the last chapter was that meaning communicated in 
language is a cooperative and collaborative achievement. It should become clear in the 
present chapter’s explanation of the inescapably embodied and embedded nature of this 
collaborative achievement that gesturing is nonetheless a cognitive activity as well as a 
communicative practice. Put differently, the problem with the meaning-leaking gesture 
theorists critiqued in Chapters II and III is not that they attempt to link gesturing to 
cognition, but rather the model of cognition that they implicitly use when doing so. A 
phenomenologically-oriented approach to cognition as embodied, embedded, and 
enactive can offer improvements and corrections to an inherited Cartesian subject-object 
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dichotomous picture of thinking as internal mechanistic processing of external input 
(whether mediated or not) that has characterized so much of twentieth-century cognitive 
science and psychology (see Wheeler 2005).68 Of course, merely throwing 
phenomenology into the mix will not accomplish an account of gesture as cognitive and 
communicative meaning enactment. For instance, McNeill’s use of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty is an example of a partial encounter that does not reap the full benefits of 
philosophical insight. While attempting to link gesture and thought through his notion of 
imagistic, bodily-based thinking, McNeill misses not only the intersubjective aspect of 
this activity, but also, in outlining a rigid separation between linguistic and imagistic 
thinking, McNeill overlooks the intelligence and conditioning world relation that is 
present in spontaneous bodily action. Reconceiving this cross-disciplinary engagement is 
a primary goal of this chapter. 
To contextualize this chapter’s critical and interdisciplinary engagement with 
phenomenology, note that the thinkers that I made use of in the previous chapter to 
explore the conditions and structures of communicative success – particularly Habermas, 
but also Rorty – have criticized phenomenology for failing to acknowledge that 
intersubjectivity is rooted in communally normative language use and for giving a 
foundationalist, metaphysical, or reified account of language (Habermas 1967, 1981, 
1985; Rorty 1993; see also Lafont 2000).69 One trend in the contemporary scene in 
                                                          
68 For an introduction to the ‘4E’ paradigm of cognitive science – embodied, embedded, enactive, and 
extended – see Menary 2010. On my reading, ‘embodied’ is the most general or encompassing of these, 
and can speak to a variety of approaches to how the human body constrains and affords meaning. 
‘Embedded’ refers to context, situation, environment, and interaction with these, as well as to culture and 
habit. ‘Enactive’, to be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, rejects representationalism and 
locates meaning in temporal and dynamic agent-environment couplings; it can be said to focus on ‘on-line’ 
cognitive activity, in which ‘mind is enacted’. ‘Extended,’ closely related to ‘enactive’, identifies external 
structures as indispensible to our cognitive processes. 
69 Note that Habermas’s communicative action theory as well as Rorty’s linguistic-turn view both centrally 
figure some kind of account of world that echoes Heidegger’s.  This world-relation conditions the 
possibility of communication, according to thinkers like Habermas and Apel, by normatively constraining 
what sense an individual can make in terms of what her communication community is prepared to receive 
and accept without further justification. Habermas specifies three kinds of world-relation achieved in 
communication action. He offers a broad, “phenomenological” model, which includes three ways 
(objective, social, and subjective) in which we thematize an always already given, pre-thematic, shared 
lifeworld (Habermas 1981, 83). On this phenomenological model, “…rational expressions have the 
character of meaningful actions, intelligible in their context, through which the actor relates to something in 
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phenomenology and cognitive science that has held some sway for the past decade is an 
attempt to respond to this critique, generally by offering empirically-informed accounts 
of embodied subjectivity and intersubjectivity (see e.g. Zahavi 2001a; Praetorius 2004; 
Strawson 2004; Hutto 2006; Steiner and Stewart 2009; McGann and de Jaegher 2009; 
Simpson 2010). 
As should become evident in the following discussion, this response works from 
the ground up. Phenomenologists counter the post-linguistic turn critique by rejecting 
propositional language use as the primary or only adjudicating space or activity for 
meaning, agreement, and knowledge of self, other, and world. In increasing 
rapprochement with a recent embodied turn in cognitive science, phenomenology can 
point to the embodied know-how of environmentally or situationally embedded subject-
organisms comporting themselves in a world that always already includes other like 
creatures. Meaning is to be found in intentional world relations at least before it is to be 
found in the giving and asking for reasons.  
The present work shares much in common with this tack: I take embodiment as a 
condition for our communicative being and insist that we must go beyond propositional 
language to adequately analyze this being. At this point, it is clear that gesture study 
articulates new questions regarding the phenomena of bodily expression in language and 
cognition. Some phenomenologically-minded scholars have noted that gesture research 
provides evidence for claims of the centrality of human embodiment in cognition.70 Rich 
connections can be articulated between cognitive science and phenomenology 
particularly due to their shared endeavor to “recorporealize cognition” in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Yet consider that the hand gestures that accompany speech are a 
special case of intelligent movement and perception, because they are a part of utterances 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the objective world. The conditions of validity of symbolic expressions refer to a background knowledge 
intersubjectively shared by the communication community” (1981, 13). The major difference between this 
and the phenomenological account is that the former misses embodiment while the latter (putatively) 
misses intersubjectivity and post-conventional normativity. 
70 Peter Woelert offers a review of literature on image schemas, gestures, and pointing as evidence that 
human spatiality shapes, constrains and deploys our conceptualizations (2010). See also Gallagher 2005, 
2008. 
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or speech acts. Gestures are thus instances of ‘higher’ cognitive phenomena.71 In other 
words, since I take these gestures to be linguistic, to explain their role in cognition and 
communication I require the kind of careful approach that is brought to study of 
language. The phenomenological rejoinder to a linguistic philosophy critique, such as the 
kind that Zahavi offers in claiming that “from the phenomenological side, one would 
insist that a still more fundamental type of intersubjectivity precedes this [linguistic 
intersubjectivity] – the subject is already pre-linguistically intersubjective” (2001a, 203), 
does not seem to me to exhaust the possibilities for a phenomenological encounter with 
linguistic intersubjectivity. Therefore, a significant question that a phenomenological 
account of embodied meaning faces is: can we have intersubjectivity and post-
conventional normativity (à la Habermas) at the level of language in an embodied and 
empirically informed phenomenological account? My answer is a qualified yes: this is 
possible, but requires linking higher-order cognitive behavior to what is currently on 
offer (more basic embodied cognitive being-in-the-world type research) to adequately 
respond to the rigorous demands for constitutive sociality and intersubjectivity posed by 
theories of communicative action.72 
The interdisciplinary efforts of phenomenologically-rooted, embodied cognitive 
science of intersubjectivity draw on work in visual perception (Gibson 1966; Thompson 
1995; Noë and Thompson 2002), emotions such as empathy (Adolphs, Damasio, et al 
2000), and pre-linguistic social interactions (Stawarska 2006, 2007). The cross-over with 
cognitive science is relatively new but increasingly rich and well-established (as 
exemplified in the prolific peer-reviewed journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences). Meanwhile, the field of cognitive linguistics that attempts to explain language 
(usually linguistic structure and competence) on the basis of what is scientifically known 
                                                          
71 To be contrasted with ‘lower’ or more ‘basic’ cognitive phenomena such as motor action and perception, 
as in Mark Johnson’s characterization of the task of giving an embodied account of reasoning: “to show 
how there could be a connection between structures of our bodily activity and what we think of as our 
‘higher’ cognitive operations” (1999, 82). 
72 Put differently, when Habermas raises the critique “Meaning is unthinkable without intersubjective 
validity… there is no such thing as pre-linguistic meaning… Meaning is bound up primarily with 
communication in an everyday language, not with ‘experiences’” (Habermas 1967, 417), I want to agree 
with just the first claim, and not the later ones. 
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about cognition (and its embodiment) is not in the same kind of direct dialogue with 
phenomenology.73 I suggest that as another, complementary line of inquiry, we need a 
phenomenological account of the intersubjectivity of co-speech gesturing. As Dan Zahavi 
demands, “any convincing theory of social cognition should be able to account for our 
face-to-face encounters with others, should be able to deal with our faced-based ‘mind-
reading’ abilities” (2008, 515). Human face-to-face encounters frequently involve 
linguistic behavior. An account of social cognition will involve a treatment of language, 
which in turn will properly involve a treatment of co-speech gestures. The engagements 
between phenomenology and gesture theory that I sketch in this chapter therefore have 
the potential to further interdisciplinary inquiry into embodied cognition, linguistic 
meaning-making, and intersubjectivity. Moreover, they indicate a route to a response to 
the Habermasian critique that meets it at the level of linguistic performance.  
Given the introductory nature of the cross-disciplinary contact I wish to stage, 
then, before broaching the possibility of a phenomenology of co-speech gesturing or even 
of embodied linguistic activity, it is useful to consider the broader and more established 
question in phenomenology of intersubjectivity and embodied social being. In this section 
(0), I offer brief background comments on how intersubjectivity is presented in certain 
phenomenological paradigms. For the purposes of relevance and scope, I shape my 
analyses in the remainder of the chapter around cross-disciplinary dialogues already 
begun by gesture theorists, though in each case I seek to broaden the possibilities of what 
phenomenology might bring to and gain from the exchange. In sections 1 and 2, I discuss 
how Martin Heidegger’s work has been taken up by gesture scholars David McNeill and 
Jürgen Streeck, respectively. In sections 3 and 4, I solidify the suggestion of embodied 
and embedded intentionality as the basis for enacted communicative intentionality by 
discussing how McNeill and Streeck can be set in dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
In the final section of the chapter, I indicate what I take to be the fruits of this crossing 
and the path for future work. 
                                                          
73 Note that in the recent Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (2007), mention of Merleau-Ponty 
takes place on two pages out of over one thousand. (Heidegger is not mentioned.) While George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson are both credited with acknowledging Merleau-Ponty in their inaugural work in the field of 
cognitive linguistics, the reader is explicitly directed to Dirk Geeraerts (1985: 354-64) for the “only” 
“extensive treatment” of Merleau-Ponty “in a cognitive linguistics context” (Nerlich and Clarke 2007, 602). 
But see Woelert (2010) for a recent counterexample to this claim. 
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Phenomenology of intersubjectivity: intentionality and world-based normativity 
Intersubjectivity is accounted for in the phenomenological tradition primarily in 
two ways: through world relation and through embodiment. Both the fact that humans are 
always situated in a historically thick, rich, individual-transcendent world and the fact 
that human selves are particularly embodied provide phenomenological starting places 
for encountering other human beings and engaging in practices of understanding and 
meaning-making with them.74 What one finds in secondary literature that seeks to 
recover a phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the work of Husserl, Scheler, Stein, 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (particularly in the work of Dan Zahavi (2001a, 
2001b, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010) and Shaun Gallagher (2001, 2005); also Zahavi and 
Gallagher 2008) is an explicit focus on the pre- and extra-linguistic foundations of human 
being-with and –for others in a shared world.  As mentioned above, contemporary 
phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based empirical) inquiry into intersubjective 
aspects of experience tends to focus on encounters and activities that are considered ‘pre’ 
or ‘non’ linguistic, such as facial expressions, emotional displays, and just being there 
with or for the other in a shared world.75 
                                                          
74 This initial statement points already back to Husserl’s inaugurating work in twentieth-century 
phenomenology, including his influential notion of lifeworld (Husserl 1970 [1954], 1988 [1931]). I do not 
here attempt to engage the vast literature on this figure, whose work is so foundational for the thinkers I do 
discuss in this chapter. It should be noted that Dan Zahavi and others argue that for Husserl, 
intersubjectivity was a constitutive problem for giving an account of objectivity (and here the aspect of 
world-relation is appropriate), and that Husserl’s commitment to phenomenological method (in contrast 
with a priori postulate-stipulation) led him in turn to investigate the constitution of intersubjectivity (Zahavi 
2001a, 17) largely in terms of the first person experience of empathy. These inquiries tended to ask after 
how it is that I encounter, perceive, and know of another’s bodily being: how are the other’s experiences 
given to me, how do I apprehend them, what is the status of this knowledge? (Zahavi 2010, 293). That the 
structure of my understanding of another is likely based on my deep-rooted expectation that she is like me 
returns the account to the idea of lifeworld. Ultimately for Husserl, and influentially for subsequent 
twentieth-century philosophy, “subjectivity and objectivity exits only in relation to one another,” and the 
nature of this relationship is “manifest in the ‘intentionality’ of consciousness directed toward its 
intentional object” (Kearney and Rainwater 1996, 4). 
 
75 “Without ever denying the eminently intersubjective character of language, phenomenologists have often 
endeavored to unearth pre- or extralinguistic forms of intersubjectivity, be it in simple perception or in tool-
use, in emotions, drives, or body-awareness” (Zahavi 2005, 176). Zahavi takes this to be “decisively 
different” in approach from Habermas. Notably, Beata Stawarska develops a dialogical phenomenology 
(2009a) that engages with empirical work on infant-caregiver interactions. See also Stawarska 2009b. 
While gesturing as Stawarska discusses is not paradigm co-speech gesturing, as pre-linguistic infants are 
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To see how both world and embodiment are at the heart of a phenomenological 
account of intersubjectivity as well as a point of convergence with embodied cognitive 
science, consider the perennially returned-to moment of Being and Time in which Martin 
Heidegger analyzes equipmentality.76 Heidegger’s claim that “the world of Dasein is a 
with-world,” the “Being-in” which is always to be characterized as “Being-with-Others” 
(1962, 155) is based upon an earlier analysis of Dasein (the human agent) as being 
always already circumspectively concerned with matters (entities, projects) in the 
involvement-whole or relational totality of significance that constitutes its own 
environment at any given point.77 “Being-in-the-world… amounts to a non-thematic 
circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-
hand of a totality of equipment,” says Heidegger (1962, 107). All understanding and 
signifying rest upon prior active engagement of a person (being purposive, being as 
thrown projection) in the world. Reference is the mode of existence for the objects as 
well as activities that concern us (and so it is our mode of ultimate self-understanding as 
well) (Heidegger 1962, 119). Heidegger points out that “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such 
thing as an equipment” (1962, 97). A single tool is intelligible only as it refers us to 
equipment, which is intelligible as that collection of things that refer us to a workspace 
and a project (an in-order-to), both of which are intelligible only as they refer to a 
purpose or for-the-sake-of, which will always ultimately refer to a care or mortal 
attachment that the agent has to something or someone in its shared world.78  
                                                                                                                                                                             
involved, this work assists in defeating the theory-theory of mind and paving a way for the sort of inquiry 
being called for here. 
 
76 Noting the popularity of this passage, philosopher of cognitive science Michael Wheeler writes, “If 
there’s one bit of Heidegger that’s passed into mass philosophical and cognitive-scientific consciousness, 
it’s his phenomenological analysis of tool-use (Heidegger 1926)” (Wheeler 2007, 8). 
77 This gloss of Dasein, popular in the cognitive science uptake, is for the sake of expediency and ease for 
readers, but is really a too-quick translation of the analytic purposes Heidegger is after with this term. 
78 Merleau-Ponty offers a more basically embodied notion of this kind of reference: “in the action of the 
hand which is raised toward an object is contained a reference to the object, not as an object represented, 
but as that highly specific thing towards which we project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, and 
which we haunt” (2002, 159). 
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There is no need here to get into the constitutive anxiety of Dasein’s (our) 
condition, since a priori intersubjectivity is established along with worldhood. But we do 
need to ask, how is intersubjectivity established as a constitutive aspect of worldhood? 
Paying direct attention to the broken hammer, I find myself also at once in an 
environment (at a table, with drawers full of non-hammers perhaps, and the table and 
drawers are made of wood, which is made from trees, that grow in a forest) and a public 
world (but who cut down those trees? Who turned the logs into planks? Who sanded 
those smooth and shipped them to Ikea?) (see Heidegger 1962, 100). The nature of the 
discovered public world can always be made more explicit by further referential moves: 
why do we (or for Heidegger, das Man, ‘one’ or ‘they’) work at tables? Why does one 
buy inevitably shoddy furniture from Ikea? Why do low prices matter? And so on. The 
point here is that any object, space, or even simple action is already significant via 
reference to a context and set of purposes involving and deriving from the existence of 
other people. The possibilities of action are already shaped, and we are thrown into them. 
Any encountered object or action points to the way it is with a surrounding community 
and a lifeworld. Intersubjectivity is in a sense a priori and presupposed – which can make 
it somewhat invisible and hence requiring phenomenological analysis.79 
Recent cognitive scientists (such as Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) and 
Michael Wheeler (2005)) interested in a radical move away from the subject-object 
duality of Cartesian-based treatments of cognition seem to spend less time unpacking this 
indication-maze that always leads back to other people, preferring to focus on concernful 
absorption as our primary mode of worldly comportment. Their uptake of Heidegger’s 
equipmentality analysis features “smooth coping” as a kind of “world encounter” 
demonstrating “embodied know-how” (Wheeler 2005, 129-130). These terms are 
                                                          
79 Note Merleau-Ponty’s implied critique of Heidegger’s ‘One’ world as an explanatory basis for 
intersubjectivity: “The reply will be once more that I see a certain use made by other men of the 
implements which surround me, that I interpret their behavior by analogy with my own …in the last resort, 
the actions of others are, according to this theory, always understood through my own… But this is 
precisely the question: how can the word ‘I’ be put into the plural, how can a general idea of the I be 
formed, how can I speak of an I other than my own, how can I know that there are other I’s, how can 
consciousness which, by its nature, and as self-knowledge, is in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode 
of the Thou, and through this, in the world of the ‘One’? The very first of all cultural objects, and the one 
by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of behavior” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002, 406). Merleau-Ponty’s more directly embodied account is touched on below. 
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translations of Heidegger’s notion of circumspection or Umsicht, which highlights the 
kind of targeted, already-for-the-sake-of-something way that an embedded human agent 
interacts with her environment (see Heidegger 1962, 98).  Since circumspection is the 
kind of awareness that fundamentally characterizes human being-in-the-world on 
Heidegger’s account, detached observer modes are derivative. In particular, a 
subject/object divide is not the appropriate mode for analyzing our “everyday epistemic 
encounters” (Wheeler 2005, 130). The phenomenological experience of absorption erases 
a subject/world boundary, or even a sense of self: there is only the task at hand (Wheeler 
2005, 131). This kind of analysis can be used to overturn a Cartesian paradigm for 
understanding cognition (Wheeler 2005) and can move us towards the enactive 
perspective, in which mind and selfhood are enacted in pulses of interaction with the 
environment and with others (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Thompson 2007). 
 Yet at the same time, this non-thematic embodied know-how manifested in 
hammering that “has its own kind of sight” (Heidegger 1962, 98) can nonetheless be 
understood by the embodied cognitive paradigm as intersubjectively structured or 
requiring constitutive intersubjectivity:  
 
For Heidegger, then, the crucial for-the-sake-of-which relation – the 
normatively loaded structure that is at the root of every involvement-
network and that involves an act of projective self-interpretation – is itself 
cultural in character. …it is precisely the norm-laden apparatus of 
involvement-networks, involvement-wholes, and so on, that constitutes the 
human agent’s world. (Wheeler 2005, 148-149)  
 
In order to act in this norm-laden world via concernful dealings, the human agent must be 
actually, physically engaged with it. Wheeler continues, “Indeed, a world is not a 
projection of any internal categories to be found inside the human agent’s head. Rather, 
the human agent is itself external, in that it projects itself in terms of the public, social 
world of which it is an embodiment” (Wheeler 2005, 149).  Normativity in this 
Heideggerian-rooted phenomenological tradition is derived from the always-already 
nature of the worlds into which we are thrown and the ways in which our embodiment 
affords us this thrown world. Contemporary academics, for example, smoothly cope in a 
world of word-processing programs, textual citation formats, and library due dates; this 
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means we ask questions in a certain way; our very research projects are determined by 
what has gone before, by what one does and how one does this and that for the sake of 
being an academic.80 It also means that we get back cramps from typing, trip over absurd 
stacks of books on the floor, and frequently wear eye-glasses. (Perhaps we were drawn to 
academia because, despite these aches and pains, this was more suitable to our bodies 
than professional basketball.) As Zahavi sums up the connection, “Subjectivity and world 
are internally related, and since the structure of this world contains essential references to 
others, subjectivity cannot be understood except as inhabiting a world that it necessarily 
shares with others” (Zahavi 2005, 167), and furthermore, “The very possibility of 
intersubjectivity is rooted in the bodily constitution of subjectivity” (Zahavi 2005, 163).81  
Yet perhaps this phenomenological analysis of world as presupposing the 
existence of others and so constitutively intersubjectively normative has not adequately 
addressed the embodied basis for experiences of intersubjectivity. One way of posing the 
problem of embodied intersubjectivity is in terms of expression and empathy: “how… 
can the perception of another person’s body provide me with information about his 
mind?” (Zahavi 2005, 148). This view is gaining increasing attention in the debate on 
how we know other minds. Following Scheler’s critique of empathy and the problem of 
other minds, Zahavi writes, “we should avoid construing the mind as something visible to 
only one person and invisible to everyone else. The mind is not something exclusively 
inner, something cut off from the body and the surrounding world, as if psychological 
phenomena would remain precisely the same even without bodily and linguistic 
expressions” (2005, 152). Recall from Chapters I and III that the problem of how to know 
                                                          
80 See also Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope (2006) and “Response to Hubert Dreyfus and Nancy Sherman” 
(2009) about this book for a Heidegerrean-based “ontological inquiry into the conditions of the possibility 
of things making sense” (Lear 2009, 81). Lear’s analysis of the crisis in Crow way of life is particularly of 
interest due to its practical nature: what the Crow lose is a world, and this means a loss of the ability to 
“make sense of my past, or my people’s past, or my culture’s past practically understood: that is, as a way 
of going forward in my deliberations, choices, actions, aspirations and identifications” (Lear 2009, 86). 
81 Note that the term ‘world’ is being used rather broadly here, and may include work worlds, the 
world of home, and so on. ‘World’ in this sense best refers to ‘worldhood’ (see Heidegger 1962, 
114). As the chapter’s discussions unfold, I attempt to point out increasingly local, shifting, 
transient ‘worlds’ that speaker-gesturers collaboratively enact. 
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what is going on ‘in’ another person’s mind goes to the root of how communication 
works. A phenomenological answer to this question, particularly one based in the way 
that the body non-thematically (non-propositionally, non-conceptually) yet meaningfully 
and knowingly goes on about its dealings in the world, could thus greatly enhance a new 
kind of interpretation of communication as a practice of cooperative linguistic enacting.  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers one such phenomenological answer in his more 
direct route to embodied intersubjectivity. In some ways, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical 
commitments offer a starting place in which the problem of the others is not really a 
problem at all. For Merleau-Ponty, “subjectivity is not hermetically sealed up within 
itself, remote from the world and inaccessible to the other,” (Zahavi 2001a, 151). Rather, 
in various analyses of corporeality and temporality, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that 
humans experience “intra-subjective alterity,” which can then act as a basis for 
“intersubjective alterity” (Zahavi 2001a, 159).82 Hence, in a way parallel to and yet far 
more explicit than what one finds in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
intersubjectivity begins with and builds an individual subject’s embodied intentional 
relation to the world.  
The phenomenological premise of human existence’s essential intentionality 
indicates for Merleau-Ponty not a thematic object-directedness but rather our body’s 
perpetually active and knowing fusion with or being-toward the world. His notion of 
intentional arc captures the always already knowing way in which, for example, I move 
about in my apartment. The surroundings are meaningful, familiar, not calling out for 
direction objective inspection – and yet they continue to inform my unfolding conduct (a 
moved piece of furniture guides my steps around it; a photo calls out in a certain way on 
a certain day), through the “intentional threads” that run from my limbs to the 
environment in which they move (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 150). Explaining the intentional 
arc, he writes 
 
…the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual 
life – is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us 
                                                          
82 Not to mention the more Satrean point: “to exist embodied is to exist in such a way that one exists under 
the gaze of the other, accessible to the other; my bodily behavior always has a public side to it” (Zahavi 
2005, 161). 
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our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and 
moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects. And it is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the 
senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 
157) 
 
Thus we are to understand cognitive intentionality most basically as “motility”: 
“consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’” (Merleau-
Ponty 2002, 159). My lived experience is always intentional, then, but not always 
representationally thematic or propositional. Nor is it closed or ‘hermetically sealed,’ 
since I occur in motion, as this motion, as this act of reaching for the cup of coffee, or as 
this more complex act of dodging cars as I cross a busy street to meet a friend.  
This active, bodily intentionality as open-ness is the basis for intersubjectivity: 
 
I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of 
behavior and a certain world, and I am given to myself merely as a certain 
hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my body which perceives the 
body of another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous 
prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the 
world. (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 412) 
 
Note that Merleau-Ponty smoothly extends this shared experience of body dealing with 
the world to language use, the activity of which also helps readily explain the experience 
of other people: 
 
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person 
and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a 
single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by 
the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of 
which neither of us is the creator… Our perspectives merge into each 




For Merleau-Ponty as for Heidegger, then, human beings exist through their inhabiting a 
material and cultural world. Our being-in-the-world is being-in a with-world, a shared 
world, an always already intersubjective world.  
The foregoing brief tour of examples of intersubjectivity (via the route of 
embodied being-in-the-world) found in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is meant to 
demonstrate that phenomenology has a strong basis for claiming that intersubjectivity is 
an integral part of its analyses of the human condition. I have also suggested in passing 
that the irreducible situatedness and sociality of human existence thus proven might be 
used to dispel the need for a narrow mental-states and mind-reading picture of 
communicative success (see also Merleau-Ponty 2002, 408-411). In the rest of the 
chapter I facilitate encounters between these phenomenologists and work in gesture 
theory in the hope of building on this basis toward a more rigorous account of linguistic 
being-in-the-world. I want to highlight and figure a response to the still persistent 
question of how to link our higher cognitive and communicative acts and practices with 
the robust account of intelligent and interactive embodiment that can be gleaned from 
recent readings of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. My aim is to bring this sense of 
incarnate and intercorpeal world-relation into closer contact with the kind of world-
disclosure that linguistic activity enables.83 I attempt this by developing, through 
encounters with gesture studies, an intersubjective and embodied notion of appropriative 
disclosure. In the course of the following four encounters, I establish three points of 
rapprochement between aspects of a phenomenological view of language and current 
claims and methods in gesture studies. These regions of contact, which are here only first 
approached, are 1) the contrast and relation between sedimented versus originary speech; 
2) the function of language as world-founding and world-disclosing; and 3) the 
                                                          
83 Habermas suggests an interpretation of lifeworld freed from a phenomenological notion of 
consciousness, a lifeworld “as represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of 
interpretive patterns. …Relevance structures can [then] be conceived instead as interconnections of 
meaning holding between a given communicative utterance, the immediate context, and its connotative 
horizons of meanings” (Habermas 1985, 124). In distinction from Zahavi’s critical response to Habermas’s 
critique, then, I aim to use select phenomenological resources not to dig for deeper ontological foundations 
than linguistic pragmatists such as Habermas seek (Zahavi 2001a, 206). Rather, I advocate that we deploy 
phenomenological resources and insights to broaden our understanding of linguistic activity beyond a 
narrow scope of justification and rule-following. 
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characterization of language as an active process that is experienced, undergone, or lived, 
and as such cannot be adequately dealt with or glimpsed in propositions. 
 
1. First Encounter Between Phenomenology & Gesture Theory:  
Heidegger in McNeill’s Hands 
 
Throughout his writings, Martin Heidegger offers a distinct and challenging 
approach to language, famously claiming that “Language speaks” (Heidegger 1971, 188), 
that language is “at once the House of Being and the home of human beings” (Heidegger 
1993, 260), and insisting that humans speak only in response to language (Heidegger 
1971, 206-207; 1993, 411, 424), which he describes as an active force or destiny larger 
than and encompassing of human existence. Full appreciation of what Heidegger is up to 
in offering these descriptions requires an engagement with his larger project of 
phenomenology as ontology. Rather than enter into this engagement, I find in Heidegger 
two important and inviting contributions to the reciprocally critical encounter I stage in 
this chapter between a phenomenologically-informed approach to language and select 
appropriations of phenomenology in current gesture studies.  
The contributions are I find in Heidegger are: first, the idea that humans are 
situated or embedded in language. We do not only use or manipulate language; we 
inhabit it. Language understood in this sense provides and constrains our possibilities for 
meaning and understanding.84 Language historically transcends any given speaker and so 
discloses in a certain way the world in which a speaker finds herself. In saying 
“Language speaks,” Heidegger describes language as an activity that names, calls, or 
draws up a world, concealing some possibilities while disclosing others. The second 
contribution I take from Heidegger is that there are then different ways that a speaker 
responds to this living ‘in’ language. Heidegger distinguishes between different modes of 
responding to the possibilities of disclosure offered by language. These modes are 
                                                          
84 For instance, Heidegger writes in Being and Time, “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. …That 
which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have 
called ‘meaning’. …The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world… expresses itself as discourse. The totality-
of-significations of intelligibility is put into words.” (Heidegger 1962, 204) 
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sometimes differentiated as ‘authentic’ as opposed to ‘inauthentic’ speech (Heidegger 
1962), or as ‘originary’ as opposed to ‘residual’ speaking (Heidegger 1971).85         
Undergirding both contributions is Heidegger’s differentiation between Language 
as the ‘House of Being’ and the derivative or founded activity of what he calls ‘mortal 
speech’. As Robert Bernasconi explains, Heidegger makes a distinction between “an 
experience undergone with a given actual language (die jeweilige Sprache),” such as 
finding the right word for something while writing, and “the projective saying that 
‘brings the un-sayable into the world’ [das entwerfende Sagen]” (Bernasconi 1985, 52). 
On Heidegger’s view, a given speaking or everyday use of language is not necessarily the 
same activity as saying, “where something that has never yet been spoken is brought to 
language” (Bernasconi 1985, 52). As I will discuss later in this section, saying for 
Heidegger is essentially a kind of showing; this is the significant possibility that language 
offers humans, but it is not one that is taken up in everyday speaking. 
Poets and thinkers are those, for Heidegger, who are aware of this difference or 
distinction and accept the task of taking it up. In many essays, Heidegger carefully brings 
out the idea that poets and thinkers realize that language is always a disclosure of Being, 
a simultaneous concealing and unconcealing of Being, and at their best they struggle with 
this burden of using language themselves in a way that preserves how Being at once 
comes to presence and covers itself over in language.86 Regarding the possibility of 
change in how language discloses one’s world, Bernasconi observes, “The only words at 
a thinker’s disposal during the time of the overcoming of a tradition are traditional words: 
we are compelled to speak the old language, as the only language available to us” (1985, 
57).87 This is an important clue to understanding how Heidegger thinks humans are to 
                                                          
85 For the highly circumscribed purposes of this brief exegesis, I do not take on the well-established 
discussion in Heidegger scholarship regarding how to relate his pre-Turn writings to his later essays on 
language. On my reading, the general points being made here about his view of language can be found in 
many places throughout the body of his work. 
86 For present purposes, Being is perhaps most usefully understood as “a twofold movement of coming into 
presence and withdrawal” (Jacerme 2002, 312) and as ‘the gift of situation’ (Heidegger 1993, 237-238), 
i.e., the possibility of possibilities, a place requiring perpetual interpretation, and hence the condition not 
only for familiar functioning but also for meaningful life and activity. 
87 Heidegger advocates a new relationship to metaphysics in light of an understanding that metaphysics is a 
thinking in which “the truth of Being comes to language” (Heidegger 1949, 391). 
153 
have a relationship to something (Being, Language) greater than they yet grounding for 
them and revealed in their practices.  
On the one hand, humans cannot force language and must only listen to it 
(Bernasconi 1985, 67). Typical of Heidegger’s statements, this is not intended as a 
prescription but as a structure of human existence: we may delude ourselves by enjoying 
a positivist or objectivist relationship to language, believing in a direct correspondence 
between the words we use and the world we seek to grasp in that usage, but these 
common (and commonly philosophical) perspectives “ignore completely the oldest 
natural cast of language” (Heidegger 1971, 191). Language is before any one of us and 
all around us; just as I find myself thrown into a world of mass furniture-manufacturing 
and lumber mills, I find myself thrown into a worldview that is linguistically mediated. It 
is worth noting that a range of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), J.L. 
Austin (1961), Michel Foucault (1972), and Richard Rorty (1979), each in their own way 
echo this idea that any linguistic expression is connected to and enabled by conditions 
and conventions found in a broader horizon of meaning possibility, and that linguistic 
expressions reflexively maintain this horizon of intelligibility or potentially begin to 
disclose it in a new way. Like Heidegger, these thinkers push us to seek a different 
experience in language; Heidegger’s reflections on language offer a particularly 
uncommon vocabulary for philosophers to use. 
On such a view, art and speech, projects and poetry, realize the possibilities of a 
given time and place. Heidegger emphasizes that in their highest form, these projects 
become reflexively aware of this and reveal their own conditions (see Heidegger 1971, 
15-87; Bernasconi 1985, 35, 44). This is the beginning of the possibility of 
transformation in what language discloses: not forcing or grasping, but an inward-turning 
and quiet reflection or dwelling exactly where one is already in order to discern the echo 
of other meanings and possibilities (see Bernasconi 1985, 62). Poetic language is 
particularly originary for Heidegger in that it uses the language the poet has to name and 
call to presence what is in concealment. The poet discloses what has been in concealment 
precisely by not using language to maintain fixed, sedimented, or received meanings, but 
to discover something no one else yet hears in those words. This is what it means to 
‘bring the un-sayable into the world.’ The world is experienced in a new way through 
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poetic disclosure, which must operate with the materials given, but which at its best 
shows these materials as given, and invites others to find new meaning and new 
possibility in familiar forms.  
Unlike poetic disclosure, the response to language that is typical of human 
linguistic activity is something that Heidegger calls “idle talk” (Heidegger 1962, 208). 
This is the average speaking that ‘everyone’ takes part in, which “disburdens” any one 
person from taking on the task of originary speaking (Heidegger 1962, 165). Such 
linguistic activity does not lead to disclosure of unseen possibilities; rather, “talking 
extensively about something covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity 
– the unintelligibility of the trivial” (Heidegger 1962, 208). It is important to note that in 
later essays Heidegger does not use the language of idleness or inauthenticity, preferring 
to advocate for a certain reticent, listening response to language rather than to analyze the 
existential structures of everyday speaking. Yet as I demonstrate below, a certain reading 
of Heidegger emphasizes this authentic/inauthentic modality, and this understanding 
characterizes McNeill’s interpretation of Heidegger.88 The broader question of how 
humans use or ‘live in’ language as a horizon of intelligibility that precedes and exceeds 
us is a phenomenological theme that reoccurs in discussions of Merleau-Ponty later in the 
chapter. The contributions I sketched here thus establish a basis for understanding what 
gesture theorists seek to get out of Heidegger. Furthermore, in what follows I refine these 
contributions through engagement with gestural phenomena such that they can then 
inform the gesture-inclusive construal of language that I am articulating in the context of 
mutually constraining dialogue across traditions and disciplines. 
 
The H-model of cognitive being 
David McNeill uses an apparatus he calls the H-model, after Heidegger, to equate 
the presence of speech-accompanying hand gestures with certain cognitive activity going 
on for the speaker. As the remainder of this section works to show, this explanatory move 
is problematic on both philosophical and gesture-based grounds. Yet the shortcomings of 
                                                          
88 While not only found here, Dreyfus’s (1991) commentary on Heidegger exemplifies this reading and 
frequently appears either explicitly or implicitly in interdisciplinary uptake of Heidegger’s work. 
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the H-model are highly instructive for both fields, as this and the next section 
demonstrate. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter II above, David McNeill’s theoretical 
contribution to gesture studies is his theory of the growth point, a hypothesized unit of 
thinking-for-speaking meant to account for and predict utterance formation and meaning 
construction in specific contexts.89  Without rehashing every detail of this account 
(presented earlier in II.2), it is important to recall some specific elements of the growth 
point theory as they show McNeill’s deployment of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
(Therefore, some of these aspects of the theory will also be referenced in IV.3.)  
McNeill’s growth point can be thought of as a ‘thought seed’ that is unpacked (or 
grown, or blossoms) into an utterance. This seed contains the lifespan of a thought, from 
its earliest stages in a speaker’s “cognitive being” through its external manifestation, 
when the thought is “brought onto a concrete plane of existence” in the composite act of 
speech and co-speech gesture (McNeill 2005). McNeill also uses the idea of the growth 
point to refer to the moment in an utterance that manifests this thought seed. The growth 
point in the sense of ‘thought seed’ has an internal dialectical structure in which two 
distinct modes of thinking – imagistic and linguistic – mutually inform and constrain 
each other as a thought unfolds into an utterance.90 The growth point as ‘manifested seed’ 
functions externally in the utterance as the point of differentiation and most salience from 
a background context. In the example below, the salient point is the object (bowling ball) 
that pushes Sylvester down the pipe, and this is where gesture and speech achieve peak 
convergence or co-expressiveness. 
Recall from Chapter II the canonical example of a growth point. A participant re-
tells the narrative of a Sylvester and Tweety cartoon wherein Tweety drops a bowling 
                                                          
89 The growth point is a theoretical concept “referring to the primitive form, psychologically, from which 
the utterance is claimed to emerge. This growth point is a theoretical entity with defined properties that 
predict empirical data”(McNeill 1997, 190). “Thinking-for- speaking” describes cognition that is 
constrained by the requirements of a specific linguistic code (Slobin, 1987, 1996). 
 
90 One way that the GP is dynamic, then, is in this instability between the kinds of thinking that go into 
utterance formation and production (verbal-linguistic, gestural-imagistic) (see discussion in Chapter II). 
Importantly, the dialectical “unpacking” of the GP is the microgenesis not only of the verbal and gestural 
output, but of the thought itself. 
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ball into the drainpipe of which Sylvester is concurrently climbing up the interior. The 
speaker’s sentence expresses that Tweety takes the bowling “ball and drops it down the 
drainpipe.” She makes a symmetrical two-handed gesture with palms loosely curved and 
facing down. The downward stroke of the gesture is synchronous with ‘down’. 
Importantly, the gesture stroke does not coincide with the verb ‘drops’, but is withheld to 
co-occur with ‘down’. McNeill identifies the growth point of this utterance as ‘it down’, 
the image of the downward movement plus the linguistic content of the ‘it’ (the bowling 
ball) and the path particle ‘down’. The gesture is withheld because the core concept to be 
accomplished in this instance, according to McNeill, is what the bowling ball was doing 
and how it pushed Sylvester down a drainpipe. This action marks the external contrast 
with the general flow of the story – this is the salient point the speaker is making via 
interplay of the two distinct modes of speech and gesture. Though Tweety is still the 
agent in the utterance linguistically speaking, the gesture aided in transitioning to an 
understanding of the bowling ball as the real agentive force and ‘it down’ as the true 
“anchor” of the sentence (McNeill 2005, 122).  
This dual nature of the growth point motivates McNeill’s notion of 
communicative dynamism, which holds that in both internal form (different modes of 
thinking) and external form (synchronized modes of expression in context), “gestures add 
contrasts” and so move emerging meaning along (McNeill 1992, 251). Hence, gestures 
carry the burden of a certain expressive effort not found in speech or ‘linguistic’ thinking. 
For McNeill, communicative dynamism – the varying of this expressive effort in context 
– is the beginning of the answer to the question “why do we perform gestures at all?” 
(McNeill and Duncan 2000, 155) and explains why sometimes we may speak without 
gesturing. In later work, McNeill describes communicative dynamism in terms of “the H-
model”, writing: 
 
By performing the gesture, the core idea is brought into concrete existence 
and becomes part of the speaker’s own existence at that moment. The 
Heideggerean echo in this statement is intended. Gestures … are 
themselves thinking in one of its many forms – not only expressions but 
thought, i.e., cognitive being, itself. (McNeill and Ducan 2000, 155-156, 
original emphasis)  
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On this view, the growth point’s internal-external dialectic is a process of mapping 
“‘external’ interactive contexts into internal units of functioning,” because it 
simultaneously brings linguistic categories and constraints to bear on idiosyncratic, 
personal reactions to a given situation, and in turn ‘grounds’ semantic frames and abstract 
grammatical constructions in context-specific experiences of significance and salience 
that take shape imagistically (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 157).91 The point at which new 
meaning takes shape in the hands “is a mechanism for this ‘existential content’ of speech, 
this ‘taking up of a position in the world’” (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 193). When a 
speaker gestures, she reveals not simply her thoughts (as inner mental contents), but “part 
of her current cognitive being, her very mental existence, at the moment it occurs” 
(McNeill and Duncan 2000, 193). A gesture manifests an experience of significance: 
“This concept [cognitive being] explains the occurrence of gestures, and explains why 
they are more frequent and more elaborate where the departure of the meaning from the 
context is felt to be greater” (McNeill and Duncan 2000, 157).  
‘Cognitive being’ can be provisionally understood as McNeill’s way of 
characterizing thinking as a dynamic process that takes place in the context of a 
conversation or communicative action. On McNeill’s view, a speaker’s gestures highlight 
the richest moments of her event of meaning-making, indicating for her interlocutors (or 
observers) that her “mental existence” is doing something new and interesting relative to 
the immediate context. This prompts a provocative corollary: An absence of gesture 
indicates little or no contrast in a speaker’s on-going expressing. Speech without gesture, 
then, is “speech without thought” (McNeill 2005, 103). McNeill and Duncan thus use 
Heidegger (and, as I discuss later, Merleau-Ponty) to explain the processes of utterance 
development and expression as an existential event of contrast and effort, as a genuine 
moment of thinking.  
 
Cognitive being: having something to say 
What McNeill commits to or points out with his phrase ‘cognitive being’ is not 
prima facie evident. The gloss I gave above suggests that we think of cognitive being as a 
peak moment of dynamic thinking. This peak takes the form of a speech-accompanying 
                                                          
91 Recall that thinking-for-speaking starts imagistically for McNeill. 
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gesture; the presence of gesture marks or indicates the peak by enacting it, while the 
absence of gesture indicates the absence of dynamic thinking. On McNeill and Duncan’s 
view, the very existence of a gesture discloses the speaker’s cognitive being by 
manifesting her thought processes. Before turning to Heidegger, it should be said that this 
notion of ‘cognitive being’ will not be found there. However, attending to how a certain 
reading of Heidegger rates different events of speaking brings into play the philosophical 
stakes in this notion of disclosing something about a speaker’s existence. 
As introduced earlier in this section, in some places in his writing Heidegger 
distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic speech. Philosopher and Heidegger 
commentator Stephen Mulhall (2007) emphasizes the normative weight that can be given 
to these acts of linguistic disclosure.92 Mulhall presents conversability as constitutive of 
humanity’s (Dasein’s) being; his description points to an ethical ideal of authentic 
conversation and an accompanying aversion to the idle talk we are typically called to 
practice. Mulhall explains that the possibility of a person’s essentially dialogic 
internalstructure is the temporal distance within the human self, the never-completeness 
inherent in our always-thrown projection. (Recall that this aspect of human existence is 
the condition for intersubjectivity for Merleau-Ponty, as discussed in IV.0.) When I am 
with others in an inauthentic mode, I engage in a practice Stanley Cavell describes as 
“amentia” (Mulhall 2007, 54), the mindless and inane chatting that deploys language 
without thinking, indeed, as a barrier against thinking. Lost in this fully actualized place 
where “everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (Heidegger 1962, 165), I am not 
possibly responsible for my already-decided being or what comes out of my mouth. 
Particularly, I am unlikely to be quiet long enough to hear (or heed) the call of 
conscience, that uncanny experience that Heidegger holds as constitutive for authentic 
human existence.93 In an authentic mode, however, I experience myself as an other, as 
                                                          
92 Heidegger rejected an ethically-weighted interpretation of the discussions of inauthenticity and 
authenticity in Being and Time (see Heidegger 1993, “Letter on Humanism”). The inauthentic chatter of 
Das-Man is constitutive of Dasein’s situation and not necessarily or simply ‘a bad thing’. 
93 “The voice of conscience indicates that, beyond any particular demands the self might address to itself, it 
is essentially capable of addressing itself from itself – a being whose nature is such that its present state is 
always open to question from the perspective of a state that it might (although it does not yet) occupy, a 
being for whom to live is a matter of asking and answering oneself about, hence conversing with oneself 
about, how to live” (Mulhall 2007, 56). 
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not fully known or familiar, as an unfinished project. As such, I can “converse with 
[my]self about how to live” (Mulhall 2007, 56). Since I have something to say to myself, 
I potentially have something “of my own” to say to others. As Mulhall lays out in a 
lecture on Rush Rhees: 
 
. . . to be a speaker is to have something to say . . . and something 
of one’s own to say (something one is prepared to stand behind, to 
own rather than to disown – something through which one stakes 
and declares oneself). (Mulhall 2007, 23)  
 
In becoming a conversation partner for myself I become an authentic individual and 
conversation partner for others. Humankind seen in this way is “a kind of enacted 
conversation” (Mulhall 2007, 58).  
Mulhall’s contrast between ‘mindless’ chatter as opposed to ‘having something to 
say’ parallels and spells out a plausible philosophical backdrop for McNeill’s H-model, 
which suggests that a speaker’s active cognitive being will result in the presence of 
gesture.94 This ‘having something to say’, something that comes from a distance within 
one’s self that is never fully closed, could be another way of describing the phenomenon 
of newness, salience, or upsurge that McNeill links with imagistic thinking, which is 
associated with the gestural dimension of thought that is then indicated in gestural 
expression. I offer this as the most plausible way to link McNeill’s notion of ‘cognitive 
being’ and the H-model more firmly to the H in question.95 Note, however, that the best 
                                                          
94 As will also be pointed out when we get to McNeill’s connection to Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical 
side of this parallel rests on an unstated assumption that this enacted conversation is entirely verbal – even 
when it takes place silently or wordlessly (Heidegger 1962, 318; Mulhall 2007, 52). The metaphor that 
explains being human as being in conversation gets its logical structure from the entailed premise that 
taking a reflective stance on one’s self is tantamount to or accomplished via an internalized dialogical 
activity. This claim is tantalizing in the possibility it holds out for adding a new dimension to 
phenomenology’s current approach to intersubjectivity (say, something like intersubjectivity as the model 
for self-cultivation). Yet we ought to tread carefully here to avoid falling into a propositionality 
requirement for the realization of the highest mode of human existence. Part of what I aim to build in a 
phenomenologically-inspired construal of language is an understanding of linguistic expression that goes 
beyond propositionality and beyond the verbal or spoken modality. 
95 McNeill says only that the H-model “follows Heidegger’s emphasis on being”, and is intended to get 
away from seeing gestures as a representation (2005, 99). In footnotes, McNeill credits a lecture by Barbara 
Fox in 1995 and email exchanges with Streeck in 1996.  
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connection McNeill has to Heidegger is thus a questionable one. Mulhall’s treatment of 
Being and Time exemplifies an existentialist trend of seeing some kinds of speaking as 
more ‘authentic’ than others.96 This suggested function of language is problematic; if one 
observes and seeks to explain everyday ubiquitous linguistic activity, the 
phenomenological-existential tendency to treat language as primarily for the pursuit of 
authenticity, and to treat certain speech acts as more ‘pure’ or profoundly in relation to 
Being than others, appears a counterintuitive and unwieldy measure. There is, however, 
an idea in this account of authentic language that is worth holding on to, but this McNeill 
misses.  
McNeill misses (at least) half of the insight on offer in a Heideggerean-inspired 
analogy with the relationship between speaking and being. If gesture is “a way of 
cognitively existing” (McNeill 2005, 99), then such existence ought to be seen as taking 
place in one of a variety of disclosive modes. For Heidegger, human existence discloses 
Being in different ways, some more ‘deficient’ or ‘privative’ than others, but always in 
some way (Heidegger 1962, 213). A question here presents itself, perhaps particularly for 
those interested in ‘recorporealizing’ phenomenology, regarding the possibility of 
inauthentic, or less ‘cognitive being’-full, gestures. Recent literature debates the folk 
theory of whether or not gestures can lie, and the McNeillian camp (the ‘meaning-
leakers’ in my Chapters II and III) tends to err on the side of full inadvertent revelation; 
gestures are a window into one’s cognitive being at any given moment. Gestures cannot 
be false. Furthermore, by McNeill’s account, the presence of gesture manifests the effort 
of genuine thinking being done behind the scenes, as it were.  
A truly inauthentic gesture by Heideggerean analogy, however, would not be 
simply missing, but would be ‘idle’ or lacking ‘something to say’ in this originary or 
primordial sense. Even if we do not want to take on the full weight of this evaluation, it 
points out the possibility and likelihood of expressions that vary in their intentional 
content and disclosive power. A gesture might be falsely present, offering the appearance 
of effort, passion, or creativity, but perhaps just going through the motions, much as one 
does when idly chatting or even repeating the heated exhortations of a pet politician. The 
                                                          
96 A preferable, less ethically-weighted version is clearly put forward in Merleau-Ponty’s spontaneity-
sedimentation dialectic of inhabiting words (2002). I return to discuss this further in this chapter. 
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absence of gesture that McNeill explains with the H-model of communicative dynamism 
could (but does not seem to have to) indicate a lack of meaningful contribution in a given 
communicative situation, that is, a momentary idleness in one’s ‘cognitive being’.  Yet 
what about a presence of inauthentic gesture – gesturing that ‘says’ nothing – is this 
possible?  
The answer predicted by McNeill’s H-model is ‘no’, since gesture manifests 
important shifts in cognitive being. Yet again, to the extent that gesture is a core part of 
language, as McNeill argues and as I agree, it is reasonable to expect it to fall prey to the 
same circumstantial and existential shortcomings as do our spoken activities. McNeill 
works towards this conclusion with his H-model but offers an all-or-nothing dichotomy 
of gesture presence or absence, rather than taking on the full existential-
phenomenological insight that not every deployment of language comes from an upsurge 
of our being in Being. The point is that the reality of these variations does not mean that 
we are not thinking, nor does it mean that we are not, through our linguistic activities, 
always disclosing in some way. It just may be the case that what we are disclosing is not 
particularly interesting, unexpected, or difficult to say; sometimes we repeat stock 
phrases; some of our gestures may be more guided by habit than brimming with newness. 
Because McNeill has linked gesture so tightly to idiosyncrasy and has rejected any strong 
notion of conventions undergirding gestural meaning, it is not surprising that these 
vicissitudes are overlooked.97 While some gestures may not be as informative or 
communicative as others, it is important and productive to think of all co-speech hand 
gestures as disclosive at different levels of significance, or in different registers of world-
relation. This notion of gestural disclosure will be refined and elaborated in a discussion 
of Streeck’s gesture ecologies, below.  
 
                                                          
97  At the same time, however, McNeill himself offers a taxonomy of co-speech gesture types, outlined in 
Chapter II, though he seems to forget about these various ways that gestures can express when taking a 
more theoretical, existential stance on the phenomena.  
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2. Second Encounter: Heidegger in Streeck’s Hands 
 
What we find in the following encounter is a different way to conceive of hand 
gestures that accompany speech and the event of meaning-making they enact. Streeck 
presents gesturing as a variegated and environmentally-motivated set of practices. With 
his notion of ‘clearing,’ he presents an alternate description of how gestural enactments 
are constrained and tied to a local context yet powerfully able to transform that context. 
This portrayal keeps some of the movements found in a Heideggerean experience of 
language without carrying over or inflating metaphysical or ethical claims, and it 
suggests concrete methodological preferences that are phenomenologically rooted.  
Streeck’s recent work (2009, 2010) offers a micro-analysis of cases of the six 
gestural ecologies he has outlined: (1) gestures physically linked to the environment at 
hand; (2) gestures disclosing the world within sight; (3) gestures depicting abstract, real, 
or imagined worlds; (4) gestures that construe concepts; (5) gestures embodying the 
communicative act of a speaker; and (6) gestures that regulate communicative exchanges 
and interactions (2010, 226). I have discussed these ecologies above (Chapter II), and I 
generally favor this interactionist and ecological approach to gesture studies. In this 
chapter it is useful to highlight the basically phenomenological orientation of Streeck’s 
studies of human gesture practice. In stark contrast to the arranged lab setting and 
requested narrative re-tellings that make up McNeill’s methodology, each of Streeck’s 
analyses describes “embodied subjects that inhabit life-worlds as the producers of 
gesture” (2009, 204). He thus takes the notion of worldhood and being-in-the-world as a 
starting place, employing Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s notion of coupling to inform 
each of his micro-analyses of case studies (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch1991, 206-207, 
213-214).98 From this perspective, gestures are the intelligent and intelligible actions of 
embedded as well as embodied persons. Gesturing is a practice of interacting not only 
with others but with, in, and through some kind of shared world (actual, imagined, at 
hand, in sight, social, etc.). 
 
                                                          
98 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) discuss many forms of ‘coupling’ or ‘structural coupling’, which 
describe a reciprocal fit between agent and environment, with emergent properties for both. The coupling 
replaces the notion of separate or divided entities confronting each other. 
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Hands as communicatively disclosive instruments 
The examples for the first gestural ecology come from workers in a car 
mechanic’s shop. In these cases, Streeck’s analyses highlight two main phenomena: first, 
how the manual actions of the mechanics in the course of their everyday working form 
the basis for communicative manual actions (gestures) between themselves and with 
customers. Second, Streeck shows how the rich background of the mechanics’ familiar 
environment, expert knowledge, and joined purposes buoy simple orientational gestures 
so that these are on par with if not surpassing verbal activity in terms of reaching shared 
understanding and enabling progress towards solutions. In a conversation between the 
manager of a shop and his mechanic, a double pointing gesture, with one hand indicating 
a broken headlight and the other directing attention to a nearby junkyard (paired in this 
case with the very minimal phrase “This … ’cross the street”) communicates a shared 
knowledge of what the car needs, what the mechanic needs, and where the mechanic can 
get what he needs (Streeck 2009, 63). Yet the information is even more specific than the 
general phrases just given: the car needs this part to go here; the manager happens to 
know that that very part is currently available at that very junkyard; the mechanic knows 
that the junkyard is located across the street; and so on. Streeck notes, “Pointing 
gestures… do not simply select physically present entities, but often also evoke their 
implicit, known-in-common meanings …their [the interlocutors’] shared knowledge of 
the cognitive landscape… enables the parties to communicate via a minimal set of 
gestures of orientation” (2009, 63). Not purely originary or spontaneous, then, many 
gestures operate in part in virtue of what ‘one’ knows, what is taken to be common 
ground in a shared lifeworld.   
In regards to manual labor as the basis for communicative gestures, Streeck takes 
his cue from Heidegger’s famous analysis of equipment. He writes,  
 
To Heidegger (1962 [1926]), manipulating things and unthinkingly using 
equipment are our most basic modes of understanding the world. By using 
tools and handling things we also incorporate and make sense of the world 
that others have made and left for us in the form of the artifacts that we are 
handling and the techniques that we apply. (Streeck 2009, 57) 
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Tool use demonstrates circumspective, embodied know-how; it perpetuates certain 
knowledges and skills; and it alters the given environment through its labor and 
production. This insight – that our hands are both “data-gathering devices” and “organs 
of making” (Streeck 2009, 69) – enables a profound negotiation of the concept of 
disclosure as being fundamentally tied to communicative intentionality as much as it is to 
an ever-present and ever-constraining worldly background.  
 Consider that my hands can visualize tactile experience for someone else 
watching me touch something. Hands thus have the ability to coordinate understanding 
and action between two parties across sensory modalities. In the same car mechanic’s 
shop, the manager examines a customer’s car and finds a leak in the head gasket. Hussein 
(the shop manager) traces this leak with his finger. The customer repeats the action, 
following the pathway disclosed by Hussein, and in so doing gathers the same sensory 
information and reaches the same (or similar) understanding of the problem. Hussein says 
“We have a bad leak here” while tracing a line on the car. “You see here leak?” The 
customer then traces the same line. Hussein says “the valve cover gasket, we should take 
care of this I think” (Streeck 2009, 70). As Streeck analyzes this event, “What is 
interesting are the multisensory nature and transformative potential of such tracings: 
while the actor’s roaming finger may follow the lead of tactile discoveries, to the 
interlocutor this action provides visually mediated information” (2009, 70). It is precisely 
this transformative potential – moving from haptic to visual (to shared haptic) 
information – that allows working hands to become tools of meaning enactment. Streeck 
writes, “…the dual nature of the hand is recruited for communicative purposes; tactile 
features of the world, presently available only to a single party, are visually broadcast to 
everyone present” (2009, 70).  
Tracing and other exploratory procedures of the hands identify the properties of 
objects that can be gained by active tactile contact. Features like texture, consistency, and 
temperature are often only known to us by moving our hands over an object in time. 
Following Gibson (1962), Streeck notes that these “extractable features correspond to 
performance characteristics of exploratory actions: a rough surface implies different 
movement-characteristics of the hand than a smooth or slippery one. The audience can 
infer invisible features of the object from visible properties of the act. This multimodality 
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of manual action forms the basis for its communicative potential” (Streeck 2009, 71). Yet 
note that my touching something in order for you to know something about its touchable 
features works not only because I perform this act in such a way that it is at once both 
exploratory and communicative. My performance is part of the process, but so is the 
possibility of your comprehension, a possibility that undergirds communicative 
intentionality as such: “the beholder, the recipient of conversational gestures, also draws 
upon this undisclosed background of haptic understandings; otherwise, he or she would 
not be able to recognize the action-patterns that the gestures instantiate nor the equipment 
and objects that go with them” (Streeck 2009, 150).   
Streeck draws on these aspects of gestures making sense of the environment or 
world directly at hand, along with cases of gestures that select, highlight, and render 
specifically meaningful (or “annotate”) aspects of a scene that both interlocutors look at 
(but do not touch) (see Streeck 2009, 76-82), to structure his notion of clearing.  
 
‘Clearing’ means that an objective, merely existing, uncomprehended 
setting is transformed into a field that is jointly known and understood by 
the parties. Where there was opacity, there is now transparency: we can 
see what is the case, what is going on, what is wrong, and what needs to 
be done. We show each other what has happened here and what we will 
do. Such clearings of the field are routine components of many forms of 
cooperation among people. (Streeck 2009, 59)  
 
Streeck explicitly states that he follows Dreyfus’s interpretation of this Heideggerean 
term (Dreyfus 1991). Leaving Dreyfus aside, I take Streeck’s account on his own terms 
as an original, gesture-specific thematization of disclosive effort, and explore what falls 
out when these terms are set in dialogue with select Heideggerean themes presented 
above.  
There are several different facets of Streeck’s notion that can be pulled apart. On 
the one hand, Streeck prefers to think of clearing not as “augmenting reality” so much as 
“gathering meaning,” which “emphasizes that meanings are not usually brought into 
existence by indexical practices, but that these methods aid in selecting, disclosing, 
emphasizing, and elaborating meanings that are already inscribed in the world, in part as 
residues of prior human action” (Streeck 2009, 61). Yet Streeck points out that gestures 
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which ‘clear the field’ or ‘gather meaning’ also “figure intentional relations” (64). 
Showing another person “what there is, what can be seen, where things are” (83) sets up 
the scene from the speaker’s perspective specifically for the other to share or dwell in as 
well. Moving away from a quieter inflection of clearing as a space for human ek-sistence 
gathering and disclosing, Streeck introduces a more active reading in regards to a human 
relation to language. This more active description seems to capture well certain 
phenomena of observed gestural practice:  
 
When we observe …people in work-places… again and again we find 
gesture-type actions by which they annotate and highlight the setting at 
hand. These acts of clearing transform settings into ‘spaces of 
possibilities’ (Dreyfus 1991:189) and enable the shared understanding of 
the ‘involvement-whole’ that is structured by such meaning-relations as 
‘in-order-to’, ‘towards-which’, and ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. [Streeck goes 
on to cite from Being and Time:] “The interconnection of these 
relationships …[is] ‘significance’ …[whose] unity makes up what we call 
the ‘world’. (Heidegger 1962 [1926]:364)” (Streeck 2009, 67)  
 
Streeck’s proposed notion of clearing, then, suggests an active and communicative 
interpretation of a world in order to make it intelligible in a certain way to a certain group 
of people in a certain environment for a certain purpose. It seems quite evident (in large 
part following from Streeck’s careful analyses) that gesturing is a practice that aids in 
such labor of active, interpretive disclosure. Gesturing practices at once reflect and 
reflexively alter the constituting norms, perspectives, and possibilities found in a given 
space.99  
 
‘Clearing’ as appropriative and transformative gestural practice 
Streeck discusses clearing as a practice that is particularly well-carried out in hand 
gestures. While he is clearly after his own appropriation of the idea of ‘clearing’, 
                                                          
99 More will be said about the role of convention in representation, and the world-organizing function of 
representation, in a later section in this chapter that sets Streeck in dialogue with Merleau-Ponty. Streeck’s 
explanation of gestural iconicity rests on the idea that “representation actively organizes the world” 
(Streeck 2009, 119). 
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situating this use alongside some of Heidegger’s descriptions of language points to the 
philosophical plausibility of a construal of language that is inclusive of gestural practice. 
For Heidegger, saying is to be contrasted with speaking. In “The Way to 
Language,” Heidegger makes a similar point to the one noted in the above discussion of 
idle chatter and amentia: “One can speak, speak endlessly, and it may all say nothing” 
(1993, 408). Following the German term Sagan, Heidegger tells us that saying, in 
distinction to speaking, “means to show, to let something appear, let it be seen and heard” 
(1993, 409). This is precisely the function that the gestures in Streeck’s first two 
ecologies serve. When our interlocutors move their hands communicatively, to show us 
something, we see gestures, not the hand motions themselves (recall the earliest 
distinctions made in Chapter II – people recognize co-speech gesture as different in kind 
and differently meaningful than scratching an itch, catching a ball, or waving away a fly). 
Gestures say something to us. This kind of saying need not be verbal: 
 
To speak to one another means to say something to one another; it implies 
a mutual showing of something, each person in turn devoting himself or 
herself to what is shown. To speak with one another means that together 
we say something about something, showing one another the sorts of 
things that are suggested by what is addressed in our discussion, showing 
one another what the addressed allows to radiate of itself. (Heidegger 
1993, 409)  
 
As frequent examples of the previous chapters have shown, gesturing that accompanies 
speech relates in an immediate, local, and special way to what is being discussed, co-
accomplishing along with the speaking the momentary enactment of meeting, and 
perhaps facilitating this meaning ‘allows to radiate’. It is this kind of saying, rather than 
speech itself, that matters to Heidegger: “We shall call the essence of language as a whole 
the saying [die Sage]” (1993, 409). This is also the kind of saying that matters to a 
gesture-inclusive construal of language. The intentional content, the aspects of world, of 
living in Being, that are disclosed and presented in saying constitutes language in action. 
I thus take gesture to be another way of ‘saying’.100    
                                                          
100 In Heidegger’s picture, “The saying joins and pervades the open space of the clearing” (Heidegger 1993, 
414). There seems to be at least some surface connection or correspondence, then, between what Streeck 
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Streeck explains his sense of clearing as transforming a given environment into a 
richly layered and selectively presented ‘space of possibilities’. This highlights a function 
of gesture as selective unconcealing, or disclosing. Streeck explains the dual nature of 
this disclosure when he raises the following issue: “One may disagree as to whether the 
people at Hi-Tech [the mechanics’ shop] and other gesturing collaborators impose 
meaning with their gestures onto the scene at hand or rather gather and disclose meanings 
that are ‘already there’” (2009, 69). He describes this debate as a choice between a 
constructivist versus a phenomenology-of-embodiment position on intersubjectivity and 
human action. For the former, “meaning is the result of sign-production and usage,” 
while for the latter “meaning is, in the first place, the product of intentional action in the 
world, incorporated in acts and their instruments, objects, and settings, from which it can 
be recovered and made salient and public by indexical practices of use” (Streeck 2009, 
69). Streeck responds to the tension he identifies by pointing out that “the dialectic is 
inherent in the actions of the hands: human hands are data-gathering devices in as much 
and at the same time as they are organs of making” (2009, 69). In other words, the hands 
construct-impose meanings (organs of making) because they disclose-gather meanings in 
their intentional, world-situated, purposive actions. 
What I find most refreshing and salient in Streeck’s gesture-based account of the 
clearing, then, is this conceptual link he builds between disclosure and communicative 
intention. On my reading, this formulation is more productive than McNeill’s notion of 
cognitive being, and parallels the more general differences between these two gesture 
theories. I take it that for Streeck, disclosure via gesturing is an intentional act on two 
levels: first, gestures are intentional in the sense of being part of bodily action that is 
oriented towards something in the world (akin to Merleau-Ponty’s incarnate 
intentionality, discussed above in IV.0). Yet due to their potential for multi-modal 
translation in expression (that is, following Heidegger, their potential for saying), these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
calls ‘clearing’ and Heidegger’s more complex notion. If one were interested in pursuing this connection, 
my suggestion is that Streeck is describing a phenomenon closer to Heidegger’s idea of Eignen (owning, 
propriation) than he is the idea of a clearing (see Heidegger (citations)). Yet Streeck is fundamentally 
describing an activity of humans, not the movement of Being, Language, or history as destiny. The way to 
full convergence is thus blocked; hence the present conversation works to articulate a fuller notion of 
gestural disclosure as appropriative unconcealing in a micro-context.  
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very intentional, world-embedded gestural acts become embodied enactments of worldly 
significance for others who co-inhabit that world. This two-storied intentionality gives 
rise to a specific interpretation of dwelling as a basic experiential requirement for gestural 
practice (Streeck 2009, 83-84).  
Commenting on traditional treatments of human communication, Streeck writes, 
 
Communication is thus separated from the world: it is portrayed as being 
about, but not of this world. But, as far as gesture is concerned, this 
disembodied and worldless approach to communication obscures the fact 
that gestural forms often emerge through the confluence of practical, 
environmental, representational, and conceptual factors. (2009, 84) 
  
Streeck thus calls for “an account that situates the communicating person within his or 
her lived-in world, not apart from it” (2009, 84). A method of micro-analysis requires 
observing a specific gesturer in a moment of communication that unfolds with a 
particular other, for a particular purpose or problem, in a particular space, and drawing on 
particular salient history and knowledge. The way that an expert mechanic or rice farmer 
or professor of architecture can use their hands to draw up a meaningful scene for their 
interlocutor reflects how gestures “belong together” with one’s “livelihood” (Streeck 
2009, 84). This sense of dwelling and this requirement of locating a gestural event within 
a local field of significance have great implications for the methodology of studying 
gestural practice. To appreciate such dwelling, a researcher would have to be fairly well 
acquainted with the subject of research and their specific world-environments. The 
researcher would observe gestures made in the course of dwelling and acting in this 
space; they would not be elicited by artificial prompts. Furthermore, the meaning and 
know-how so enacted would go beyond propositions, while still being linguistic in the 
sense of a certain kind of disclosure in saying that I have drawn out above. The notion of 
dwelling that we can garner from various gestural ecologies is an important 
methodological watchword for gesture study, and continues to invite a particular sense of 





Gesture as language: tool or poetic praxis? 
While I am in favor of the phenomenologically-based gesture analysis that 
Streeck exemplifies, particularly in its weaving together of embodied and embedded 
intentionality with social, intersubjective communicative intentionality, this very 
approach prompts Streeck to classify gestural practice as distinct from linguistic 
practice.101 Note that his phenomenological basis first motivates him to describe 
gesturing as a craft, “My aim in this book has been to describe embodied subjects that 
inhabit life-worlds as the producers of gesture, and I have therefore described gesture as a 
craft, comprised of practices and skills” (Streeck 2009, 204). He then goes on to claim, 
“conceiving of gesture as a craft – or an art or techné – seems to be more empirically 
adequate than to construe it as a code or part of language” (Streeck 2009, 204). The basis 
for this claim comes from Streeck’s highlighting of gesture’s creative and active nature, 
one that is informed by convention and constrained by the realities of manual form but 
that yet knows “no prescription” (Streeck 2009, 204). Rather it is “a mixture of traditional 
forms, personal habit, and spontaneous invention” (Streeck 2009, 204). While an apt 
description of the complex phenomenon, this seems a thin justification for distinguishing 
gestural practice from the activities of language. Interestingly, Streeck nearly ends up at 
the conclusion I am advocating when he interjects several quotes from Humboldt: 
 
‘We must look at language, not as a dead product, but far more as a 
producing’ (Humboldt 1836: 48); ‘language [in itself] is no product 
(ergon) but an activity (energeia)’ (49); and ‘linguistic form’ means 
‘method of language-making’ (52). (Streeck 2009, 209)  
 
To these words from Humboldt, Streeck adds, “gesture form means method of forming a 
gesture” (2009, 209). But note how Streeck continues: “Speaking, the mode of existence 
of language, is energeia; speaking is activity that makes use of existing forms (ergon), 
sustaining these but also modifying them in the process. Speaking and gesturing are 
activities that always make their own resources – grammar, phonemes, words, and so on” 
(2009, 209). There seems to be no justification, then, for not also seeing language as a 
craft, art, or techné. Indeed, in his unique statement of the clearing, Streeck has opened 
                                                          
101 Note that this is a different tack than his earlier works, which I draw on in Chapter III. 
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up another route to be explored in this interdisciplinary engagement of studying gesture, 
by focusing on gestures as at once appropriative and creative. He points out the gestures 
do not have prescriptions for their use, yet they draw on shared conventions, local 
histories, traditions in form; and with these they make a world new. Such a description of 
gesture may resonate with aspects of Heidegger’s understanding of poetry. 
For example, in “…Poetically Man Dwells”, Heidegger suggests that human 
dwelling on earth is a matter of a certain kind of poesis, making, or building. Here poetic 
use of language is explicitly contrasted with “the mere propositional statement that is 
dealt with solely in regard to its correctness or incorrectness” (Heidegger 1971, 214). 
Poetic thinking, speaking, or dwelling is not a flight of fancy, Heidegger explains, but the 
most original grounding of humans on earth, in that it “takes measure” of the dimension 
in which we are to dwell. This is “a strange measure for ordinary and in particular also 
for all merely scientific ideas, certainly not a palpable stick or rod but in truth much 
simpler to handle than they, provided our hands do not abruptly grasp but are guided by 
gestures befitting the measure here to be taken” (Heidegger 1971, 221). ‘Gestures 
befitting the measure to be taken’ –what might these be, if not the world-disclosing 
motions of hands responding to a significance in which they are embedded? Heidegger 
also speaks of gesture when in another essay he analyzes a Trakl poem in order to get at 
something about the essence of language as poetic building and dwelling. Discussing “A 
Winter Evening,” he writes: 
 
What does the first stanza call? It calls things, bids them come. Where? 
Not to be present among things present; it does not bid the table named in 
the poem to be present here among the rows of seats where you are sitting. 
…The naming call bids things to come into such an arrival. Bidding is 
inviting. It invites things in, so that they may bear upon men as things. The 
snowfall brings men under the sky that is darkening into night. The tolling 
of the evening bell brings them, as mortals, before the divine. House and 
table join mortals to the earth. The things that were named, thus called, 
gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities. …This 
gathering, assembling, letting-stay is the thinging of things. The unitary 
fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the 
thinging of things, we call – the world. In the naming, the things named 
are called into their thinging. Thinging, they unfold world, in which things 
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abide and so are the abiding ones. By thinging, things carry out world. Our 
old language calls such carrying bern, bären – Old High German beran – 
to bear; hence the words gebaren, to carry, gestate, give birth, and 
Gebärde, bearing, gesture. Thinging, things are things. Thinging, they 
gesture – gestate – world. (Heidegger 1971, 197) 
 
I will not attempt an adequate exegesis of this passage, itself a poem, here.102 Rather, 
consider that this passage is a description of the saying of a poem. Recall that this saying 
may take various forms. What Heidegger seems to suggest in his analysis of this saying is 
that it shows us the world in a certain way, as made up of certain objects, as unfolded in 
certain activities and events. A poem, in its saying, ‘clears the field,’ structuring a space 
in a specific way for a specific time and audience. 
One suggestion that falls out from this juxtaposition of contemporary research 
projects alongside aspects of Heideggerean phenomenology of language is that both 
bodies of thought entreat us to reconsider language as an on-going activity of selective 
and purposive world-disclosure that is hence at the same time world-making. Heidegger’s 
notion of poetry is particularly suggestive here, but the ways that it might be changed by 
undergoing exposure to the phenomena of co-speech gesturing cannot yet be exhaustively 
spelled out – more work and more reflection is needed. Furthermore, recall that 
Heidegger hails poetry as an originary speaking. Yet as worked through earlier, what 
gestures enact will not always be originary; that is, they will not always initiate a 
transformation in our relationship to language as such.  
                                                          
102 Note that Derrida has meditated extensively on Heidegger’s linking of the hands to thinking and poetry 
as ‘true Hand-Werk’ (Derrida 1987). Derrida explains that for Heidegger, the capabilities of showing 
particular to the human hand highlight a crucial distinction between humans, who have a special 
relationship to language that allows them to demonstrate, represent, give, and receive, while animals with 
hand-like organs can only take hold of, grasp, or manipulate. Animals are denied the reflective and 
representing distance of seeing (or taking, or showing) something as such; this is a special capacity of 
human existence (Derrida 1987, 175). In the course of this reading Derrida quotes many enticing passages 
in which Heidegger speaks of gesture. In one such from What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger says, “But 
the hand’s gestures run everywhere through language, in their most perfect purity precisely when man 
speaks by being silent” (quoted in Derrida 1987, 175). While this is highly suggestive, Derrida’s reading 
makes clear that for Heidegger, hand and speech co-belong in writing, in pointing, and in silence (Derrida 
1987, 179), and that this single and singular notion of ‘the hand’ in Heidegger does not refer simply to 
humans’ biological organs (Derrida 1987, 182). Therefore, we cannot immediately superimpose what 
Heidegger says about hands and gesture onto the research under discussion here. These are seeds for future 
exchanges, perhaps, that will need to be worked out on their own terms. 
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Gathering the encounters between McNeill and Heidegger and between 
Heidegger and Streeck, we can articulate these early lessons learned in a description of 
gesture practices as disclosive in various ways, and we can note that many of these ways 
are local and constrained. Another result of these encounters is convergent philosophical 
and empirical-observational justification for reconciling an inherited split between verbal 
linguistic forms and haptic, kinesic, visual linguistic forms. Linguistic no longer means 
only, as it has in previous discussions, what is required to draw inferences about 
another’s behavior or reasoning such that their manifestations of sapience are 
comprehended and justified. Linguistic in this phenomenological and gestural encounter 
means appropriation of sedimented forms that is disclosive at various levels, and in a way 
that at once reveals meanings made in previous intentional acts and at the same time 
shifts these meanings anew, thus establishing and perpetually modifying shared worlds of 
significance. In turn, seeing the manifold ways that multimodal language use enacts 
scenes and ecological relations may prompt a shift in the priority of the question of 
originality or authenticity. 
 
Another, related route for a phenomenology of gestural practices takes its lead 
from the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As was the case in the foregoing 
discussions of Heidegger, what follows is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of 
Merleau-Ponty’s complex and evolving philosophy of signs. Rather, I again take 
direction from how gesture theorists have, in small but crucial ways, borrowed 
conceptualizations and possibilities from Merleau-Ponty. Especially useful at this 
juncture is the way that Merleau-Ponty shifts the discussion of authenticity to the 
appropriative nature of language use and the role the intelligent, actively sensing body 
plays in this appropriative deployment of sedimented uses and background habit. 
Considering how gesture theorists have and might dialogue with Merleau-Ponty brings a 
level of concreteness to the analysis of two-order, embodied-cognitive and 





3. Third Encounter: McNeill and Merleau-Ponty: Dueling Dialectics 
 
Recall that on McNeill’s view, gesturing and gestural thinking aids the speaker in 
cognitive preparation for making an utterance, rhythmically guides the execution of the 
utterance, and carries certain expressive content in the utterance that is meaningful to 
other conversation participants (1992, 2005). McNeill draws explicitly on Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in articulating his theory of gesture’s role in cognition (2005). While 
Merleau-Ponty’s own mentions of gesture and his claim that “the spoken word is a 
genuine gesture” (2002, 213) are not necessarily intended to explain the same phenomena 
that McNeill researches, the imagery-language dialectic that McNeill introduces to 
account for the cognitive processing/expression producing dual role of gestures is 
inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s sedimentation-spontaneity dialectic for speech significance 
(McNeill 2005). In the analysis that follows, I contend that McNeill (2005) does not 
adequately appreciate the sedimented aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s picture, and hence the 
socio-culturally constituted nature of the possibilities of meaning construction that his 
phenomenological view offers. 
 
Merleau-Ponty on gesture: sedimentation-spontaneity dialectic 
 In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty presents the dialectic 
interplay of sedimentation and spontaneity as an explanation for how speech is 
meaningful and how thoughts come into being via bodily accomplishment (2002). 
Gesture, for Merleau-Ponty, is the spurring force, the bodily act of a speaker using 
conventional language to say something original. In this model, sedimentation describes 
spoken speech, which provides the material for thoughts and verbalizations.103 On the 
other hand, spontaneity marks true speech, original speaking, that is, the birth of a new 
relationship between myself, the world, and others that brings thought into existence 
                                                          
103 Note that sedimentation as a characteristic of historical human thought is found in Husserl. “With regard 
to the praxis of human cognition, sedimentation refers to a consolidating process of linguistic conceptual-
ization, in the course of which the evident cognitive structures originally given in embodied sense-
experience have certain “persisting linguistic acquisitions” super- imposed on them (Husserl 1970b, 362). 
In particular, through sedimentation, linguistic concepts become more and more an immediately available, 
unquestioned (and sometimes even unquestionable) element of the language user’s conceptual repertoire” 
(Woelert 2010, 119). 
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through an appropriation of constituted language (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 213). These 
previous acts of expression are not merely a static assemblage of dictionary definitions or 
an inanimate corpus; Merleau-Ponty describes the spoken word as an embodied habit that 
enables in the first place any response to our ‘momentary desires’ to make meaning out 
of “the primordial silence” (2002, 213). Spoken words are gestures (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 
217). 
A gesture for Merleau-Ponty is the way that meaning inhabits a body and a body 
inhabits acquired ways of expressing, which is to say, the way that a particular existing, 
thinking, and communicating body-subject lives – and creates – a particular meaning. A 
gesture is a meaningful bodily act, the way a human body always transcends itself 
towards some significance. Gesture, then, is precisely the simultaneous constitution of 
thought and expression. In distinction from the Cartesian paradigm that dominated 
philosophy of mind since modernity, language for Merleau-Ponty does not represent 
some interior item awaiting expression. Merleau-Ponty tells us that “thought is no 
‘internal’ thing and does not exist independently of the world and of words” (2002, 213). 
Thought is achieved or completed in bodily expression; once expressed via the gesture of 
taking up constituted speech it may recur in what appears, but only appears, to be an 
inner monologue. Expression is the outcome of the dialectic of sedimentation and 
spontaneity, in that expression is the body’s appropriation of acquired form in a new act 
of meaning-giving. The body is always the medium of expression. Note that for Merleau-
Ponty, speech is already gesture: the use of words is an instance of body movement and 
expression. Gesture is the happening, or enactment, of thought.  
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of thought extends the sedimentation-spontaneity 
dialectic of spoken and speaking speech to thought. ‘Pure’ thought is an immeasurable, 
invisible, pre-linguistic spark of spontaneity just as expression and thought co-arise in the 
body. If not for the dialectically joined elements of expressive body and sedimented or 
acquired symbols, this “‘pure’ thought reduces itself to a certain void of consciousness, to 
a momentary desire” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 453).  Underneath acquired thought – 
thoughts with which ‘one is familiar, thoughts already expressed that form a historical, 
sedimented lexicon that any subsequent thought must don to have its being – we find 
“another thought which is struggling to establish itself, and succeeds only by bending the 
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resources of constituted language to some fresh usage” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 453). Thus 
‘pure thought’ is never pure – or never pure for long – as it would fade away if not 
safeguarded in constituted language. 
Sedimented language is stretched, bent, and inhabited in order that new thought 
come into being, into form and presence. Acquired words and thoughts are taken up 
through a stylistic inhabiting, which Merleau-Ponty calls gesture. The spontaneity-
sedimentation dialectic unites thought and language completely. For Merleau-Ponty, 
gesture is this stroke through which a speaking subject incorporates the past into the 
present, establishing continuity with a previous context of thought and meaning in the 
same moment that she gives embodied expression to a new and original idea that is at 
once communicable and recognizable as such. We can define ‘gesture’ for Merleau-Ponty 
as the stylistic inhabiting of acquired words and thoughts to make new meaning, to think 
new thoughts or speak originally.104 
 
McNeill’s imagery-language dialectic  
McNeill follows Merleau-Ponty in emphasizing thought’s existence as bodily 
expression in speech and gesture. His imagery-language dialectic, a key element of his 
growth point theory, runs on the tension of two unlike cognitive modes juxtaposed in 
time and in concept as the two sides of an underlying idea unit. Speech and gesture 
respectively embody two unlike modes of thinking, according to McNeill: the speech 
mode is linear, analytic, categorical, constrained, and conventional, while the gesture 
mode is characterized as holistic, imagistic, less constrained, and idiosyncratic. The 
conflict of these modes gets resolved in a well-formed utterance that usually includes 
gesture.  
As discussed above, McNeill explains the occurrence and absence of co-speech 
gestures in terms of communicative dynamism, arguing that gestures are more likely to 
                                                          
104 It is important to note that while I find Merleau-Ponty’s account of gesture incredibly salient and useful 
to bring to bear on contemporary gesture scholarship (particularly because this scholarship occasionally 
cites Merleau-Ponty), his use of ‘gesture’ is broader than mine and of that of other gesture scholars. My 
target phenomenon in the present work is speech-accompanying gesture. I remain agnostic in regards to 
possible agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s view that gesture is more originary and all-encompassing than 
speech. 
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occur when the utterance content emerges as a salient point or contrast to the unfolding 
communication scenario. Thus, “the higher the newsworthy content, the more elaborate 
the image” and the more likely the gesture (McNeill 1992, 57). The gesture increases in 
likelihood and complexity in relation to the idea unit’s differentiation from current 
discourse. McNeill’s more recent “H-model” presents communicative dynamism in 
existential terms: “The H-model is in this way an extension of Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘existential content of speech’ (and gesture). It gives existential content an interpretation 
on the level of cognitive being” (2005, 99). An absence of gesture indicates little or no 
contrast in a speaker’s ongoing expressing. Thought is an unpacked idea unit that arises 
as a break from a given context; therefore an absence of gesture – or the cessation of the 
dialectic and the remainder of “pure verbalism” – indicates an absence of thought. 
McNeill surmises, “All this implies that the dialectic itself varies proportionately with 
communicative dynamism and memory, and when these conditions are absent speaking is 
no longer merging with thinking” (2005, 103). McNeill boldly concludes: speech without 
gesture is “speech without thought” (2005, 103). 
 
Dueling dialectics? 
McNeill’s idea of a not-yet-articulated but fully intentional idea unit is analogous 
to Merelau-Ponty’s spontaneous flash or upsurge of ‘new intention’ or ‘pure thought’ – a 
new moment in the body’s ongoing meaningful engagement with the world, one that 
initiates its own inhabiting of sedimented forms to new expressive ends.105 It follows that 
McNeill’s process of unpacking, or the playing out of the imagery-speech dialectic, is 
comparable to the act of appropriation and inhabitation of constituted speech, that is, the 
process of Merleau-Ponty’s spontaneity-sedimentation dialectic. The suggestion then is 
that the act of appropriation (in Merleau-Ponty’s terms) could also be explained by the 
interaction of gesture (imagistic thinking) and speech (linear analytic formal thinking), 
with gesture in McNeill’s sense being a way of talking about active, true, original or 
‘speaking’ speech in Merleau-Ponty’s sense (and McNeill’s speech being tantamount to 
Merleau-Ponty’s spoken, constituted speech). Then gesture is the root (as that imagistic 
                                                          
105 Again, McNeill calls this moment the ‘growth point’. 
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‘half’ of thinking) and the manifestation (as the physical expressive action that 
accompanies speech) of Merleau-Ponty’s “new sense-giving intention”.  
Rather than attempt to make these dialectics line up (which requires a bit of 
gymnastics to get around Merleau-Ponty’s much broader use of ‘gesture’), the more 
exciting result that emerges when we put these dialectics side by side is not that they are 
mutually translatable, but that they are reciprocally critical. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
gesture as stylistic, intentional inhabiting can act as a corrective to McNeill’s strict modal 
dichotomy. For Merleau-Ponty, the thinking-expressing gesture is an embodied and 
embedded act that carries, creates, and delivers its meaning holistically. The dialectic 
enabling the appropriative act of gesture marks a distinction between spoken speech and 
speaking speech, a difference between speech that says something new as opposed to 
inauthentic or mindlessly recycled speech. The tension is between the creative versus the 
conventional quality of this gesture: how authentic is it? To what degree does it stretch, 
elaborate, push, or reinterpret the forms it takes up? To what extent is this taking up of 
given forms able to say something that hasn’t been said before? What is the effect of this 
appropriative inhabiting? How does this gesture make a difference to meaning at this 
moment? While McNeill walks a similar path with the notion of H-model and a speaker’s 
shifting ‘cognitive-being’, he does not need to take on the weight of authenticity claims. 
Rather than winding up with the conclusion that a speech act that lacks gesture is 
‘inauthentic’ or mindless (“without thought”), it is interesting, plausible, and productive 
to question how our verbal linguistic behavior can be spontaneous and how our gestural 
linguistic behavior demonstrates sedimentation and ‘rule-following’.106 Put another way, 
for Merleau-Ponty, ‘spontaneous’ action is never blind, automatic, or cleanly separable 
from convention.107  
                                                          
106 Furthermore, it is not clear that Merleau-Ponty would conscience a clean dialectical separation of the 
conventional (non-natural) and nonconventional (natural) within us. As he writes in The Structure of 
Behavior, “Man is not a rational animal. The appearances of reason and mind do not leave intact a sphere 
of self-inclosed instincts in man” (2006, 181). For Merleau-Ponty, the acting body is always discriminating 
and taking as, whether in speech, perception, or gesture. 
107 “Action is the action of subjects; it is the action of minded individuals” (Zahavi 2005, 161). As Etienne 
Bimbenet describes the defining ambiguity of perception in Merleau-Ponty’s account, “It turns out, and this 
is the ultimate point, that there is in perception as much passivity as there is spontaneity, or that perception 
is a feeling at the same time that it is a thought” (Bimbenet 2009, 73). 
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McNeill’s contribution here consists in pointing out the ubiquity and semantic 
richness of hand gestures, which Merleau-Ponty does not seem to notice; therefore we 
can now say that Merleau-Ponty gives us an impoverished picture of linguistic expression 
as being only verbal – and it is this verbal behavior that Merleau-Ponty describes as 
gestural. Yet in turn, McNeill seems to miss exactly that insight – that our use of verbal 
language is idiosyncratic, contextual, stylistic, intentional, and particularly meaningful – 
whenever he characterizes the ‘linguistic’ or verbal side of his dialectic as strictly linear, 
conventional, and so on. While philosophers of language ought to attend to McNeill’s 
general claim that language has been construed too narrowly, he himself should avoid 
falling into the same trap, merely adding on to language (or to psycholinguistic 
processing models of thinking-for-speaking) a gestural channel of cognition and 
expression, rather than rethinking linguistic activity as such. 
It is worthwhile to note how McNeill’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty is in 
tandem with his general eschewing of the social, normative, and conventional aspects of 
co-speech gestural practice. Given the importance of normativity in language according 
to pragmatics and phenomenology (interpreted differently in each tradition, but always 
rooted in intersubjectivity), there are good philosophical reasons to be cautious of 
accounts of gesture that want to see them as wholly natural, romantically expressive, or 
incapable of failure, critique, or conscious control. While he rightly points out that 
gestures are part of language (1992, 2) and that they ‘accomplish thought’ in a Merleau-
Pontian sense, McNeill walks a precarious path whenever he insists on categorizing 
spontaneous hand gestures as unconventional and whenever he speaks of them as 
especially revelatory of a speaker’s inner thought processes. Regarding the impact that 
gestures have on thought, McNeill writes that “gesture supplies the idiosyncratic, the 
personal, and the context-specific aspects of thought, to be combined with the socially 
regulated aspects that come from the conventions of language” (1992, 2). This 
perspective renders gesture incapable of failure and seemingly immune to audience 
reception.  
In fact, a Merleau-Pontian interpretation should point in the other direction. 
Precisely since “expressions are not merely exterior manifestations of something that was 
already internally present” but instead “what is expressed is fully realized only in the 
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expression” (Zahavi 2005, 152-153), word choice matters, and gestures can go wrong. 
Indeed, following this line of thought, we can start to realize all of the many ways that 
gestures may turn an expression in an unintended direction, for example, or elicit shades 
of discomfort from a foreign interlocutor.108 Why take as given that co-speech gestures 
are always true, helpful, or readily and successfully interpreted? As discussed in the 
previous chapter’s investigations into the normative constraints that condition gesture 
meaningfulness, we do better to at the very least include a ‘meaning-building’ inquiry 
into gestural phenomena alongside this well-established ‘meaning-leaking’ research 
paradigm.  
As I introduced in Chapter II, a meaning-leaking paradigm retains traditional 
representationalist and individualist characterizations of cognition by holding gestures to 
be uncontrollable, unconscious windows to speakers’ thought patterns and intentions.109 
This can be contrasted with a meaning-building paradigm that portrays gestures as 
external objects accessible for both speakers and listeners to monitor and interact with. 
Those interested in demonstrating how embodied cognition is socially structured have 
reason to improve upon a line of inquiry that sees certain embodied communicative 
practices as accidental or irrational. As we have seen from the foregoing speech-act 
analysis (Chapter III), it oversimplifies matters to see gestures as only and ever 
‘spontaneous’ (unconventional, or non-normative) and speech as only and ever 
‘sedimented’ (conventional, or normatively regulated). Furthermore, a focus on 
individual cognitive processes tends to overlook the irreducible sociality of linguistic 
activity, and at its worst locates intersubjective meaning achievement in mind-reading 
modules rather than in the shared tangible space and actions of participants in dialogue. 
 Fortunately, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied appropriation of linguistic 
forms immediately indicates the basic sociality and intersubjectivity of the human 
condition that facilitates our communicative practices. While Merleau-Ponty may have 
                                                          
108 Recall Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the angry Japanese person who smiles (2002, 219). 
109 For example, gestures unwittingly give away our lies (Franklin 2007), while speech-gesture mismatches 
may “…point to a state of overload, in which the speaker’s emotional content exceeds the means of 
expression, and marks the search of this means of expression by the speaker” (Waisman 2010, 173). Such 
explanations logically fall out of a theory of speech-gesture interaction that ascribes to gesture all of the 
personal, idiosyncratic, and nonconventional aspects of cognition and communication. See McNeill and 
Duncan 2000 for a clear statement of the “window” view. 
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been thinking primarily of the act of verbal speech when he called language a genuine 
gesture, it is nonetheless possible and productive to examine the ways in which gestural 
practice makes appropriative use of previously deployed forms and makes new forms that 
resonate with the way our bodies know the world, and thus enrich our notion of embodied 
and communicative intentionality.  
 
4. Fourth Encounter: Merleau-Ponty and Streeck: Iconicity and Intelligent Bodies 
 
Streeck does not explicitly base his account of iconicity and iconic representation 
on Merleau-Ponty. In his 2009 work Gesturecraft, in which he lays out the gestural 
ecologies discussed above (Chapter II, Chapter IV.2), however, he draws broad 
inspiration from this phenomenologist (Streeck 2009, 6, 31, 40, 55, 57, 206). In general, 
Streeck takes from Merleau-Ponty the notion that our bodies themselves are mindful and 
intelligently (if “unthinkingly”) active and meaning-generating (Streeck 2009, 31). 
Streeck notes that routine activities of the hands such as grasping are simultaneously 
physical and cognitive actions (2009, 40). He frequently cites Merleau-Ponty as naming 
the hands a “vehicle for being in the world” (from Merleau-Ponty 2002, 82), and, via a 
nod to Bordieau as well as Heidegger, discusses human hands as forming habits that 
build up a haptic epistemology, or a personal knowledge and “point of view” on one’s 
world (Streeck 2009, 57). 
Yet the ways that our hands act and achieve meaning in our worlds are not only 
manifested in the first few gestural ecologies Streeck identifies, in which everyday labors 
and handlings involving concrete, ready-to-hand objects and projects provide the basis 
for related communicative gesturing. In depictive gesturing, the hands also reflect and 
reflexively shape world-knowledge, yet in a different register. These are the gestures that 
are said to bear iconic relations to referents; they achieve their meaning 
representationally. How they do so is not fully understood; in the literature, the 
representational aspects of hand gestures are varyingly dismissed as obvious and 
uninteresting, held up as evidence for the naturalness and non-conventionality of 
spontaneous gesturing (e.g. Wharton 2009), or taken as straight-forward corollaries of 
verbal lexical items. Despite this confusion, depictive or iconic speech-accompanying 
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gestures have been the focus of gesture analyses and have been featured in modern 
gesture taxonomies since Wundt’s work (see Chapter II). As Kendon points out, most 
contemporary gesture scholars observe that a primary function of gesturing is 
“representing through some form of depiction or enactment something that is relevant to 
the referential content of what is being said” (Kendon 2004, 107).  
While a full historical aside is not feasible here, it is illuminating to note that for a 
long time the iconicity of manual forms was the bane of linguists studying sign languages 
(see Wilcox 2000, 36). These linguists, admirably defensive of the rights and humanity of 
the Deaf communities they studied, feared that non-signers would interpret iconicity as 
non-linguistic; thus the iconic was downplayed in preference to the symbolic.110 In other 
words, the specter of non-conventionality loomed large and threatened to undermine the 
status of sign languages as ‘real’, sufficiently arbitrary or conventionalized symbol 
systems. As a result of this worry, formal analyses of ASL avoided acknowledging or 
adequately explaining the rich ways that handshapes, locations, and movement patterns 
(the morpho-phonemic parameters of a sign language system) embody and enact aspects 
of the collectively known world. Yet recent scholars of ASL, particularly informed by 
cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphor theory, offer nuanced treatments of 
iconicity, attempting to bring together the creativity and stability of iconically motivated 
forms (see Taub 2001; Wilcox 2000; Liddell 2003; Wilcox 2004). 
 Awareness of a history of fear and misunderstanding of iconicity in language 
makes all the more significant Streeck’s analysis of gesture iconicity, which marks a vast 
advancement in terms of how gestural representations are explained, particularly when 
paired with Merleau-Ponty’s idea of appropriation.111 What I suggest, then, is that gesture 
                                                          
110 Thanks to Eric Pederson for clarifying this historical point (personal communication). 
111 It is important to note that this notion of appropriation is not only related to Heidegger’s Ereignis or 
propriating, but also appears in other analogous formulations throughout the Continental tradition, as a 
question of how we pass from language as a social system of signification that always already precedes 
(and exceeds) us into moments of meaning that are specific, local, meaningful, and significant for us and 
our interlocutors. This question of passage or appropriation responds to a divide in language introduced by 
structuralism and is framed variously as the passage from langue to parole (Saussure), potentiality to 
actuality (Agamben), the semiotic to the semantic (Benveniste), the sedimented or spoken to the 
spontaneous or speaking (Merleau-Ponty), from language to discourse (Benveniste and Agamben), from 
‘pure language’ to ‘human language’ (Agamben). 
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theorists indeed do well to take up this dialectic, but rather than understanding the 
conventional, sedimented pole as the verbal and ‘linguistic’ side of the equation, they 
ought to stay closer to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding and see both spontaneous and 
sedimented aspects as ‘linguistic’. Various communicative modalities should demonstrate 
both poles of the dialectic at work. While not calling it such, this is the kind of analysis 
that Streeck offers. 
 
Representations rooted in haptic knowledge   
Complicating the traditional yet unsatisfactory understanding of iconicity as 
resting on straightforwardly perceived similarities between signifier and signified, 
Streeck identifies and analyzes a variety of heterogeneous practices by which gesturers 
achieve an interpretation in depiction (2008a).  Streeck names twelve methods by which 
hand gestures construe something as something for their receivers (2008a, 292-295). 
These gestures make sense to participants immediately as the hand motions transparently 
give way to the selected schemata or features they enact. For Streeck, the “pictorial 
language” by which gestures construe consists “of schematized acts of making, handling, 
drawing, and so on: whatever is depicted – things, inanimate processes, actions – is 
depicted and at the same time analyzed in terms of manual acts. Knowledge of these 
acts… is not in the first place knowledge of the gesture methods (or gestures’ meanings), 
but of ways of acting in the material world” (Streeck 2008a, 298-299). Common practices 
and familiar action sequences in a shared world, rather than formal resemblance or 
mirroring, thus enable our understanding of depictive gestures. 
Especially relevant here is Streeck’s claim, following philosopher Nelson 
Goodman’s analysis of representation, that an iconic gesture “analyzes” the object it 
represents (2008a, 286). “The gesture is not like its referent, but rather shows what the 
referent is like” (Streeck 2008a, 286). “Thus, when we represent something by a gesture, 
we ‘achieve an interpretation’ [Goodman 1968] (p. 9)’” (Streeck 2008a, 286). Gesturing 
with the hands actively construes something as something. Understanding how this 
deliberate, selective, organizing representation is made will help us to better understand 
how communicative movements of our two hands “can ‘be like’ or ‘look like’ such 
diverse phenomena as swimming-pools, polka-dots, or an acrobat’s routine, to name 
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some random phenomena that gesturing hands can depict for us” (Streeck 2008a, 285). It 
can also help us to understand how the interpretations we seek to achieve via depicting 
gestures may fall short (since they are achievements and hence can fail) or perhaps not 
allow what is presented to ‘radiate’.  
 While his treatment is not meant to be exhaustive, Streeck outlines various 
routines or habits by which gesturing hands intelligently and intelligibly depict objects, 
actions or events in such a way that analyzes them and brings forth features and aspects 
salient to the matter at hand – what is being discussed verbally or more broadly 
communicated.112 These routines include drawing, such as drawing lines with an index 
finger; scaping, shaping domains or terrains with hand gestures; self-marking, elaborating 
or annotating one’s body with actions or drawings made on the body; and model-world 
making, when a succession of gestural acts constructs a model of a world (Streeck 2008a, 
293-294). Note that, much as in the above description of Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic, a 
new, local, and specific purpose drives any particular instance of deploying certain 
recognizable forms. Also recall this chapter’s earlier discussion of Streeck’s idea of 
background haptic knowledge that enables the recipient of a gesture to comprehend the 
gestures she sees in terms of what her body knows. Here focusing on iconicity, Streeck 
explains, 
  
Gesture by hand, the craft or praxis, comes with its own, rich terms of 
construal. Included in these is a repertoire of habitualized postures and 
actions that a pair of human hands, socialized in a specific place and into a 
specific set of forms of life, has learned to perform. The hands can draw 
on these routines when they gesture and thus bring their inherent 
significances to bear upon what they gesture about. The routines are 
multimodal schemata, integrating visual, haptic, and kinesthetic 
components. (Streeck 2008a, 286) 
 
While any one person enacts her own gestures, embodying for another her particular 
vantage point on something (object or topic) at hand, it is the operative significance of an 
intersubjectively shared world that prompts certain gestural forms and movements 
                                                          
112 Note that Streeck defines depiction as a subset of iconic gesture practices: in depiction, a gesturer 
watches her own gestures, and is using them to focus on something. In ceiving or metaphorical gesturing, 
iconic gestures are also used, but these are not depictions in Streeck’s sense (see Streeck 2008a, 289). 
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through the force of habit, and also acts as the basis for new construals in particular 
contexts. This shared world is made up not only of tangible objects and cooperative 
labors but also of inherited symbolizations and region-specific conventions.113 As one 
example of iconicity in depictive gesturing, Streeck offers the following account of a 
family dinner conversation:  
 
… Later something triggers Mother’s memory of a little outfit that 
Daughter used to wear on Halloween, a “Jackie O outfit with a pill-box 
hat”. Mother begins the depiction with an enactment of tying a knot under 
her chin (this could be classified as acting or handling or pantomime); then 
she traces two parallel lines down her front (self-marking): given what we 
know about clothing, these traces evoke the collars of a jacket, coat, or 
cape. The vantage point of these depictive acts is that of the depicted 
character: tying the knot as the wearer of the cape would, tracing the 
collars of the virtual cape that she wears. The pill-box hat, finally, is 
evoked by both hands, configured with index and thumb about one inch 
apart and moved outwards: an evocation of a ribbon or rim by means of a 
delimitative gesture, combined with the drawing of a line. But it is the 
location of the gesture near the speaker’s head which makes it a hat-
depiction (self-marking). (Streeck 2008a, 296)  
  
Note that what we know about clothing is a necessary condition for the mother’s gesture 
to be a gesture of a garment; what we know about where one wears a hat maps to the 
gesture location and makes those hand movements a gesture that describes a hat and not a 
belt.  
Streeck’s analysis of iconicity as analyzing construal opens an avenue for seeing 
how gestures are conventionalized and normatively constrained at their semantic level of 
representation, thus further intertwining the two orders of intentionality discussed above 
                                                          
 
113 “At the same time, minimal configurations and simple strokes suffice to evoke things and events of the 
kinds that everyone knows, that are part of the participants’ common ground, either because of their 
membership in a cul-ture or because of the shared understandings that the discourse so far has yielded, or 
both. Frequently, the gestural image is tied to what it represents by indexical links, for example when it is 
predicated upon a certain hand-shape or action and a certain class of objects going together. What 
Langacker wrote about language is also true about gesture: ‘expressions are not meaningful in and of 
themselves, but only through the access they afford to different stores of knowledge that allow us to make 
sense of them’ (Langacker, 1986, p. 65)” (Streeck 2008a, 297).  
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(cognitive and communicative). Insofar as representation has to do with content, 
misrepresentation can occur when content in some way fails to fit the communicative 
setting (see Wheeler 2005, 58-59 for a discussion of representation and misrepresentation 
in terms of mental states). If I want you to hand me an egg-shaped salt shaker but my 
gestures depict a slim, vertical container (perhaps shaking up and down), this may delay 
the achievement of understanding cooperation that we are after. Such a representation 
would be wrong in part because it fails to indicate how your hand is supposed to reach 
out and interact with our shared environment; it misguides your intentional relation to the 
world.114 Such an analysis is therefore an improvement upon McNeill’s uptake of 
Merleau-Ponty, which locates the appropriative movement of the dialectic in the speaker-
gesturers’ own bounded consciousness, rather than in the shared understanding and 
sense-making co-presence of interlocutors with/in their momentary yet historically-rich 
environment. Insofar as Streeck’s treatment of iconicity brings us to consider the way that 
hand movements stop appearing as hand movements and start appearing as something 
else, indicating to recipients how they are to take something as something, we can also 
find a way back to Heidegger. In their dynamically representational functions, always at 
once tied to background conditions of intelligibility which are embodied at various levels, 
and yet always transcending these to feature something that is now coming to presence, 
gestures say something.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
My aim in this chapter has been to pave a way for a gesture-informed 
phenomenology of language and a phenomenologically-informed empirical analysis of 
gestural practices. By elaborating the four encounters above, I provided a common basis 
for these projects in an embodied, intentional world-relation as the condition for 
intersubjectively meaningful linguistic enactments. Rather than recapitulate what each 
                                                          
114 Recall from Merleau-Ponty: “in the action of the hand which is raised toward an object is contained a 
reference to the object, not as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing towards which we 
project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, and which we haunt” (2002, 159). 
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thinker originally brings to the encounter, let me briefly state what emerges from the 
exchange. 
Going beyond McNeill and Streeck’s suggestive borrowings of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, the elaborated encounters show that phenomenological reflections 
regarding spoken language can be extended to the gestural modality. In turn, the 
encounters indicate that the most recent empirical research on linguistic communication 
is increasingly embodied and world-embedded in its premises and target phenomena, thus 
convergent with these aspects of phenomenological treatments of language. Fusing these 
endeavors, we can understand language as multi-modal, cooperative enactment of world-
disclosure and interpretation. This is an empirically updated phenomenological 
definition.  
Importantly, the construal of language thus worked out offers new normative 
criteria for the practice of co-speech gesturing. Gestures, like speech, can be evaluated in 
terms of what they ‘say’. Like words, gestures ‘say’ in a context, working through and at 
the same time beyond inherited ways and forms. It is not enough to note whether gestures 
are present or absent in an utterance, and it is not appropriate to designate one model for 
their coming into being, for they have as many ways of presencing as does speaking. 
These ways are yet unique to the modality, and further research into these gestural ways 
of saying is warranted. Such research is encouraged by the realization that gesturing is, 
like speech, a simultaneously constrained and creative activity.  Furthermore, it is an 
intersubjective, social, interactive activity: gestures say for an audience, selectively and 
interpretively presenting a shared space in some way for some specific project of shared 
understanding. The intentionality of gesturing is thus always double: gestures are 
cognitively (and bodily; these are not to be seen as different) about or toward something, 
as seen in any of the various ways they deal with things in the world, and also they are 
communicatively intentional, in that their being-toward is enacted in a way that brings 
something out as something for an interlocutor. Intersubjectivity based in embodiment 
and world-embeddedness is therefore interwoven with linguistic performance and 
communicative action. 
This four-part engagement between phenomenology and gesture studies has 
continued several conversations from earlier chapters. It has enriched the notion of 
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intersubjective normative constraint by describing a more material, direct, and embodied 
world-relation as a background for collaborative meaning-making. The functions of 
multi-modal language have been expanded in this discussion of varying methods of 
disclosure and in the examples given. Language use is not only justificatory, but also 
poetic, an active process of inhabiting and transforming a space with others. Yet this 
expanded construal of language is not limitless or unchecked by convention: in 
spontaneous co-speech gesturing, speakers or utterers make use of certain forms and 
patterns that become habitual in a region or a workspace due to a complex sedimentation 
of an intelligent body’s way of being in a world with others. The problem of other minds, 
particularly in the context of communicative intention, is thus also addressed without 
making recourse to mental states or proposition-processing internal devices. In gesturing, 
an utterer may draw on a recipient’s non-thematic haptic knowledge of a situation, 
process, or object. In the next chapter I will discuss how the same kind of collaborative 
embodied understanding is metaphorically extended to emotions and abstract concepts in 
other kinds of gestural practice. Chapter V also pushes toward an even more enactive 




GESTURES AS LINGUISTIC ENACTMENTS:  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
0. Defining Gestures, Redefining Language 
 
The previous two chapters work to come up with a philosophically guided and 
empirically grounded account of spontaneous co-speech hand gestures as a linguistic 
practice. In the course of this effort, drawing from work within philosophy as well as 
from empirical engagement with the undertheorized phenomena of speech-accompanying 
hand gesturing, I articulate a particular way of thinking about language. Also in the 
course of this effort, I examine and critique different ways of thinking about gesture. In 
the first case – reconstruing language – I faced an uphill battle, as a certain way of 
thinking about language in philosophy is so entrenched that we find it crossing various 
philosophical traditions and time-periods and pervading contemporary discussions. This 
way of thinking presents language as a representational, and primarily verbal and 
propositional, medium for conveying or expressing ideas. When it comes to critiquing 
modern gesture research – a much newer field, and one with only a handful of theoretical 
apparatuses so far in its arsenal – some of the same resistances are found. This trend 
continues to be a background theme in this chapter, as I consider recent and on-going 
routes of research and interdisciplinary effort relevant for my account of gesture: 
conceptual metaphor theory and the enactive paradigm in cognitive science. In an 
exciting way, these research paradigms take up gestural phenomena and do so within a 
context aware of its own philosophical stakes. Yet at the same time, this contemporary 
work calls for the critical sensitivity I develop here. 
Before I unpack the way that I advocate philosophers and researchers proceed in 
investigating, conceptualizing, and experiencing language (including gesture), consider 
how I have come to this moment. In Chapter III, I mined ordinary language pragmatics 
and a linguistic neo-pragmatist tradition for the possibility of non-propositional 
intersubjective understanding, normativity, and constrained non-convention in linguistic 
communicative acts. In Chapter IV, I drew on phenomenology to examine an embodied 
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and worldly basis for such normative constraint, and via this cross-disciplinary 
engagement, I reflected on the event of meaning-making as a disclosive appropriation of 
sedimented forms and world relations. Both chapters make evident, I think, the serious 
challenge of conscientious cross-disciplinary theoretical contact. It would seem 
reasonable to expect that ordinary language philosophy, speech act theory, linguistic 
pragmatism, or phenomenology – each an arguably marginal tradition within the 
discipline of philosophy, each putting forth a challenge to traditional and formal 
philosophical approaches to language and meaning by focusing on performance, 
communication, and context – would offer ready resources to bring to the new, emerging 
science of gesture study. In some respects, this proved to be the case, though not without 
struggle. In truth, none of these traditions are fully prepared to do this work, nor is it 
necessarily fair to ask them to do so. Rather, the contact must be allowed to evolve its 
own terms, problem sets, and strategies, neither wholly belonging to one side or the other, 
but relevantly bearing on both.   
 These reciprocal critiques, or this contact space, yield a formula for construing 
language in a gesture-inclusive way:  
 
Language is an embodied, world-embedded, intersubjectively normative, 
dynamic, multi-modal enacting of appropriative disclosure. 
 
To briefly gloss these terms (but also delay fuller explanation until further discussions in 
this chapter): By appropriative disclosure, I mean that language use draws on sedimented 
and already operative meanings and conventions, but does so each time in a way that 
brings forth something selective and potentially (but not necessarily) transformative in 
regards to those meanings. The precise meaning of enacting, the verb on which the 
formula hangs, is discussed extensively later in this chapter. It is to be contrasted with 
‘representing’ and for present purposes is best thought of as ‘bringing forth.’ Multi-modal 
specifies that language is inclusive of (at least) verbal speech and hand gesture. The term 
dynamic speaks to the living, valuing, evolving, and temporal nature of linguistic 
meaning. Intersubjectively normative is perhaps a redundant phrase; it is meant to explain 
the enabling constraints of linguistic meaning. Language as enacting is an achievement 
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practice: it can go more or less well; it can fail to meet local needs and expectations. The 
criteria for linguistic enactments are specified first and foremost by one’s fellow 
meaning-making participants and by the shared environment or context. By world-
embedded, I indicate that linguistic practices arise in and reflexively effect co-inhabited 
spheres of significance. By embodied, I mean having the properties of an intelligent, 
active, and valuing living organism. Another way of glossing this formula is to say that I 
take the cumulative result of the foregoing discussions to be a warrant for the claim that 
spontaneous co-speech gestures, while being indeed spontaneous, are nonetheless 
informed in various ways by conventions that they appropriate and deploy. Through this 
appropriation and deployment speakers enact meaning in various linguistic modalities. 
Giving this claim concrete work to do – in particular, discussing what research 
could develop and support this re-conceiving of language – is one goal of this final 
chapter. The other goal is to set this claim in the context of significant questions in 
philosophy of language and mind, that is, to summarize the significance of this claim and 
indicate its implications for future work. The first goal is undertaken in sections 1 and 2: 
in V.1, I discuss how study of gesture is extending and evolving the field of cognitive 
linguistics, specifically Conceptual Metaphor Theory (as developed by Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999). In V.2, I present enaction as a new paradigm in cognitive science. I 
have been describing gestures as enactments throughout the dissertation: here I briefly lay 
out some emerging theoretical grounding for that description. In both discussions it 
should be apparent that these research endeavors can be appreciated and evaluated in a 
particular way because of the philosophical work done in the previous chapters. How I 
think a philosophy of gesture can be put into play in these contexts is demonstrated in the 
third section (V.3), wherein I conclude the project by explaining what is meant by 
approaching hand gestures as enactments, suggesting a research program that follows 
from this understanding, and indicating how this approach changes philosophical 






1.  Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Gesture 
 
In this section I review how image schemas and conceptual metaphor theory link 
linguistic expression and comprehension to broader embodied cognitive capacities and 
activities. Considering how metaphor is enacted in gesture highlights in a particularly 
pressing way questions about the nature of metaphor and about the nature of gestural 
expression. Metaphoric gesture, as particularly dynamic, winds up demanding a more 
communicative and interactive understanding of metaphoric processing and use, thus 
opening up a new way to look at embodied cognition itself. Good questions as well as 
problematic assumptions about cognition and culture show a need to bring in 
phenomenological reflection to clarify study of metaphoric gestures. A better 
understanding of cultural constraints is achieved through reflection on what conditions 
the mapping process itself. This discussion returns us to normativity, convention, 
collaboration, sedimentation, and appropriation, in other words, the definition of 
language built in Chapters III and IV. 
 
Conceptual metaphor theory 
 For the past thirty years, since Lakoff & Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980), 
cognitive linguistics has paid attention to conceptual accounts of the phenomenon of 
metaphor. A foundational tenet accepted by all cognitive theories of metaphor holds that 
metaphor is a phenomenon of cognition, wherein one concept or conceptual domain is 
understood (at least partially) in ‘terms’ of another, or against the background of another, 
or via structural or schematic similarities with another. On this view, expressions that 
have traditionally been referred to as ‘metaphors’ are linguistic manifestations of cross-
domain conceptualizations. A broadly cognitive view may understand metaphor as a 
cognitive mapping across conceptual domains, a construal process in which one concept 
or domain is profiled against another, a relatively basic and straightforward example of 





Image schemas  
Mark Johnson’s notion of image schemas provides the foundation for conceptual 
metaphor theory as put forth by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). In his The Body in the 
Mind (1987), Johnson defines image schema as “a dynamic pattern that functions 
somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connect[s] up a vast range 
of different experiences that manifest this same recurring structure” (Johnson 1987, 2). 
Image schemas are not pictures; they are not propositional in structure. Johnson tells us 
that they are “…not rich, concrete images or mental pictures, either. They are structures 
that organize our mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at 
which we form particular mental images” (Johnson 1987, 23-24). Though likely to draw 
on visual perception, and though they can be sketched in diagram form, they are too bare 
and too flexible in their structure to be mental ‘pictures’, per se. Image schemas, once 
established, are informed (fleshed out, made dynamically applicable for different 
situations of conceptualization) by encyclopedic knowledge and may be entrenched by 
recurring basic physical experiences as well as by repeated activation of neural patterns. 
As Johnson describes them, “their most important feature is that they have a few basic 
elements or components that are related by definite structures, and yet they have a certain 
flexibility” (Johnson 1987, 28).  
Johnson and other cognitive linguists suggest that functioning of image schemas 
is observable in everyday verbal language. Many common words such as prepositions 
(‘in’, ‘out’, ‘over’), simple nouns (‘bed’, ‘bank’, ‘path’), or verbs (‘run’) are polysemous; 
we use them frequently in many different kinds of expressions and situations to mean 
many different things. The traditional view is that the relations among different meanings 
of a term are not systematic; image schemas, however, have offered accounts of these 
words that demonstrate strong root connections grounded primarily in the human 
experience of embodiment, of being physical creatures within a physical environment. 
For example, the containment image schema has been used in connecting the concrete 
and abstract uses of prepositions such as ‘in’ and ‘out’. Johnson’s idea of metaphor, 
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developed with George Lakoff, explains how these underlying meaning structures map 
out onto the multifaceted, abstract usages these words come to have.115 
 
Conceptual metaphor theory: TARGET IS SOURCE 
According to the view of metaphor put forth by George Lakoff (1993) and by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), a metaphor is a cross-domain conceptual mapping: a 
source domain, usually a very basic and primary conceptual domain, gets ‘mapped’ onto 
a target domain, usually a more abstract domain. The mapping is structured by the 
image-schematic structure of each of the two domains; this structure must be preserved 
for each domain in the mapping (Lakoff 1993). This structured mapping entails a set of 
ontological and epistemic correspondences. An example frequently used to illustrate the 
theory is the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. The source domain in this 
case is journey; the target domain is love. The commonly used notation is a capitalized 
mnemonic for the set of correspondences, as shown above, with the target domain stated 
first and linked to the source domain via the copula or ‘as’: TARGET IS 
SOURCE/TARGET AS SOURCE. In this example, the image-schematic structure of 
journey involves forward motion in space, rather than static containment. Thus the 
mapping that construes love in terms of a journey will involve a schematic sense of 
forward motion. Lakoff lists the ontological correspondences of this conceptual metaphor 
as: the LOVE-AS-JOURNEY mapping; the lovers correspond to travelers; the love 
relationship corresponds to a vehicle; the lovers’ common goals correspond to their 
common destinations on the journey; difficulties on the relationship correspond to 
impediments in travel; joys of romantic relationships correspond perhaps to dazzling 
natural wonders or other roadside attractions (Lakoff 1993). The ontological elements 
(objects, relations, etc.) of one domain correspond analogously and quite strongly to the 
ontological elements of the other domain. Furthermore, the ontological correspondences 
make possible an additional, epistemic mapping, in which the knowledge we have about 
                                                          
115 Alan Cienki’s “STRAIGHT: an image schema and its metaphorical extensions” remains one of the best 
image schema analyses and demonstrations of polysemic extensions of an image schema to date. Cognitive 
Linguistics 9-2 (1998), 107-149. 
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journeys gets applied to, and is thus able to structure and interpret, the knowledge we 
have about love.  
According to Lakoff, the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY gives rise 
to a great many metaphorical expressions, such as ‘we’ve hit a dead-end street’; ‘their 
marriage is on the rocks’; and many others, which on this view are seen not as individual 
metaphors themselves but as manifestations of the same cross-domain conceptual 
mapping (1993). The mapping is a “fixed part of our conceptual system,” says Lakoff, 
which “explains why new and imaginative uses of the mapping can be understood 
instantly, given the ontological correspondences and other knowledge about journeys” 
(Lakoff 1993, 210). As another example, recall the novel metaphor that opened Chapter I. 
Here Jon Stewart describes analysis of news media practices in terms of doing ‘climate 
science,’ with the sub-mapping that news reporting is akin to the less reflective position 
of ‘forecasting the weather’. The metaphorical mapping that structures the sense of these 
expressions is NEWS MEDIA AS METEOROLOGY. Lakoff argues that conceptual 
metaphors play a central, and possibly primary, role in our abstract thinking and 
reasoning.116  
In Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), Lakoff and Johnson update conceptual 
metaphor theory to incorporate much research and analysis sparked by Metaphors We 
Live By (1980). The first theory that is integrated is Christopher Johnson’s theory of 
conflation, which states that young children go through a developmental phase during 
which associations are “automatically built up” between domains of subjective 
experiences and sensorimotor experiences (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 46). For example, an 
infant’s subjective experience of affection and intimacy is associated with its sensory 
experience of warmth and physical closeness. Also integrated is Joseph Grady’s theory of 
                                                          
116 Lakoff claims that the “event structure” metaphor (source: space/spatial domain; target: event) “shows 
that the most common abstract concepts – TIME, STATE, CHANGE, CAUSATION, ACTION, 
PURPOSE, and MEANS – are conceptualized via metaphor. Since such concepts are at the very center of 
our conceptual systems, the fact that they are conceptualized metaphorically shows that metaphor is central 
to ordinary abstract thought” (Lakoff 1993, 222). Furthermore, the phenomenon of “inheritance 
hierarchies”, where one metaphor, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, inherits the set of correspondences of 
another metaphor, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, allows for many generalizations that facilitate reasoning. Lakoff 
thus puts metaphor in a very central and crucial place in regards to our everyday, abstract reasoning.  
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primary metaphor, developed in response to mapping inconsistencies that result from an 
unspecified hierarchy of metaphor. “Each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and 
arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means 
of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed” (Lakoff & Johnson 
1999, 46).  Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor is the third integrated theory and 
states that as cross-domain associations are made in childhood, the corresponding neural 
regions are simultaneously activated, resulting in “permanent neural connections being 
made across the neural networks that define conceptual domains” (Lakoff & Johnson 
1999, 46).  
Indeed, the present state of the field of cognitive linguistics would be 
unimaginable without the influence of Lakoff and Johnson’s work (as noted by Müller 
2008a, 220). Work on conceptual metaphor theory (including image schemas) constitutes 
a vital force and tradition of its own (as demonstrated by on-going conferences and 
societies, journals, and edited volumes (Hampe and Grady 2005; Gibbs 2008)). 
Increasingly over the past ten years, scholars are enriching and extending the core claims 
of conceptual metaphor theory, which hold that cognitive processes of reasoning, symbol 
use, and linguistic acts are rooted in situated bodily processes and experiences, and are in 
continual and reciprocally informing relations with these bodily processes and 
experiences, via an engagement with gestural phenomena. 
 
Metaphor and co-speech gesture 
 Both within cognitive linguistics circles and gesture studies circles, researchers 
are taking up the relationship between gesture and metaphor. Some historical context for 
this work comes from the study of conceptual metaphors, image schemas, and iconicity 
in American Sign Language (e.g. Taub 2001; Wilcox 2000; Liddell 2003). Treatment of 
the metaphoricity of the manual modality dates back to Wundt (1973), who studied 
gestural systems in the absence of speech, as discussed in Chapter II. Contemporary 
study of gesture and metaphor in many ways takes its cue from the combined influence of 
conceptual metaphor theory and David McNeill’s work on co-speech gesture and 
cognition (1992). Conceptual metaphor theory showed metaphor to be a cognitive 
process underlying verbal expressions and all forms of symbolic interaction. As we have 
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seen, McNeill puts forward an intricate view of gesture as a complement to speech in the 
cognitive process of utterance production (1992, 2000, 2005). Hence, the discussion of 
metaphor and gesture is a discussion fundamentally about cognition and symbolic 
communication. The influence of McNeill’s analysis on gesture-metaphor research is 
extensive. At the same time, other gesture research paradigms bring rich resources to bear 
on this topic, and importantly highlight the socially interactive ‘use’ aspects of metaphor 
as well as the cognitive nature of metaphor. 
A comprehensive orientation to the study of metaphor and gesture is found in 
Alan Cienki and Cornelia Müller’s article “Metaphor, Gesture, and Thought” (2008a).117 
Cienki has written on image schemas and conceptual metaphor theory from the beginning 
of that research, while Müller has written on gesture for over ten years. Individually (see 
Müller 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Cienki 2008) and collectively they arguably constitute the 
leading authority on gesture and metaphor, and are co-editors of the third volume in the 
Gesture Studies series, Metaphor and Gesture (2008b). Müller’s gestural-inclusive theory 
of metaphor is discussed in detail later in this section; first I summarize their article to 
introduce the phenomenon of metaphoric gesture. The complex issues raised by the study 
of metaphor and gesture become apparent, and I turn to them subsequently. 
 
Defining metaphoric gesture 
Frequently in the literature, a gesture is deemed metaphoric insofar as it iconically 
represents the source domain of a conceptual metaphor (e.g. McNeill 1992; McNeill, 
Cassell, & Levy 1993; Müller 1998; Nuñez and Sweetser 2001). For example, Cienki has 
recorded a conversation among American students about exam honesty. Describing other 
students’ behavior, one participant says, “And I think that they’re willing to push their 
moral limits, to the extent that they can or cannot be labeled cheating.” When the speaker 
says ‘willing’ she forms a fist with her dominant hand, and when she says ‘push’ she 
moves it forward. By the time she says ‘moral’ the hand-shape has become “half-open 
with fingers together, making a solid, curved form, palm vertical, facing center space;” 
when she says ‘limits’ she moves this hand shape outward from her body (Cienki and 
                                                          
117 For a broader treatment of multi-modal metaphor, see Forceville and Urios-Aparisi, 2009. 
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Müller 2008a, 487). As Cienki and Müller analyze this, “The speech and gesture describe 
a scene in which the possibilities for which behaviors can be considered moral are 
mapped onto the amount of space in which one can physically move” (2008a, 487). They 
explain this as correlating with the MORAL ACTION IS BOUNDED MOVEMENT 
conceptual metaphor and with MORAL CONCEPTS AS BOUNDED SPACES. The 
hand gestures in the example represent aspects of the source domain, showing movement 
and boundary within an area. In this example, in both speech and gesture, “the 
questionable nature of the ethics involved is expressed in speech as an alteration being 
made in the location of the moral boundary” (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 488). Note that in 
this case, as would be predicted by previous research in speech-gesture co-expressiveness 
and synchrony (Kendon 1988; McNeill 1992), the lexical affiliate is preceded by the 
gesture. 
Cienki and Müller conclude from this and like examples in which speech and 
gesture both describe or present an object or idea in terms of something else that 
“gestural metaphors may be semantically co-expressive with speech but temporally 
detached from the verbal metaphor… Gesture and speech therefore appear to share the 
communicative burden to express one and the same metaphor, which means that 
metaphor is not limited to the verbal medium of expression. …it can be multi-modal” 
(2008a, 488). Metaphor, as a “general cognitive principle” with “metaphoric mappings 
[that] may be processed online” (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 484), is understood as a way 
of thinking that, when operating, informs expressions in various modalities.118  
While this conclusion already adds evidence backing core tenets of conceptual 
metaphor theory and extending the theory, Cienki and Müller do not rest with this 
straightforward explanation. They describe many other kinds of speech-gesture relation 
in the domain of metaphorical expression, including instances of metaphors expressed in 
gesture but not in co-occurring speech, different metaphors expressed in speech and in 
gesture within one utterance, and metaphor expressed in gesture that is “never used in the 
language system [being spoken] itself” (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 491). As an example 
of a metaphor expressed in gesture but not co-occuring speech, consider the following, in 
                                                          
118 Müller emphasizes that metaphors thus inform and explain works of art and visual representations as 
well as verbal and gestural utterances. 
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which a speaker uses spatial gesturing to conceptualize a logical relation being talked 
about. A student talking about how much someone might prepare for an exam says, “It 
depends on the student, but it also depends on the teacher.” With the first ‘depends’, she 
moves both hands palms down, side by side, to a space at her right. When she says ‘also’ 
she lifts them and places them down at her left. “The two gestures lay out the two 
conditions in her argument as separate spaces in front of her,” explain Cienki and Müller 
(2008a, 490-491). Cienki and Müller note this as an example of metaphoric gesture at the 
pragmatic level: the speaker is “distinguishing different parts of the argument being made 
as separate spaces” (2008a, 491). She thus conceptualizes the conditions as separate and 
also lets her interlocutor know that this is how her reasoning is proceeding. Pragmatic 
metaphoric gestures are important and complex phenomena that will reappear in 
discussions below. 
One additional insight that Cienki and Müller gain from the variety of cases of 
metaphoric gesture they observe is that, contrary to the “ontological assumption” that is 
frequently assumed in the literature, the target domain of the conceptual metaphor is not 
always more ‘abstract’ than the source domain (2008a, 485).119 In the example just 
described, the student is showing a schematic understanding of her reasoning process, 
which, one could argue, is an abstraction of what the content of her speech is doing (see 
also Cienki 2008, 17). Metaphoricity is also found when gestures depict one concrete 
entity in terms of another concrete entity, for example gesturing an hour-glass shape to 
refer to a woman’s body (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 485). They conclude, “metaphoric 
gestures, regardless of the context of their occurrence” or modality are “voluntary 
movements of the body which use a cross-domain mapping to express certain thoughts or 
feelings” (487). The quality of metaphoricity they highlight is thinking of something in 
terms of or as something else.120 
                                                          
119 It should be noted that Lakoff suggests that abstract reasoning is one kind of image-schematic reasoning; 
he does not insist that it is the only kind that may be enacted in metaphorical mappings (1993). He also 
notes the hourglass example in poetic metaphor and describes it as an “image-mapping” (Lakoff 1993). See 
also Lakoff 2008, in which Lakoff describes a number of neural computations structured by cross-domain 
mappings. 
120 Thus, “gestures appear as an articulatory independent mode of expression which is used flexibly, and 
not only to illustrate the semantic content expressed verbally” (Cienki and Müller 2008, 492). 
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Issues raised by metaphoric gestures 
 Cienki points out that gesture study brings some solutions to lingering debates in 
conceptual metaphor theory while calling for some new tactics (2008, 16-23). Metaphoric 
gestures can be taken as further evidence for the embodiment of cognition and for the 
psychological reality of image schemas and metaphorical mappings. Metaphoric gestures 
can make more nuanced our understanding of the structure of mappings, as discussed 
above. While the fact that metaphors show up in different modalities is in some ways 
predicted by the theory (since metaphoricity is a cognitive, not linguistic, principle), 
confirmation of this feature calls for new ways to identify, label, and analyze 
metaphorical mappings as manifested in different modalities. Study of metaphoric 
gestures indicates from a new perspective the question of what functions gestures serve, 
and for who, since metaphoric gestures at once organize and display one’s thoughts in a 
communicative context. While a host of issues are thus opened up by this research and 
will come up in subsequent discussion, the remainder of this section investigates what 
metaphoric gestures show about the nature of metaphorical thinking. 
Since “gestural data provide an independent source of evidence” for the much-
debated psychological reality of conceptual metaphors, they are said to reduce the alleged 
circularity of conceptual metaphor theory’s method of taking verbal expressions as 
evidence for cognitive processes that are then called on to explain understanding of those 
verbal expressions (Cienki 2008, 16; see Cienki 1998, 190 for a statement of the 
critique). The logic here is that if a metaphor shows up in gesture, then it is safe to say 
that the conceptual mappings are cognitively ‘active’ and hence can explain metaphoric 
verbal expressions. This explanation revisits the core logic of conceptual metaphor 
theory, namely, that linguistic expressions of metaphor are surface realizations of a 
cognitive mapping process (Lakoff 1993).  
Examining gestural instantiations of metaphor prompts a question as to what 
those cognitive processes are up to in any given instance of the wide variety of 
metaphorical reasoning possible. In the early literature, this question is sometimes 
obscured by conceptual metaphor theory’s primary focus on explaining conventional 
metaphor as a stock of experience-based ways of thinking that both explains the logic of 
typical expressions and is used in novel creations. For example, Lakoff writes, “Everyday 
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metaphor is characterized by a huge system of thousands of cross-domain mappings, and 
this system is made use of in novel metaphor” (Lakoff 1993, 203). Such an explanation 
can imply that the mappings are not utilized differently in varying everyday metaphorical 
expressions, and neither degrees of use nor activation are explicitly discussed (but see 
Lakoff 2008, 35-36). Lakoff and Johnson, critical of the traditional understanding of 
conventional metaphors as ‘dead’ literalizations, argue instead that “conventional 
mappings are not dead, but alive. They are psychologically real, they can be activated, 
and we think using them” (1999, 87). Müller seeks to refine this view by positing that 
metaphoricity can be activated to different degrees, explaining,  
 
When speakers’ gestures represent aspects of the source domain of a 
concurrently used linguistic metaphorical expression …then the gesture 
may serve as an indicator of activated metaphoricity of the co-articulated 
verbal expression. …metaphoricity must have been cognitively accessible 
and activated because apparently it served as a source for the co-
articulated gesture. (Müller 2008a, 221) 
 
In light of metaphoric gestural phenomena, Müller puts forward a dynamic theory of 
metaphor that seriously considers the complex processes of on-line metaphorical thinking 
as it forms multi-modal language use. 
While Müller is guided by the premise that metaphoricity is a cognitive principle, 
her analyses begin with multi-modal acts that establish metaphoricity on-line (or in use), 
and then rate the use according to a gradient of metaphoricity. She observes that gestures 
show up in ‘waking’ metaphors, or in moments in which the metaphor cognitively in play 
is more ‘awake’ in use (2007, 2008b). Much as McNeill describes the role of gesture in 
communicative dynamism, the presence of gesture marks the real-time on-line processing 
of a metaphor as metaphor. Metaphoric gestures in particular can manifest a waking 
metaphor for the speaker, as opposed to a sleeping one. Müller rejects the notion of a 
‘dead’ metaphor in most cases, since her focus in on on-line processes of seeing 
something in terms of something else, which is always a present possibility (see Müller 
2008b, 30-31).121  
                                                          
121 It is important to note, then, and will be discussed in more detail later in this section (V.1), that Müller is 
not explaining the neural activation of a cross-domain mapping, but the establishing of a triadic structure of 
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Gesture is a primary way that a speaker foregrounds a metaphor, hence 
demonstrating ‘awake’ metaphoricity, for the benefit of the discourse construction that 
she and her interlocutor are co-building. Müller explains, “What is in the focus of 
attention of the speaker is foregrounded in a verbal-gestural utterance” (2007, 114). This 
is observed in a speaker’s gestures while describing the trajectory of a romantic 
relationship:  
 
Metaphoricity was first rather weakly active in an entrenched metaphoric 
expression (‘it went up and down’) with a tiny downward movement of 
the head, and then it was successively more activated through verbal and 
gestural reformulations and foregrounding techniques, such as gaze 
direction and the spatial characteristics of the gestural movement. (Müller 
2007, 114) 
 
The use of gestures, as well as their frequency and degree of observation by the speaker 
and hearer, varies with the degree of metaphorical ‘wakefulness’ and the cognitive 
foregrounding processes through which the speaker manifests the current focus of her 
attention. Gestures offer a “window” into dynamic metaphoricity “at the level of use” and 
indicate “creative exploitation” of a linguistic system’s repertoire of potential metaphors 
(2007, 115). Müller gives evidence of the embodiment of communicative dynamism in 
gesture, as well as support for thinking that is dialectical and dynamic not only in its 
opposing semiotic modes but also in its synthesizing of a “sedimented” or conventional 
system with idiosyncratic moments of metaphoric meaning (2007, 110, 116; see also 
Chui 2011).  
Ought this treatment of gesture assign Müller’s research to the ‘meaning-leaking’ 
perspective that I have diagnosed and criticized in earlier chapters? Note that in many 
places, Müller follows McNeill’s paradigm view of gesture as revealing something about 
thinking (e.g. Müller 2008a, 221; Cienki and Müller 2008a, 494). To offer a preliminary 
answer, I find important differences that distinguish Müller’s approach and conclusions 
from the aspects of McNeill’s meaning-leaking view that causes me concern, although 
                                                                                                                                                                             
processing that sees something in terms of something else (Müller 2008b, 31, 133). This is in dialogue with 
actually fairly removed from Lakoff’s CMT or NTM view. 
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similarities remain. To get this better into view, let us try to understand several significant 
issues at stake in Müller’s idea of metaphoricity as “a property that can be in the 
background or the foreground to varying degrees” (Cienki 2008, 20). I do this by 
comparison between three recent inquiries into how convention plays into the cognitive 
relation of metaphor and gesture: an experimental piece by McNeill’s former student Fey 
Parrill, a more detailed and critical explanation of Müller’s idea of metaphoricity’s 
dynamism (her sleeping and waking view), and Streeck’s challenge to scholars to explain 
the perceived fit between gestures used and context of use.  
    
Culture, convention, and cognition in metaphoric gestures 
The work of explaining metaphorical meaning in gestures calls attention to some 
open questions in metaphor theory and in notions of cognitive processing involved in 
language use. Psychologist and metaphor researcher Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. succinctly 
describes an emerging set of issues in metaphor study as the “paradox of metaphor”: 
“metaphor is creative, novel, culturally sensitive, and allows us to transcend the mundane 
while also being rooted in pervasive patterns of bodily experience common to all people” 
(2008, 5). While Gibbs raises the important question of aesthetic novelty, there is a 
deeper tension lurking here that pertains to the relationship between cultural conventions, 
linguistic conventions, cognitive habits, and expressive spontaneity. As is evident in the 
following studies, and as the preceding chapters prepare us to appreciate, unless some 
effort is made to understand the conditions of metaphoric mappings vis-à-vis the context 
of utterances, context being understood at several different levels, the event of gestural 
meaning-making (metaphoric and non) and the nature of metaphoric thinking will remain 
obscure.122 My contention in the following analysis is that to posit that metaphoricity 
(either as a cognitive principle or as the quality of multi-modal utterances, but 
metaphoricity as such) is either conventional or nonconventional presupposes answers to 
questions that are still live for theoretical and empirical research. 
 
                                                          
122 It should be noted that Lakoff and Johnson (1999) address thoroughly the conditions of metaphoric 
thinking, yet this explanation calls on an enactive metaphysics or ‘embodied realism’ that is typically 
unappreciated in subsequent conceptual metaphor literature. 
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Parrill and McNeill on gesture convention 
 In a recent publication, Fey Parrill asks why it is that a particular gesture studied 
in the literature, here called the PRESENTING gesture, “occurs with high frequency in 
very similar discourse contexts,” wondering, “does the sameness with which different 
speakers produce the gesture come from shared underlying imagery or from the existence 
of a cultural convention?” (Parrill 2008, 204). Parrill investigates this by comparing the 
PRESENTING gesture, an open-hand, palm-up gesture typically used with expressions 
like “here’s what I think we should do” and typically understood as presenting an idea, 
with the emblematic OKAY gesture. Parrill’s experiment asks “whether observers are 
equally sensitive to violations of the canonical production forms of these two gestures” in 
order to see whether “the PRESENTING gesture is like the OKAY gesture insofar as it 
has a conventional form” (2008, 204). The details of the experiment are themselves 
interesting, and perhaps cautionary in terms of experiment design, yet I am concerned 
with the presuppositions of the study itself.123      
 Note that the aim of the study is to choose between two apparently exclusive 
options: either the PRESENTING gesture pervasively occurs in certain stable contexts 
“because the conceptual metaphor in which ideas are conceptualized in terms of objects 
is so pervasive,” or because, “on the other hand, the gesture’s production form may be 
governed by a culturally established standard” (Parrill 2008, 204). This choice presumes 
that a culturally established standard form for a gesture could not be motivated by a 
conceptual metaphor shared by that culture. This is a surprising presumption, given that 
conceptual metaphor theory is frequently used to explain just that sort of phenomena in 
                                                          
123 Parrill has native English speakers rate the naturalness of a number of constructed stimuli (video clips 
where a sentence is spoken and accompanied by one of the two gestures; the speech and gestures were 
constructed separately and then combined in video editing). In all stimuli, the PRESENTING gesture is 
used in contexts that violate the typical convention of its use setting and the OKAY gesture is used in 
contexts that violate it. Out of a larger stimuli set, each participant viewed and rated sixteen randomly 
selected stimuli for each gesture, and were then asked probe questions about why they thought something 
was unnatural if they rated it as such and what sort of setting would make the gesture more natural. The 
experiment results failed to demonstrate a clear difference between the emblematic gesture and the other 
gesture, which Parrill describes as metaphoric and pragmatic (2008, 203-204), in terms of expectations of 
standards of form (2008, 211-214). Rather, unexpected high variability amongst participant ratings and 
responses was found. These results are perhaps unsurprising given that the experiment was designed to 
investigate something that it at the same time presupposed, namely, the nature of the conventions governing 
form and usage (which, incidentally, are conflated in the study) of the PRESENTING gesture. 
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morpho-phonemic parameters of ASL expressions.124 Parrill seems to be further 
presuming that metaphorical motivation for gesture forms is nonconventional because it 
is something that takes place in the mind of the speaker-gesturer at the moment of 
utterance production (a process of “conceptualization” as opposed to “convention”), 
which (as per the meaning-leaking paradigm) Parrill takes to be a private and unregulated 
affair.  
 An explanation for these problematic premises can be found in McNeill’s 
definition of linguistic convention, which structures one of his continua for gesture 
classification that Parrill adopts in order to motivate the comparison between 
PRESENTING with an emblematic gesture (OKAY):  
 
A convention comes into being when a community of users reaches an 
agreement about something, whether it is the proper side of the road to 
drive on or that a certain acoustic signal should be associated with a 
meaning, as in the case of the words of a spoken language. With a 
representational gesture, on the other hand, it is not a collective agreement 
that motivates the use of a certain form, but visuo-spatial thinking. (Parrill 
2008, 198)   
 
Parrill then takes PRESENTING to be a representational (nonconventional) gesture while 
OK is conventional (emblematic), and accordingly she predicts that “if the 
PRESENTING gesture is less conventional than the OKAY gesture, participants should 
be more tolerant of violations of its form, accepting more variants of it” (2008, 208).125 
Note the founding logic of this divide: visuo-spatial thinking is not conventional, because 
                                                          
124 One example of conventional metaphorical motivations for ASL grammar and usage out of many that 
Taub (2001) analyzes is that an ASL-signer can sign a phrase translatable in English as “I can’t get through 
to him.” This sign is made by using a conventional handshape for thought (a G-hand, or a pointing 
handshape) and a conventional movement pattern of traveling to the space being used to refer to the person 
in question and bouncing against a palm moved to that space. This enacts an IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
metaphor, as well as the CONDUIT metaphor of linguistic expression, since the handshape and movement 
of this sign technically traces the trajectory of a pointed-at object through space to an unreceptive location 
in order to express that a thought or message to be communicated is ‘not getting through’.  
125 The decision to weigh PRESENTING against OKAY puts the cart a bit before the horse, since the study 
is attempting to explain what kind of a gesture PRESENTING is. Also, the OKAY gesture is clearly iconic; 
explaining why it is not taken as representational (anymore) would add a telling dimension to the inquiry. 
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it is not collectively agreed upon. Similarly, metaphoric thinking is not conventional, and 
so observers are expected to tolerate violations of its form.126 
 That this study did not produce the desired result – a clear answer to the question 
“Is the PRESENTING gesture as conventional as the OKAY gesture?” (Parrill 2008, 
212) – might be seen as sufficient internal criticism of both the question and the design of 
the experiment. Yet Parrill’s inquiry exhibits a broad, pressing need for more clarity in 
the discourse about gesture and metaphor and hence a need for further theoretical as well 
as empirical work. Before turning to other investigations into gesture and metaphor that 
hold promise for more clarity, it is important to appreciate just what is going wrong here, 
and how the sort of philosophical engagement carried out in the previous chapters of the 
present work might help.  
 Parrill’s experiment rests on presumed dichotomies – convention as opposed to 
nonconvention, cultural norms as opposed to individual cognitive processes – as well as 
on a presumed conflation between the processes involved in producing a gestural form 
and those involved in meaning something by that gesture. Two distinct but related issues 
can be raised in response to this: First, too little attention is being paid to the role of 
communicative intentionality. As my above reading of Grice shows, the form of an 
utterance alone underdetermines the meaning of that utterance in any particular use 
context. At the same time, interlocutors are not at a loss when it comes to comprehending 
each other’s utterances; nonconventional speech acts such as conversational implicatures 
are nonetheless normatively constrained in virtue of various shared reasoning practices 
and cultural norms. (In other words, there are better and worse ways that a convention 
may be violated in context.) In Chapter III, I took up this insight and explored some of 
the many ways that co-speech gestures serve as tools in participants’ collaborative 
navigation and construction of meaning in a conversational context. Metaphoric gesture 
has the potential to offer further, powerful insight into this embodied and intersubjective 
understanding of communicative intentionality and communicative action. For example, 
a palm-up presenting gesture can be understood as enacting an IDEA AS OBJECT 
                                                          
126 Recall also from Chapter IV Streeck’s treatments of iconicity in gesture that representation only 
succeeds because interlocutors are prepared to take something as a representation of something. Usually 
this preparation comes from shared cultural conventions. 
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conceptual metaphor, in which the use of this gesture functions primarily “to present the 
speaker’s idea, as if it were an object on the flat open hand, available for joint 
inspection”(Cienki and Müller 2008a, 490). This metaphoric gesture draws on common 
experiences of collaborative object use. When performed with accompanying speech 
such as “they experience brutal things yes indeed” in the context of discussing characters 
in a novel (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 490), the gesture is adding to the meaning of the 
utterance not at the level of the speaker’s idea, but at a pragmatic level, showing that the 
speaker is inviting the listener to examine and weigh in on this presented interpretation. 
By drawing on this metaphor, this gesture is readily understood. The same is the case in 
the common use of the gesture with phrases like “Here is what I mean,” in which the 
gesture specifies the underdetermined verbal deictic term by offering a location (the up-
ward palm, where the idea sits) for the imprecise lexical use (“Here”). The point is that 
gestures so understood confirm something that conceptual metaphor theory has long 
argued – that the common reasoning processes by which interlocutors make sense of 
syntactically and sometimes semantically underdetermined utterances are rooted in 
bodily sense-making. This rich possibility cannot be pursued under a narrow, 
unmotivated understanding of convention like the sense Parrill deploys. 
 Secondly, it is neither fruitful nor accurate to oppose cultural conventions to 
individual cognitive processes. This alleged opposition also runs counter to many of the 
more interesting findings in conceptual metaphor theory. Moreover, this dichotomy stops 
any inquiry into the conditions for communicative success dead in its tracks. Here 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of sedimentation and Heidegger’s treatment of being-in-the-
world, both of which I examined in Chapter IV in the context of embodied and world-
embedded practices of disclosure, shed some light. It might be tempting to think of 
certain cognitive processes like visuo-spatial thinking (Parrill 2008, 198) or imagistic 
thinking (McNeill 1992, 2005) as idiosyncratic, interior activities that uniquely and 
spontaneously occur anew for each person in every moment of conscious awareness. Yet 
recall that the image schemas that are extended in conceptual metaphors and that ground 
verbal metaphorical expressions are patterns that abstract from recurrent experiences of 
interaction with the environment or from our experiences of being-in-the-world (Johnson 
1987, 2). Imagistic, body-based thinking as understood in this paradigm is not 
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particularly personal. (Indeed, metaphor scholars argue that the “supraindividual” is “the 
level at which the claims of conceptual metaphor theory make more sense” (Cienki 2008, 
16).) Hence we find all those verbal metaphorical expressions that make sense to 
speakers of a language, whether those expressions are conventional or novel. Studies of 
cultural variation and stability of image schemas and conceptual metaphorical mappings 
prove this point further (Kövecses 2000, 2005). Any speaker-gesturer is free to deploy 
these habitual schemas in untold ways, but such usages will only make sense to her 
audience in light of what Streeck calls background haptic knowledge (2009) and in 
dynamic interaction with the common ground provided by the lifeworld and the 
intelligence of bodies that grew up there (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Looking for standards of 
form to rule out metaphoricity misses the point. 
 
 The question of convention in terms of metaphoric dynamism: Müller revisited 
 One probing question implicit in Parrill’s premise that metaphoric thinking is 
nonconventional, that is, to be contrasted with community-set standards of form, is how 
we are to understand the cognitive activity going on ‘behind the scenes’ of metaphoric 
expressions. In presuming that metaphoric gestures are unconventional due to cognitive 
work involved in processing them, Parrill appears to follow in the footsteps of classic 
conceptual metaphor theory, which holds that these mappings are alive at all times and 
“can be activated” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 87). Yet, while still an open question for 
neural research today, the nature of this activation has been empirically studied (for a 
review of debates regarding conceptual metaphor processing as well a recent 
experimental study, see Lai et al, 2009; see also Lakoff 2008, Feldman 2006, Coulson 
and Van Petten 2002). Note that Lakoff updates CMT (conceptual metaphor theory) with 
NTM (neural theory of metaphor). Working in conjunction with neuroscientists, Lakoff 
puts forward a processing prediction regarding conventional conceptual metaphorical 
mappings: 
 
When you hear a metaphorical expression, the literal meanings of the 
words should activate the source domain circuitry and the context should 
activate the target domain circuitry, and together they should activate the 
mapping circuit. The result is an integrated circuit, with activation of both 
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source and target domains and processing over both at once. Thus, 
understanding language that makes use of a conventional conceptual 
metaphor should take no longer than normal frame-based nonmetaphorical 
processing. (Lakoff 2009, 27) 
 
This finding implies that attempting to sort conventional from metaphorical processing 
cannot rely on expectations that metaphorical processing will take longer or require more 
effort. While the present work is not directly concerned with the small but growing body 
of neural research on language, gesture, and metaphor, it is nonetheless crucial to note 
that this research “changes how one does metaphor analysis” (Lakoff 2009, 36). New 
methods allow for investigation of the sensorimotor basis for source domain topology as 
well as of the ways the brain makes connections across sensory modalities and spanning 
levels of meaning (see also Damasio 1999, Tucker 2007).127  At this point, researchers on 
metaphor cannot be satisfied with asking questions of activation and processing, or 
making claims about convention in opposition to metaphorical thinking, without 
engaging this recent work.  
In light of the questions of how conceptual metaphors are processed and the 
degree of activation found in using conventional conceptual metaphors, I return to 
Müller’s gesture-inclusive dynamic theory of sleeping and waking metaphoricity. 
Müller’s observations of gesture lead her to the dynamic theory summarized above, 
which seeks to explain what goes on for the speaker-gesturer in making the metaphorical 
utterance (in whatever modality) as well as what goes on in terms of the recipient’s 
understanding. Specifically, Müller argues that metaphor theories posit a triadic structure. 
In Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual theory, according to Müller, that structure involves 
B: one kind of thing, C: another kind of thing, and A: experiencing/understanding “in 
terms of” (Müller 2008b, 28). (Imagine a triangular diagram with A as the top corner and 
B and C as the bottom corners: B is understood in terms of C because of A (experiential 
understanding).) Her own view has it that “on the level of use [as opposed to system], the 
                                                          
127 Recent work in the neuroscience of visual and haptic perception demonstrates the possibility of 
“multisensory object recognition in which representations are flexibly accessible via top-down or bottom-
up processing, the choice of route being influenced by object familiarity and individual preference along 
the object-spatial continuum of mental imagery” (Lacey and Sathian, 2011, 165). 
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third element is the cognitive process which establishes the relation between B and C. It 
is this process on which the establishment of metaphoricity depends” (Müller 2008b, 30-
31, my italics).128 The distinction here may seem subtle, but Müller is really seeking to 
explain a different phenomenon, a dynamic as opposed to static one (on her view). In any 
given instance of on-line multi-modal symbol use, a speaker may engage a process of 
seeing something in terms of another, and they may engage in this process to a particular 
degree. For Müller, this is true for both novel and conventional constructions. The only 
difference is that “a conventionalized verbal or conceptual metaphor adds a 
preconfiguration or a certain prefigured route to this process” (Müller 2008b, 31).   
 Note that Müller is seeking to measure metaphoricity as a process of establishing 
relation. In this context, it is unclear what exactly is meant by ‘activation’; this seems to 
imply that the process itself exists, sometimes in an activated and sometimes in an un-
activated state. I appreciate Müller’s approach to analyzing metaphoric gesture as a 
public element of interaction, and I find promising the notion of a dynamic process that 
establishes relations as more or less foregrounded, or more or less salient in attentional 
communicative practices. My preferences are based in philosophical reflection on the 
communicative nature of gesture engaged in throughout this work. Nonetheless, how 
Müller’s proposal might work at a neural-psychological level (how it might fit in or bear 
on the sorts of investigations mentioned above) is unclear.  
For now, consider that Müller thinks it is just as likely for a conventional 
conceptual metaphor to be ‘awake’ in use as it is for it to be ‘asleep’. The following 
example shows that a conceptual metaphor is ‘awake’ in gesture. This example shows a 
speaker describing the effects of depression with the phrase durch dieses depressive 
(‘because of this depressiveness’) while repeatedly making “a slow, downward 
movement with her right hand palm down, thumb, and forefinger forming a ring shape” 
(Cienki and Müller 2008a, 498). Müller points out that it is unlikely that this speaker 
knows or was at that moment aware that the German term for depression comes from the 
                                                          
128 She repeats this claim later on in the work, and indicates here that she construes metaphoricity as a very 
broad process: “Activating metaphoricity is activating a triadic structure of this kind, regardless of whether 
the relata for A are lexemes, expressions, sentences, utterances, pictures, sculptures, gestures, or simply the 
process of seeing-in-terms-of; or whether the relata for B and C are concepts, meanings, things, verbal or 
conceptual domains, conceptual metaphors, or sensory experiences” (Müller 2008b, 133). 
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Latin verb deprimere/depression ‘to press down’. Müller draws on conceptual metaphor 
theory to explain the connection found in this utterance: 
 
But the notion that SAD IS DOWN, apparent in the development of the 
word [deprimere  Depresivität]’s abstract meaning, reappears in a 
gesture with speech. How can this be? Apparently, a conceptual metaphor 
which motivated the extension of a word to an abstract domain can still be 
active in a culture and continue to constitute an imagistic way of thinking 
about the idea, even if it is no longer transparent in the form of the word 
itself. (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 489) 
 
Furthermore, Müller points out that nowhere in the entire conversation does the speaker 
‘activate’ the SAD IS DOWN metaphor in speech. In her terminology, the metaphorical 
etymological root of the German word ‘depressive’ is dead (no longer available for 
establishing metaphoricity for speakers), yet the experiential conceptual metaphor SAD 
IS DOWN is awake and available for on-line use in gesture (Müller 2008b, 80). As 
Müller explains her example, “this provides support for one controversial claim put 
forward by Lakoff and Turner (1989), namely that conceptual metaphors may be active 
although some of their lexical instantiations are no longer transparent metaphors” (Müller 
2008b, 80). On her view, again, conventional conceptual metaphors offer a route to 
establishing metaphoricity, but that process (or to what degree that route is taken) varies 
in each context of use: “the degree of activation of metaphoricity is context-dependent 
and does not automatically follow from conventionalization” (Müller 2008b, 199).129 In 
this case the SAD IS DOWN metaphor is ‘awake’ in the gesture that established the 
emotional feeling in terms of a downward movement; Müller’s analysis seems to suggest 
that if the gesture had been accompanied with words like “I have been so down lately,” 
the metaphoricity would be even more strongly established. 
                                                          
129 This bears on some of the confusion exhibited in Parrill’s statement of her experiment’s problem. Müller 
identifies that the dead versus alive view of metaphor that has such a strong hold on the scholarship mixes 
its criteria, such that “vitality” implies three distinct aspects of metaphors: “conventionalization, 
transparency, and consciousness” (Müller 2008b, 184). The first two of these have to do with “properties of 
metaphors as members of a linguistic system, and the third refers to the cognitive activation of metaphors 
in an individual speaker” (Müller 2008b, 184). 
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At the heart of Müller’s dynamic or “sleeping/waking” view of conceptual 
metaphor I find an understanding of the dialectic between sedimentation and spontaneity, 
one that is closer to Merleau-Ponty’s own view than is McNeill’s uptake of Merleau-
Ponty. Referring to the products of metaphorical thinking, Müller points out, “Metaphors 
are members of a linguistic system and they are used by individual speakers and writers 
and comprehended by individual listeners and readers” (Müller 2008b, 208-209). 
Metaphoric language in particular is “a multifaceted phenomenon” that “has at least a 
collective and an individual side” (Müller 2008b, 210). Thus even fixed metaphorical 
expressions, those ‘sedimented’ in the collective store of what is available for a 
community of speakers, are better thought of as ‘sleeping’ than dead (Müller 2007, 111). 
As long as such metaphorical products are still available to be part of the process of 
establishing a triadic structure of metaphoricity (seeing something in terms of another 
thing), at any moment the metaphoricity of these expressions may be ‘awakened’ to some 
degree.  Müller explains, 
 
Both entrenched and novel metaphors may show varying degrees of 
activated metaphoricity. This means that the degree of metaphoricity is not 
a fixed property of a specific metaphoric expression… because one and 
the same metaphoric expression can be more or less activated depending 
on its context of use, that is, it can be sleeping in one context and waking 
in another. In one context, metaphoricity may be slightly activated; in 
another context, it may be highly active and become an object of focused 
attention or even of metalinguistic awareness. (Müller 2008b, 198) 
 
It should be noted that Müller’s proposal is based in an appreciation of the multimodality 
of metaphor, including observations of metaphoric gesture practices. Because 
metaphoricity is a property of cognition, it can be ‘sleeping’ in the background or can 
become ‘foregrounded’ (awake) in various symbolic and attentional practices.130   
How does Müller rate the activation level of metaphoricity-establishing processes 
in any given instance of use (in speech or gesture or both)? As Cienki and Müller explain, 
                                                          
130 Later in the work, Müller clarifies that a ‘sleeping’ metaphor is a transparently metaphorical verbal 
expression that is not accompanied by any activation indicators; hence it is accessible for foregrounding but 
not foregrounding (Müller 2008b, 198). 
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“the argument is an iconic and an interactive one: the more cues that direct the attention 
of the interlocutors to the metaphoric quality of a verbal metaphoric expression, the 
higher the degree of cognitive activation of metaphoricity in the speaker (and also 
potentially in the addressee)” (2008a, 495). They take metaphoric gesture as one of these 
cues. A metaphoric gesture is “foregrounded” if, for example, it “receives the speaker’s 
and listener’s gaze, and draw[s] upon the same source domain as the verbal metaphoric 
expression” (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 495). Multi-modality is an important indication of 
metaphoricity activation; ‘interactive’ in Cienki and Müller’s usage speaks to the relation 
between modalities and other contextual variables in achieving meaning. They conclude, 
“…these clusters of attention-getting cues produce interactive foregrounding of 
metaphoricity and since what is interactively foregrounded is also interpersonally 
foregrounded, metaphoricity should in these cases be highly activated intrapersonally” 
(Cienki and Müller  2008a, 495). In other words, Cienki and Müller claim that the 
presence and interaction of gaze, gesture (possibly metaphoric), and speech (possibly 
metaphoric) collectively indicate metaphoricity that is salient for both parties and so, 
presumably, cognitively activated for the speaker. 
An important premise for Müller’s description of metaphoricity as dynamic and 
“graded” is that gestures act as a window onto cognitive processes. This aspect of her 
theory indeed seems to motivate her methodological focus on activation indicators. As 
just outlined, Müller “relates the notion of activation” of metaphoricity not to 
consciousness, but to public “activation indicators” (Müller 2008b, 198) like gesture, 
gaze, and verbal elaboration. On my reading, this avoidance of the question of 
consciousness is ambiguous. On the one hand, Müller may be pointing out that 
metaphoricity, as a cognitive relation, is established in public communicative acts (this is 
the reading I like). On the other hand, she may be saying, à la McNeill, that speakers are 
not or need not be conscious of their gestures; rather, their gestures unintentionally reveal 
their unconscious cognitive processing. I find her explanation to contain elements of both 
(see Müller 2008b 198-199); she intends for activation indicators to be “empirical” 
measurements of a cognitive process. To answer a question introduced earlier in this 
chapter, the sleeping/waking view of metaphor has features of both the meaning-leaking 
and meaning-building paradigms, insofar as it is highlights the social, interpersonal, 
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public, and dynamic nature of cognition, yet still hides cognitive processes behind 
communicative acts. It is to her credit that the dynamism that Müller puts forward, while 
inspired by McNeill’s work on gesture’s role to thinking-for-speaking, goes beyond the 
binary of absence and presence to posit a graded spectrum of multi-modal metaphoricity. 
Both gestural motion and cognition can vary in degrees of metaphoricity-wakefulness on 
this view (Cienki and Müller 2008a, 495). Yet the notion of metaphoricity as a graded 
process of establishing relation that at its most ‘awake’ manifests itself in activation 
indicators remains a bit puzzling. It seems that more research is needed in particular 
regarding what the activation indicators indicate in terms of emerging evidence from the 
neural theory of metaphor.  
 
Streeck on pragmatic metaphor and perceived fit 
 Streeck’s reflections on metaphor and gesture are given the final word in this 
section because they are the closest to the view being put forward here. They are also 
quite relevant: in commenting on the metaphoricity of pragmatic gesture, Streeck takes 
up the example of the open-handed palm-up gesture (or “gesture varieties,” as he aptly 
notes) (2008b, 260). He notes that cross-culturally, these “can often be identified without 
much doubt as schematic versions of acts of offerings or handling over that fit the 
relevances of the moment well: it makes easy sense that turn-transfer be figured as a 
handing-over, or the voicing of an opinion or the making of a statement as an offering” 
(Streeck 2008b, 260). Yet Streeck furthers this analysis by pointing out that even in the 
case of communicatively successful metaphoric uses, sometimes a researcher may be 
hard-pressed to specify the source domain of a given schematic gesture or know for sure 
what specific aspect of a target domain is being elucidated. Consider the following 
example. 
In speakers of Ilokano in the North of the island Luzon in the Philippines, the 
palm-up gesture is conventionally used, with an accompanying intent gaze at the empty 
palm by the speaker, to indicate a story is going to be told (or, seen another way, to begin 
telling a story). Streeck deduces this conventional meaning from observations that the 
speaker does not move the palm towards the audience, and that the gesture is usually 
followed by elaborations in which the speaker repeatedly points at the palm with the 
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index finger of the other hand or uses the other hand to grip fingers of the open palm in 
turn. Corpus searches confirm that this gesture occurs with or just before telling a story, 
and that the pointing or finger-grasping is accompanied by verbal listings of characters or 
events. Yet Streeck observes that despite this seemingly “good fit between the gesture 
and the context or position in an action sequence where it is made,” analysts can only 
“speculate” that the sense made is due to some systematic connections between the 
speaker’s actions and the communicative function they serve. The speaker might look 
pointedly at his palm to show that he is gathering his thoughts or setting a stage. “We 
could even speculate that the gesture expresses the cultural notion that telling a story 
from memory is like reading from a book …But of course, these are all conjectures” 
(Streeck 2008b, 262).   
Streeck thus takes up the question of fit as the object of inquiry, in light of the fact 
that participants do not struggle to make good pragmatic sense of what is going on: “And 
yet participants somehow seem to understand these gestures and be able to see the talk 
and interaction of the moment in their light” (Streeck 2008b, 260). Hence the issue is 
how researchers and analysts might have an account to “explain the fit between context 
and form” (Streeck 2008b, 262). Note that the fit in question is not between a stable 
meaning and form, because how the meaning is constructed is the thing that researchers 
are trying to find out. Rather, why does this gesture fit this context in such a way that 
meaning is enacted successfully for participants? 
Without giving a definitive answer, Streeck points the way to an appropriate 
methodology for taking up this question. This has already been discussed in Chapter IV 
in terms of the hands’ haptic epistemology. The hands in action – in their own knowing, 
“wise”, world-embedded actions – directly bring about a local space of shared 
significance. As Streeck here describes it, “Gestures classify in the first place by virtue of 
the acts that they are, not by what they look like or what they resemble. In other words, it 
is the specific physical act itself – its particular, if underdetermined, grip, hold, push, etc. 
– that organizes the target in terms of the source domain” (Streeck 2008b, 262).131 
                                                          
131 Elsewhere, in identifying his gestural ecologies, Streeck describes the gestural practice of ceiving, in 
which the hands think (conceive) in action, offering a gestural cept or thought. Ceiving gestures are often 
metaphorical. Streeck describes the example of a mechanic rotating his finger by his ear while making a 
certain facial expression; this corresponds with the spoken word “crank” and embodies the idea of hearing 
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Significantly, Streeck associates this view of ‘wise’ hands – “familiar with experienced 
reality and capable of coping with it” – with Johnson’s account of image schemas 
(Streeck 2008b, 263). The passage from Johnson that Streeck quotes is: “Our perceptual 
interactions and bodily movements within our environment generate… schematic 
structures that make it possible for us to experience, understand, and reason about our 
world” (Johnson 1987, 19). For Streeck, this core claim of embodied cognition (and 
conceptual metaphor theory) insists that we reject “the prevailing intellectualist view of 
metaphor in gesture, which asserts that gesture expresses conceptual metaphors that exist 
independently of them” (2008b, 263).  
If gestures do not express conceptual metaphors or represent activated 
metaphoricity, then what do metaphoric gestures do? They enact a mapping. Note that 
this view radically overcomes the divide posited in conceptual metaphor theory and even 
in Müller’s waking-sleeping dynamic theory between cognitive processes and linguistic 
products. On my view, this divide is not a principled commitment of either conceptual 
metaphor theory or Müller’s work; rather, it is a lingering residue of an entrenched way 
of thinking about language (analyzed by Reddy as the CONDUIT metaphor (Reddy, 
1979)). It is possible to read Müller after Streeck’s fashion: metaphoricity is ‘awake’ in 
the communicative activities of participants who speak and/or gesture metaphorically. 
Whether sleepy or bright-eyed, backgrounded or foregrounded, metaphorical thinking is 
not separable from the communicative actions that realize it. This conclusion resonates 
with the re-conception of language I gave at the start of this chapter, and with the 
findings in previous chapters on which this formula rests: a reciprocally informing notion 
of sedimentation and spontaneity, an understanding of normativity that transcends 
convention and is itself revisable, and a focus on interpersonal interaction and 
communicative success as intelligent bodily being-in-the-world. To further appreciate 
how certain gestural practices can enact conceptual metaphorical mappings, I turn in the 
next section to engage the enactive paradigm of cognitive science.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cranking. In this case, Streeck, explains, “the gesture is a concrete cept (manual concept) that corresponds 
to a verbal concept, not to a physical entity or event, as depictive gestures do” (2010, 233). 
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2.  Enaction and Gesture 
  
 Throughout the present work, I have used the language of enaction to describe 
how linguistic meaning, as well as certain kinds of cognition, takes place. In arguing for 
co-speech hand gestures as linguistic and embodied enactments, or better, in arguing for 
co-speech gesturing as an intersubjective process of enacting linguistic meaning, I mean 
something quite particular and yet difficult to fully articulate. Let me say a bit about my 
intended sense of ‘gestural enactment’ or ‘gestures enacting’ before turning to a technical 
theoretical approach that can support this usage.  
According to my usage, gesturing does not represent a meaning, and in the 
context of a conversational exchange, gestures are not ‘decoded’ by interlocutors 
(although researchers may spend a great deal of time coding and decoding them). Rather, 
in myriad ways, gesturing enacts meaning. I could say gesturing ‘brings about’ meaning, 
‘generates’ meaning, ‘discloses’ meaning, ‘opens up’ meaning, ‘causes’ meaning ‘to 
come to presence’. Gestures do not ‘create’ meaning out of a vacuum, but neither do they 
‘reveal’ an objective and patiently waiting meaning. ‘Enacting’ is meant to describe (or 
better yet, enact) a practice of holistic and immediate, active, selective, and interpretive 
simultaneous finding of a significance and inhabiting it.  
The way that Johnson defines meaning is a good expression of this enactive view 
and can be used to specify the significance that gets ‘enacted,’ ‘brought to presence,’ or 
‘disclosed’ in my above phrasings. Johnson explains that, “The meaning of something is 
its relations, actual and potential, to other qualities, things, events, and experiences. In 
pragmatist lingo, the meaning of something is a matter of how it connects to what has 
gone before and what it entails for present and future actions…” (2007, 265). Johnson 
follows Dewey and Gendlin in seeing that, while broader than language, meaning as 
consequence-in-experience is “enriched” and “explored” through linguistic enactments 
(Johnson 2007, 266-267).  
Two further qualifications should be kept in mind in considering the sense of 
enaction sketched above: the gesturing practices examined here do not enact meaning on 
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their own, but in conjunction with speaking.132 Speaking enacts meaning in much the 
same way; it too does not operate primarily as a representational function. Secondly, 
enacting meaning can, in a derived way, be a solitary activity, but it is fundamentally an 
intersubjective process. It is so in at least two ways: one enacts meaning for others, even 
if that other is one’s self. This importantly shapes, constrains, and establishes criteria for 
the success of that meaning. Enacting meaning is also intersubjective in that the sphere of 
significance brought forth in the enacting always borrows from, is in response to, and 
may transform a broader, pre-defined horizon of possibilities. 
  As an analogy for my sense of enacting, consider friends looking for an 
apartment. This activity does not spring up in a vacuum: the friends live in the same city, 
in different apartments. The city is near the college they graduated from. There are 
websites that list available apartments. There is a process of apartment-searching (phone 
calls, appointments) and one of apartment-applying (credit checks, security deposits, 
references), and the friends are more or less familiar with these. They do not go about 
finding an apartment unknowingly, or in an unmarked style (they use Craigslist as 
compared to a real estate agency). Once the apartment is decided upon, the friends sign a 
lease and move in. They decorate. They buy groceries. They divide the space. (All of this 
too has practices, scripts, ways of being done.) The lighting, furniture, cooking habits, 
cleaning rotation, time spent in common and private areas, all converge to enact the 
apartment as theirs.  
 To start thinking about gestures as enactive in this sense, recall the example I 
presented at the start of Chapter I, in which Jon Stewart is attempting to explain to Rachel 
Maddow her role in the reporter-transcending trends of cable news media that Stewart 
analyzes and critiques. Recall that in this case his metaphorical gestures, which in both 
handshape and repetition across key speech phrases establish a contrast between his and 
Maddow’s perspectives or ‘places’ in the news media world, enact the metaphorical 
reasoning far more clearly and precisely than does his fragmented speech. The words he 
                                                          
132 As has been hinted at various points, even this speech+gesture sense of enacting is too ideal, since gaze, 
posture, head movement, intonation, setting, common ground, history, purpose, and more inform each 
enactment. Yet for the sake of leaving philosophers with a workable next step, and in light of the specific 
properties of the manual modality that allow them to work in such intimate tandem with the verbal and 
vocal modality, I leave this aside for the time being. 
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aligns with his position are “weather patterns,” “climate scientist,” and “aggregate.” The 
words used when showing Maddow’s position are “talking about the weather.” The real 
contrast between their respective roles comes out in his handshape and position, as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2 (on pages 2 and 4, respectively). These gestures demonstrate what it is 
that Stewart wants to take from the vocabulary of meteorology that he and Maddow 
share: not details about the weather, but various perspectives that one can take in regard 
to the phenomena, different levels at which the data can be handled. With this enactment 
he selects features of shared knowledge and makes them immediately and particularly 
salient in a new context.     
  
Gesture in terms of enactive cognitive science 
 My sense of ‘enacting’ finds confirmation and convergence in an alternative 
paradigm in cognitive science. Tenets of an enactive view of cognition are introduced in 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind (1991). Very recently, scholars 
have come together to turn a set of ideas into a coherent paradigm, one that is still being 
developed (Stewart, Gapenne, and Di Paolo 2010; Thompson 2007; Hutto 2006, etc.). As 
a way of studying human cognition, enaction theory involves concerns that are broader 
than and at times tangential to my purposes here. Yet as demonstrated in the above 
discussion of conceptual metaphor theory (and indeed, sharing some relation to this 
theory), how cognition is understood bears upon how language practices are understood. 
Here I introduce the aspects of the enactive view that bear most directly on my 
understanding of gesture as an embodied and intersubjective practice of linguistic 
meaning-making. 
  
Technical definition and core tenets of the enaction paradigm 
 Enaction answers the primary question of cognitive science – how to explain the 
relationship between a physical or material state and a mental state – “by grounding all 
cognition as an essential feature of living organisms” (Stewart 2010, 1). Stemming from 
biology and systems theory, the enaction paradigm takes as its basic target phenomenon 
an organism-environment dyad, in which organism and ecological niche are co-
determining of each other (Stewart 2010, 2). Sensorimotor coupling between an organism 
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and its environment is reciprocally informing: sensory inputs guide organism actions, and 
organism actions affect the environment and thus modify the sensory returns (Stewart 
2010, 3). Action is a necessary condition for perception and for a known world: 
 
…what the world “is” for the organism amounts to neither more nor less 
than the consequences of its actions for its sensory inputs; this in turn 
clearly depends on the repertoire of possible actions. Without action, there 
is no ‘world’ and no perception. This is the heart of the concept of 
enaction: every living organism enacts, or as Maturana (1987) liked to say 
brings forth the world in which it exists. (Stewart 2010, 3) 
 
Note that this view is not original to enaction theory, or to Francisco Varela, Evan 
Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, or Herbert Maturana, some of the first to put forward the 
view under the ‘enaction’ banner. John Dewey takes an organism in interaction with its 
environment as a foundational explanation for human behavior at its highest levels 
(Dewey 1922; MW.14). Jakob von Uexküll likewise put forth the idea of umwelt that in 
turn influenced Max Scheler and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (von Uexküll 1957). Another 
acknowledged philosophical ally of the enaction paradigm is Hans Jonas (1966), whose 
Phenomenon of Life is a touchstone for Ezequiel Di Paolo and others. Also, as discussed 
in Chapter IV, cognitive scientists working in and outside of the enaction paradigm read a 
similar non-dichotomous subject-object relation in Heidegger.133  
 While a proud heir of these legacies, the enaction paradigm involves five 
interrelated core tenets that are each specified in a way particular to the purposes of 
explaining cognition in contemporary scientific terms. These core ideas are: autonomy, 
sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De 
Jaegher 2010, 37). To be a living organism is by definition to be autonomous in the sense 
of following laws established by its own activities, laws that maintain the organism’s 
existence as a distinct entity. Every distinct organism can be seen as a precarious network 
of interdependent processes (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 38). These 
processes form a system that, while co-constituted by its environment, nonetheless 
                                                          
133 For an extended discussion of the connection between phenomenology and the enactive view, see 
Thompson 2007. 
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maintains what Damasio (1999) calls a “permeable boundary;” the organism-as-system is 
“operationally closed,” which means that “the results of the processes” for the system are 
“the processes themselves” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 139). There are thus 
constraints for each process to operate; organisms demonstrate Jonas’s notion of “needful 
freedom” insofar as they can influence (not remove) their own limitations, setting up via 
their actions their own ways of maintaining their processes and hence surviving (Di 
Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 38). “If a system ‘has no say’ in defining its own 
organization, then it is condemned to follow an externally given design like a railroad 
track” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 37). But the life of an organism is not so 
neatly laid out as a train on a railroad track, as indicated by the other core notions of 
enaction. 
 Organisms “cast a web of significance on their world” through their identity-
sustaining actions (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 39). Organisms thus have a 
normative perspective on the world, because they have a goal of continuing to generate 
their respective identities. Interactive “exchanges with the world are thus inherently 
significant for the agent [or organism] and this is the definitional property of a cognitive 
system: the creation and appreciation of meaning or sense-making” (Di Paolo, Rohde, 
and De Jaegher 2010, 39). An autonomous, sense-making system is cognitive because it 
is non-neutral with respect to its actions and interactions (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
488). Note that “such systems do not operate by representation. Instead of representing 
an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable 
from the structure embodied by the cognitive system” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991, 140). As a basic example of a living system enacting the world via cognition as 
valuing action, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (following Myin 2003) offer the example of a 
sponge: It is not the case that in my encounter with a sponge I represent to myself its pre-
existing properties of softness and absorbency. Rather,  
 
the softness of a sponge is not to be found ‘in it’ but in how it responds to 
the active probing and squeezing of our appropriate bodily movements 
(e.g., with the fingers or the palms of the hand). It is the outcome of a 
particular kind of encounter between a ‘questioning’ agent with a 
particular body (sponges are solid ground for ants) and a ‘responding’ 
segment of the world. (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 489)  
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Non-representationalism and non-neutrality in cognition – or, to put it positively, sense-
making – is at the heart of the enactive view.  
Both autonomy and sense-making demonstrate the third core idea, that of 
emergence: autonomy is “the consequence of a new identity that arises out of dynamical 
processes in precarious” interdependence; while “meaning is not to be found in elements 
belonging to the environment or in the internal dynamics of the agent, but belongs to the 
relational domain established between the two” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 
40). Emergent properties arise from the interaction of different processes existing prior to 
the new property, and emergent properties (or processes) have their own autonomous 
identity and introduce effects on the initial properties giving rise to the emergence (Di 
Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 40). Di Paolo et al. give the example of cellular life 
as a paradigm case of emergence (2010, 40). This is telling, since in the enaction 
paradigm, “mind is life-like and life is mind-like” (Thompson 2007, 218), or as it is 
frequently and bluntly put, mind is life. Mind itself is a “precarious self-generating 
identity that acts adaptively;” “the animate body in its world is a mind” (De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007, 488). 
 Given that the animate body in its world is a mind, the core notion of embodiment 
is taken in its most robust sense by the enactive approach. The body is not merely a piece 
of hardware to run the software of mind. “Embodiment means that the mind is inherent in 
the precarious, active, normative, and worldful process of animation” (Di Paolo, Rohde, 
and De Jaegher 2010, 42). Furthermore, the body’s involvement in sense-making is “not 
restricted to concrete sensorimotor activities”; as we saw in the above discussion of 
conceptual metaphor theory, “higher-level cognitive skills, such as reasoning and 
problem-solving, mental image manipulation, and language use depend crucially on 
bodily structures” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 43). Embodiment in the 
enaction paradigm is understood as a real part of our daily experiential lives; Di Paolo et 
al. thus provide an answer to the observed phenomenological experience of mind-body 
duality or ‘absent body’ pointed out by Drew Leder (1990) and others. Even if ‘I’ decide 
to change my body by going to a yoga class or taking up a long-distance running 
regimen, this can be seen as the kind of emergent “reflexive autonomy” characteristic of 
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a living organism, but now taking place on a “sociolinguistic” level (Di Paolo, Rohde, 
and De Jaegher 2010, 43). In such a case,  
 
…the body, by further manipulating its sense-making activity, is capable 
of putting itself in a novel situation that is partly its own creation. In doing 
so, it is playing a highly skillful dual role. This is afforded by the plasticity 
of the human body, but it would not be possible without immersion within 
a symbolic order and the social mediation that makes our bodies fit to a 
scheme of control and observation of behavior and cultural norms. (Di 
Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 43) 
 
My body’s ability to change and adapt can inform and guide my activities such that I 
continue to change and adapt my body. Moreover, my ecological niche includes pilates 
classes and magazine articles on weight loss. I am determined by this niche and in turn 
live up to its expectations (or alter them). 
 As can already be seen from this example, in the enaction paradigm, experience is 
a methodological tool rather than a problem in need of a solution. Being alive means 
being “immersed in a world of significance” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 43). 
Most concretely, the notion of experience guides this paradigm’s dialogue with and use 
of phenomenological analysis, and experience informs what might be called an enactive 
epistemology. In a move that calls to mind Streeck’s descriptions of hands as “wise,” Di 
Paolo et al. take up Jonas’s definition of life as a “process with interiority” (Di Paolo, 
Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 44). Experience of interiority stands in for currently lacking 
scientific explanations of inner life. Methodologically, this means that the enaction 
approach uses reflection as argumentative strategy: “No amount of rational argument will 
convince a reader of Jonas’s claim that, as an embodied organism, he is concerned with 
his own existence if the reader cannot see this for himself” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De 
Jaegher 2010, 45). 
 Notably, the most recent efforts in establishing the enactive approach to cognitive 
science aim to include social cognition through an analysis of social interaction that 
parallels the model of organism-environment coupling. Sensorimotor sense-making is 
extended to the social domain via dynamical systems theory and a focus on interaction as 
coordination (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Interaction on this view is taken to be “the 
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coupling between an agent and a specific aspect of its world: another agent” (Di Paolo, 
Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 61). In an enactive view of social cognition, the other is 
part of my environment and thus participates in my sense-making process De Jaegher has 
developed this notion in terms of participatory sense-making, an idea that is now 
included in most introductory presentations of the enaction paradigm (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007, 497). 
  
Social coordination and participatory sense-making 
 Coordination, a key notion in the enactive approach and a promising link between 
lower and higher cognition, shows a way of describing social interaction as an embodied, 
normative, intersubjective and unique phenomenon.134 Di Paolo and De Jaegher use the 
idea of coordination as a way to study social interaction as a phenomenon in itself, with 
its own autonomy and processes. On its own terms, an interaction as the coordination 
                                                          
134 There is at present no single, defining, fully worked-out enactive theory of language. Yet it is important 
to note that, given the advances in this direction made so far, the paradigm from the beginning is ready to 
include gesturing in its account of linguistic behavior. Cognitive scientist Didier Bottineau argues that to 
approach language while taking the core tenets of enaction seriously requires reflexive awareness of the 
experience of languaging, which he glosses as “the act of speech in all its forms;” a “multimodal 
experience” (Bottineau 2010, 271). For Bottineau, languaging is first and foremost a sensory experience of 
one’s environment; for the case of ‘acoustic languaging’ (as opposed to ‘optical languaging’ and other 
forms), he frequently points out that one cannot help but hear and be affected (if by varying degrees) by the 
speech of a nearby person. He thus advocates that (verbal) communication be modeled not as a speaker 
passing information directly to a hearer in a linear fashion, but “… as a retroacting radial propagation that 
will constantly affect the consciences in presence and be reprofiled in real time according to transitory 
effects and actions: a binary structural  loop in which two living bodies’ cognitive experiences are 
alternatively controlled and synchronized through somatic interface with the shared medium” (Bottineau 
2010, 272). Note that on this view, speech itself (in the absence of gesture) is still a multimodal sensory 
experience. 
Offering a perhaps more familiar take, scientific consultant and enaction theorist John Stewart 
notes that since verbal utterances radically underdetermine the meaning a speaker communicates with 
them, one must turn to communicative intention to explain how the utterance means what it does (2010, 
15). Stewart cites practices of metalinguistic correction or navigation – using phrases like “Do you mean 
that…” or offering feedback like “Yes, I see” – to show how interlocutors work together to converge upon 
a meaning being enacted. Importantly, he points out that “It is to be noted that these metalinguistic 
messages – absolutely vital for linguistic intercomprehension, on this account – are often replaced by facial 
gestures and mimics… Such gestures are not usually counted as ‘linguistic’ (they are not words), but if this 
[enactive] theory is right, such metalinguistic signals are actually at the core of what is characteristically 
linguistic” (Stewart 2010, 16). Stewart posits that linguistic communication is “a second-order 
communication about the status of the first-level intercomprehension” (2010, 16). He notes that Maturana 
and Varela describe language as “a coordination of coordination of actions” (Stewart 2010, 16). 
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between two systems can break down or continue, depending on how it shapes 
participants’ actions within its sway (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). In particular, Di 
Paolo and De Jaegher use the term ‘coordination’ to classify non-accidental correlation in 
the activity of two or more systems via a coupling (2007). Coordination takes place when 
this correlation is over and above what is expected from the systems’ normal (uncoupled) 
behavior (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 490). A coordination shows a double influence 
between the agents involved and the coupling (coordination) itself; this double influence 
is defining for the phenomenon of social interaction as a distinct phenomenon (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 492).135  
Once begun, a social interaction encounter invests agents with the role of 
interactors; thus the encounter generates emergent local identities. An encounter of social 
interaction cannot be analytically reduced to individual sense-making; it emerges from 
participants’ coordination and so has its own properties (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
492). Notably, it tends to be more difficult to avoid coordination than to get involved in 
it, and this is true in both the physical and social realm. Coordination does not depend 
upon advanced individual cognitive activity, and hence does not require complex internal 
explanations on the part of the individuals involved.  
 
Consider the situation in a narrow corridor when two people walking in 
opposite directions have to get past each other. They have to decide 
whether to continue walking as they are, or shift their movement to the 
right or to the left. Occasionally, such encounters unfold like this. Instead 
of choosing complementary movements that would allow them to carry on 
walking, the individuals move into mirroring positions at the same time. 
This unintended coordinated change in individual position creates a 
symmetrical mirroring relation. This symmetry, in combination with the 
spatial constraints of the corridor, increases the likelihood that the next 
move will also be a mirroring one (there are not many other moves 
available). Thus, the coordination maintains a property of the relational 
dynamics that forces the individuals to keep facing each other and 
                                                          
135 “Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the 
regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous 
organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the 
agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced)” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
493). 
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consequently to remain in interaction (in spite of, or rather because of, 
their efforts to break from this situation). In addition, the interaction 
promotes individual actions that tend to maintain the symmetrical 
coordination. Coordinated sideways movements conserve symmetry and 
symmetry promotes coordinated sideways movements. (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007, 493)  
 
Note further that in this case, “the coordinated lateral shifts in position are functional for 
the continuation of the interaction (not for the interactors’ intentions!)” (De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007, 493). Another example frequently offered is a case when instead of 
ending a phone call, both speakers continue to say ‘goodbye’ without hanging up. On the 
view being put forward here, these examples throw out mind-reading as a plausible 
explanation for social interaction, since neither person wants or intends for the interaction 
to continue. The point is that these interactions, even if brief and fleeting, have a ‘life of 
their own’.136 Yet individual actors cannot completely lose their autonomy; if they did, 
the phenomenon described would no longer be an encounter or an instance of social 
cognition. De Jaegher and Di Paolo thus introduce the notion of participatory sense-
making. 
 In the case of social interaction, individuals continue their active, intentional, 
expressive sense-making, yet the aspect of the world with which they couple is another 
sense-making agent. On this view the agents’ “movements – including utterances – are 
the tools of sense-making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 497). A conversation can thus 
be seen as a social interaction in which participants engage in collaborative or 
participatory sense-making: “the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, 
whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social 
sense- making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own” 
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 497). Notably, there can be degrees of participation in 
sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 497): in the case of getting stuck in a 
hallway, each individual’s sense-making is affected by coordination dynamics, but the 
                                                          
136 Note, then, that participatory sense-making does not always mean a smooth, pleasurable, or desired 
situation. This is helpful to keep in mind if the goal is to model cognition on life; in life, a coupling 
between an organism and environment may not always be mutually beneficial. It is nonetheless mutually 
determining (for the coupling in question at least). 
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significance generated is low, and the interaction ends as soon as those dynamics (lateral 
movement) end. Yet on the opposite end of the spectrum, in the case of robust 
collaboration between academic colleagues,  a significance (a new perspective, a solution 
to an old-problem, a more fruitful way of talking) may emerge that cannot be attributed to 
any sole contributing party (Di Paolo et al 2010, 72). In-between cases include orienting 
someone’s attention to something or a greeting. Particularly in the social domain, then, 
sense-making is enriched and constrained by a history of interactions (or coordinations) 
between individuals. A history may make individuals more or less likely to continue or 
maintain interacting in the future. As De Jaegher and Di Paolo describe it,  
 
…patterns of coordination can directly influence the continuing 
disposition of the individuals involved to sustain or modify their 
encounter. In this way, what arises in the process of coordination (e.g. 
gestures, utterances and changes in intonation that are sometimes labeled 
as back-channeling or turn-repair, etc.) can have the consequence of 
steering the encounter or facilitating (or not) its continuation. (2007, 492)  
 
Note here that linguistic elements of conversations can also be analyzed in terms of 
interaction, coordination, and sense-making. The highly promising idea of the enactive 
approach is that the entire, whole phenomenon of an encounter between two people can 
be studied with a view to meaning, yet this experience of meaning-making will be 
continuous with an understanding of a person as a living organism cognitively (actively 
and interpretively) existing in her world. The enactive ideas of participatory sense-
making and social interaction as coordination, while new and still under development, 
hold out an empirical strategy for synthesizing aspects of phenomenological and 
pragmatic approaches to linguistic behaviors, among other cognitive activities. 
  
 
3. Conclusion: Gestures as Enactments 
 
On the basis of this brief introduction to the paradigm of enactive cognitive 
science, an approach still under theoretical development (Di Paolo 2011), I suggest again 
that hand gestures enact their meaning. An instance of gesturing and speaking is an 
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instance of an organism enacting its world, or more accurately, of involved participants 
collaboratively enacting their world, where ‘world’ is understood to mean a particular 
(possibly passing) shared sphere of significance. Given the foregoing considerations I 
presented not only in describing enactive cognitive science, but in all previous chapters, I 
claim that the particular practices of hand gesturing that the present work examines are 
best thought of as practices of sense-making using hands in the context of using spoken 
language. This way of thinking about gesture meets the criteria of the formula for 
language stated at the start of the chapter: gesturing, like speaking, is an embodied, 
world-embedded, intersubjectively normative, dynamic, multi-modal enacting of 
appropriative disclosure. 
Furthermore, some co-speech gesture situations can be seen as instances of social 
interaction understood as a special kind of coordination. In the course of a conversation, a 
gesture can be a mutually regulated link that itself acquires a transient form of autonomy 
(see De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 2010). Indeed, “synchronization of speech and 
bodily movements during a conversation” is taken as “a typical example of coordination 
between two people” on this view (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 2010, 441). We 
have seen already (Chapter III) that gestures are mutually regulated via gaze, interaction 
with speech, and recipient-designed repair. Note that applying the method of studying the 
interaction process itself as an emergent autonomous coordination also offers an 
explanation of how gestures can have the qualities of spontaneity and ‘uncontrollability’ 
or naturalness without positing an interior representational model. Rather, gestures may 
be elements of engagement, “the qualitative aspect of a social interaction as it starts to 
‘take over’ and acquires a momentum of its own” (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 
2010, 441). Occurring in the tangible and visible space of an interaction, available for all 
participants (and observers), informing their experience and shaping the course of the 
continued interaction, speech-accompanying gestural movements effect the emerging 
significance of the interaction.  
Thus the description of coordination as autonomous that De Jaegher and others 
provide removes the necessity that every aspect of the interaction is planned or deduced 
by the parties involved. The practice of gesturing does not arise from a vacuum but 
comes into being as part of an interaction. Recall that a core requirement of a social 
229 
interaction on this view is that the participants actively regulate the interaction in a way 
that allows for the interaction to develop its own self-regulating properties. Body heat 
that emerges at a crowded bus stop is not a product or case of social interaction, but two 
people moving closer in order to have an intimate conversation is. A gesture may be born 
out of one participant’s sense-making in a social environment, but it is immediately up 
for grabs as a mechanism by which participants in the environment understand each other 
and themselves. Seeing individual and social processes as dynamically interwoven and 
reciprocally informing reduces the need to cross bridges of intersubjective understanding.  
At the same time, understanding gestural enactments as elements of 
coordination/social interaction does not rule out the possibility of their failing or 
contributing to a break-down, rather than a continuation, in interaction. Much to the 
contrary, precisely because gesturing is a sense-making practice – not yet a good-sense 
making practice nor a bad-sense making practice – the sense made will be evaluated in 
terms of the interaction and the participants’ autonomous drives for sustainability. Just as 
an organism in interaction with its environment always projects normativity and 
significance for itself in its perpetually valuing intentional movements, gesturing as a 
coordinating social practice casts a web of significance that speaks to and builds up a 
history, or as we have discussed it before (Chapter IV), engages the meanings in play or 
the situation, in a specific, selective, and potentially transformative way. 
 
Example of gestural sense-making 
Consider an example. Streeck analyzes an Ilokano conversation about a medical 
practice. For Streeck, this conversation includes gestures that demonstrate a recipient 
understanding a speaker’s gesture (2009, 106). Note below that he uses the language of 
‘enactment’ in describing the encounter. After presenting the example, I extend this 
reading in light of the discussion of social coordination.  
In this case, the speakers are talking about a practice of heating a child. The first 
speaker presents the practice in speech and gesture. The second two speakers are both 
unsure what to make of this practice; the third speaker ultimately clarifies her 
understanding by repeating a gesture used by the first. Speaker 1 performs a gesture as 
part of her description, holding both of her arms extended out at shoulder level into the 
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conversational space between the three female interlocutors, palms facing up and elbows 
slightly bent so that a kind of cradling or ‘holding over’ is shown. This gesture pairs with 
the speech ‘like that,’ as the speaker says,  
 
Speaker 1: “And when the salt is cracking like that, you’re heating the child, like that”137  
Speaker 2: “A living person?”  
Speaker 1: “hmm. But what -”  
Speaker 2: “Ah.”  
Speaker 3: “That is you’re ‘like-this-ing’ it (away from you).”  
 
While the third speaker says the underlined part of the phrase, she repeats the first 
speaker’s gesture. The repeated gesture is somewhat modified: the third speaker’s elbows 
are more bent, closer to her body, and she holds her palms out and upward at a level 
between elbow and shoulder height. Streeck explains, “The issue here is that both the 
child and its handler must be at the right distance from the flames in order not to get 
burned, and the child must be moved constantly. These details are more readily enacted 
than described,” and he notes that it is in such cases – “where a bodily enactment is more 
precise than spoken language might be” – that one typically finds gesture responses to 
gesture (Streeck 2009, 107).  
It would be plausible to suggest that the third speaker, who repeats the gesture, 
either is familiar with the practice and is offering her own careful enactment of how it is 
to be done, or that she comes to understand what the first speaker is suggesting and how 
this practice could indeed be beneficial (or at least not harmful, and possible) in 
performing the gestural enactment for herself. That the third speaker is making sense of 
the first speaker’s meaning by gesturing seems particularly likely, given that the verbal 
speech repeats the first speaker’s co-verbalization, ‘like this’. In fact, the third speaker 
makes this phrase a verb, even more closely aligning the gestural action with the 
demonstrative speech: ‘you’re like-this-ing it.’  
                                                          
137 Streeck 2009, 107; the conversation is translated from Ilokano by Streeck. 
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The gestures in this example are enactments – active and collaborative sense-
makings – that build an understanding of a practice under discussion. Through gesturing, 
not only this understanding, but along with it, a web of significance, a world, is enacted. 
Both women making the gesture in turn reach out into the space of interaction, over the 
same space, over the same imagined fire with salt cracking. They both hold an infant, 
carefully, in this way, so that it is warmed rather than burned. They establish a shared 
knowledge, a shared possibility, which did not exist for the three of them in the same way 
before that this is an acceptable and plausible practice. This enacted sense that the women 
have collectively made of this practice can now be integrated into other environment-
interactions following the conversation.  
This example can be fruitfully examined in light of aspects of De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo’s notion of coordination. If we see the women as involved in a social interaction in 
the enactive sense, then the interaction should demonstrate some autonomous influence 
on the participants, who in turn “sustain the encounter” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
492). This perspective enables the observer to see that the third speaker does not plan to 
repeat the gesture of her interlocutor. Nor is there any need to guess at whether or not the 
third speaker is propositionally calculating in an internal dialogue with herself the 
likelihood that the first speaker is serious and not ironic or joking in her communicative 
intention. If anything, the repeated gesture and the repeated words, the inhabiting of the 
first speaker’s sense-making, is the way that the third speaker negotiates this unexpected 
utterance. Thus this case exhibits social interaction: the women enter into, experience, 
and work out the meaning together in their gestures.      
As a caveat, we must keep in mind a recurring finding in the present work: 
gesturing is a collaborative and social practice of making sense in a particular context for 
particular interlocutors. This practice is broad and probably better seen as a set of related 
practices.  A satisfactory, philosophically-grounded treatment of co-speech hand 
gesturing must resist the temptation to see all gesturing and all gestures as the same. This 
temptation is strong: one’s own gesture taxonomy, implying that one recognizes a variety 
of gesture types, is not always enough to keep a gesture theorist from declaring that 
‘gestures reveal thought,’ or other general pronouncements. Rather, researchers should 
follow and further investigate the idea that a gesture may disclose in a particular way, or 
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may enact a certain degree of participatory sense-making. For example, pragmatic 
gestures, as identified by McNeill (1992), Streeck (2009), Müller (2004) and others may 
regulate coordination in a social interaction, while depictive gestures draw on shared 
experiences to enact select aspects of an object, action, or environment (Streeck 2009), 
while metaphoric gestures enact a conceptual mapping – making sense of something as 
something – at a particular level of salient awareness (Müller 2007). In each case, 
gestures are made and received in certain ways that are specific to the interaction at hand; 
they arise in interaction and cause the interaction to continue in one way or another. They 
are products of coordinated attention and at the same time are processes of mutual 
orientation and modes of significant engagement in the unfolding encounter.  
 The above paragraphs sketch some potential convergences between an enactive 
approach to social cognition as participatory sense-making on the one hand, and on the 
other, the more detailed descriptions of gestural practice that have been discussed 
throughout this work. I find these convergences promising, and, in keeping with the 
strategy of the present work, I suggest that these disciplines would benefit from a 
reciprocal encounter of their own. Even though inquiries in embodied cognitive science 
already overlap with and are informed by gesture studies, the novel idea of participatory 
sense-making has not yet been applied in a detailed examination of gestural practices as 
the primary aim of an inquiry. While promising, then, such potential interconnections are 
at this point only sketches to be worked out in further theoretical and empirical 
investigation and collaboration. Yet it is important to include them here, because they 
articulate an empirical hypothesis for the philosophical message of this work: Language 
is to be re-construed and re-approached in philosophy as a kind of enaction, and gesturing 
that accompanies speech is thus to be categorized as a linguistic practice. This claim is 
not only the conclusion of the present argument, then, but also a founding question for a 
new research program. 
  
Implications of the project for problems in philosophy 
 The previous section outlines a program of future work in an informed, 
interdisciplinary project of studying the ubiquitous human practice of gesturing with the 
hands while speaking. In this final section, I recall the road that I took to this future-
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looking vantage point. I revisit a few particular steps in order to point out the implications 
that understanding language as gesture-inclusive and cognition as embodied and enactive 
sense-making has for significant and open questions in philosophy of language and mind.  
 
What should count as a linguistic practice? 
  Against a well-entrenched preference found in various disciplines, I argue 
throughout this work that co-speech hand gestures are linguistic phenomena. In Chapter I, 
I laid out a historical narrative showing the contingent and arbitrary nature of the 
inherited divides that cut off visible and kinesic bodily activity from linguistic, 
communicative, or rational activity. In Chapter II, I reviewed a vast and growing mass of 
experimental and observational studies that demonstrate speech-accompanying hand 
gestures to be meaningful in a variety of respects and that open up questions about how 
this meaning is achieved. In Chapter III, I considered some traditional criteria for 
linguistic practices – normativity and rationality – and showed them both to be met in 
non-propositional and non-verbal practices of speech-accompanying gestures. 
(Furthermore, there are demonstrated cases of gesturing contributing to an utterance’s 
propositional meaning.) Chapter III achieved several important insights: that gesturing is 
a conventional practice (this is further taken up in Chapter IV in an extended reflection 
on the relationship between sedimented and spontaneous language use and the 
appropriative relation that binds them); that nonconventional performances are 
nonetheless sensible in virtue of higher-order normative constraints; and that the practice 
of rationality is precisely the practice of making sense of particular uses over and above 
what is conventional in those uses. In Chapters III, IV, and V, I showed this process of 
sense-making to be not necessarily propositional nor individually nor internally 
conducted, but rather intersubjectively enacted. Finally, gestures are linguistic 
phenomena because gesturing, like speaking, is a practice of cognitively enacting one’s 
world, and the products of gesturing, like speaking, effect the world in certain ways for 
one’s self and for others. The structure of the argument across chapters is to at once show 
how gestures meet various philosophical criteria for determining a practice or product as 
‘linguistic’ and at the same time to show that gestures challenge and transform those 
criteria, such that even verbal linguistic activity must be re-thought. 
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 Before turning to the implications of this conclusion, it is worth noting here three 
good arguments against my view. One can argue that it is more natural, intuitive, 
efficient, or perhaps accurate to see gestures as communicative, but not insist that they are 
linguistic. This critique has some purchase insofar as the linguistic phenomena that I take 
up in this work are, by and large, elements of conversational practices (as opposed to 
reading and writing, for example).  While I definitely agree that speech-accompanying 
gestures are communicative, I continue to hold that gesturing while speaking is a 
linguistic (as well as communicative) performance or enaction. Within the hierarchy of 
meaning-making practices and communicative acts that humans engage in, co-speech 
gestures occur with speech and achieve their meaning in close interaction with speech. I 
can communicate by throwing things, and this is probably not well-classified as a 
linguistic act. But surely pointing to a book is closer to verbally bringing someone’s 
attention to a book than it is to throwing the book at them. Particularly in the normative 
constraints that condition its meaningfulness and in its ability to enact abstract reasoning, 
hand gesturing is more like talking than book-throwing. 
 Another critique worth considering is that in calling gestures linguistic, I may 
obscure an important distinction between gestural activity and sign language. This is a 
tricky issue, as many linguists currently study the relationship between gesture and sign 
(e.g. Liddell 2003, Goldin-Meadow 2003, 2007; Wilcox 2004; Cardona 2008; Taub et al. 
2009). Both gesture and sign demonstrate iconic and metaphoric motivation in both 
morpho-phonemic structure and in usage. Some scholars claim that hand gestures take on 
increasingly systematic properties in the absence of speech (Goldin-Meadow 2003, 2007; 
Goldin-Meadow and McNeill 1999), and hence posit various continua relating gesture 
and sign. On the one hand, I can dodge this critique by pointing out that I am specifically 
making this claim about speech-accompanying gesture or co-verbal gesture (and put off 
the complex issue of sign-accompanying gesture). But at its heart, I take this critique to 
be a worry that the sense of system – structure, convention, and rules; syntax, phonology, 
and morphology – is lost by using ‘linguistic’ to describe something other than the 
structure of a known language. To this I have two responses. First, co-speech hand 
gestures have structure and convention, and they can be coded in terms of morpho-
phonemic parameters similar to what is used in sign language analysis. Put more bluntly: 
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linguists, psycholinguists, and cognitive linguists are leaders in the field of gesture 
studies. Gestures are then at the very least linguistically relevant phenomena. Secondly, 
this is not the sense of ‘linguistic’ that I am most concerned with, as demonstrated in the 
formula posted earlier in the chapter. My proposed notion of language is intentionally 
destabilizing; it calls into question the distinction between the described system of 
studied languages on the one hand and the normative, appropriative, disclosive, 
collaborative practices of meaning-making that co-occur with speaking on the other. 
 Lastly, one might argue that ‘embodied practices of meaning-making’ are more to 
the point that ‘linguistic’ versus ‘non-linguistic practices’. This is similar to the first 
argument, but more pointedly asks, ‘Why care about whether gestures are linguistic or 
not? Let’s just study embodied meaning-making in all its multi-modal glory and see what 
we get.’ (This can be expected perhaps as the argument from anthropology or cognitive 
science.) Here I have only a tactical motivation for holding my position. My goal is for 
philosophers of language and meaning to spend time wrestling with the ubiquitous reality 
of co-speech gesture. As I demonstrate in critical engagements between philosophy and 
gesture studies, there are many open questions, emerging paradigms, and new problems 
to be looked at. Philosophy can play an important role here, but only if it overcomes 
dichotomies between mind and body, individual and society, verbal and non-verbal. I do 
not think it can or will play this role as long as it continues to uncritically accept a 
received premise that hand gestures are fundamentally ‘other’ to language.      
 Bearing these counterarguments in mind, I hold my argument that gestures are 
linguistic phenomena, and that gesturing is a linguistic practice. The support for this, 
particularly in the demonstrations of normativity, convention, and intentionality in 
gestural practices and in the re-casting of cognitive activity as sense-making, have far-
reaching implications for current debates in philosophy of language and philosophy more 
broadly. Below I touch on a few of these implications. 
 
Semantics versus pragmatics 
As introduced in Chapter I, a robust philosophical industry involves deciding how 
much ‘context’ to allow in formal semantic analysis. The present work shows that the 
meaning of an utterance is underdetermined by its verbal elements, and its gestural 
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elements involve rich knowledge – haptic, embodied knowledge as well as the more 
abstract ‘contextual’ or ‘encyclopedic’ kind. Semantics must involve pragmatics and 
must involve context. ‘Insensitive’ semantics is a plausible pursuit only if it takes itself to 
be analyzing unreal constructions of its own device; it deals only in abstractions.  
It may be more important to consider new endeavors in empirical or ‘cognitive’ 
pragmatics, because these are closer to my view and likely more plausible to an 
interdisciplinary audience. A leading question for this field is how communicative 
intentions are understood and navigated by conversation participants. Recent treatments 
of this issue frequently include gestural phenomena in some way (e.g. Wharton 2009; 
Bara 2010; Enrici et al. 2011). As has been my refrain in Chapters III-V, conversational 
participants do not necessarily make sense of each other’s linguistic behavior via internal 
processing of propositions. I allow that they may, but this is a speculative position that 
tends to entail clunky mentalist commitments and an outdated metaphysics and 
epistemology of representation. Rather, interlocutors enact meaning together. Language 
use is a fundamentally social, embodied, and embedded endeavor. It is not clear that 
people encounter each other’s being, presence, or activity as a problem at all. 
Communicative misfires can be seen as productive turns taken in coordinated interaction 
(Stewart 2010, 15).138 Empirical or ‘cognitive’ pragmatics ought not only to embrace 
multi-modality enthusiastically, but also embrace empirically responsible accounts of 
cognition. 
 
Communicative intention is not mental 
  As I suggest above, communicative intention does not have to be investigated as a 
private mental entity. This chapter’s lengthy engagement with recent work in the enactive 
paradigm of cognitive science, particularly the notion of participatory sense-making, 
seeks to undermine the tendency to see communicative intention as a mental problem to 
be solved. This does not mean that communicative intention is not a significant and 
                                                          
138 Stewart points out that people converse with each other largely on the basis of the social norm of 
assuming that we understand each other, or will figure out what is being said as we go along. He goes on: 
“Arguably, some of the most significant moments of communication occur when speakers identify a 
misunderstanding; paradoxical thought it may seem, what happens is that then they realize that up until that 
point, they had been misinterpreting each other” (Stewart 2010, 15). 
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constituent aspect of linguistic activity. Participatory sense-making suggests that 
communicative intentions are not the whole story in meaning-making, since interactions 
can (and should) be studied as phenomena in their own right. Yet to the extent that it is 
part of the story, communicative intention should be understood as a special case of 
intentionality as Merleau-Ponty describes it, as the way that living beings non-neutrally 
comport themselves in and towards their world and non-neutrally receive and are 
constrained by their world. Value begins here, and there could be no higher-order 
meaning in the absence of this world-interactive significance. How the communicative 
intention that conditions linguistic acts as such is connected to this level of intentionality 
is a compelling question for future research. In Chapter IV, following Streeck, I suggest 
that the always-intelligent (or in enactive parlance, always cognitive), always-valuing 
manner that humans engage the world with their hands is transformed into a second-order 
communicative intentionality through the phenomenon of showing. This suggestion can 
be extended in both theoretical and empirical ways.139 For now, it is a telling alternative 
to seeing communicative intention as an intracranial secret.   
 
Sense-making after the linguistic turn 
 Explicit in Chapter III (and implicit in some discussions in Chapter IV) is the 
question of how philosophers are to understand or even say anything about language in 
the wake of the linguistic turn. While the linguistic turn was itself initially 
foundationalist, seeking to understand thought and reality through analysis of language 
(Rorty et al 1967), the twentieth century witnessed in various traditions an increasingly 
self-conscious avoidance of foundationalist narratives. In regards to linguistic meaning, a 
frequent consequence of this turn is to reject explanations in which words refer to objects 
                                                          
139 Much more can and should be worked out regarding this notion of ‘showing’. Grice requires a linguistic 
code for non-natural meaning, and so argues that one can show something to another without (in a technical 
sense) meaning anything by it. Contemporary empirical neo-Griceans taking various stances on the 
pragmatics of ‘non-verbal’ behavior have deconstructed this distinction to locate communicative 
intentionality in showing (see Wharton 2009 and Tomasello 2008). Meanwhile, for Heidegger showing is 
the essence of language (as discussed in Chapter IV). Heidegger links the human hand to thought and 
language and says that apes “have organs that can grasp but have no hand” (Heidegger 1968, 16). I am 
tempted to problematize this claim by referring to Tomasello’s important work on ape gesture and 
intentionality. Most likely such a response is too flatly empirical, though Derrida himself berates Heidegger 
for failing to take account of discourses in zoological knowledge (Derrida 1987, 173). 
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in the (‘real’) world, or represent aspects of reality to us such that we can communicate 
truths of the world to each other.  
This non-foundationalism is a valuable insight, one that disciplines outside of 
philosophy are also called to follow. Yet when it comes to philosophy after the linguistic 
turn, rather than replacing the rejected account with something intuitively plausible and 
useful, certain thinkers have taken perplexing stances. Rorty (1989) deflates linguistic 
meaning to causal consequences in behavior and will have no more said about it; 
Brandom (1999) maintains that we can ground linguistic meaning in justificatory 
practices of argument; both reject experience as something with which to be concerned. 
In his efforts to overcome reference and representation as the dominant philosophical 
modes of understanding language, Heidegger is accused of reifying language as an 
inflexible onto-theological entity, that is, human destiny (see Lafont 2000). Habermas 
(1981) relocates the ground for successful communicative action in defeasible 
community-regulated discursive norms, but insists that intersubjectivity cannot exist 
except in linguistic practice, which for him is disembodied (see Zahavi 2001a for 
critique). 
 The proper response is not that linguistic meaning is without any foundation, but 
that it is without absolute and objective foundation. Excesses on both sides of the debate 
– experientialist or lingualist – can be avoided by using each position to supplement the 
other. Furthermore, there is no reason to eschew experience or embodiment so long as 
these are properly understood as contingent, mutable, and socially and culturally 
constituted features of human life. The turn to embodied practices of meaning-making 
necessitates neither a turn to relativism nor to a reductive naturalism, as studies of 
gestural practice demonstrate.  
Note that we can talk about gestures representing something when we analyze 
gestural depiction (Streeck 2009): one’s fingers tracing lines on one’s body can represent 
something about an article of clothing. The gesture cannot enact that particular 
representation in all times and places, but it can speak out of and to a certain shared and 
sedimented culture of clothing. Employees in a mechanics shop might refer to a source 
for a needed part by pointing in the direction of a junkyard across the street; the meaning 
of this gesture is ‘grounded’ in knowledge common to those employees and called forth 
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in a situation that restricts and specifies its scope. Jon Stewart uses a metaphoric gesture 
to enact for Rachel Maddow a world in which trends in television cable news reporting 
overtake political discourse like a climate system, brooking no reflection and no refusal. 
If Maddow cannot see that media analysis shares a structural similarity with the study of 
weather patterns, this enactment will fail; if she disagrees with Stewart’s interpretation 
she can wave it away with her hands and shape something else in its place, or modify the 
offered enactment.  
It is right to see that linguistic meaning enables a way of being in the world, but 
wrong to see these meanings either as direct perceptions through a window or as 
collective delusions. In other words, the relation between language and world should be 
rethought, not dismissed. Language enacts not only world relations but multiple worlds, 
or spheres of significance, to inhabit. These relations are enacted not only in macro-level 
phenomena like Rorty’s vocabularies or Wittgenstein’s language games, but also in 
micro-level interactions in which the relations are established and re-established through 
a transformative and appropriative dialectic of sedimentation and spontaneity. Being 
alive – being embodied and embedded – is not a neutral experience, and it is a mutable 
experience. Seeing these as conditions as well as constraints for linguistic meaning offers 
a way out of the false dichotomy between foundationalism and relativism, and opens up 
the way for new philosophical and interdisciplinary work.  
 
These brief comments on reference, representation, communicative intention, and 
non-foundationalism in linguistic meaning sketch only a few specific instances of 
philosophical issues that require rethinking in the light of the reality that co-speech hand 
gestures form a part of our linguistic behavior. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue in 
great detail at the close of their tome Philosophy in the Flesh, the implications of 
embodied cognitive science and embodied explanations of linguistic behavior constitute a 
sea change in analytic philosophy’s most basic and core tenets and disrupt the central 
dichotomies of Enlightenment thinking. The present study of co-speech gesturing is 
intended as a further step in that on-going journey of transformation. Additionally, I have 
shown here that other traditions and other disciplines, despite their noble efforts to the 
contrary, still struggle under their inheritance of these tenets, most prevalently the idea 
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that linguistic activity is essentially the use of propositions to send out into the world 
meanings that are experienced first ‘in the head’. Gesture researchers too should be wary 
of the conduit and container metaphors of language use. While existential 
phenomenologists and linguistic neo-pragmatists offer accounts of language that largely 
overcome this representationalist bias, and are thus good interlocutors in conversations 
about embodied meaning-making, in so doing there can be a tendency to restrict the 
function of language either to pursuit of authenticity or pursuit of justification. Studying 
the diverse functions of co-speech gestures as linguistic enactments opens up these 
restrictions and makes way for an increasingly nuanced and sophisticated analysis of how 
we collaboratively enact our worlds, in part through multi-modal language use.         
The evidence I have presented in this dissertation is meant to show the centrality 
of gesture in human linguistic meaning-making. The historical reality is that philosophy 
of language in the twentieth century dismissed gestural phenomena as superfluous, 
‘extra-linguistic’ at best, and instead charted a course that ignored embodiment and the 
richness of human meaning-making. The chosen course entailed a blinding preoccupation 
with epistemic justification and propositional and conceptual structure. For philosophy of 
language to serve a philosophical purpose, such as working toward a better understanding 
of human life by clarifying the ways in which we achieve a certain kind of meaning 
together, it will have to rethink itself in orientation, scope, and relation to other 
disciplines. To bring gesture into the central place it deserves in philosophical inquires of 
linguistic practices is not to engage in a minor fix-up. As this chapter has argued, in order 
to properly understand gestural sense-making, we need an enactive approach to cognition 
and close attention paid to the fundamental and primary role of communication and 
interpersonal interaction. Taking what gesture shows seriously thus opens up exciting 
interdisciplinary possibilities, while at the same time breathing some much needed fresh 
air into problems that have become stale. As I hope to have demonstrated thoroughly, 
there is no shortage of work that can be done for those interested in learning more about 
human linguistic practice. 
In terms of conclusion, then, this work offers a new formula for approaching 
language, the claim that co-speech hand gestures are linguistic, and a possible research 
program investigating these hand gestures as emergent and reflexive elements of 
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participatory sense-making. Taking these claims seriously demands a methodology of 
studying co-speech gestures in everyday interactions and viewing them as enactments, 
not unregulated or a posteriori expressions. Another important claim emerges in the 
performance of the project: investigations in gesture studies can be put in fruitful and 
mutually critical (hence mutually beneficial) dialogue with a variety of topics and 
inquiries in philosophy.  It is more crucial at this point to insist that this work continue 
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